You call it depth. I call it utility.
While I agree with a very few of the things you say I'm particularly opposed to the concept you have of 10 brigades four of which have 1 deployed and heavy equipped, 1 also heavy and ready rotatable with the 1st, and 2 are light ready brigades all presumably RegF or RegF heavy. The other six brigades are basically home guard with civilian equipment and primarily ResF. 10 identically manned brigades as identified would range from 3-5,000 pers so a field army of 30-50,000 folks roughly in the range of the current total army strength give or take 10,000.
This has the makings of another Hong Kong disaster for the deployed forces. Even assuming that Canada doesn't execute on the lesson it has already learned, that the "unit of action" is the division and keeps its deployed force at 2,200, the force that you describe cannot be maintained by the paltry two "heavy" bdes, even if augmented by the two "light" bdes in peacetime, much less wartime. In an LSCO I would expect that your "heavy" brigade will be out of people and equipment within a month, assuming it can mount a viable defence. There is neither trained personnel strength nor equipment strength to support that beyond one rotation. You can't count on the other six brigades as they have neither the equipment or training to play a role.
IMHO, you cannot ignore:
1) the need for a divisional structure (and I propose smaller than 15,000 pers);
2) the fact that at some point we need to be prepared to put a division in the shop window in Europe either manned or with flyover troops and forward deployed equipment;
3) that you will need at least two additional fully equipped and trained divisions to sustain the deployed force
By my count that is six manoeuvre brigades, three arty brigades, three sustainment brigades and related divisional troops lets say 33,000 folks a mix of say 15,000 RegF and 18,000 ARes. What's important here is not just the personnel and the equipment but also the recruiting base and the manufacturing base to sustain that for any period extending beyond six months. If you can't plan to do that then you've written the deployed force off before you ship it overseas. Each of these divisions should be expandable in mobilization so that each can triple itself in size with civilian recruits and stockpiled or newly manufactured equipment. In short should we become involved in LSCO, one division fights, one division provides immediate sustainment and the third forms the core of three new divisions.
What do you concurrently need in Canada over and above the three expeditionary divisions. I'm vacillating but my guess is a base of three divisions - one east coast/Prairies, one west coast/Quebec and one centre/Ontario. Each with two to three manoeuvre brigades, a fires brigade and a sustainment brigade. Their brigades would be substantially different. East and West would have an A2AD brigade on their respective coasts and an interior brigade. The central division would have a light airborne/air transportable brigade oriented on the north and one or two interior brigades. All three divisions have one or two large Canadian Ranger groups under their command. Canadian Rangers would have minimal training and equipment to the point of being viable security force augmentees. "Interior" brigades are light armoured but fully trained in "heavy" operations so as to make them available as replacements in any division. Fires brigades are oriented towards A2AD fires and air defence. Division size could vary based on location but I would say the total would be 10,000 RegF, 20,000 ResF and >10,000 Canadian Rangers.
We're roughly on a par with numbers and not far off from the current army establishments which definitely need to grow the number of reservists and, perhaps, the RegF.
It's the depth that matters. Depth at a reasonable cost comes from mobilizability of lower cost resources where you can. BUT, you can't cheap out on certain issues otherwise you are producing neither a credible deterrent to prevent war, nor a viable force capable of being sustained in LSCO.
Incidentally,
here's a recent Staff College paper on mobilization (by a gunner) that's quite thought provoking.
www.ctvnews.ca
