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Replacing the Subs

Vendors can deliver boats faster than the RCN can train crews

The rapid delivery schedules may not be as important as we all think

Somewhere in the middle, not too fast that we can't keep up with training enough crews and not too slow that retention of said crews becomes a problem.
 
June 30 @1300EST, SK/De, 8/6 I favour stealthier 212CD but think it’ll lean in favour of KSS3 since Hanwha is tying into Alberta via fossil fuels.
 
Vendors can deliver boats faster than the RCN can train crews

The rapid delivery schedules may not be as important as we all think

With regard to the emphasis on schedule, my understanding from media reporting is that the RCN has advised the Canadian government that both designs are technically acceptable, and that the remaining factors to decide on which submarine to procure are primarily industrial benefits and delivery schedule.

Having said that, I agree completely with you that the RCN faces a significant manpower challenge. Manning and sustaining a future fleet of 12 submarines will be exceptionally difficult unless there are major improvements in recruitment and retention. I see this, in part, as a "crisis of invisibility," and I've written a paper on that topic.

With respect, though, I think an earlier delivery of the first Canadian Patrol Submarine (for example, 2031 instead of 2032) would actually help address the manpower challenge rather than make it worse.

If I may explain...

My assumption is that transitioning from one submarine class (such as the Victoria class) to a completely new class would likely take several years. More specifically, I believe that transitioning from one class of submarine (such as the Victoria class) to another would, unrealistically, take three years, and more likely around five years (with moderate optimism).

If either TKMS or Hanwha Ocean were able to deliver an operational submarine to Canada as early as 2031, it would allow the RCN to begin building expertise in operating, maintaining, and training on that specific class while the remaining boats are still under construction.

To crew that first submarine, the RCN would probably have to "rob Peter to pay Paul" by reallocating experienced personnel from one, or perhaps two, of the least operational Victoria-class boats. That would create the initial nucleus of maintainers, instructors, and operators for the new Canadian Patrol Submarine class.

Using the KSS-III Batch II as an example, while it requires only a crew in the mid-30s, it has an extra dozen or more bunks that could be used for trainees.

Where I think today's manpower shortage will have its greatest impact is not necessarily on boat #1, or perhaps not even on boat #2, but on boats #3 through #12. Those later submarines will require a sustained and very significant effort in recruitment, training, and retention — far greater than I fear is currently in place.

So, getting back to your original point, I believe an earlier delivery of boat #1 is one of the key elements needed to help solve the future manpower challenge. It gives the RCN more time to build the expertise needed for the new class.

The broader challenge, however, remains what you note, and what I have previously described as the "crisis of invisibility." In my opinion, unless that issue is addressed, recruiting and retaining sufficient submariners for boats #3 through #12 will remain the real long-term challenge.
 
Vendors can deliver boats faster than the RCN can train crews

The rapid delivery schedules may not be as important as we all think
TKMS must pay you well, or you have a lot invested in them...

Between now and 2035, the RCN has a lot of time to train new Submariners. Particularly now that some sub specific trades are being developed, so sailora dont need to qualify surface before going subs in some trades.
 
this is what CTV is saying:

A pre-NATO meeting announcement?

My view is Canada does not want to create an awkward situation at the meeting in front of Norwegian/German NATO allies. So if that CTV video is correct with a pre-NATO meeting announcement, it could be TKMS will be awarded a contract for 12 x Type-212CD submarines.

But if no announcement is made before nor during the first day of the NATO meeting, I speculate a Hanwha Ocean contract award more likely.

If an announcement is made for Hanwha Ocean KSS-III-batch II prior to the NATO meeting, I would not want to be the Canadian military and government officials in that NATO meeting explaining such to the Norwegian and German allies.
 
I disagree.

The Poles are spending a crapload of money on Korean kit. No one in NATO (to my knowledge) is giving them a hard time about that.

The reality is that TKMS has a full order book with the German/ Norwegian orders- so much so that the proposed delivery schedule for Canada actually has them each giving up an early boat.

It is actually better for NATO if Canada buys Korean. Overall, more boats in the water sooner for the Alliance.
 
I disagree.

The Poles are spending a crapload of money on Korean kit. No one in NATO (to my knowledge) is giving them a hard time about that.

The reality is that TKMS has a full order book with the German/ Norwegian orders- so much so that the proposed delivery schedule for Canada actually has them each giving up an early boat.

It is actually better for NATO if Canada buys Korean. Overall, more boats in the water sooner for the Alliance.

I am pretty certain TKMS would more than welcome an order of 12 submarines to Canada, regardless as to how full their order book may be.

As you note, a German politician made that perfectly clear, where he noted that both Norway and Germany would give up one of their early place 'in line' boat deliveries to Canada. They would only make this offer to significantly encourage Canada to procure the European (Type-212CD) boat if they thought it good for NATO.

They (Germany/Norway) definitely have a view different from yours, as to what is better for NATO. I would wager they believe a strong European defence industry, building more boats, is far superior to NATO. As to what is better for Asia-Pacific and Canada's interests there is not so much of their concern.

My own view is closer to yours - as to what might be better for NATO, given what I perceive as a need for Canada to procure replacement submarines for the Victoria class boats as soon as possible. An earlier submarine fleet delivery is good for Canada's Asia-Pacific interests and for Canada's NATO support IMHO.

Regardless - I still would NOT want to be in the shoes of the senior Canadian military officers nor politician, who go to a NATO meeting around 7/8-July if a Hanwha Ocean KSS-III-batch II award was announced a day or two prior. IMHO delaying the decision would make the politics of the situation far easier for those attending.
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The Poles are spending a crapload of money on Korean kit. No one in NATO (to my knowledge) is giving them a hard time about that.

The Poles are also procuring a submarine class from a NATO country.

I refer to the A26 Blekinge-class submarine for Poland's Orka (Orca) procurement program. These submarines are being built by the Swedish defense company Saab Kockums
 
TKMS must pay you well, or you have a lot invested in them...

Between now and 2035, the RCN has a lot of time to train new Submariners. Particularly now that some sub specific trades are being developed, so sailora dont need to qualify surface before going subs in some trades.

I hope as the bew RCN entry training model develops and matures this will help generate more folks, faster.
 
this is what CTV is saying:

Here is a 22-June CTV article (not quite as recent)

where it states ..

Secretary of State for Defence Procurement Stephen Fuhr told reporters on Monday the government expects to announce its sub decision by the end of the month, “plus or minus a couple of days.”

That means the announcement will land just ahead of the next big NATO alliance summit, set to begin on July 7 in Ankara, Turkey.

in that same article former navy commander Mark Norman, now with the consultancy Samuel Associates, gives his assessment as to how Canada would use the submarines.

That CTV article also restates what everyone on this thread already know;

Fuhr has said the biggest factor driving the government’s decision-making is the question of which sub contractor is offering the best package of economic spinoff benefits.

He said that’s because the navy made it clear early on that both submarines meet its operational requirements.

I note no mention of 'schedule' ... whether that is a CTV omission or a Secretary of State for Defence Procurement Stephen Fuhr omission, or whether not covered for reason of brevity in an answer, or for other reasons, I can only speculate.
.
 
I note no mention of 'schedule' ... whether that is a CTV omission or a Secretary of State for Defence Procurement Stephen Fuhr omission, or whether not covered for reason of brevity in an answer, or for other reasons, I can only speculate.
.

Further to the above I note this CTV article from 23-June


where in it I note this quote:

Ottawa has said its scoring of the bids breaks down to 50 per cent for sustainment, 20 per cent for submarine capabilities, 15 per cent for cost and 15 per cent for economic benefits and strategic value.

again - no mention of schedule. I wonder (while dated 23-June) if that quote referencing 'scoring' could be out of date? Or as noted earlier in this thread ... perhaps schedule is indeed no longer much of a factor?
 
June 30 @1300EST, SK/De, 8/6 I favour stealthier 212CD but think it’ll lean in favour of KSS3 since Hanwha is tying into Alberta via fossil fuels.
@KevinB 15 July Split - SK & GER 7 + 7
@HavokFour 1 July SK 12
@OldSolduer 1 July - 3pm EST SK ?
@oldcpu 13 July SK 12
@Oldgateboatdriver 3 July SK 12
@MilEME09 30 June 14:00 EST SK 12
@NavyShooter 2 July SK 12
@MacNav63 13 July SK 12
@Czech_pivo 7 July Ger 12
@Colin Parkinson 8 July SK 9
@foresterab 9 July SK 12
@deepblue202 5 July SK 12
@calculus 10 July SK & GER 8 - 4
@Retired AF Guy 26 June 15:00 SK 10 B2 option 2 B3
@JMCanada 29 June 5+2 SK & 5+2 Ger
@GR66 2 July Australia(!) 6 Collins Class
@Genetk44 3 July SK 12
@vonGarvin 10 July 10:39 ADST SK 9
@Nvlgzr 30 June 13:00EST SK & GER 8 + 6

@JMCanada - You're in the batter's box......
@MilEME09 & @Nvlgzr - You're both in the warm-up circle.....
 
Baseball nerdism...

On-deck circle
I grew up, (Southern-Ontario, on the border of Detroit) using both terms -

Yes, the terms "on-deck circle" and what is colloquially referred to as the "warm-up circle" are the same physical thing. It is the designated circular area located in foul ground between home plate and the team dugout where the next scheduled batter mentally and physically prepares for their turn at bat.
 
Regardless - I still would NOT want to be in the shoes of the senior Canadian military officers nor politician, who go to a NATO meeting around 7/8-July if a Hanwha Ocean KSS-III-batch II award was announced a day or two prior. IMHO delaying the decision would make the politics of the situation far easier for those attending.
I think we are overstating the butt hurt. TKMS has a full order sheet, they sell submarines all over the world (like 45 or something still sailing). The Germans have lost competitions before (the Polish one most recently) and they will express their disappointment and move on. What are they going to do? Stare daggers at the RCN folks? The Germans and Norwegian military side will just shrug and say "Political programs am I right?".

Canada has plenty of other opportunities for cooperation with the Germans. Germany strategically are probably ok with us not cutting into their build program ensuring their submarines arrive faster for themselves. With the cancellation of their AAW frigate program they have more pressure to get their own submarines built sooner.
 
With regard to the emphasis on schedule, my understanding from media reporting is that the RCN has advised the Canadian government that both designs are technically acceptable, and that the remaining factors to decide on which submarine to procure are primarily industrial benefits and delivery schedule.

Having said that, I agree completely with you that the RCN faces a significant manpower challenge. Manning and sustaining a future fleet of 12 submarines will be exceptionally difficult unless there are major improvements in recruitment and retention. I see this, in part, as a "crisis of invisibility," and I've written a paper on that topic.

With respect, though, I think an earlier delivery of the first Canadian Patrol Submarine (for example, 2031 instead of 2032) would actually help address the manpower challenge rather than make it worse.

If I may explain...

My assumption is that transitioning from one submarine class (such as the Victoria class) to a completely new class would likely take several years. More specifically, I believe that transitioning from one class of submarine (such as the Victoria class) to another would, unrealistically, take three years, and more likely around five years (with moderate optimism).

If either TKMS or Hanwha Ocean were able to deliver an operational submarine to Canada as early as 2031, it would allow the RCN to begin building expertise in operating, maintaining, and training on that specific class while the remaining boats are still under construction.

To crew that first submarine, the RCN would probably have to "rob Peter to pay Paul" by reallocating experienced personnel from one, or perhaps two, of the least operational Victoria-class boats. That would create the initial nucleus of maintainers, instructors, and operators for the new Canadian Patrol Submarine class.

Using the KSS-III Batch II as an example, while it requires only a crew in the mid-30s, it has an extra dozen or more bunks that could be used for trainees.

Where I think today's manpower shortage will have its greatest impact is not necessarily on boat #1, or perhaps not even on boat #2, but on boats #3 through #12. Those later submarines will require a sustained and very significant effort in recruitment, training, and retention — far greater than I fear is currently in place.

So, getting back to your original point, I believe an earlier delivery of boat #1 is one of the key elements needed to help solve the future manpower challenge. It gives the RCN more time to build the expertise needed for the new class.

The broader challenge, however, remains what you note, and what I have previously described as the "crisis of invisibility." In my opinion, unless that issue is addressed, recruiting and retaining sufficient submariners for boats #3 through #12 will remain the real long-term challenge.
You're making a lot of assumptions that don't reflect how the RCN actually introduces a new class of submarine.

The biggest flaw is the belief that getting the first boat a year earlier somehow solves the manpower problem. It doesn't. It simply moves the problem forward by a year unless the training, maintenance, infrastructure, spares, simulators, documentation, and certification systems are already being built in parallel. And that is exactly the point people keep missing.

Once the submarine is selected, especially if the Korean design is chosen, you are going to see a steady stream of Canadian submariners, engineers, technicians, maintainers, instructors, and project staff going to Korea long before the first Canadian boat ever shows up in Halifax or Esquimalt. That is where the real transition starts. Not on delivery day. Not when the first submarine sails into Canada. It starts years earlier with Canadians embedded in training, construction, trials, documentation, maintenance planning, and acceptance work.

There is also a rumour floating around that Korea may even lend Canada a boat to accelerate crew training. If that turns out to be true, it would only reinforce the point. The manpower solution is not simply “deliver Boat 1 sooner.” The solution is getting Canadian crews onto the selected class as early as possible, building the training cadre, and growing the support system before Canada receives its own fleet.

Your suggestion of “robbing Peter to pay Paul” is exactly what the RCN has been trying to avoid for decades. Strip experienced sailors out of the Victoria class and you've just degraded the very fleet responsible for keeping the submarine service alive. You haven't created people. You've simply redistributed a shortage.

And while everyone loves to talk as if recruitment and retention are in freefall, the reality is more nuanced. Recruiting and retention are actually improving with the new benefits, pay changes, and quality of life measures recently introduced. Is the problem solved? Of course not. There is still a mountain of work to do. But pretending nothing is changing ignores the fact that the CAF is finally starting to put resources in place to keep people and attract new ones.

The manpower challenge isn't caused by delivery schedules. It is caused by trying to grow from four submarines to twelve while sustaining the boats we already have. Delivering Boat 1 in 2031 instead of 2032 doesn't magically produce hundreds of submariners, engineers, technicians, and maintainers.
 
And while everyone loves to talk as if recruitment and retention are in freefall, the reality is more nuanced. Recruiting and retention are actually improving with the new benefits, pay changes, and quality of life measures recently introduced. Is the problem solved? Of course not. There is still a mountain of work to do. But pretending nothing is changing ignores the fact that the CAF is finally starting to put resources in place to keep people and attract new ones.
We will soon be moving to recruiting submariners right off the street. It will be its own occupation. There is a lot of folks who think subs are super interesting and getting them to self select earlier is a good start.

This will also be a big cultural transition for the RCN. We were always a surface navy that had submarines. Now there will be a true submarine operating navy. It won't be like the Russians (where the sub fleet is the premier fleet and you generally can't get to be admiral without going through the subs), but more like the US, where the submarine arm is strong and well represented.
 
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