If its mobilization it doesn't matter WTF they think. Their other option will be jail.
As long as the word coming out of the CAF is we're going to grow the reserves to 100,000 I'll know they aren't serious. That's not mobilization planning. When they say we'll build a dozen equipment and munitions factories, three armoured and three light divisions, 12 submarines, 30 armed patrol vessels, and another hundred aircraft, or something of that nature, then I'll start to pay attention.
Doesn't every plan need to start with a vision or " big hairy audacious goal". Pin that to the wall, gather a group of intelligent, experienced yet practical thinkers and then figure out how to make the BHAG come to life. Discover the key constraints and identify current deal-breakers. Then circle back to the BHAG and find a way to work around the deal-breakers. It may not be the CAF way but it can be done ... if there is sufficient support. Strike while the Carney is hot!
This was kind of my point.
0 if we were in a shooting war with Russia or china, and the casualty lists are coming home.
Which is an institutional issue which should be rectified. Hence the consistent circular argument on this page about how to make the UIC an actual deployable entity when the shit hits the fan.
I am not understanding how 31(1) would apply to the Reserves? Unless it was an Emergency. Which case I would assume the EA would be enacted and then they have all kinds of irregular powers.
The word "MAY" is a key word in the legislation. DND does not want to use that legislation due to responsibly for job losses upon return during peace time operations. If they did enact 33(2)(b) it would indicate to all that they were not meeting their Regular Force Commitments during peace time operations. That might mean a few people would have to answer to that. No to mention the amount of Reservists who would loose their Civilian Jobs and or have major setbacks rejoining the work force.
The law needs to be justified in its use. One does not need to strong arm the case to keep acceptance under normal operating conditions.
Doesn't every plan need to start with a vision or " big hairy audacious goal". Pin that to the wall, gather a group of intelligent, experienced yet practical thinkers and then figure out how to make the BHAG come to life. Discover the key constraints and identify current deal-breakers. Then circle back to the BHAG and find a way to work around the deal-breakers. It may not be the CAF way but it can be done ... if there is sufficient support. Strike while the Carney is hot!
That is a very real problem and with the current job protection being provincial and the provincial crowns up to their butts doing the mass of the criminal work in the country, you won't find much help there.
The structure we had back in the late 1950s and onwards for much of the Cold War was based on ideas brought out by Gen Guy Simonds. We had a larger RegF than ResF because he was convinced we would not be able to mobilize reserves in time for a modern war in Europe. We'd be forced to fight with what was in theatre and was equipped and that was a brigade. Most felt that the war would be quick. 30 days or less because NATO was prepared to go nuclear if pushed too far back and we'd either be at the negotiating table or exterminated. No one expected a Ukraine-style meat grinding exercise. That just shows you how well we can judge the other side.
The Army uses all units, Reg and Res, to generate ad hoc deployable units for operations. It's a larger circle to square than just the Res F.
Indeed it does - I call it a "vision" which is fostered by a high-level champion.
s31(1)(b) or (c) does not need an "emergency." As to s 33(1)(a) and s 33(2)(b) note that "emergency" includes the rider "whether real or apprehended." "Apprehended" is both broad and anticipatory in its meaning. Note this OiC for example:
Emergency was probably the wrong word. But a very good strong reason to do so would be better termed. Again this would only open up the discussion over Regular Force Staffing levels if they had to Activate a Reserve Unit(s) to full fill a UN mission.
Again they would have to require a reason to employ such a scope of use.
Laws are in place but they have their reasons to enact such a law. There are checks and balances within those laws to keep them from being abused. Although you can do something, does not mean you should unless you have a good reason.As to the rest of your arguments, they are very imaginative but not real. Enabling laws are laws. Whether they are used or not is a political decision vested in cabinet and the MND respectively.
"Emergency" i a very good word, in fact, because it has very specific meanings in the NDA going beyond the ordinary definition of the word.
There ought to be a reason, certainly. "Very good strong," are modifiers that are not required legally and is arguable as to being a politically necessity - good propaganda can generate the requisite public buy-in.
I'm a very strong believer that day-to-day missions that the CAF is anticipated to fulfill should be within the ambit of the RegF's duties and missions. The time and reason to mobilize a ResF unit is very much dependant on the situation.
That's not in dispute. Who defines what is reasonable varies from person to person. When it comes down to the issue then the opinion of the GiC or the MND is what governs.
The check and balance is that the GiC or, as applicable, the MND - i.e. officials elected by the public - are the final decision makers.
I would think that in the type of situation that you describe the best course of action would be to have a portion of the RegF lead a large mobilized ResF in combat while the rest of the RegF trains further reservists and new recruits.
It only effects the Supplementary reserve. It has no effect on the PRes.
I don't feel challenged at all. After twelve years in the RegF artillery I went to law school and from 1984 to 2009 served as a ResF legal officer as a DJA, a DAJAG and as the DJAG(Res). Advising people on the NDA, the QR&Os etc, the CSD and the LOAC was literally my job. As @dapaterson can confirm, there are a whole lot of senior officers, both RegF and ResF, who do not have a firm handle on military law. Myths and misconceptions abound at all ranks.
Keep in mind Ukraine had a lot of former conscripts available in country who could be armed and retrained much faster than anywhere in the West. That makes a difference when you consider how fast they mobilized. They weren't starting from scratch, they were refreshing and bringing up to date on many.
Armed Forces of Ukraine - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
169,000 Jan 2022
700,000 July 2022
Plus border guards (60,000)
police (130,000)
and national guard. (60-90,000)
Over 500,000 people absorbed in under 6 months.
( and that included buying their own uniforms, guns and drones, learning how to fire Javelins and NLAWs, and directly and actively engaging Russians, killing and being killed, while families were being killed, captured or evacuated).
It matters as if you are mobilizing without a real serious need, you will lose a lot of people from the Reserves and likely kill any future that organization has.
Mobilizing the militia worked exceptionally well in both wars. I have no doubt though that plenty would bail hard.
A different thing. But yes. I suspect we would struggle to conscript unless we were in an existential crisis. And even then.
You who is really bored? MP's. They love it when you ask them to go check in at a PRes members house.
Maybe. Recent events show that they won’t even investigate Facebook private groups until it becomes national news. My guess is they would just punt it to the units to deal with…
Of course. I suspect a pile will pull out whatever card they can to get out of it. You see it in the reg force as well. Sudden med chits and excuses to avoid deploying.
