Drones, the Air Littoral, and the Looming Irrelevance of the USAF

[Kirkhill]

No comment. He's right.

Want Drone Dominance? Let the Squad Fail - Modern War Institute

In Ukraine, a soldier is provisioned a low-cost drone from a factory that only began operations in the last twelve months, modifies it with a 3D printed part from a trench, and uses it the next day to spot Russian logistics movements. Meanwhile, the United States Army is just now beginning to...

mwi.westpoint.edu

Get rid of the Bishops.
Try a Presbyterian army.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Meanwhile:

What does a large drone look like?

Air Force debuts pilotless cargo flights in the Pacific

The service incorporated remotely-operated flights into its massive REFORPAC exercise as it aims to make cargo flights cheaper.

www.defenseone.com

A 767F? A CC330?

In the Canadian context, and assuming friendly skies, is there a role for uncrewed Twotters and Buffalo for supplying hamlets in the territories?

A lot of those small airlines are where your future crop of pilots for large aircraft come from. You might be solving one problem while creating a new one. The pay a lot of these small plane pilots get, is not great, but they do it in the hopes of moving to the big leagues.

 

[Kirkhill]

"It's Like A Flying Aircraft Carrier": US Army's MQ-9A Mothership Unleashes Switchblade Death Swarms That Hunt Targets Anywhere

The recent test flights of the Switchblade 600 loitering munition from a General Atomics’ MQ-9A unmanned aircraft system have unveiled a new frontier in

www.energy-reporters.com

Drones from drones.

Reaper launches Switchblade at Yuma.

 

[Kirkhill]

I debated putting this in the Arty section under Indirect Fires Modernization.
But I think the Army is figuring out what their Division looks like and how they want to fight it.

The Air Force on the other hand....
Defence of Canada
A sub-1,000,000 CAD air vehicle.
Vertical Launch
From the Ground
3000 km range
Autonomous seeker
Multi-Purpose warhead

I don't know that all of those features are in one platform just yet but that certainly seems to be the direction of travel.
Throw in OTH radar, satellites and MQ-9s, and possibly some Bombardier Global Express supplying surveillance and targeting.

What impact on F-35 numbers?
What impact on Continental Defence Corvette capabilities?
What is the influence of an 2,000,000 USD recoverable "booster" that can add 5600 km to your cruise missile range?

Welcome to the era of the ‘affordable’ cruise missile

Long-range cruise missiles were once expensive and in the hands of the few. Now they are being reinvented at a fraction of the cost, disrupting defence in the process.

www.smh.com.au

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/3/20/startup-wins-army-contract-to-develop-vertical-takeoff-cruise-missile

 

[Kirkhill]

Second double post today. Sorry.

 

[FJAG]

I debated putting this in the Arty section under Indirect Fires Modernization.
But I think the Army is figuring out what their Division looks like and how they want to fight it.

The more I see of army modernization, the more I dislike it.

I'm afraid that you are right when you say "their Division." The fact is they have two divisions to construct and so far the second division is being punted down the road. Quite frankly it needs to be seen in serious DoC roles and not merely expensive haulers of sand bags and fire hoses. There are some serious coastal defence and key infrastructure defence issues to be dealt with.

A hint from the army of the vision for their DoC div would be nice. My fear is that there really is no vision or that whatever it is is extremely limited.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The more I see of army modernization, the more I dislike it.

I'm afraid that you are right when you say "their Division." The fact is they have two divisions to construct and so far the second division is being punted down the road. Quite frankly it needs to be seen in serious DoC roles and not merely expensive haulers of sand bags and fire hoses. There are some serious coastal defence and key infrastructure defence issues to be dealt with.

A hint from the army of the vision for their DoC div would be nice. My fear is that there really is no vision or that whatever it is is extremely limited.

I foresee some monumental architecture in their future

 

[FJAG]

I foresee some monumental architecture in their future

I just happen to be proofreading one of Mark's chapters in WAFG 2 right now which is about several gunners working with the OMLTs and P-OMLTs in Afghanistan in 2008 and it strikes me how similar the problem of raising the competence level of the ARes is to that of the ANA and ANP. There were a lot of brilliant lessons that came out of that - good and bad - that we should learn from and apply to how to set up and run the DoC div.

The other insight that came out of this is that the CAF is absolutely crap at the lessons learned process. We gather stuff in fairly well but timely dissemination or incorporation into doctrine development lags substantially. Even at the rotation to rotation level. If it doesn't come up in the predeployment recce it probably never will.

To build the ARes there's an investment of leadership and mentoring and logistics support that needs to go on for years before you get to where you want to be. IMHO, just to raise sufficiently capable companies would probably take five years of hard support to grow the OCs and CSMs and I'm not sure you could get to the battalion level in less than ten. And then its a fragile think that can fall apart on one poor promotion of an LCol or CWO.

This is why I'm locked into my concept of hybrid 30/70 battalions where the RegF leads the battalion and has a full coy of RegF over and above the O<LY folks integrated into the companies.

 

[Kirkhill]

I just happen to be proofreading one of Mark's chapters in WAFG 2 right now which is about several gunners working with the OMLTs and P-OMLTs in Afghanistan in 2008 and it strikes me how similar the problem of raising the competence level of the ARes is to that of the ANA and ANP. There were a lot of brilliant lessons that came out of that - good and bad - that we should learn from and apply to how to set up and run the DoC div.

The other insight that came out of this is that the CAF is absolutely crap at the lessons learned process. We gather stuff in fairly well but timely dissemination or incorporation into doctrine development lags substantially. Even at the rotation to rotation level. If it doesn't come up in the predeployment recce it probably never will.

To build the ARes there's an investment of leadership and mentoring and logistics support that needs to go on for years before you get to where you want to be. IMHO, just to raise sufficiently capable companies would probably take five years of hard support to grow the OCs and CSMs and I'm not sure you could get to the battalion level in less than ten. And then its a fragile think that can fall apart on one poor promotion of an LCol or CWO.

This is why I'm locked into my concept of hybrid 30/70 battalions where the RegF leads the battalion and has a full coy of RegF over and above the O<LY folks integrated into the companies.

Post in thread 'Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC'

Yesterday at 11:39

USANG visits Danish Homeguard.

Take-away:

"The whole idea of ‘catching more flies with honey than vinegar’ kept coming to mind."

https://www.184iw.ang.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4294794/177th-airman-trains-with-danish-home-guard-at-former-nazi-site/

.....

“It was about influential leadership, really, above all else. How do you motivate somebody when you don’t have the power to command them to do something? They keep reiterating how leadership and command were NOT the same thing. They wanted to teach us how to lead, not how to command.”

“The Danish Home Guard...

• Kirkhill

• 

......


The problem, as I see it, is that it is easy to command. It is hard to lead.

And the Militia, being a voluntary organization, demands to be led. It cannot be commanded. No matter how many laws there are on the books.

If nobody is willing to disrupt society to the extent necessary to give those laws effect then those laws have little value. No value in peacetime.

Calling the voluntary service Militia the Reserves and pretending that they are Regulars-in-waiting serves neither organization.

The Militia may be "a reserve" in the sense that they provide depth. It may even be the "primary reserve" in that there are few, if any, alternatives. It may be the only reserve. But it is not a reserve in the sense that most armies understand it. It is not a reservoir of trained ex-regulars that the regulars can recall to the colours in time of need on command.

The Militia needs to be asked.

The Militia can be a useful reserve. It can provide useful peacetime capabilities. It can provide the basis for wartime expansion. But you won't get what you want out of it by expecting it to act as if it were composed of people whose salaries you are paying and whose time is committed to your command.