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Informing the Army’s Future Structure

My arguments all start from an unpopular premise. The unpoular premise I have been arguing for lo these many decades is that, like charity, defence begins at home
This doesn’t explain or support why there should be a full time occupation with a unique career management structure for the glory of the unique career management structure.

Maybe step back from the career focus of your force design and answer: What is the threat that requires a substantially large Domestic Defence Force? What is it defending against?
 
In what way?

An expeditionary air force is one of the key requirements of any NATO commitment. We deploy RCAF resources internationally all the time, e.g.,



“We’re going to exercise a concept that is called ‘agile combat employment.’ Basically, we’re deploying to unfamiliar aerodromes and unfamiliar operating conditions,” Tremblay-Verreault said.

 
An expeditionary air force is one of the key requirements of any NATO commitment. We deploy RCAF resources internationally all the time, e.g.,



“We’re going to exercise a concept that is called ‘agile combat employment.’ Basically, we’re deploying to unfamiliar aerodromes and unfamiliar operating conditions,” Tremblay-Verreault said.


I agree. We occasionally deploy 4 to 8 fighters. Out of a fleet of 40 to 80 fighters plus or minus.

The bulk of the effort is domestic and held domestically. It is available to usefully counter threats to the nation and the state.
 
This doesn’t explain or support why there should be a full time occupation with a unique career management structure for the glory of the unique career management structure.

Maybe step back from the career focus of your force design and answer: What is the threat that requires a substantially large Domestic Defence Force? What is it defending against?


Start from here and tell me how the Canadian Armed Forces contributes to managing each of those threats. Specfically reference its role as the govenment's last resort when the unexpected happens or a particular threat achieves a higher than anticipated level.
 
I agree. We occasionally deploy 4 to 8 fighters. Out of a fleet of 40 to 80 fighters plus or minus.

The bulk of the effort is domestic and held domestically. It is available to usefully counter threats to the nation and the state.
I think that's a leap. Most of our fighters are here because we need to train with them on a day to day basis to keep pilot proficiency. I expect there probably is a number required under our NORAD alert requirements (but have no idea how many those are).

I guess if you want to stretch the analogy, over 90% of our army is present in Canada at any given time so they must have a priority role for the defence of Canada to counter threats to the nation and state rather than expeditionary roles.

🍻
 
I think that's a leap. Most of our fighters are here because we need to train with them on a day to day basis to keep pilot proficiency. I expect there probably is a number required under our NORAD alert requirements (but have no idea how many those are).

I guess if you want to stretch the analogy, over 90% of our army is present in Canada at any given time so they must have a priority role for the defence of Canada to counter threats to the nation and state rather than expeditionary roles.

🍻

Fair enough.

10%.

You want 1 brigade overseas.
I want 9 brigades in Canada.

You want a functional, fully staffed and equipped and well supported brigade overseas? I want 9 at home.

You want a regiment of guns and an anti-air regiment overseas? I want 9 at home. But I don't think I need 9 Field regiments at home. I will give you 3 more for rotational support and turn the other 6 into IAMD regiments - whatever those may look like.

You want 100 tanks / heavy direct fire support vehicles overseas. Give me 900 at home. But again I don't need 900. I will give you 300 and spend the rest of the equivalent value on light armoured vehicles, oversnow vehicles, riverine vessels, utility vehicles and helicopters.

And so on and so forth, etcetera und so weiter.
 
You will create little pools of stagnation where top leaders hang-on for years and the tallent below them quits because there is no local prospect for advancement and no mechanism to move to where advancement exists.
Which the Res F already is, so definitely a job for Res F...
 
The LAV issue is not surprising given the origins of the LAV in the AVGP program which was originally envisaged as a domestic security vehicle and trainer with many folks proclaiming it would never be used outside of Canada.
I think it’s a significant leap in that respect. At the time the 6x6 MOWAG Piranha (that the AVGP series was license from) was generally seen as a domestic security vehicle, but the LAV-25 with the USMC brought the 8x8 LAV 2.0 to the forefront as an expeditionary combat vehicle.

There are a number of European nations that are planning on buying a lighter LAV III design than the LAV 6.0 as GDLS acquired MOWAG has started pushing the 8x8 and 10x10 systems in Europe. But they are much more along to the lines of the Canadian LAV III design as opposed to the double v hull 6.0 series and don’t share common engines or drive train.

The foreign service vehicle was the M113 as used by the US. The bison, too, was intended for domestic service while the M113 continued in foreign service.
So the Reg Force never planned on using the Bison as a domestic vehicle. While yes the original concept of buying 199 for the PRes was by nature a domestic service- but that lasted about as long as the ink was dry on the contract.

One year ago you would have had no argument from me. I've become more equipment agnostic with the predominant view being that I couldn't give a frig where the origin of the equipment initially comes from so long as we have the IP and can manufacture it ourselves. Americans have become unreliable allies.
Unreliable or not, we are the only player who has cards in a larger Russian or Chinese conflict. But yes the ability to have domestic manufacturing of both consumables (munitions many spare parts etc) and core systems is a must have for Canada to be able to try to stand on its own without needing to lean on our leg to keep you upright.
Maintenance is a big issue and quite frankly I don't care if you're running an M1 or a Leo as whatever organization you link into has a supply/maintenance system that doesn't interlock well with ours. We'll be lucky if the NATO standard ammo is interchangeable enough without having to adapt to it during a crisis moment.
Ah the joys of STANAG…
British 105mm Artillery and 120mm tank guns are really only the ammunitions that aren’t compatible. The UK has let stuff slip so far, they will be begging for ammo long before the CA does (scary huh!)
Amongst other things, this is why I feel we need to form the core of a division with a Canadian theatre support structure. A brigade might do, anything smaller definitely won't.

🍻
I fully agree with you there.
 
But you aren’t. You are putting forth a case without any justification.

Any financial or other organizational efforts should be linked to a justifiable cause. Which many of us do not feel you make.

I feel your feels.
 
I feel your feels.
Based on our PM's I think it is more of a terminology issue.
You want depth - which is what many of us want for the CA as well. We may differ on what that exactly means - but I always believe that ones Primary Reserve should be 1) Equipped to the same standard as the Regular Army 2) At least 3-4x larger than the Regulars.
This requires a lot of domestic manufacturing - as well as a viable organization and training system for a hybrid force.
Older Equipment is reset and placed in war stocks to enable massive expansion if needed for a global conflict.
 
You call it depth. I call it utility.

The mantra for as long as I can remember is that a soldier trained for what you now call LSCO can do any lesser job therefore we should train and equip everyone to the highest standard.

But

The cost of equipping and training a full time professional army results in a vanishingly small army

And

an army that finds many tasks to be beneath it.

In my world it lacks utility.

...

In my world the key requirement for any army is manpower. Specifically organized manpower that serves the needs of the government of the people that pay the taxes.

Not all of those people need to be on the payroll all the time.

Not all of those people need to be able to operate as a cog in an armoured division in a LSCO. They don't need the equipment. They don't need the training.

They do need some equipment and some training but they can contribute usefully in disaster management and local security with basic skills, commercial vehicles and small arms. Even commercial comms.

I stipulated 10% up thread. I'll stick with that.

An army of 10 brigades with the intention of supplying 1 brigade on permanent foreign service.

I start from 10 equal sized brigades. Same number of bodies when on operations.

All the brigades are equipped with the same civilian vehicles, the same civilian comms and the same PPE and small arms. That is the base line.

1 brigade, the one for foreign service has additional equipment. It has all the necessary high tech kit to survive and succeed in the field.

But it can't stay there forever. It needs to be rotated out and other troops need the experience.

So

Three more brigades.

One a ready brigade identically equipped and organized to the deployed brigade.

The other two are primarily light brigades with a mech unit within its ranks to cover eventualities that light troops can't handle, to provide support to the light troops and to maintain a core of skills so that the brigade can rotate back into the ready and deployed positions.

If all these brigades have the same number of people but the bodies are not required for operations then they are held on strength but LOB. Some folks might think of that as a kind of reserve.

So far I have accounted for 4 of my 10 brigades.

The other 6 brigades, located in Canada, by virtue of their civilian equipment, are capable of relocating across Canada by road and supplying assistance to any community on the road network. They can communicate. They can navigate. They can supply useful man power. They can supply security.

The government can stockpile civilian vehicles and phones as well as PPE and small arms to the benefit of the economy and the community.

Where specialised vehicles are advantageous, oversnow, amphibs, riverine or armoured then they can be made the responsibility of transport companies under an enlarged Service battalion.

Which leads to organization.

10 brigades identically organized.

HQ
C5ISR Regiment
Service Group or Regiment
IAMD Regiment

The professional backbone of all the brigades. In the 6 domestic brigades the transport companies of the Service groups are manned by part timers. The IAMD is manned 24/7.


Fd Ambulance
Construction Engineers

Common to all brigades. Reserve heavy at home.

And finally we come to the soldiery bit.

Deployed and Ready Brigades

3x CA battalions on the Swedish model (22x MBT, 26x IFV)
1x Arty Regiment (16x Guns, 8x Rockets).
1x Cbt Engr Sqn

3rd and 4th Brigades

Same kit
2x light role battalions
1x CA battalion
1x Arty Regiment
1x Eng Sqn
Kit surplus to requirement in storage and maintenance.

6 Domestic Brigades

1x Cavalry (Patrols) Regiment
3x Infantry (Security) Battalions
All enhanced by independent coys and sqns at lower levels of readiness.
All providing one Class B/C QRF subunit at NTM.

The Arty Regiment swaps its guns for more rockets and stands up as a second IAMD regiment.

And I will take all the unpaid civilian volunteers I can get ahold of for they also serve who only stand and wait.
 
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