Informing the Army’s Future Structure - CAMO Discussion

[Kirkhill]

Battle Group, Brigade Group, Division, Corps or Army, there always seems to be more space than troops. There are always open flanks and there is always the risk of envelopments.

Even with the great conscript armies it was not uncommon for whole armies to be encircled and scooped.

Guerilla warfare is the ultimate expression of adaptive disperzed operations. It is very hard to scoop a guerilla army.

There might be something to be said for small combined arms teams roving the field in medium armour defining the shape of the field and determining where it is best to bring the heavies into the fight.

Or where to bring the lights in when the terrain is appropriate and other troops can't reach.

I referenced Bill Slim elsewhere. His 14th Army supported in the Jungle at the heaviest scales he could arrange (light tanks and 25 pdrs) by air (fighter-bombers, STOLs and C47s), seems like a better starting point than Montgomery's 8th or Patton's 3rd.

Roving forces buried in their own personal clouds of UxVs and sustained by cargo drones and offset precision parachute drops might be a workable plan.

 

[Infanteer]

Foward Line of Own Troops - A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time.

If a picket line is the most forward position of your element, that is your FLOT.

 

[Kirkhill]

Battle Group, Brigade Group, Division, Corps or Army, there always seems to be more space than troops. There are always open flanks and there is always the risk of envelopments.

Even with the great conscript armies it was not uncommon for whole armies to be encircled and scooped.

Guerilla warfare is the ultimate expression of adaptive disperzed operations. It is very hard to scoop a guerilla army.

There might be something to be said for small combined arms teams roving the field in medium armour defining the shape of the field and determining where it is best to bring the heavies into the fight.

Or where to bring the lights in when the terrain is appropriate and other troops can't reach.

I referenced Bill Slim elsewhere. His 14th Army supported in the Jungle at the heaviest scales he could arrange, light tanks and 25 pdrs, by air, fighter-bombers, STOLs and C47s, seems like a better starting point than Montgomery's 8th or Patton's 3rd

Foward Line of Own Troops - A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time.

If a picket line is the most forward position of your element, that is your FLOT.

Given that then, and reports of those pickets moving through 10 to 20 km of contested ground to support, does that mean that the contested zone is actually 20 to 40 km deep when considering both sides?

 

[KevinB]

Given that then, and reports of those pickets moving through 10 to 20 km of contested ground to support, does that mean that the contested zone is actually 20 to 40 km deep when considering both sides?

Potentially. Every theatre will be different, and even areas of a theatre will be non symmetrical.

 

[Kirkhill]

Potentially. Every theatre will be different, and even areas of a theatre will be non symmetrical.

Agreed, even in Ukraine some positions are within a grenade toss of each other. On the other hand some places the OPs are 5 km apart and the FPV zone on either side of that 5 km is another 15 to 20 km making for a contested zone inhabited by pickets that is up to 50 km deep. Gun lines lie outside that zone meaning you need cannons with ranges greater than 50 km to reach meaningful targets. Thus the popularity of rockets and drones.

And the Pacific, and our North, will be worse.

 

[KevinB]

Which is why the Symmetrical Army is setup to fail from the get go.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Our doctrine recognizes linear and non-linear operations, and mentions that linear operations tend to have a defined Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) and also have more secure lines of communication. Non-linear operations tend to be stability/COIN operations. Modern forces have logistical requirements that cannot be hand-waved away, and the requirement for somewhat secure lines of communication exists. That has indeed gotten harder.

The so-what's of FLOT and FEBA for staff officers is that they tend to be become control measures - lines will be drawn that conform to them and assigned names that will be used to determine who needs to be contacted when fires are desired or delineate battlespace between the battle groups conducing the main defensive battle and the security elements in front. The FEBA is very relevant to you in defensive operations. The FLOT would usually be in front of the FEBA and would have your security/observation elements. I suppose the FLOT could also be your FEBA if you have no ground elements in front of you. Some doctrine has a statement that some small friendly elements can be forward of the FLOT. In offensive operations your FLOT is (hopefully) moving.

The Watling article is, as always, interesting. The tools are different, but the methods are reminiscent of some WW 1 Western Front methods (crumbling/ bite and hold) where the aim was not to achieve a deep penetration but to grab a chunk of line and then repeat later. Seems like an effective adaptation to the situation with the available resources!

Regarding deep operations and the armoured corps, the Cavalry Regiment in Battle mentions the Deep Manoeuvre Area while recognizing that it is not formalized in Canadian doctrine.

Not linked to that, I think we tend to think of the Deep battle as being primarily executed by fires, starting in a modern sense with Air-Land Battle's efforts to disrupt follow-on-forces of a Soviet invasion of Germany. German and Soviet theorists in the inter-war period, though, wrestled with deep operations in terms of manoeuvre - achieving penetrations and then unhinging the enemy. Habeck's Storm of Steel provides a relatively modern (2003) study of this. Is this still relevant with what we are seeing in Ukraine? Maybe.

 

[dapaterson]

A transport platoon OC is more aware of strategic issues than an Inf Bn CO.

The Bn CO will become a GOFO; the Pl Comd will not.

That is the Army's fundamental problem.

 

[KevinB]

A transport platoon OC is more aware of strategic issues than an Inf Bn CO.

I totally disagree. The BN CO has direct lines of communication to the Bde Commander and Bde staff, the Transport Platoon OC is routed through the Svc BN CoC. They are only getting the information needed for their Company at best - and not a picture of anything beyond Bde. While the OC may become peripherally aware of some logistical issues at the BN and Bde, the CO of an Inf BN should be directly aware of the availability of supplies to their BN (and somewhat the rest of the Bde) as well as aware of the Div Commander’s intent.

The Bn CO will become a GOFO; the Pl Comd will not.

That is the Army's fundamental problem.

The Army’s fundamental issues to me are having constantly needing to rob Peter to pay Paul, and planning for small scale deployments and ignoring larger issues.

Logistics being one of those area that is often ignored except on minor levels.

It’s hard to be aware of the Division intent when you aren’t playing beyond the BattleGroup.

 

[Infanteer]

Given that then, and reports of those pickets moving through 10 to 20 km of contested ground to support, does that mean that the contested zone is actually 20 to 40 km deep when considering both sides?

Yes. A FLOT doesn't mean the bad guys are all in front of it.

The so-what's of FLOT and FEBA for staff officers is that they tend to be become control measures - lines will be drawn that conform to them and assigned names that will be used to determine who needs to be contacted when fires are desired or delineate battlespace between the battle groups conducing the main defensive battle and the security elements in front.

This.

Regarding deep operations and the armoured corps, the Cavalry Regiment in Battle mentions the Deep Manoeuvre Area while recognizing that it is not formalized in Canadian doctrine.

I call that a break-away.

Not linked to that, I think we tend to think of the Deep battle as being primarily executed by fires, starting in a modern sense with Air-Land Battle's efforts to disrupt follow-on-forces of a Soviet invasion of Germany. German and Soviet theorists in the inter-war period, though, wrestled with deep operations in terms of manoeuvre - achieving penetrations and then unhinging the enemy. Habeck's Storm of Steel provides a relatively modern (2003) study of this. Is this still relevant with what we are seeing in Ukraine? Maybe.

The Germans never really had a Deep Battle Concept - it was uniquely Soviet. The Soviets did consider deep battle to composed of operational manoeuvre into the enemies depth.

I'd say this concept was from a period when the most artillery ranged 10km or so. I think the operational range of modern fires systems has created the conceptual change of deep operations into what we recognize it as today. As well, there is a temporal aspect to it. I'm not sure I would consider a penetration into the enemy depth to be a deep operation - it's a successful close operation. I would consider a deep insertion by an airmobile/airborne operation that works to shape/support the close fight to be one.

A transport platoon OC is more aware of strategic issues than an Inf Bn CO.

The Bn CO will become a GOFO; the Pl Comd will not.

That is the Army's fundamental problem.

Huh?