"Why no outcry from NGOs against IEDs?"

[The Bread Guy]

Actually - EFP's and IED's are predominately fairly sophisticated and are manufactured in many ways.
1) Certain countries manufactuer advance triggering mechanisms
2) Certain countries send technicians into Iraq and Afghanistan (as well as do lecturing in camps in 3rd locations) on how to build and employ advanced IED's and EFP's
3) Insurgent Groups have numerous sites devoted to building IED's and EFP's

This is a cottage industry -- its not just farmer bob out sinking a 152mm shell into the ground and Inshaalla.

No shortage of interdiction options then, are there?  Not easy ones, mind you...

 

[Blackadder1916]

Which NGOs?  In Mr. Granatstein’s piece he suggests that NGOs, including the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), take a more public stance against the use of IEDs in Afghanistan and Iraq by non state armed groups (NSAG), but saying “NGO” covers a lot of territory.  I understand the basis for much of the disrespect aimed at NGOs on this forum.  I have been frustrated (personally and professionally) by the actions of certain organizations but I have also been awed by the commitment and deeds of others.  With an estimated 40,000 NGOs operating internationally (plus several million more that stay within their national boundaries) there is bound to be disagreement with some included in this heterogeneous group.  Do they have agendas?  Of course, otherwise they would have stayed home.  Hypocrisy, perceived racism, mismanagement, proselytizing, petty squabbling, self promotion;  these are all things that have been said before, and that's only some of the things I have said directly to individuals belonging to some of the more reputable organizations.  Don't get me started!

But if we limit the discussion to Mr Granatstein’s comments it may be more manageable. 

Even if the call to publically denounce the use of IEDs (landmines) was aimed solely at the ICBL, it is now narrowed down to some 1400 (give or take a few) separate organizations that make up the coalition that is the ICBL.  Of course, some of them are more prominent than others.  In fact one of them, Human Rights Watch, was mentioned in a previous post as a NGO that has denounced the used of violence by the Taliban in Afghanistan.  This group is one of the original six founding members of the ICBL and continues to play a leading role with a representative on the management committee.  The other founding organizations were Handicap International, medico international, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation.

The Ottawa Treaty did not suddenly happen because a bunch of hippies held hands in a circle and chanted ‘kum by ya’.  The ICBL’s success in convincing the majority of the world's states to implement a landmine ban treaty was in part due to an understanding of the political process (as practiced in the individual countries) and a masterful use of the media in shaping public opinion with regards to this issue. Not all the work to get the treaty was done through the media, a lot of it was behind the scene negotiation with political leaders. 

By the same token, if the ‘actual’ goal is to have NSAGs discontinue the use of  IEDs and landmines, then what would be the more effective method to change a specific NSAG’s policy?  Public denunciation of one of the prime methods they use for shaping public opinion, (both in their own country and in the home countries of the forces they are engaging) or by engagement in negotiation so that the NSAG accepts and abides by the terms of the Mine Ban Treaty.  Some of both, I believe.  One of the difficulties, however, for NGOs who may wish to pursue this goal is the tendency of certain states to accuse NGOs and other humanitarian organizations involved in conflict areas of collaborating with armed groups or supporting terrorists.  On the other side of the coin if an organization denounces a specific NSAG, then the consequences may be deadly for individuals working for that NGO in a particular region.  Either way, the results for the NGO could be the refusal of some donors to support its aims or making their activities in the field more difficult.

But it is not a lost cause.  There have been NSAGs that have signed deeds of commitment to a ban on anti-personnel mines .  Some of them in states that are not yet signatories to the treaty.  In fact there is an NGO, Geneva Call whose sole purpose is “engaging armed non-state actors (NSAs) to respect and to adhere to humanitarian norms, starting with the ban on anti-personnel (AP) mines”.

I found the following questions thought provoking.  They are from a Geneva Call request for submission of discussion papers for an upcoming conference to explore criteria and conditions for engaging NSAs to respect international Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law.

a) Who to engage? Which NSAs should humanitarian NGOs negotiate with? Under the labels “armed groups” or “armed non-State actors” can be found an array of different organizations. Are there certain lines that should not be crossed? Can all armed groups be engaged? Should the humanitarian imperative prevail or should groups be engaged as access and opportunities arise? Should so-called “terrorist” organizations be engaged? How can NGOs define the concept of “terrorism”?

b) Who engages? The process of engagement with armed groups has tended to put NGOs and low-profile United Nations (UN) agencies at the forefront. What are the special characteristics of these actors? What can and should be the role of States, associations, institutions, UN agencies, etc. in the negotiation process?

c) When to engage? What are the conditions, criteria and strategies to adopt in order to enter into dialogue with a NSA? Should humanitarian engagement happen within a wider political engagement such as a peace process? Should these two types of engagement remain unconnected? Should humanitarian engagement be preventive? How is the engagement process inscribed in the conflict dynamic?

d) Why and on what issues to engage? Should humanitarian engagement be limited to securing humanitarian access? Should it include human rights? Should it take into account wider humanitarian norms? Should the humanitarian community provide training on humanitarian norms to these groups?

e) How to engage? Should we engage through the government, through direct contacts, through local population or civil society? Should we engage with incentives? Does engaging armed group by humanitarian actors in negotiation encourage or facilitate it in its convictions to continue fighting?

f) What are the main challenges (both practical and ethical) and consequences of engagement? What are the relationships to political processes and conflict dynamic? What kind of monitoring should be put into action? What happens if a State objects?