What Should the Army's Role, Capabilities & Structure Be?

[a_majoor]

I am sorry if my post implied the Navy is the Taxi service for the Joint Expeditionary Force. Perhaps a better way to look at is is the Navy requires sufficient combat capability to perform power projection missions across the ocean, while also supporting the "U-Haul" function of transporting the battlegroup and supporting them ashore. That will define the size of the fleet (more platforms for Mine counter measures, AAD, NGS, surveillance and so on).

I notice the Air Force hasn't come aboard this discussion yet. What do we need in the Air Expeditionary Wing?

Pbi's other point about stripping away excessive overhead is well taken. When reading the LFRR Phase 2 briefing packages, the implications were pretty clear to me. In my brigade, we would go from having six company+ sized Infantry "Regiments" to six companies within a notional "31 Infantry Brigade". Collapsing all the various units into sub-units of a larger organization (31 Infantry Bn, 31 Armoured Regt, 31 Artillery Regt, 31 SVC BN and 31 CER) results in reducing LCol's, RSM's and Staffs from the current 15 to five. For esprit de corps reasons, the companies/squadrons/batteries might retain the historical titles in their unit designations (A/31 "Essex and Kent Company").

On a larger scale, the Brigade headquarters and Joint Expeditionary Force HQs will also need reforming, using modern communications and "reach back" capabilities to tie into national level assets when needed, rather than carry a lot of staff and equipment around. Database development and "distributed programming" (think of a military Kazzaa or Napster for finding information on the DWAN) will help reduce the possibility of "decapitation" by an enemy armed with WMD.  Other organizational changes to reduce "overhead" are also urgently needed to speed up the pace of information flow, and free up funds for the "sharp end".

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

Agreed a majoor. That would work for us.

 

[McG]

I once read an observation that unification resulted in administrative unification only and that it failed in its intent to produce what we now know as "jointness."   But at the same time, some of unification's successes have been undone.   I believe that the helicopters should be placed back under the command of the forces that employ them (the pilot would remain an Air MOC, but the airframes and crews should be commanded by the guys that employ them).

This would see Tac Hel under Land Forces Comd and Maritime Helos under Maritime Comd.

 

[pbi]

So because you lost something (which most naval personnel would agree was a stupid decsion) that the navy/airforce might? What if the goverment decided the army should be an all infantry force and the air force should scrap all of its CF18s?

I am not doing a very good job of expressing myself. However,I think you may be putting the wrong spin on it: you are depicting suggestions (that I haven't actually made, BTW...) that the Navy consider any loss of a particular capability as being motivated by narrow-minded pouting vengeance on the part of the Army, because "the government" took the Army's toys away. The force structure and equipment changes in the Army are almost all internal decisions, mostly driven by the last CLS. "The government" has contributed little of any substance to the Army Transformation program, except to choke the Army for funding (much as it has all the Services) and to studiously avoid any national strategic guidance that might help with Army. That is one of the reasons that we are looking forward to a proper  Foreign Policy/Defense Review, although in the Army's case the Transformation train is already leaving the station.

Look at the some of the posts here. People that while well meaning feel we should get out of the sub business all together without having a clue about naval warfare. I have yet to see any sailor advocate the army or air force get rid of a piece like the army has for the navy.

I agree with you-they may be ill informed. But they really aren't "the Army"-they are some Army people who think that way. On your second point, I could challenge you by asking you to what extent the Navy(in general) even thinks about the Army (in general)? Maybe the reason "The Navy" has not proposed  changes to the Army (in a joint force package) is not because the Navy has any particular regard for the Army, but because it simply does not care. Maybe it has focused on ASW to the exclusion of anything else, as a default occupation, because it no longer has any other significant capability? Much as some people in the Army would have us focus on "peacekeeping" to the exclusion of preparation for war: equally a "default" occupation.

Do you support developing a CJEF, if it means de-emphasis on "classic" naval actions(ie: independent formations of surface and subsurface combatants manoeuvring and engaging independently in order to achieve a naval decision?) As a soldier I support developing a CJEF, even if it means a de-emphasis on heavy forces for the Army (almost a throwaway, because we are on our way there now...).

 

[DJL]

I am drawn to this conclusion by the fact that as DJL said in the AAD thread "steel is cheap and air is free", and on the pricing of "transport ships" from the US, Australia, Britain, Spain, France that we could easily get what we need,  unarmed motor barges essentially, at a cost of 100,000,000 to 200,000,000 Dollars apiece.  The Brit/Dutch/Spanish vessels are about 160,000,000 each and a USNS Bob Hope vessel is 250,000,000 USD according to McGregor in Transformation Under Fire.  3 or 4 vessels of that type, manned by a couple of full time crews of 50-60, 3 or 4 reserve crews and some top up reservists specializing in bolt on point defence systems, would not take an incredibly large chunk out of the Navy's budget.  Especially if you consider a vessel life in excess of 40 years.  (Fearless and Intrepid were commissioned in the 60's and are just now being decommissioned by the RN).

Kirkhill, here's an option that might intrest you (intrested me):

http://peos.crane.navy.mil/futureships/MPF(F)/MPF.htm

IMHO, a hybrid RO/RO such as this, could be within the CF's reach based on only a slight increase in the current budget.

No because I am looking at the USMC model and that is provided by the USN cruisers and destroyers that get assigned to an ARG, it is not integral. USN also man the LHDs, LPDs and the myriad of other amphibs.

Here's a link to the Wasp's website which might make a little more sense of what Ex-Dragoon is saying:

http://www.wasp.navy.mil/

Now if you scroll down and look to the left, you will see which ships make up the Wasp's strike group.

Notice:

1 688 nuke boat
1 Burke destroyer
2 Ticonderoga cruisers
1 LSD
1 LPD

And of course the WASP.(I won't bring up the supply train)

 

[a_majoor]

Unification; Jointness; Imperial Defense Council, these are mostly words of the week to describe very similar concepts. The real "sticking point" is tribalism, as was noted a few posts back. The main reason 31 CBGHQ is  NOT lording over 31 Inf Bn and the rest of the 31 battlegroup is the well justified fear that Regimental Senates and Associations will scream bloody murder. The response might be just short of HQ personell being beheaded on Al Jazeera by enraged former CO's (although a few current CO's might be thinking along those lines...step back sir...sir...)

For now LFRR Phase 2 remains a slick briefing package, and there seems to be no mandate to pull the trigger on the full implimentation.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks DJL,  looks more in line with what I was thinking about.  Even a large freighter with LASH capability (Lighter Aboard Ship - big ship carries small shallow draft boats that can land cargo ashore (a commercial not military vessel)) would do.

I can't see an amphibious assault capability in the Canadian Navy anytime soon.  And I am not convinced we need that.  We just need transport.

For comparison, the C17 is not armed and costs so much that both the USAF and the RAF prefer to fly into ports where there is no or very little threat.  I can't see my way clear to understanding why we cant acquire ships to operate in similar environments.

Cheers.

 

[McG]

We just need transport.

I think we need more than this.  In addition to current capabilities, the Navy should be capable of projecting power inland (Deep strike capability, tactical fire support, theater air defence, EW, etc) as part of a joint force.

 

[pbi]

We just need transport.

No! This is exactly what Ex-Dragoon has complained of: reducing the Navy to a barge service. This is not jointness at all: An Army does not need a Navy to operate barges: the US Army Quartermaster Corps has its own barge and tugboat service. We need a Navy that is an equal and capable combatant partner in a joint force package that includes the ability to project land force ashore without immediate access to a port facility. This does not imply "Iwo Jima", rather a degree of flexibility.

I think we need more than this.   In addition to current capabilities, the Navy should be capable of projecting power inland (Deep strike capability, tactical fire support, theater air defence, EW, etc) as part of a joint force

Roger that. Cheers.

 

[DJL]

Thanks DJL,  looks more in line with what I was thinking about.  Even a large freighter with LASH capability (Lighter Aboard Ship - big ship carries small shallow draft boats that can land cargo ashore (a commercial not military vessel)) would do.

I think the US military sealift command looked at that in the early 80s and decided that in most senarios a conventional Ro/Ro (with mexe-float like barges) would do (In most cases, it's easier to load and unload). With that said, I think they operate a couple barge carriers for outsized cargos.

 

[Kirkhill]

OK poorly put.  I will try again.

I agree with the need for Bluewater capabilities.  I agree with the need for the current force structure, subs and all.  I can see the need for the AAD destroyers and the command capability.  I  agree with all of the above.

What I am trying to say, and maybe you are all understanding this and I am still not getting it, what I am trying to say that the next capability we (the nation) need is the ability to transport land forces from here to there.

While LHA/LHD/LPDs would be very nice at the prices that are involved, the manpower that is involved, the additional systems that are involved would require a MASSIVE increase in the naval budget alone.  Here I agree with Ex-Dragoon as well.

We can buy the transport capability at a considerably cheaper price so that the Navy can afford to buy the Blue Water fleet that we really need and maybe also the Inshore fleet that we need as well.

I don't imagine turning the entire Navy into Taxi Drivers, but no matter how you dress it up we still need Taxi Drivers and if the Navy doesn't supply them, amongst the other jobs they do then who will drive them?  Do we need a separate Lift service that drives both the Air and Sea Taxis?

LPD-17 San Antonios cost over 1 Billion Dollars each and require a 400 man crew and would get used infrequently
Rotterdam/Bay LSDs cost about 150-200,000,000 each and require a 50-120 man crew and would get used infrequently.

Either one of them would also require the task group referred to by Ex-Dragoon and DJL to give us over the horizon assault capability.

Frankly I don't see that happening.   I would love to be wrong.

But if I am right .... as far as I am concerned better half a loaf than none.  At least there would be some circumstances we could get troops to foreign lands and get them back.

Not a Navy OF Taxi Drivers.  A Navy WITH Taxi Drivers.

Cheers.

 

[DJL]

I think we need more than this.  In addition to current capabilities, the Navy should be capable of projecting power inland (Deep strike capability, tactical fire support, theater air defence, EW, etc) as part of a joint force.

Aside from an aircraft carrier, I tend to think that many of those needs could be solved with about 4-6 of these:

http://peos.crane.navy.mil/ddg51/default.htm

All we need is about 4-6 billion dollars  :-

No! This is exactly what Ex-Dragoon has complained of: reducing the Navy to a barge service. This is not jointness at all: An Army does not need a Navy to operate barges: the US Army Quartermaster Corps has its own barge and tugboat service. We need a Navy that is an equal and capable combatant partner in a joint force package that includes the ability to project land force ashore without immediate access to a port facility. This does not imply "Iwo Jima", rather a degree of flexibility.

I tend to agree, with (relatively) small investment of a few billion dollars, we could have a few capable assault ships and the inherited ability to deploy, land and support a battalion sized group. We just need the money, will and leadership......

 

[REZTEEN]

i must say this. we must make sure that we are prepard for what ever this new century can throw at us. cause i would be humilated to have the yanks to the dirty work for us if something was to happen to us. i would like there help but we must make sure we are ready. that means the right training, leadership, eqiutment, man power, support of the public, the big one MONEY. we must the Money to do what we have to.

 

[McG]

The employment of UAVs should also be considered as part of the joint force structure.  These are valuable at sea and on land.  Where possible, ship based UAVs should support both enviroments.

 

[pbi]

Speaking of UAVs!!! I attended a meeting this afternoon here in CJTF76 at which a new min-UAV was discussed. This system, which is being trialled here, is so light it is launched by throwing it, like a model aircraft. It can easily be carried by a single soldier as an individual load, and provides real time video. The discussion revolved around the use of the system as a coy/bn level "pet UAV" To me, this is something that we need to pay close attention to under the ISTAR area of interest. Fascinating stuff! Cheers.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I think we need more than this.   In addition to current capabilities, the Navy should be capable of projecting power ... as part of a joint force.

This is the correct start point.

From a policy perspective we want to:

"¢ Be able to fight - in mid to high intensity operations if necessary; but

"¢ Avoid combat by projecting our power and, therefore, showing our willingness and ability to fight, if necessary and alongside allies.

It isn't just the Navy which must be able to do this - although power projection is, traditionally, their primary domain.   The army and air force must also be built and maintained to be parts of joint and combined (multi-national) forces which can and will project power - and use it, too, if it becomes necessary.

 

[Inch]

You guys were busy, too bad I was in ground school all day!

I notice the Air Force hasn't come aboard this discussion yet. What do we need in the Air Expeditionary Wing?

It's been said before what we need.   We don't have a problem having Taxi drivers amongst us since that's one of our current capabilities.   Strat airlift is lacking, Tac Airlift is not in a healthy state since the Hercs are in bad need of replacement and the Griffons can't do what we bought them to do.   As Ex-D said, the Navy and Air Force have been working jointly since unification and we integrate quite well. MH is a necessity, since the only thing a sub fears more than another sub is a Maritime Helo with 2 Mk46's. MH also provides utility flights for the Navy, SAR for a Task Group, we transfer NBP's (not as common now but once the Cyclone is in service it'll be more common place), we also provide the range and speed the Navy requires to see what's "out there". We're the eyes and ears for the fleet,   we extend the range of the ship's sensors.

It can be argued whether or not we need to be responsible for Domestic SAR, but since no one else can afford to provide the service, we get stuck with it.

Now I could get into the rest of the capabilities, but to be honest, short of Strat airlift and more money so that we can be proficient at what we do (flying time costs money and regardless of what you non believers will say, flying is the only way to get flying experience, simulators can't do it all), we have all the capabilities we need to perform what our country asks us. We just need new aircraft to enhance our capabilities, technology has advanced and so must we if we want to be effective.

The biggest problem with kit for the Navy and Air Force is the price. There is nothing the Army can buy that will cost $100 million a pop. That's the reality of the Navy and Air Force.

As was already mentioned, even though everyone likes the way the Marine Corps works, the USN provides all the firepower to protect them.

Cheers

 

[bossi]

Speaking of UAVs!!! I attended a meeting at which a new min-UAV was discussed.  This system, which is being trialled, is so light it is launched by throwing it, like a model aircraft.  It can easily be carried by a single soldier as an individual load, and provides real time video.

Good - on Roto 0 we heard about them being used by an ABC ally - glad to hear the other colonials are catching up ... (chuckle)

The other version was described to me as being like a Frisbee ... thus I can only imagine the Aussie version, a Polaroid taped to a boomerang ... ?

 

[a_majoor]

Re mini-UAV's, I proposed getting some R/C model Predators, which even come with a digital camera: http://www.rctoys.com/predator.php and have an optional GPS module for long ranged flights w/o a dedicated pilot. I got a few strange looks on that one...

Question for Inch: since we don't have Aircraft carriers, what should we be doing to project tactical air power for the Joint Expeditionary Force? CF-18s have very short legs, but I can't really see us buying used F-15 Strike Eagles or Su-31's for long range tactical air power either. (Or should we be considering getting an entire new generation of aircraft?)

Question for the Navy people: How much of an advantage is going really fast. I see both the US Navy and Army have gotten INCAT "Wave Piercing Catamarines" with advertised speeds in the high 30 kts. This woudl certainly allow the package to get to  the AOR much faster than today, but what are the + and - sides of the equation?

 

[McG]

(Or should we be considering getting an entire new generation of aircraft?)

Or perhaps a combat UAV?  Another option is GPS guided cruise missiles.