Informing the Army’s Future Structure - CAMO Discussion

[Kirkhill]

Battle Group, Brigade Group, Division, Corps or Army, there always seems to be more space than troops. There are always open flanks and there is always the risk of envelopments.

Even with the great conscript armies it was not uncommon for whole armies to be encircled and scooped.

Guerilla warfare is the ultimate expression of adaptive disperzed operations. It is very hard to scoop a guerilla army.

There might be something to be said for small combined arms teams roving the field in medium armour defining the shape of the field and determining where it is best to bring the heavies into the fight.

Or where to bring the lights in when the terrain is appropriate and other troops can't reach.

I referenced Bill Slim elsewhere. His 14th Army supported in the Jungle at the heaviest scales he could arrange (light tanks and 25 pdrs) by air (fighter-bombers, STOLs and C47s), seems like a better starting point than Montgomery's 8th or Patton's 3rd.

Roving forces buried in their own personal clouds of UxVs and sustained by cargo drones and offset precision parachute drops might be a workable plan.

 

[Infanteer]

Foward Line of Own Troops - A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time.

If a picket line is the most forward position of your element, that is your FLOT.

 

[Kirkhill]

Battle Group, Brigade Group, Division, Corps or Army, there always seems to be more space than troops. There are always open flanks and there is always the risk of envelopments.

Even with the great conscript armies it was not uncommon for whole armies to be encircled and scooped.

Guerilla warfare is the ultimate expression of adaptive disperzed operations. It is very hard to scoop a guerilla army.

There might be something to be said for small combined arms teams roving the field in medium armour defining the shape of the field and determining where it is best to bring the heavies into the fight.

Or where to bring the lights in when the terrain is appropriate and other troops can't reach.

I referenced Bill Slim elsewhere. His 14th Army supported in the Jungle at the heaviest scales he could arrange, light tanks and 25 pdrs, by air, fighter-bombers, STOLs and C47s, seems like a better starting point than Montgomery's 8th or Patton's 3rd

Foward Line of Own Troops - A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time.

If a picket line is the most forward position of your element, that is your FLOT.

Given that then, and reports of those pickets moving through 10 to 20 km of contested ground to support, does that mean that the contested zone is actually 20 to 40 km deep when considering both sides?

 

[KevinB]

Given that then, and reports of those pickets moving through 10 to 20 km of contested ground to support, does that mean that the contested zone is actually 20 to 40 km deep when considering both sides?

Potentially. Every theatre will be different, and even areas of a theatre will be non symmetrical.

 

[Kirkhill]

Potentially. Every theatre will be different, and even areas of a theatre will be non symmetrical.

Agreed, even in Ukraine some positions are within a grenade toss of each other. On the other hand some places the OPs are 5 km apart and the FPV zone on either side of that 5 km is another 15 to 20 km making for a contested zone inhabited by pickets that is up to 50 km deep. Gun lines lie outside that zone meaning you need cannons with ranges greater than 50 km to reach meaningful targets. Thus the popularity of rockets and drones.

And the Pacific, and our North, will be worse.

 

[KevinB]

Which is why the Symmetrical Army is setup to fail from the get go.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Our doctrine recognizes linear and non-linear operations, and mentions that linear operations tend to have a defined Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) and also have more secure lines of communication. Non-linear operations tend to be stability/COIN operations. Modern forces have logistical requirements that cannot be hand-waved away, and the requirement for somewhat secure lines of communication exists. That has indeed gotten harder.

The so-what's of FLOT and FEBA for staff officers is that they tend to be become control measures - lines will be drawn that conform to them and assigned names that will be used to determine who needs to be contacted when fires are desired or delineate battlespace between the battle groups conducing the main defensive battle and the security elements in front. The FEBA is very relevant to you in defensive operations. The FLOT would usually be in front of the FEBA and would have your security/observation elements. I suppose the FLOT could also be your FEBA if you have no ground elements in front of you. Some doctrine has a statement that some small friendly elements can be forward of the FLOT. In offensive operations your FLOT is (hopefully) moving.

The Watling article is, as always, interesting. The tools are different, but the methods are reminiscent of some WW 1 Western Front methods (crumbling/ bite and hold) where the aim was not to achieve a deep penetration but to grab a chunk of line and then repeat later. Seems like an effective adaptation to the situation with the available resources!

Regarding deep operations and the armoured corps, the Cavalry Regiment in Battle mentions the Deep Manoeuvre Area while recognizing that it is not formalized in Canadian doctrine.

Not linked to that, I think we tend to think of the Deep battle as being primarily executed by fires, starting in a modern sense with Air-Land Battle's efforts to disrupt follow-on-forces of a Soviet invasion of Germany. German and Soviet theorists in the inter-war period, though, wrestled with deep operations in terms of manoeuvre - achieving penetrations and then unhinging the enemy. Habeck's Storm of Steel provides a relatively modern (2003) study of this. Is this still relevant with what we are seeing in Ukraine? Maybe.

 

[dapaterson]

A transport platoon OC is more aware of strategic issues than an Inf Bn CO.

The Bn CO will become a GOFO; the Pl Comd will not.

That is the Army's fundamental problem.

 

[KevinB]

A transport platoon OC is more aware of strategic issues than an Inf Bn CO.

I totally disagree. The BN CO has direct lines of communication to the Bde Commander and Bde staff, the Transport Platoon OC is routed through the Svc BN CoC. They are only getting the information needed for their Company at best - and not a picture of anything beyond Bde. While the OC may become peripherally aware of some logistical issues at the BN and Bde, the CO of an Inf BN should be directly aware of the availability of supplies to their BN (and somewhat the rest of the Bde) as well as aware of the Div Commander’s intent.

The Bn CO will become a GOFO; the Pl Comd will not.

That is the Army's fundamental problem.

The Army’s fundamental issues to me are having constantly needing to rob Peter to pay Paul, and planning for small scale deployments and ignoring larger issues.

Logistics being one of those area that is often ignored except on minor levels.

It’s hard to be aware of the Division intent when you aren’t playing beyond the BattleGroup.

 

[Infanteer]

Given that then, and reports of those pickets moving through 10 to 20 km of contested ground to support, does that mean that the contested zone is actually 20 to 40 km deep when considering both sides?

Yes. A FLOT doesn't mean the bad guys are all in front of it.

The so-what's of FLOT and FEBA for staff officers is that they tend to be become control measures - lines will be drawn that conform to them and assigned names that will be used to determine who needs to be contacted when fires are desired or delineate battlespace between the battle groups conducing the main defensive battle and the security elements in front.

This.

Regarding deep operations and the armoured corps, the Cavalry Regiment in Battle mentions the Deep Manoeuvre Area while recognizing that it is not formalized in Canadian doctrine.

I call that a break-away.

Not linked to that, I think we tend to think of the Deep battle as being primarily executed by fires, starting in a modern sense with Air-Land Battle's efforts to disrupt follow-on-forces of a Soviet invasion of Germany. German and Soviet theorists in the inter-war period, though, wrestled with deep operations in terms of manoeuvre - achieving penetrations and then unhinging the enemy. Habeck's Storm of Steel provides a relatively modern (2003) study of this. Is this still relevant with what we are seeing in Ukraine? Maybe.

The Germans never really had a Deep Battle Concept - it was uniquely Soviet. The Soviets did consider deep battle to composed of operational manoeuvre into the enemies depth.

I'd say this concept was from a period when the most artillery ranged 10km or so. I think the operational range of modern fires systems has created the conceptual change of deep operations into what we recognize it as today. As well, there is a temporal aspect to it. I'm not sure I would consider a penetration into the enemy depth to be a deep operation - it's a successful close operation. I would consider a deep insertion by an airmobile/airborne operation that works to shape/support the close fight to be one.

A transport platoon OC is more aware of strategic issues than an Inf Bn CO.

The Bn CO will become a GOFO; the Pl Comd will not.

That is the Army's fundamental problem.

Huh?

 

[ueo]

A Canadian combat team is defined by its parts (a combined arms grouping based on one or two different manoeuvre sub-units). It might be subordinate to a BG, or it may report directly to the Bde HQ.

But, the US has used the label "combat team" as an adjective for organizations ranging from company to brigade in size to indicate combined arms groupings.

People here like to use both meanings. You need to infer from context.

A lawyerly response!

 

[McG]

On the limitations of the all-purpose independent brigade:

More than Just Another Echelon: Defining the Division’s Function in Large-Scale Combat Operations - Modern War Institute

The fight around Bakhmut that began in the summer of 2022 and dragged on well into the following year exposed an old truth under new conditions: A brigade can keep fighting while reaching operational culmination. Russian and Ukrainian formations fought through months of dense artillery, drone...

mwi.westpoint.edu

 

[GR66]

I get that we have a doctrine about how we'd like the Army to fight and that we're trying to build an Army structure to match the doctrine however in my opinion Canada is in a somewhat unique position in terms of how we are likely to use our mechanized Division (however we're planning on naming it).

Realistically, under what circumstances would Canada be expected to deploy a mechanized Division? Latvia is the obvious answer. In the Pacific in case of a war with China? No, that's not a conflict for mechanized forces. Where else would Canada's political interest justify deploying a full mechanized Division? The Korean War only saw a Brigade Group deployment.

If realistically the only place we are expecting to deploy our mechanized Division is in Latvia in support of our existing Brigade-level NATO deployment then that puts us in a rather unique situation. We know what enemy we'd be fighting and what equipment they have and we even have some significant insight into their TTPs from observing the Ukraine War.

We also have a pretty good sense of what Russia's strategic objective would be. They don't have the equipment or manpower to try and drive deep into Poland where NATO has strategic depth all the way to the Atlantic Ocean. By far the most likely military option would be to take the Baltic States and link up Kaliningrad with Russia proper in order to provide a larger buffer between Russia and NATO and to significantly shorten the front line between the two. In such a scenario Belarus would most likely remain nominally "neutral" in order to significantly shorten the front and limit NATO's ability to perform operational maneuver by flanking the Russians through Belarus. Russia would most likely threaten to counter any NATO breaking of Belarus' neutrality with tactical nuclear weapons.

So Russia's strategic goal would be to take and hold the Baltic States. NATO's strategic goal would then be to prevent Russia from doing so. It would not extend to invading Russia and driving toward Moscow or St Petersburg as that would likely trigger a Russian nuclear response. So the objective would be forward defence in order to prevent the Russians from taking territory in the first place and then retaking any captured territory up to the pre-war borders (and potentially a small buffer zone into Russia to put Baltic communities outside Russian artillery range.

European NATO and the Baltic States in particular will not want to risk nuclear weapons being used on or adjacent to their territory for obvious reasons. That will eliminate options for strategic maneuver through Belarus or into Russia and the political necessity to not give up territory will seriously limit the opportunity for defensive maneuver.

The result is that any war with Russia in the Baltic States will be one of positional warfare - most likely highly urban in nature and highly attritional. I'd suggest that Canadian forces would most likely hold urban strongpoints and use high concentrations of fire to disrupt Russian forces trying to advance. The Russians will try to seep through the terrain between the built up areas and try and engage NATO in urban combat where NATO's advantage in ranged and precision fires are degraded.

That to my mind calls for a force structure more similar to what we currently have rather than moving to a lighter, more maneuverable Divisional structure that some are proposing. I'd keep the Brigades like they are structured now, with an integral Artillery Regiment to provide close fires support and an integral Engineer Regiment to provide the defensive fortifications and mobility requirements of positional and urban warfare. I'd even consider adding a 4th Infantry Company to the Battalions to provide additional manpower depth. Replacing the LAVs with a tracked IFV better suited to movement in a rubbled, urban environment is a no-brainer as well.

The Divisional Fires Brigade would then focus on the isolating the forward Russian units from supply and reinforcement.

Such a structure might not fit our preferred doctrine of Maneuver, but I think it likely better fits the fight that we are most likely to face.

 

[Kirkhill]

I get that we have a doctrine about how we'd like the Army to fight and that we're trying to build an Army structure to match the doctrine however in my opinion Canada is in a somewhat unique position in terms of how we are likely to use our mechanized Division (however we're planning on naming it).

Realistically, under what circumstances would Canada be expected to deploy a mechanized Division? Latvia is the obvious answer. In the Pacific in case of a war with China? No, that's not a conflict for mechanized forces. Where else would Canada's political interest justify deploying a full mechanized Division? The Korean War only saw a Brigade Group deployment.

If realistically the only place we are expecting to deploy our mechanized Division is in Latvia in support of our existing Brigade-level NATO deployment then that puts us in a rather unique situation. We know what enemy we'd be fighting and what equipment they have and we even have some significant insight into their TTPs from observing the Ukraine War.

We also have a pretty good sense of what Russia's strategic objective would be. They don't have the equipment or manpower to try and drive deep into Poland where NATO has strategic depth all the way to the Atlantic Ocean. By far the most likely military option would be to take the Baltic States and link up Kaliningrad with Russia proper in order to provide a larger buffer between Russia and NATO and to significantly shorten the front line between the two. In such a scenario Belarus would most likely remain nominally "neutral" in order to significantly shorten the front and limit NATO's ability to perform operational maneuver by flanking the Russians through Belarus. Russia would most likely threaten to counter any NATO breaking of Belarus' neutrality with tactical nuclear weapons.

So Russia's strategic goal would be to take and hold the Baltic States. NATO's strategic goal would then be to prevent Russia from doing so. It would not extend to invading Russia and driving toward Moscow or St Petersburg as that would likely trigger a Russian nuclear response. So the objective would be forward defence in order to prevent the Russians from taking territory in the first place and then retaking any captured territory up to the pre-war borders (and potentially a small buffer zone into Russia to put Baltic communities outside Russian artillery range.

European NATO and the Baltic States in particular will not want to risk nuclear weapons being used on or adjacent to their territory for obvious reasons. That will eliminate options for strategic maneuver through Belarus or into Russia and the political necessity to not give up territory will seriously limit the opportunity for defensive maneuver.

The result is that any war with Russia in the Baltic States will be one of positional warfare - most likely highly urban in nature and highly attritional. I'd suggest that Canadian forces would most likely hold urban strongpoints and use high concentrations of fire to disrupt Russian forces trying to advance. The Russians will try to seep through the terrain between the built up areas and try and engage NATO in urban combat where NATO's advantage in ranged and precision fires are degraded.

That to my mind calls for a force structure more similar to what we currently have rather than moving to a lighter, more maneuverable Divisional structure that some are proposing. I'd keep the Brigades like they are structured now, with an integral Artillery Regiment to provide close fires support and an integral Engineer Regiment to provide the defensive fortifications and mobility requirements of positional and urban warfare. I'd even consider adding a 4th Infantry Company to the Battalions to provide additional manpower depth. Replacing the LAVs with a tracked IFV better suited to movement in a rubbled, urban environment is a no-brainer as well.

The Divisional Fires Brigade would then focus on the isolating the forward Russian units from supply and reinforcement.

Such a structure might not fit our preferred doctrine of Maneuver, but I think it likely better fits the fight that we are most likely to face.

The problem, as I see it, is that we know what we have today. We know what our likely allies have today. We know what the enemy has today. And we know how battles are being fought today.

We don't know what the situation is going to look like tomorrow, let alone 5 or 10 years from know. And we are writing programs for 2030, 2035 and 2040. Was the current war predicted on 22 February 2022?

Or the rate of change?

 

[FJAG]

We don't know what the situation is going to look like tomorrow, let alone 5 or 10 years from know. And we are writing programs for 2030, 2035 and 2040. Was the current war predicted on 22 February 2022?

And yet we have to plan for tomorrow on our best guess what that will bring assisted by a programmed flexibility to allow us to react when it doesn't.

That to my mind calls for a force structure more similar to what we currently have rather than moving to a lighter, more maneuverable Divisional structure that some are proposing

I guess that I'm one of those who advocates for lighter divisions in order to make them more manoeuvrable.

My analysis of Latvia is unburdened by knowing what the real operational plans are or how the many wargames run by Canada have played out. Here's my gut reaction based on a map recce.

Looking at Latvia I see a border with Russia that is roughly 160kms and, Latvia at it's widest when the Belarus border is added in is roughly 200 kms. Considering a div can practically hold a frontage of 20-30 kms in the traditional model, you'd need in excess of five divs to hold the line (ignoring depth). We don't have those. Nor do we have an urban environment. Eastern Latvia is farmlands, woods, lakes and boggy ground with only a few urban areas dense enough to be considered "urban terrain." It ranges from wide open to areas where the ground conditions hinder and canalize mechanized forces, but not foot borne or air mobile forces.

Latvia main strategy is not to lose land and is partially based on being a part of a Baltic Defence Line but its 10,000 member National Guard units are regionally dispersed and lack tactical manoeuvrability. It's active army is limited to one mechanized brigade. There are tens of thousands of reservists but quality and available weapons vary. NATO contributes one multinational mechanized brigade and, of course, some NATO rapid response forces such as the Allied Reaction Force.

In short, there are not enough forces in Latvia to cover the geography and the size of a single Canadian division is almost irrelevant as it will not be deployed to hold ground per se. More likely than not, Canadian forces will need to be used to rapidly counter any significant penetrations of the Baltic Defence Line which means that rapid response and manoeuverability in the face of a hostile drone/fires environment, is required. IMHO, two 10,000-man mech divisions are preferable to one 20,000-man one.

However, the issue quite simply is not how many divisions Canada is prepared to commit but how many men Canada is prepared to commit. One can't merely assume that if we form a monstrous 20,000-man division that Canada will deploy all of that. Canada's history over the last three to four decades is replete with deployments that are based on manpower ceilings set by the GoC. Based on those limitations the CAF has continuously deployed mashed together ad hoc units. IMHO, that needs to stop. Quite frankly I think that the GoC is much more likely to agree to deploy a doctrinal "pocket division" of 10-12,000 (plus theatre support) than the bloated cow that 1 Div is becoming. Assuming that is the case then we should now be forming "doctrinal" divisions to match that decision and, if so, take those 20,000 folks in 1 Div and form two 10,000-man divisions. One to deploy and one to stay home to train and supply reinforcements. Start developing the doctrine around what we will be more likely to commit and for the role they are more likely to be required for. . . . And if the GoC is feeling generous in a crisis, then send the 2nd division as well.

$0.02

 

[Kirkhill]

And yet we have to plan for tomorrow on our best guess what that will bring assisted by a programmed flexibility to allow us to react when it doesn't.

The key element there is retained flexibility. Encouraging people to be willing to do the other thing.

Otherwise, when the enemy reads our manual and develops TTPs that render our DS TTPs ineffective what is the DS COA? To stop fighting?