Why Are Our HQ's Growing and Can They Be Stopped?

[Edward Campbell]

One thing to remember: some things are beyond our your the CF's or DN D's control.

Consider, just for example, official languages or various flavours of equality: there will be elements in the DND C2 superstructure to advise or regulate or direct in various policy areas and no one gives a flying f___k what the MND, DM or CDS thinks about it. These things are imposed, they are government policy and we march along, in step ... even if we do so mindlessly.

Another thing: we make international agreements and we agree, in writing, to adhere to those. They, too, require some supervision and staff effort. (In my last job one my majors could, with a very few key strokes, send out a memo to D____ or PM ____ saying something like: "in project x or proposal y you have forgotten to include binding international standards 1, 2, 3 and 4 and equally binding national standards 5, 6, 7 and 8 and your project or proposal cannot progress until you apply their provisions." She had that stuff so close at hand because she sent that memo out on an appallingly regular basis. We were just one of many directorates that had and used standardization authority ~ we enforced standards to which Canada had agreed ... presumably, we hoped, for good reasons.)

 

[Tibbson]

Out of those who have already commented on this topic I'd be interested to know who has actually been posted to a Headquarters?  I ask that question only for context, not to trivialize one persons views over another.  All views are what makes a discussion.  With that having been said though I've had a long and varied career that never included a posting to HQ...until this summer that is.  Prior to posting I always viewed HQ more as a hindrance then a help.  Its where good ideas, complaints, policy changes and equipment requests go to die.  It was where the broken, the chosen and the inept went to spend their time on coffee breaks and pet projects for as long as they could or until retirement.

Now, there is some of that going on for sure since no system is perfect, but overwhelmingly I've found a group of dedicated, competent, professional and concerned individuals...military and civilian, who work hard and who want to make things better for those on the pointy end. 

- Those requests for additional vehicles needed by the troops that nobody at HQ seems to care enough about to action?  Well they have been working on it but they've also been busy punching up the weak substantiation you supplied, trying to find the funds to buy them, working with (and in many cases fighting with)  the transport types and supply types to source them through PWGSC.

- That deficiency report with the suggestion to replace unsuitable kit?  They've been battling with a supply system that essentially says "We dont care if its deficient, we have thousands on the shelf and we wont buy the better ones the troops need until the old (deficient) ones are used up.

-  That order or policy that is outdated?  They know about it but the one person assigned to oversee that task isnt an SME on everything so he's got to farm the rewrite out to someone who IS an SME so that its effective.  Since that person has other prioities it takes months to get it rewritten (or longer) but then it has to go for review then a legal opinion to make sure its proper, then translation, then review again to make sure the french matches the english (context/meaning/intent)  and then final approval.

-  Tired of the unfilled positions at your Unit?  Well I'm already tired of them at my national HQ too.  We could have the vehicles for you in spite of the above noted issues but someone decided this ongoing task requires no more then one WO.  That kit you need, the MWO is working hard to get it for you but shes also filling one of the national training positions since the MWO there retired and the position wont be filled by the career manager until next summer(IF she has the money for the posting).  Those orders....well there were 9 funded PYs (military and civilian) dedicated to that cell but it was decided by outside forces that most would be transfered to another HQ after a ministerial inquiry determined they were needed elsewhere (ie: a flavour of the day political pet project).

Yep, in any organization there is always bloat to some degree or another, at any number of levels, but I'm not convinced (yet) that its a systemic problem.  I certainly have not been here long enough to be assimilated into the Borg collective but I have been here long enough to already wonder if my previously held views were not a bit harsh.

 

[Tibbson]

A plan for the brave (since whoever does this will essentially be doing a Kamakazi run and be outcast for the remainder of their careers):

1. Do "Operation Paperchase" to identify and eliminate useless paperwork, reports and returns in the system. Then eliminate the jobs of the people who look after that paperwork.

2. Have an outside military organization audit the CF to clearly identify the bloat and school the Minister on "best practices". The USMC is one possible auditor, but the Royal Marines, the Armed forces of Singapore or even Australia are also good choices (similar cultures of small fitting forces with limited resources).

3. Have another outside auditor of the CF's logistics and procurement systems. In this case I would look to the commercial world: WalMart or Amazon.com, for example

The Minister can almost certainly do number one on his own and at any time. Methodologies like "Six Sigma" can help identify bottlenecks and inefficiencies. Outside auditors and the resulting restructuring would be very difficult and potentially drawn out processes (as GOFO's and bureaucrats have to be fought hand to hand in the corridors of power, and they will be fighting to the last taxpayer...), but with enough willpower, it could be done.

The bonus is that clearing the decks this way would actually bring far more value for money; even if we don't get any more actual cash the money we do get will go a lot farther than before, which should be a good "hook" for the political process to get started (getting a much more capable military for the same price as we pay now can only be seen as a good thing).

1.  The sheer scope of your proposed "useless paperwork" review would be overwelming and never come to an end.  Yes, some things could always be eliminated but much of it is in place gecause we are required to adhere to other govt department's needs and policies to get our jobs done,  outside regulations dictate some if it or the government has instituted it.  Case in point...I used to be able to book travel quite easily but under our new system, on imposed upon us, it can take a day and a half of justifying, comparing and eliminating other options to send someone to one of our sub units for a mandated biannual standards inspection.

2.  I'm in almost weekly communications with Aust, Brit ans US counterparts and if you think for one moment that they do things better then you are sorely mistaken.  They also work within entirely different governments with different policies and requirements.

3.  Just dont get Target to do it and while they are at it they had better be mandated to look ar PWGSC and shared services too.  Not that I think such a review would be benicial or relevant.  We'd most likely end uo with Walmart proposing that they run a national supply system like Logistic Unicorp.  Your Unit needs a new vehical?  No problem, if you have the points just call up and order it.  Need bulkets?  Sorry, you will need to wait until you get more points.  Those tank tracks were the wrong ones?  Just call for a return authorization, send them back and when the right ones are off backorder they will send you the right ones.  Dont like the points system?  No worries, if Walart takes over we will all get Walmart Mastercards and gift cards issued and we can order up to the annual limit.

 

[Tibbson]

Now, a downward change in ranks is NOT going to save money - in fact it is likely that Cdrs/LCols and above will all get pay raises to compensate them for increased (upward) responsibilities. But, a cut in 35 GOFOs and, say, 35 more Capts(N)/Cols should give us money to hire one company of infantry or the crews for two or three AOPSs.

As I understood it our numbers are capped based on people, not money, so that getting rid of 35 Generals and 35 Capts/Cols would only allow us to hire 70 pers from the various Branches those assorted 70 big shots came from.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Only partially true, as I understand it.

While our force levels may be set (xx amount of people), the wage and benefit bill also comes out of DND's overall budget. 70 Captains (or WOs, or Cpls, etc) are cheaper than 70 BGens That extra money can then be used elsewhere.

Additionally, many General Officers are entitled to an EA and/or office staff. Fewer General Officers mean that those staff (mil and civ) can be redeployed to other priorities.

Finally, I would say that empowering, Cols and LCols to make decisions that were formerly made by higher ranking individuals can make job satisfaction much higher.

 

[Edward Campbell]

We have shrunk (mostly) but also grown the numbers many, many times since I joined more than half a century ago.

I served, in NDHQ, during a series of cuts ~ cuts in which NDHQ and CHQs, too, were singled out for real reductions. In at least one set we got a (small, but measured) personnel "bonus" for the fleet and field force when the cuts at the top were made.

What was more interesting was that during the deep HQ cuts in the late 1990s our performance did not suffer: we identified what we weren't going to do and we stopped doing it. Some people, some quite senior people, didn't like that - fortunately a couple of even more senior folks said, "that's how it's gonna be."

Cuts don't have to hurt, in fact I believe that quite steep and totally arbitrary - across the board - cuts to HQs are actually helpful. (Cuts should be arbitrary but the remediation when one discovers that D___ was cut too much and D___ too little must be quick and real.)

 

[Edward Campbell]

...

Finally, I would say that empowering, Cols and LCols to make decisions that were formerly made by higher ranking individuals can make job satisfaction much higher.

That's a key point that Old Sweat has made before. When we have too many GOFOs ~ Type A personalities who want, need to achieve something ~ they start looking for things to do ... including the wrong things.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

Nothing significant is going to happen until the Feds place a moratorium on General promotions.
This can no longer be left to the cronies and friends that have an unsubstantiated  story or opinion of their friends which becomes the narrative for their promotion.

Too many people are making it to the lofty heights on the say so of their peers without a proper vetting.

We have pompous, dead wood, egotistical morons that know nothing about business, or man management, sitting in judgment on who they should let into their club, instead of looking at the persons qualifications and what they can do for the men. 

 

[Happy Guy]

Harsh words, but true for the most part.

GO/FOs are selected for their perceived abilities to lead, but at that level how many actually do lead as opposed to manage?
Despite the constant disdain for "managers" the CAF needs them - look at the bureaucratic mess we are in now because our leaders want to lead and ignore the managing part.  Very few of them understand the complex and interrelated Logistics, communications / computers, intelligence and other enablers aspects of maintaining a general purpose combat ready force.  One can say that it is up to their staffs to inform them, but if the ops staff is made up of the same "leaders" as the leadership isn't this the same as the blind leading the blind.

The CAF urgently requires leaders but their basic knowledge in understanding how to conduct operations at the strategic level is very much lacking.  They know to fight at the tactical level (very sexy), but are sadly deficient at the strategic level (translating political aims into military objectives (campaign planning) and making critical decisions that maintain, support and sustain military operations.  Consequently they are making decisions without fully understanding implications.  The CAF needs leaders who can also manage effectively.

 

[ModlrMike]

Harsh words, but true for the most part.

GO/FOs are selected for their perceived abilities to lead, but at that level how many actually do lead as opposed to manage?
Despite the constant disdain for "managers" the CAF needs them - look at the bureaucratic mess we are in now because our leaders want to lead and ignore the managing part.  Very few of them understand the complex and interrelated Logistics, communications / computers, intelligence and other enablers aspects of maintaining a general purpose combat ready force.  One can say that it is up to their staffs to inform them, but if the ops staff is made up of the same "leaders" as the leadership isn't this the same as the blind leading the blind.

The CAF urgently requires leaders but their basic knowledge in understanding how to conduct operations at the strategic level is very much lacking.  They know to fight at the tactical level (very sexy), but are sadly deficient at the strategic level (translating political aims into military objectives (campaign planning) and making critical decisions that maintain, support and sustain military operations.  Consequently they are making decisions without fully understanding implications.  The CAF needs leaders who can also manage effectively.

Interesting you say that. In classical management theory, leadership is one of the four pillars of management. The others being planning, organizing, (leading), and controlling. The military treats leadership as a separate entity, and has it removed from the management functions.

Maybe that's something we have to think about; that managers are leaders and leaders are managers. Perhaps at different places on the same continuum, but performing inter-related, not separate functions.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

A good leader in a crisis might be a poor manager for the day to day stuff. But if they know that about themselves and bring in a good manger who they will listen to, then you can have a workable team.

 

[Ostrozac]

The one HQ that still seems (to me) to be quite lean is the CMBG HQ. At last count it was, what, about 55-60 people? With one Col and one LCol as the highest ranks?

Admittedly, a CMBG HQ does like to attract attachments and when in the field can swell up to fill the largest of circus tents, but it has managed to avoid keeping all those attachments from filling up the HQ in garrison.

Now a CBG HQ is bigger than its regular counterpart for some reason, has a Col and 3 LCol, and I won't speak in its defence, but the CMBG HQ seems to be an HQ echelon that actually works. So if we decide to wholesale restructure our C2 structure, I'd recommend avoiding slashing too deep in Pet, Val and Edmonton.

Higher echelons? Sure. I'm not entirely sure that we even need any intermediate HQ in Toronto, Halifax or Montreal -- brigades used to report directly to Army Headqurters in Saint Hubert, they could do so again.

 

[Edward Campbell]

Tactical HQs shrink when you are in highly mobile operations - a highly mobile brigade HQ might go down to less than a dozen (and hordes of Signals people, of course) plus a small handful of staff clerks and rover drivers. Make the HQ static (as in Afghanistan, for example) and it will grow. The best way to shrink any HQ is to burn all the "circus tents" ~ people will migrate to warm, dry places if given the choice ... or simply stay at home.

 

[Monsoon]

Now a CBG HQ is bigger than its regular counterpart for some reason, has a Col and 3 LCol, and I won't speak in its defence, but the CMBG HQ seems to be an HQ echelon that actually works.

If you won't, I will. The difference is that a CMBG is a tactical HQ and a CBG is an administrative HQ. The work of CBGs is largely consumed with recruiting, training up to the OFP, and personnel administration - tasks that the CMBGs can entirely rely on other administrative HQs for (CFRG, CDA, CADTC, etc). This is personnel-intensive work.

 

[OldSolduer]

Tactical HQs shrink when you are in highly mobile operations - a highly mobile brigade HQ might go down to less than a dozen (and hordes of Signals people, of course) plus a small handful of staff clerks and rover drivers. Make the HQ static (as in Afghanistan, for example) and it will grow. The best way to shrink any HQ is to burn all the "circus tents" ~ people will migrate to warm, dry places if given the choice ... or simply stay at home.

I was in 1 CBG HQ & SIGS for four years. The Bde HQ was not very big - once it set out and was moving every 12 hours it got smaller, much like Mr. Campbell has explained.

 

[Kirkhill]

Not a uniquely Canadian problem apparently.

Star Creep: The Costs of a Top-Heavy Military


(Source: Third Way; issued Oct 15, 2014)

The U.S. military is more top-heavy than it has ever been. Since 2001, the enlisted ranks have shrunk while the three and four-star ranks have grown by nearly 20%. The layers of bureaucracy to support the most senior officers have grown as well, slowing decision-making and burdening the warfighter.

In “Star Creep: The Costs of a Top-Heavy Military,” we explain why this bloat is a threat to U.S. national security—hindering the troops and wasting money better used combating 21st century threats. We need to trim the fat, which will make our military both leaner and more effective. The front-line should not be sacrificed to spare the back office.


Click here for the full report (8 PDF pages) on the Third Way website.

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/158005/too-many-generals-cost-too-much.html

 

[daftandbarmy]

Not a uniquely Canadian problem apparently.

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/158005/too-many-generals-cost-too-much.html

This redistribution of resources away from front line troops clearly reflects the type of enemy one faces in peacetime (internal political) versus war time (external operational)  :nod:

 

[dapaterson]

I recently saw a document that was discussing another topic, but I came away with this nugget: in 1976, five per cent of the Regular Force was Senior Officers (Maj and above).  Doing a rough comparison to today, there has been a 60% increase - now we are at eight per cent Senior Officers.

A reduction to 1976 levels of Senior Officers would free up over 2000 positions for other purposes.


Of course, there is a very real risk that such an action could lead to a serious PowerPoint gap...