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Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS

An adventure for another crew then..
Perhaps. They will be transiting back via the Panama Canal and back to Halifax for maintenance, leave and off to new adventures. North Pole perhaps as you very well know that will be coming at some point.
 
Perhaps. They will be transiting back via the Panama Canal and back to Halifax for maintenance, leave and off to new adventures. North Pole perhaps as you very well know that will be coming at some point.

A few more firsts possible then. Horn and the NWP. NWP, Panama and Horn. North Pole. Halifax to Portsmouth via the North Pole. Esquimalt to Nordkapp via the North Pole. etc.
 
Interesting snippet from the Fall 2024 edition of the RCN's Maritime Engineering Journal - progress towards implementation of air capabilities:

The completion of its first short work period on HMCS Max Bernays (AOPV-432) through May and into early June. AJISS, or the Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessel and Joint Support Ship In-Service Support Contract, forms a collaborative enterprise of the Maritime Equipment Program Management directorate, Thales, the Fleet Maintenance Facilities, and several technical support networks with a common vision to provide world-class naval technical service delivery to maintain these new classes of ships. Through this relational contract, a first of its kind for the RCN, and designed to maximize performance through flexible partnerships based on common behavioural principles, the enterprise worked to successfully deliver more than 350 maintenance/engineering tasks through an integrated schedule.

It is a complicated arrangement to bring the various stakeholders together and coordinate the execution of hundreds of tasks, yet all the scheduled work was achieved without a single safety incident. These efforts also incorporated the essential certification tasks and engineering changes to enable Max Bernays to conduct daytime “SWOAD” (i.e. ship without air detachment) operations, a necessary step toward full air capability, and a first for the Harry DeWolf-class AOPVs. The work period was certainly not without its challenges, as the team worked closely together to solve several arising problems, and address a number of unforecasted repairs.
 
Interesting snippet from the Fall 2024 edition of the RCN's Maritime Engineering Journal - progress towards implementation of air capabilities:

The completion of its first short work period on HMCS Max Bernays (AOPV-432) through May and into early June. AJISS, or the Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessel and Joint Support Ship In-Service Support Contract, forms a collaborative enterprise of the Maritime Equipment Program Management directorate, Thales, the Fleet Maintenance Facilities, and several technical support networks with a common vision to provide world-class naval technical service delivery to maintain these new classes of ships. Through this relational contract, a first of its kind for the RCN, and designed to maximize performance through flexible partnerships based on common behavioural principles, the enterprise worked to successfully deliver more than 350 maintenance/engineering tasks through an integrated schedule.

It is a complicated arrangement to bring the various stakeholders together and coordinate the execution of hundreds of tasks, yet all the scheduled work was achieved without a single safety incident. These efforts also incorporated the essential certification tasks and engineering changes to enable Max Bernays to conduct daytime “SWOAD” (i.e. ship without air detachment) operations, a necessary step toward full air capability, and a first for the Harry DeWolf-class AOPVs. The work period was certainly not without its challenges, as the team worked closely together to solve several arising problems, and address a number of unforecasted repairs.
SWOAD with massive restrictions and limitations, that only applied to Max for that short trip and for a limited number of helos. The class is far from getting helo op certified.

That didn't include any engineering changes, they were temp fixes. A lot of Engineering changes are still in the development phase and/or scoping that are related to SWOAD or embarked helo. Most of this work wasn't actually planned and was a lot of scramble by the crew, sea training and a lot of others, and still fixing and finding issues from the base design.

There was a major flood that pulled Max off rotation for a bit and kept them in port, and was due to a design defect. Just because no one was hurt, doesn't mean that isn't a safety incident.

Pretty rosy coloured glasses for sure.
 
SWOAD with massive restrictions and limitations, that only applied to Max for that short trip and for a limited number of helos. The class is far from getting helo op certified.

That didn't include any engineering changes, they were temp fixes. A lot of Engineering changes are still in the development phase and/or scoping that are related to SWOAD or embarked helo. Most of this work wasn't actually planned and was a lot of scramble by the crew, sea training and a lot of others, and still fixing and finding issues from the base design.

There was a major flood that pulled Max off rotation for a bit and kept them in port, and was due to a design defect. Just because no one was hurt, doesn't mean that isn't a safety incident.

Pretty rosy coloured glasses for sure.
Having been in MAX at that time, specifically for SWOAD, it was an interesting time...

It was a good experience, and it should be noted that MAX conducted SWOAD evolutions with American and Canadian helos during that window. There was a plan for a lot more SWOAD work, but the slight flooding happened, and the plans changed.
 
Good to see. Well done the Ship’s crew.

Interesting that if that were the North, she’d be sitting around Pangnirtung, some 500nm South of Resolute Bay.
 
Ponder if you will the potential parallel of a ship being tasked to do things for which it wasn't designed, wasn't properly fitted for or with, and crew who are not yet trained or qualified...and that ship runs aground on a reef and sinks....and....parallel that with the SWOAD situation as mentioned.

Someone assumed a lot of risk.

I wonder if, following the loss of the Manawanui, and the recent release of the report about it, there is a bit more introspection at higher levels about assuming risk now.

Or.

Are we waiting for something to happen to our sailors and ships first....
 
Having been in MAX at that time, specifically for SWOAD, it was an interesting time...

It was a good experience, and it should be noted that MAX conducted SWOAD evolutions with American and Canadian helos during that window. There was a plan for a lot more SWOAD work, but the slight flooding happened, and the plans changed.
It wasn't really small flooding, it was a little over 30 tonnes of water. That doesn't look like much in the bilge, and it was a slower leak, but a failure like that is a 30 year old ship issue, not a 2 or 3 year old ship.

Accepting the ships with hundreds of official defects (and a lot more that were waived off or missed by the class society) is costing us a fortune in repairs and missed sailing time.
 
It wasn't really small flooding, it was a little over 30 tonnes of water. That doesn't look like much in the bilge, and it was a slower leak, but a failure like that is a 30 year old ship issue, not a 2 or 3 year old ship.

Accepting the ships with hundreds of official defects (and a lot more that were waived off or missed by the class society) is costing us a fortune in repairs and missed sailing time.
Irving: where the Q stands for quality, the P stands for professional, and the S stands for safe.
 
It wasn't really small flooding, it was a little over 30 tonnes of water. That doesn't look like much in the bilge, and it was a slower leak, but a failure like that is a 30 year old ship issue, not a 2 or 3 year old ship.

Accepting the ships with hundreds of official defects (and a lot more that were waived off or missed by the class society) is costing us a fortune in repairs and missed sailing time.
Actually the bilges in those ships are pretty small but is set up to move water very efficiently to storage tanks. If anything this demonstrated that putting a cofferdam on those high intakes is a big deal and that you need to keep up on your maintenance.
 
It wasn't really small flooding, it was a little over 30 tonnes of water. That doesn't look like much in the bilge, and it was a slower leak, but a failure like that is a 30 year old ship issue, not a 2 or 3 year old ship.

Accepting the ships with hundreds of official defects (and a lot more that were waived off or missed by the class society) is costing us a fortune in repairs and missed sailing time.
It was not an insignificant volume of water, but it wasn't the primary reason we had to go alongside, nor was it a real risk to anyone onboard.

I, and several of the crew, had been aboard a ship in genuine peril off Hawaii, and MAX was not anywhere near that state at any point. That said, we do go alongside the same jetty that PRO did back in the day, which was a bit of a trip down memory lane for a handful of us.
 
It was not an insignificant volume of water, but it wasn't the primary reason we had to go alongside, nor was it a real risk to anyone onboard.

I, and several of the crew, had been aboard a ship in genuine peril off Hawaii, and MAX was not anywhere near that state at any point. That said, we do go alongside the same jetty that PRO did back in the day, which was a bit of a trip down memory lane for a handful of us.
Heh.

Was the prison barge still there?
 
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