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Informing the Army’s Future Structure - CAMO Discussion

The latest CANFORGEN with the GOFO appointments is interesting.
1st Canadian Division ( the new regular force manoeuvre Div) will have a MGen and two BGens.
2nd Canadian Division ( the reserve Division) will have a single BGen.

So we know who will be taking orders from whom...
 
The Reserves are now at the "ok x is happening but it's actually good for you"

I don't know why but this picture came to mind ;)

doctor who pat GIF
 
Looks like someone leaked the ORBAT to the globe and mail for the maneuver div. Thos is why we cant have nice things


For the first time, the army appears to be establishing a dedicated Aviation Brigade, bringing helicopter assets under its own command rather than relying on the Royal Canadian Air Force.

I says “Pardon?” :oops:
 
You do read correctly a full aviation brigade, ive seen detailed break downs of it, and the need for this brigade is really driving NTac discussions
I can guess a couple of the topics at the top of the list are "cost" and "vulnerability", which I doubt have changed since the Golden Age of aviation (Vietnam war), leaving aside the "which branch controls it" parochial/practical discussion.

On pg 52 of "The Rise and Fall of an American Army" by Shelby Stanton, commenting on the establishment of 11th Air Assault Division in 1963:

"Many senior Army generals were adamantly against the idea. They weren't sure helicopters were thick-skinned enough to survive on the battlefield, but they were sure such a conglomeration of expensive gadgets would eat up the Army's budget."

and

"The Army staff was both right and wrong. The 11th Air Assault Division turned out to be frightfully expensive, but on the other hand, the new production models of Bell helicopters, being called Hueys, were proving fairly dependable."

The book is full of examples of the advantages of airmobility, and the costs when confronted by purposeful anti-air defences. Obviously judicious employment is necessary.

I also guess that if we had an aviation brigade purposed for mid-intensity conflict and higher, its assets would also be useful and used for a lot of lesser operations. It would not sit in Canada alternately exercising and collecting dust.
 
I can guess a couple of the topics at the top of the list are "cost" and "vulnerability", which I doubt have changed since the Golden Age of aviation (Vietnam war), leaving aside the "which branch controls it" parochial/practical discussion.

On pg 52 of "The Rise and Fall of an American Army" by Shelby Stanton, commenting on the establishment of 11th Air Assault Division in 1963:

"Many senior Army generals were adamantly against the idea. They weren't sure helicopters were thick-skinned enough to survive on the battlefield, but they were sure such a conglomeration of expensive gadgets would eat up the Army's budget."

and

"The Army staff was both right and wrong. The 11th Air Assault Division turned out to be frightfully expensive, but on the other hand, the new production models of Bell helicopters, being called Hueys, were proving fairly dependable."

The book is full of examples of the advantages of airmobility, and the costs when confronted by purposeful anti-air defences. Obviously judicious employment is necessary.

I also guess that if we had an aviation brigade purposed for mid-intensity conflict and higher, its assets would also be useful and used for a lot of lesser operations. It would not sit in Canada alternately exercising and collecting dust.
If you look up the old post Afghanistan senate defense committee report and its recommendations for our helicopter fleets, thats pretty much the way things are going
 
If you look up the old post Afghanistan senate defense committee report and its recommendations for our helicopter fleets, thats pretty much the way things are going
I haven't read those and probably won't.

I'm just hoping that someone will read all the documentation going back to the late sixties (1968 unification) and early to mid seventies during which time the air assets were carved up and assigned to different commands. The army - i.e. Mobile Command - got the 10th Tactical Air Group (10 TAG) which consisted of the "army" helicopters and even the CF-5 close air support jet fighters. The navy - i.e. Maritime Command - got the Maritime Air Group (MAG) including the Sea Kings and Trackers. To an extent this was a continuation of pre-unification service ownership of the service specific air assets.

There were numerous issues both pro and con with this setup but essentially, the air resources had been split between five major Commands. This continued until 1975 when an internal push within the CAF convinced Dextraze (the CDS) and Richardson (the MND) to create Air Command with the mandate to control all air assets in the CAF.

This latest move feels like déjà vu all over again.

I'm generally in favour of the army having management of its own air resources - but it comes at a price - both enormous calls on the budget (remember the army agreeing to throw the first Chinooks under the bus) as well as the management of a whole hockey sock of air related administration from training to air safety. OTOH it might provide a better on ramp to converting legacy aviation resources to newer and more useable assets. Based on @markppcli latest post on the UAV restrictions to customizing drones, I really can't see an innovative culture taking hold in the army anytime soon.

🍻
 
I haven't read those and probably won't.

I'm just hoping that someone will read all the documentation going back to the late sixties (1968 unification) and early to mid seventies during which time the air assets were carved up and assigned to different commands. The army - i.e. Mobile Command - got the 10th Tactical Air Group (10 TAG) which consisted of the "army" helicopters and even the CF-5 close air support jet fighters. The navy - i.e. Maritime Command - got the Maritime Air Group (MAG) including the Sea Kings and Trackers. To an extent this was a continuation of pre-unification service ownership of the service specific air assets.

There were numerous issues both pro and con with this setup but essentially, the air resources had been split between five major Commands. This continued until 1975 when an internal push within the CAF convinced Dextraze (the CDS) and Richardson (the MND) to create Air Command with the mandate to control all air assets in the CAF.

This latest move feels like déjà vu all over again.

I'm generally in favour of the army having management of its own air resources - but it comes at a price - both enormous calls on the budget (remember the army agreeing to throw the first Chinooks under the bus) as well as the management of a whole hockey sock of air related administration from training to air safety. OTOH it might provide a better on ramp to converting legacy aviation resources to newer and more useable assets. Based on @markppcli latest post on the UAV restrictions to customizing drones, I really can't see an innovative culture taking hold in the army anytime soon.

🍻
As much as I am a huge believer in Army Aviation, as you note the CA doesn’t have a proven track record with adulting where Aviation is concerned.

My concern is they will be the first to go when a budget or PY cap comes in - as the CA is notoriously miserly at saving anything outside 9 Infantry BN’s (or at least the line companies -and LtCol roles for 9) then everyone else gets to stand in line.
 
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