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Drones, the Air Littoral, and the Looming Irrelevance of the USAF

No comment. He's right.


Get rid of the Bishops.
Try a Presbyterian army.
 
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Meanwhile:

What does a large drone look like?



A 767F? A CC330?

In the Canadian context, and assuming friendly skies, is there a role for uncrewed Twotters and Buffalo for supplying hamlets in the territories?
A lot of those small airlines are where your future crop of pilots for large aircraft come from. You might be solving one problem while creating a new one. The pay a lot of these small plane pilots get, is not great, but they do it in the hopes of moving to the big leagues.
 
I debated putting this in the Arty section under Indirect Fires Modernization.
But I think the Army is figuring out what their Division looks like and how they want to fight it.

The Air Force on the other hand....
Defence of Canada
A sub-1,000,000 CAD air vehicle.
Vertical Launch
From the Ground
3000 km range
Autonomous seeker
Multi-Purpose warhead

I don't know that all of those features are in one platform just yet but that certainly seems to be the direction of travel.
Throw in OTH radar, satellites and MQ-9s, and possibly some Bombardier Global Express supplying surveillance and targeting.

What impact on F-35 numbers?
What impact on Continental Defence Corvette capabilities?
What is the influence of an 2,000,000 USD recoverable "booster" that can add 5600 km to your cruise missile range?

 
I debated putting this in the Arty section under Indirect Fires Modernization.
But I think the Army is figuring out what their Division looks like and how they want to fight it.
The more I see of army modernization, the more I dislike it.

I'm afraid that you are right when you say "their Division." The fact is they have two divisions to construct and so far the second division is being punted down the road. Quite frankly it needs to be seen in serious DoC roles and not merely expensive haulers of sand bags and fire hoses. There are some serious coastal defence and key infrastructure defence issues to be dealt with.

A hint from the army of the vision for their DoC div would be nice. My fear is that there really is no vision or that whatever it is is extremely limited.

🍻
 
The more I see of army modernization, the more I dislike it.

I'm afraid that you are right when you say "their Division." The fact is they have two divisions to construct and so far the second division is being punted down the road. Quite frankly it needs to be seen in serious DoC roles and not merely expensive haulers of sand bags and fire hoses. There are some serious coastal defence and key infrastructure defence issues to be dealt with.

A hint from the army of the vision for their DoC div would be nice. My fear is that there really is no vision or that whatever it is is extremely limited.

🍻

I foresee some monumental architecture in their future ;)


bart simpson egypt GIF
 
I foresee some monumental architecture in their future ;)


bart simpson egypt GIF
I just happen to be proofreading one of Mark's chapters in WAFG 2 right now which is about several gunners working with the OMLTs and P-OMLTs in Afghanistan in 2008 and it strikes me how similar the problem of raising the competence level of the ARes is to that of the ANA and ANP. There were a lot of brilliant lessons that came out of that - good and bad - that we should learn from and apply to how to set up and run the DoC div.

The other insight that came out of this is that the CAF is absolutely crap at the lessons learned process. We gather stuff in fairly well but timely dissemination or incorporation into doctrine development lags substantially. Even at the rotation to rotation level. If it doesn't come up in the predeployment recce it probably never will.

To build the ARes there's an investment of leadership and mentoring and logistics support that needs to go on for years before you get to where you want to be. IMHO, just to raise sufficiently capable companies would probably take five years of hard support to grow the OCs and CSMs and I'm not sure you could get to the battalion level in less than ten. And then its a fragile think that can fall apart on one poor promotion of an LCol or CWO.

This is why I'm locked into my concept of hybrid 30/70 battalions where the RegF leads the battalion and has a full coy of RegF over and above the O<LY folks integrated into the companies.

🍻
 
I just happen to be proofreading one of Mark's chapters in WAFG 2 right now which is about several gunners working with the OMLTs and P-OMLTs in Afghanistan in 2008 and it strikes me how similar the problem of raising the competence level of the ARes is to that of the ANA and ANP. There were a lot of brilliant lessons that came out of that - good and bad - that we should learn from and apply to how to set up and run the DoC div.

The other insight that came out of this is that the CAF is absolutely crap at the lessons learned process. We gather stuff in fairly well but timely dissemination or incorporation into doctrine development lags substantially. Even at the rotation to rotation level. If it doesn't come up in the predeployment recce it probably never will.

To build the ARes there's an investment of leadership and mentoring and logistics support that needs to go on for years before you get to where you want to be. IMHO, just to raise sufficiently capable companies would probably take five years of hard support to grow the OCs and CSMs and I'm not sure you could get to the battalion level in less than ten. And then its a fragile think that can fall apart on one poor promotion of an LCol or CWO.

This is why I'm locked into my concept of hybrid 30/70 battalions where the RegF leads the battalion and has a full coy of RegF over and above the O<LY folks integrated into the companies.

🍻




......


The problem, as I see it, is that it is easy to command. It is hard to lead.

And the Militia, being a voluntary organization, demands to be led. It cannot be commanded. No matter how many laws there are on the books.

If nobody is willing to disrupt society to the extent necessary to give those laws effect then those laws have little value. No value in peacetime.

Calling the voluntary service Militia the Reserves and pretending that they are Regulars-in-waiting serves neither organization.

The Militia may be "a reserve" in the sense that they provide depth. It may even be the "primary reserve" in that there are few, if any, alternatives. It may be the only reserve. But it is not a reserve in the sense that most armies understand it. It is not a reservoir of trained ex-regulars that the regulars can recall to the colours in time of need on command.

The Militia needs to be asked.

The Militia can be a useful reserve. It can provide useful peacetime capabilities. It can provide the basis for wartime expansion. But you won't get what you want out of it by expecting it to act as if it were composed of people whose salaries you are paying and whose time is committed to your command.
 
This is why I'm locked into my concept of hybrid 30/70 battalions where the RegF leads the battalion and has a full coy of RegF over and above the O<LY folks integrated into the companies.

🍻

I agree. That's the only practical improvement that would make a significant difference in the readiness and sustainability of the ARes. And, by extension, the Reg F.

But, of course, we've just sent each to their own corners of the country and said 'carry on'. So we'll see how well that works ;)
 

"The MoD is asking industry for a “jet-turbine, high-subsonic, fixed-wing STOL (Short Take-Off and Landing) autonomous collaborative platform capable of launching and recovering to a Queen Elizabeth-class carrier without catapults or arrestor wires”."

"The target is a technical demonstration at sea by the end of 2026, showing an “attritable Tier-2” aircraft with credible payload and endurance that can do intelligence-surveillance, strike and even air-to-air refuelling – a vital complement to the manned F-35B. In short, a competition has been launched to build a drone for the carrier, and one you can afford to lose. “Tier-1” means a one-shot system, like most of the drones used by the Russians, the Houthis and the Iranians: Tier-2 is one that is quite capable of coming back from a mission but cheap enough that you don’t cry if you lose one, like many American unmanned systems. Tier-3 is a high-end job that you can’t afford to be losing very often."

"there haven’t been a lot of higher-end, jet powered drones built and when they are they are designed as Tier-1 disposable strike weapons (aka “cruise missiles”). "

So terminology evolves.

Tier 1 UAV - One way UAV like a cruise missile
Tier 2 UAV - Reusable round
Tier 3 UAV - Multi-Mission

.....

"the UK armed forces desperately need mass now after years of pursuing exquisite equipment"



"We now need the Government to create the environment in which Vanquish can happen fast, probably by helping our smaller companies thrive. This requires a cultural shift, particularly around our tolerance for risk. As well as being a useful weapon and/or sensor, Vanquish could be part of this shift.

It will have real utility too. As missile speeds and ranges increase, and submarines and their torpedoes improve, anything that can provide airborne surveillance beyond the reach of the limited Crowsnest helicopter system is a good thing. Something that provides airborne intelligence for the 98 per cent of the time spent not fighting is also useful. The few F-35s we do have at sea are crippled by the lack of air-to-air refuelling, too. Vanquish, and whatever it spawns in due course, could do all these tasks. It could be ready to contribute to complex strike operations long before the F-35B will be, sadly.

The US Navy and others are not standing still. The US has its carrier-borne MQ-25 jet: the Top Guns, not keen to be put out of a job, have managed to limit it to being just a tanker for now but it has good Stealth and would be a useful contributor to strike, electronic warfare and intel-reconnaissance if it was allowed to be. Experience shows that if there is a dangerous mission to be carried out, the uncrewed option is always the first choice in real life, no matter how Maverick and Rooster may feel about that."

....

And this ex-RN surface commander can't resist stirring the pot a bit.

"The RAF may look at Vanquish and say that the short-takeoff requirement, necessary for operations from the carriers as they now stand, imposes unacceptable limitations on capability (much the same argument can be made against the F-35B). That may tempt the airmen to go instead for a long-runway variant: or they may yield to the very strong tendency of all air forces to suppress and limit unmanned aircraft as much as possible in favour of manned ones."
....

The author bemoans that the carrier can't carry its full complement of 36 F35Bs due to lack of aircraft available.
I wonder how many "Vanquish" aircraft could fit in the footprint of a single F35? Could they be parked sitting on their tails?

F35B
Length 15.6 m
Width 10.7 m
Height 4.36 m
Mass - Empty 14,729 kg

Valkyrie
Length 9.1 m
Width 8.2 m
Height NA
Mass - Empty 1,134 kg

Air Wolf
Length 3.3 m
Width 1.9 m
Height 0.6 m
Mass - Empty 59 kg
 

Matryoshka drones.

1760106195032.jpeg

Drones launching drones launching drones.

2722 kg (MTOW), 5600 km Valkyrie
which launches
Lumberjack (130 kg and 320 km)
which launches
Hatchet. (3 kg glider)

 
A lot of those small airlines are where your future crop of pilots for large aircraft come from. You might be solving one problem while creating a new one. The pay a lot of these small plane pilots get, is not great, but they do it in the hopes of moving to the big leagues.

This was brought back to my attention.

Today's thoughts.

My father started off his married life with an AI milk cart.

He loaded up the cart at night. Got up at 2 in the morning and climbed on to the cart. He got off when the cart stopped and delivered the milk. The cart moved on to the next delivery and stopped again.

The cart was horse drawn. The horse knew the route, including the way back to the dairy.

....

I am told that when the computer dies on an F35, and many other Fly By Wire aircraft, the only viable couse of action is to eject. The aircraft is unflyable by conventional means.

That suggests to me that those pilots and my father had a lot in common. They were more like passengers than drivers. More like commanders than pilots.

....

What does that mean for this discussion? It means UPS agents in AI planes managing the delivery of goods..... and people.

The skills necessary to supervise a flight just changed.

Fire the pilot. Keep the head steward.
 
My grandfather delivered ice and milk by cart. The horse knew their route well. Apparently it was quite the issue when they changed driving from the left to the right, Humans adapted quickly, the horses not so much. Everyone had to make way for the horses till they died off or retired.
 

British Army training FPV pilots. Drones as a delivery system for anti-tank, anti-personnel and anti-structure packages.
 
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