I haven't read those and probably won't.
I'm just hoping that someone will read all the documentation going back to the late sixties (1968 unification) and early to mid seventies during which time the air assets were carved up and assigned to different commands. The army - i.e. Mobile Command - got the 10th Tactical Air Group (10 TAG) which consisted of the "army" helicopters and even the CF-5 close air support jet fighters. The navy - i.e. Maritime Command - got the Maritime Air Group (MAG) including the Sea Kings and Trackers. To an extent this was a continuation of pre-unification service ownership of the service specific air assets.
There were numerous issues both pro and con with this setup but essentially, the air resources had been split between five major Commands. This continued until 1975 when an internal push within the CAF convinced Dextraze (the CDS) and Richardson (the MND) to create Air Command with the mandate to control
all air assets in the CAF.
This latest move feels like déjà vu all over again.
I'm generally in favour of the army having management of its own air resources - but it comes at a price - both enormous calls on the budget (remember the army agreeing to throw the first Chinooks under the bus) as well as the management of a whole hockey sock of air related administration from training to air safety. OTOH it might provide a better on ramp to converting legacy aviation resources to newer and more useable assets. Based on
@markppcli latest post on the UAV restrictions to customizing drones, I really can't see an innovative culture taking hold in the army anytime soon.