What Should the Army's Role, Capabilities & Structure Be?

[pbi]

Ok, I'm with you, except for:

As well, I think the current policy of seeing the Reserves as a "farm team" is like sitting adrift with no sail, give the Reservists a mission

The Reserve has three very important roles now: Augment the Regular Force, Provide a Base for Mobilization and Connect with Canadians.Under the first two fall deployment on Intl Ops, training for combat, and being ready to take on Home Defence or other domestic ops.

Now, those aren't nice tight little mission packages with grid references and timings, but to what extent is that really practical, or even desireable? How do you give a fixed "mission", when the nature of a Reserve is to deal with the unexpected that the standing force is unable to? What degree of specificity are you looking for?

Hey....wait a minute.......I think we've debated this somewhere else already.....?

Cheers.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

The Navy configured with the core capability of transporting a brigade battle group and all its equipment as a package from either coast to the AOR, defending the package in transit and supporting the package ashore with AAD, NGS and command and control until they are firmly established. These defense and support capabilities are transferable to Naval operations when the Expeditionary force is not being assembled and sent out, joining other specialist capabilities and ships which are required for Naval operations.

*Sigh*  : still being looked upon as a glorified taxi service I see.

 

[NavyGrunt]

*Sigh*   : still being looked upon as a glorified taxi service I see.

Yup thats our only use EX. Delivery........say do you Army blokes need extra cheese?

 

[Infanteer]

Reading Clay Blair's definitive history on the U-Boat campaign, I was interested in reading how the Royal Navy had become intoxicated with Mahan's notion of the Decisive Battle at Sea, essentially Clausewitz on the water.  This infatuation, Blair ably argues, was one of the reason the Brits had a tough time in dealing with the U-Boat threat in both Wars; they forgot that their prime mission was to protect British trade.  Blair writes:

"[they] postulated that control of the seas could most effectively be insured by husbanding naval assets for a single, decisive, offensive naval battle with the enemy; they opposed the diversion of naval resources to convoying, which they viewed as mundane and defensive and which, if adopted, would be an admission that Britain had, in effect, lost control of the seas to an inferior naval power."

Now, this is an honest question to you guys in the ships.  What do you feel that the prime role of Navy should be?  How can it best contribute to furthering National Interests?  Granted there are some independent operations that would fall on to the Navy (fighting pirates or smugglers), but in thinking "joint operations", how can the Navy best contribute.

In our uniquely Canadian situation, does having a Grand Fleet of cruisers and aircraft carriers looking for Gotterdammerung on the high seas in order to command the oceans seem like the ideal goal?  Or does having a fleet that is able to adequately protect itself from subsurface, surface, and air threats while independently projecting Canadian ground and air power into the places they need to be sound better.  Obviously, when the role of transport/sustainment/support of an expeditionary force is proposed, it doesn't mean floating yellow taxis.  Naturally, there is a certain level of proficiency and capability required to move this kind of hardware - just look at the Marine Task Groups.

Honestly though, I'm interested to hear about what you guys think about the future roles of the Navy and how it should fit into a joint context to execute defence policy.  You are the guys that work on the things day-in and day-out, so maybe your experiences will point out some important details I may have missed.

Cheers,
Infanteer

 

[Infanteer]

Hey....wait a minute.......I think we've debated this somewhere else already.....?

Maybe I missed that one.

Anyways, when I say farm team I mean "We need X guys for 3 Platoon..."

I am a firm believer in deploying formed reserve platoons and companies on operations on a volunteer basis if the situation demands; I was part of the militia experience in ROTO 11 and I thought it worked well.  It is a great way to get more experience to the reserve units.

When I say mission, I mean for the Reserves as a whole.  Is the Reserves really optimized with company-sized regiments in paper Brigades waiting to be called to arms and farming out its services in the meantime?  Is their an alternative structure and approach to mission that would better serve both Reservists and their communities?  Right now, I'm kinda prone to some stuff Kirkhill had been throwing around regarding a local all-arms military presence.  Something like the Canadian Rangers or the Aussie Pilbara guys, only for our provinces - the RAF was a neat model.  Anyways, I'm just throwing ideas into the sky.  If you can link me to the discussion I missed, I can join in.

Cheers,
Infanteer

 

[pbi]

Sigh*   still being looked upon as a glorified taxi service I see.

If that is an accurate representation of the Navy attitude towards becoming part of a joint force instead of refighting the Battle of the Atlantic all over again, I am afraid we are not going to make much progress amongst the three services. Being an effective part of a joint CEF does not mean being "a glorified taxi service", as I think we have already pointed out in a few posts. Modern surface and subsurface combatants, an air defense capability and capable naval aviation are all a part of that package, as far as I can see. Cheers.

 

[pbi]

Anyways, when I say farm team I mean "We need X guys for 3 Platoon..."

I am a firm believer in deploying formed reserve platoons and companies on operations on a volunteer basis if the situation demands; I was part of the militia experience in ROTO 11 and I thought it worked well.   It is a great way to get more experience to the reserve units

It is a bit difficult to progress beyond this level of things when, short of an Order in Council, we have no effective means of mobilizing Reserve units for deployed operations. As long as our Res remains a wholly volunteer thing, we are IMHO going to struggle with "who gets off the bus". However, to be fair to the Res, they have stepped up admirably and in a manner that few expected. Kudos to them.

When I say mission, I mean for the Reserves as a whole.   Is the Reserves really optimized with company-sized regiments in paper Brigades waiting to be called to arms and farming out its services in the meantime?  

OK-now----are you talking about their mission, or the way they are organized? If it's mission, I've already stated my case. If it's organization, then I do believe some changes can be made. As a example (Oh..here he goes with his stupid Bde again.......) we have put forward two proposals under LFRR to achieve "tactical grouping with a view to amalgamation" amongst our three Arty units and our three Service Battalions, so that instead of an unsustainable command structure, we have a single unit HQ in one location, and sub-units (or sub-sub-units) in all of the current locations(End state one Svc Bn, one Arty unit). No fewer soldiers, no less equipment, no less capability, no closed locations: just less command overhead which we very clearly cannot sustain.

Surprisingly,we built a strong consensus of support within our Bde on both these proposals, including amongst our Hons. The enemy was an external one: Reserve 2000 immediately attacked us (in an extremely ill-informed and unprofessional manner that showed what their true relevance is....) and threatened us with all manner of   damnation and destruction.

The funny thing is that both these proposals were about seven or eight years old in our Bde. as an aside, I can recall, as a Sgt in RRegtC in the late 1970's agreeing heatedly in the Mess with all my Sgt buddies that we needed a single strong Inf battalion in Toronto Militia District, not five weak ones. As we know, nothing came of it. IMHO this is because organizations such as R2000 (despite the good they have undoubtedly achieved) have waged such a fear/smear campaign that for years they effectvely paralyzed the ability to think rationally about the structure of our Army Reserve. Why is amalgamation such a nasty word? After all, many of the Res units that exist today are themselves products of amalgamation. The UK TA seems to survive almost endless amalgamations. Is it because of a general mistrust of any change at all? (Perhaps not without historical justification....) Or is it actually just parochialism?

In any case, I think that many serving Res soldiers today would buy into an intelligent, respectful process of amalgamation provided that it clearly led to greater Res capability, not to less. I am quite sure we can achieve this goal. Cheers.

 

[Infanteer]

No fewer soldiers, no less equipment, no closed locations: just less command overhead which we very clearly cannot sustain.

I think I proposed something very similar to that months ago on a thread; I'll see if I can find it.   Needless to say, I agree with that proposal.

 

[pbi]

I think I proposed something very similar to that months ago on a thread; I'll see if I can find it.  Needless to say, I agree with that proposal.

Excellent. Now-what do the rest of the folks out there think? Cheers.

 

[Infanteer]

Found it (Looking at it, I seem to be contradicting some of the things I've proposed, I'll have to go through all my ideas again and redefine my thought process  8)):

http://army.ca/forums/threads/16950.30.html


Anyways, what are we all going to yak about...boats or reservists?    

 

[Edward Campbell]

Well, OK, in the ADM Policy for a day mode (force structure is not the CDS' job: how much? how many? what kit? configured how? are questions which, in our system of government, are asked and answered by civilians: asked by politicians and answered by mandarins - some from the defence department, others (the really important ones) from treasury/finance and the Privy Council Office. They seek some (not too much) advice from the CDS and his colleagues but more from retired officers/professors and analysts in think tanks.   It is the same in Australia, Belgium, Chile, Denmark and in the UK and the USA, too.

As DND's ADM Policy I tell the Clerk of the Privy Council and the DM of Finance that I want:

"¢ A strategic intelligence gathering service - based, as now, on CSE - which shares intelligence with key allies: Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom, United States and cooperates, to a lesser degree with lesser allies: NATO, etc;

"¢ In cooperation with the United States: a continental surveillance, target acquisition, identification, interception and combat force which can detect, identify and deal with intruders - space based, airborne and seaborne which enter the approaches to the continent we share;

"¢ Two 'blue water' joint task forces which can project Canadian power anywhere in the world, on fairly short notice and for protracted periods - several destroyers/frigates/oilers and long range patrol aircraft and, whenever possible, land based combat aircraft ;

"¢ Two 'blue water' joint task forces which can project Canadian power ashore - essentially combat ships, big (35,000+/- ton) landing ships, amphibious battle groups (maybe 1,000-1,500 soldiers each) and VSTOL fighter/bombers.   These two forces must be able to conduct low intensity operations for protracted periods on a unilateral basis - no US support - and they must be able to join allies in mid (and after preparation) high intensity operations;

"¢ A quick reaction - air mobile/airborne - formation with supporting transport aircraft (including dedicated heavy lift helicopters) and VSTOL fighter bombers, which can deploy on unilateral low intensity missions and mid (even high, after preparation) intensity operations, like the amphibious forces;

"¢ An expeditionary brigade - motorized/mechanized - the leading elements of which can be deployed within a very, very few weeks to relieve/reinforce either the amphibious or air assault joint forces.   This formation would train to fight as a formation within a larger allied force;

"¢ Home defence and reserve forces - full time and part time - for, especially, search and rescue, internal security/Aid of (to) the Civil Power, civil assistance and disaster relief, vital point security, coastal/fisheries patrol, Arctic patrol, individual augmentation, and, and, and ... nearly ad infinitum, as is always the case for 'reserves;' and

"¢ A defence base consisting of 3rd line logistical resources, bases, dockyardss, schools, etc.

I think we need 60,000+/- people in permanent force (full time) operational units: ships, regiments and battalions, flying squadrons (including full time 'reserve' ships and units), dockyards, flying bases, joint HQs, etc.   I suspect we need another 30,000+/- in a variety of logistics, support and command and control elements and 40,000+/- civil servants supporting the 90,000+/- permanent force and, maybe, 30,000 part time people. I think it can all be had for about 2% of our $1 Trillion GDP: about $20+ Billion per year, plus real defence industry inflation plus a bit of real growth, year after year and decade after decade ...

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

The navy has no problem with joint ops its when other branches feel we should concentrate on providing lift at the expense of combat ability is when we get annoyed. Nobody in the navy has ever felt we need to remove air force or army equipment if anything we get annoyed when the goverment does so. However that same view is not shared by the army when it comes to the navy's capabilities. From what I have seen on this board a good percentage still believe no matter how often its been pointed out to them that our first priority should be expeditionary, not combat.

 

[Kirkhill]

Ex-Dragoon

I think some of the miscommunications comes from both sides defending their own end too fiercely.  Understandable when the budget is short but ultimately unhelpful.

While I have come around to understand your position on multi-use platforms and the need for Area Air Defense, I still get the feeling that some 'blue suiters" have a gut level problem with supplying taxis and taxi drivers.

The unfortunate thing is that we need taxis and their drivers and those jobs probably won't be as good a path to promotion as perhaps subs and frigates are.

I am drawn to this conclusion by the fact that as DJL said in the AAD thread "steel is cheap and air is free", and on the pricing of "transport ships" from the US, Australia, Britain, Spain, France that we could easily get what we need,  unarmed motor barges essentially, at a cost of 100,000,000 to 200,000,000 Dollars apiece.  The Brit/Dutch/Spanish vessels are about 160,000,000 each and a USNS Bob Hope vessel is 250,000,000 USD according to McGregor in Transformation Under Fire.  3 or 4 vessels of that type, manned by a couple of full time crews of 50-60, 3 or 4 reserve crews and some top up reservists specializing in bolt on point defence systems, would not take an incredibly large chunk out of the Navy's budget.  Especially if you consider a vessel life in excess of 40 years.  (Fearless and Intrepid were commissioned in the 60's and are just now being decommissioned by the RN).

One of the vessels could be permanently manned for humanitarian assistance and to possibly acting as a floating command post (bolt on CP) for units ashore.  The other units would be manned by reservists for the duration of a crisis and wouldn't hang around in a war zone.  Get in, get out, come home, reload if required.

If you got your bluewater task force, which I agree is needed, then that taskforce could supply in-transit defence to the "motor barges".

Cheers,

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Now, this is an honest question to you guys in the ships.   What do you feel that the prime role of Navy should be?   How can it best contribute to furthering National Interests?   Granted there are some independent operations that would fall on to the Navy (fighting pirates or smugglers), but in thinking "joint operations", how can the Navy best contribute.

Sorry Infanteer missed this one. Any element should maximize their combat potential first and foremost. That is what we train to do, we are no different then the infanteer who goes over section battle drills or the fighter pilot who learns to dogfight. Sailors are trained to fight their ship. As a navy, the JSS is the right way to go because it combines replenishment at sea and sealift in 3 hulls. It does not solve the problem of carrying vast quantities of troops and vehicles but its the step in the right direction. Let us get proficent at that first before looking at LPDs, LHDs etc. We have several aspects of naval warfare we need to get good at again before we even move into a new one carrying troops. Getting the subs back up and running for one another is getting enough payloads for the MCDVs. We desperately need the 280s replaced and its capbilities retained.

In our uniquely Canadian situation, does having a Grand Fleet of cruisers and aircraft carriers looking for Gotterdammerung on the high seas in order to command the oceans seem like the ideal goal?   Or does having a fleet that is able to adequately protect itself from subsurface, surface, and air threats while independently projecting Canadian ground and air power into the places they need to be sound better.  

Your second option is what the navy is striving for.

Obviously, when the role of transport/sustainment/support of an expeditionary force is proposed, it doesn't mean floating yellow taxis.   Naturally, there is a certain level of proficiency and capability required to move this kind of hardware - just look at the Marine Task Groups.

I don't have a problem with the expeditionary role. What I do have a problem with is when people decide we don't need this and that so we can be focus more on being a transport force vice combat force. Look at all the posts here from members that feel we do not need subs or the 280s. While an important mission, what would it do to morale if we went to an all transport force for the navy. No army type seems to care about what sailors think, they just care on whether or not we can get them from Point A to Point B.

The navy is a firm believer in joint ops, we do it all the time with the air force. We have built up a lot of respect in MIO, Boarding Ops, Escorting USN ARGs and CVBGs. Do you really want us to lose that?

 

[pbi]

The navy has no problem with joint ops its when other branches feel we should concentrate on providing lift at the expense of combat ability is when we get annoyed. Nobody in the navy has ever felt we need to remove air force or army equipment if anything we get annoyed when the goverment does so. However that same view is not shared by the army when it comes to the navy's capabilities. From what I have seen on this board a good percentage still believe no matter how often its been pointed out to them that our first priority should be expeditionary, not combat.

Nobody in the navy has ever felt we need to remove air force or army equipment if anything we get annoyed when the goverment does so.

The fact is that given our likely resource limitations, all services may have to give up some favourite gear or mission in order to achieve transformation. Tanks and SP arty come to mind in the Army.

However that same view is not shared by the army when it comes to the navy's capabilities

But what are you basing that statement on? Who is "the Army" in this case?

From what I have seen on this board a good percentage still believe no matter how often its been pointed out to them that our first priority should be expeditionary, not combat.

I'm not sure what the difference is. I cannot imagine a truly useful CJEF that lacked a naval combat capability, as  I mentioned above. How are you distinguishing between "combat" and "expeditionary"? "Combat" to achieve what objective, as opposed to the projection of power (however modest that may be) in the service of a particular national aim, that is represented by a CJEF?

Maybe parochialism isn't just a "brown" problem. Cheers.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

The fact is that given our likely resource limitations, all services may have to give up some favourite gear or mission in order to achieve transformation. Tanks and SP arty come to mind in the Army.

So because you lost something (which most naval personnel would agree was a stupid decsion) that the navy/airforce might? What if the goverment decided the army should be an all infantry force and the air force should scrap all of its CF18s?

But what are you basing that statement on? Who is "the Army" in this case?

Look at the some of the posts here. People that while well meaning feel we should get out of the sub business all together without having a clue about naval warfare. I have yet to see any sailor advocate the army or air force get rid of a piece like the army has for the navy.

By expeditionary I mean vessels constructed for transport and support of ground troops

As for inferring I have a narrow minded view there is no need to be insulting. I have never advocated nor supported cutting capabilities (in any element) whereas you see no problem with it.

 

[McG]

By expeditionary I mean vessels constructed for transport and support of ground troops

Would this include fire support to ground forces and theater air defence?

I have never advocated nor supported cutting capabilities (in any element) whereas you see no problem with it.

Is it simply a matter of cutting one elements capabilities over another's?  . . . or, is it about trading one set of capabilities for a set of new capabilities?

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

No because I am looking at the USMC model and that is provided by the USN cruisers and destroyers that get assigned to an ARG, it is not integral. USN also man the LHDs, LPDs and the myriad of other amphibs.

 

[McG]

In that case, I would agree that looking at the Navy only as a means of transport is close minded.  However, I do think there is room to expand the Cbt Sp capabilities of our Navy (and possibly its strategic striking capabilities).  I think this would be a natural preference for someone in the Army.  However, as the token naval dude, would you rather retain subs or increase your inland reach?

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Without question retain a submarine capability.