Iran Super Thread- Merged

[KevinB]

Offensive War of Choice is an interesting choice of words.

Your most recent reply is at least a little different from the previous. As to me at least, the one I quoted above seemed to suggest that you didn’t consider Israel a democracy liberal democracy.

Yes they have a number of problematic regional issues — but that doesn’t makes them not a democratic society.

 

[Altair]

Offensive War of Choice is an interesting choice of words.

Your most recent reply is at least a little different from the previous. As to me at least, the one I quoted above seemed to suggest that you didn’t consider Israel a democracy liberal democracy.

Yes they have a number of problematic regional issues — but that doesn’t makes them not a democratic society.

Israel is a country that views itself as under seige, and as such offensive expeditions will be seen as a protecting their nation, especially as they have no strategic depth. Toss in generational trauma of being the target of a genocide and being the only nation in the planet majority Jewish, and you have the unique set of circumstances that allow if not demand that they be bellicose.

Can this be applied to Germany, or France, or Japan, or Australia, or Italy or Canada, or the UK, or and or and or and or, the list goes on, the answer is no.

So dictatorships know this. Public sentiment in democracies sour quickly in offensive wars of choice.So dictatorships can do whatever they damn well please, kill as many innocent civilians as they please, fund terror proxies all they want, no western population will support a prolonged offensive conflict.

This war is/was a perfect example.

 

[Brad Sallows]

The question isn't particularly useful. "What conditions can I pile on to frame a rhetorical question that will essentially define it to have only one answer" is how the exercise strikes me. "Wars viewed as worth it", no matter what kind of government initiated them, was a small set to begin with.

Whoop-de-do.

 

[Altair]

The question isn't particularly useful. "What conditions can I pile on to frame a rhetorical question that will essentially define it to have only one answer" is how the exercise strikes me. "Wars viewed as worth it", no matter what kind of government initiated them, was a small set to begin with.

Whoop-de-do.

Considering how the western democracies fought like demons during WW2 start to finish, same for WW1, I think its fair to point out the discrepancy.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Considering how the western democracies fought like demons during WW2 start to finish, same for WW1, I think its fair to point out the discrepancy.

The major participants all fought like demons. What is it you think you've discovered? That most countries don't go to war unless they're attacked first? That if aggressors escalate far enough or pose a big enough threat, pretty much everything is on the table? That with very few exceptions it's difficult to depend on allies to hang in together and stick to an agreed set of victory conditions?

The US went off-track with Iran when it didn't start taking apart the industrial and transportation infrastructure as the logical next phase after writing down the big-ticket naval and air forces. All the wise men are running around saying, "See? Defeating Iran can't be done." I assure everyone it can be done, and it isn't obligatory to take the path that requires defeating all the armies in the field so that the leadership can be dug out of whatever passes for Hitler's bunker. Limitations people place on their own aims aren't proof something can't be done.

 

[Altair]

The major participants all fought like demons. What is it you think you've discovered? That most countries don't go to war unless they're attacked first? That if aggressors escalate far enough or pose a big enough threat, pretty much everything is on the table? That with very few exceptions it's difficult to depend on allies to hang in together and stick to an agreed set of victory conditions?

That if someone is stupid enough to attack the west, dont take recent wars as any indication that we cannot fight.

With a just justification and a sense of being wronged, the west can still kick a lot of ass, nomatter the cost.

The US went off-track with Iran when it didn't start taking apart the industrial and transportation infrastructure as the logical next phase after writing down the big-ticket naval and air forces. All the wise men are running around saying, "See? Defeating Iran can't be done." I assure everyone it can be done, and it isn't obligatory to take the path that requires defeating all the armies in the field so that the leadership can be dug out of whatever passes for Hitler's bunker. Limitations people place on their own aims aren't proof something can't be done.

I never once thought Iran couldnt be defeated. I did think that these particular leaders couldn't bumble their way to victory.

I actually didnt post about the war for 3ish weeks, seeing if there was a strategy to match the tactics.

Once it was clear there was not, I started posting that we were just waiting until Iran won strategically, and here we are.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Once it was clear there was not, I started posting that we were just waiting until Iran won strategically, and here we are.

What is it you think Iran has "won", other than "not losing"?

 

[Altair]

What is it you think Iran has "won", other than "not losing"?

Ability to toll the strait, 320b, complete removal of sanctions, retaining their arms industry, retaining the ability to enrich uranium.

Thats either maintaining the status quo, or above what they had before.

Win win win win win.

Shame about their navy I guess.

 

[Infanteer]

Success and failure are better terms than winning and losing. Iran was focused on regime survival, so it succeeded. It also appears to have gained additional leverage over a key global chokepoint, so success+.

As I indicated earlier, the US has so far failed to meet its military and political goals. So failure.

The next interesting thing to see is whether the regime that survived can go back and be the regime that can govern.

 

[Altair]

Success and failure are better terms than winning and losing. Iran was focused on regime survival, so it succeeded. It also appears to have gained additional leverage over a key global chokepoint, so success+.

As I indicated earlier, the US has so far failed to meet its military and political goals. So failure.

The next interesting thing to see is whether the regime that survived can go back and be the regime that can govern.

I agree to some extent.

The only thing I would say is, the regime would have survived if they conceded on key interests.

The fact they arent giving up anything while getting key concessions from the USA is very successful if we are looking at it in that light.

Which, if looking at at sun zhu, only makes sense.

 

[Infanteer]

The fact they arent giving up anything while getting key concessions from the USA is very successful if we are looking at it in that light.

Hence why I said "success+"

 

[daftandbarmy]

Bullets don't fly without Supply!...

No Logistics Tail, No Combat Teeth​

Military logistics in warfare rest on two pillars: an industrial one and a supply one. Winning a battle requires more than the ability to manufacture, service, and maintain platforms and equipment at speed and scale. It also demands the ability to deliver those capabilities reliably and securely to forward-deployed forces in distant theaters. The geographical and industrial reality of these elements projects an increasingly prolonged and costly nature of warfare with increasingly uncertain outcomes.

One crucial lesson of the Iran war is that gaining the early operational upper hand and eventually achieving decisive battlefield victory demands both a tolerance for high-tempo attrition and the capacity to absorb severe strain on capabilities. This is a capacity the U.S. does not currently possess, and it is confronting that reality in Iran in real time.

The so-far relatively short Iran war, measured against the scale of other American Middle Eastern endeavors, has already left a serious dent in US strategic munitions stockpiles and equipment reserves. According to research by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in a single regional war against a second-tier military power, the US expended more than a quarter of its prewar JASSM stock, a third of its Tomahawks, and by some estimates the majority of its THAAD interceptors, at unit costs ranging from $2.6 million to $28.7 million per missile. Replenishing some of these systems stretches to 64 months for the most depleted inventories. This pace of munitions depletion and the resulting shortages of precision weapons threaten to overwhelm aging maintenance and logistics chains, leaving the US exposed in other critical theaters. What makes this worse is that pre-Iran war munitions inventories were already insufficient for a conflict with a near-peer power like China.

No Logistics Tail, No Combat Teeth

Military logistics in warfare rest on two pillars: an industrial one and a supply one. Winning a battle requires more than the ability to manufacture, service, and maintain platforms and equipment at speed and scale. It also demands the ability to deliver those capabilities reliably and securely...

www.hoover.org