You're making a lot of assumptions that don't reflect how the RCN actually introduces a new class of submarine.
The biggest flaw is the belief that getting the first boat a year earlier somehow solves the manpower problem. It doesn't. It simply moves the problem forward by a year unless the training, maintenance, infrastructure, spares, simulators, documentation, and certification systems are already being built in parallel. And that is exactly the point people keep missing.
I disagree with your characterization of my post.
Solves the manpower problem? Solves the man power problem?? Who stated that?
First - lets not exaggerate nor make up words on what I posted. Shall we be clear on that?
I never stated it "SOLVED" the manpower problem. Go back and read my post.
I think you will find my words were "
would actually help address the manpower challenge rather than make it worse.".
Somehow in your lexicon, the words "
help address" equals solved. We speak different languages.
An early boat does thou contribute to solving the issue - mainly in training and ultimately maintenance (via training) needed for the boats.
Once the submarine is selected, especially if the Korean design is chosen, you are going to see a steady stream of Canadian submariners, engineers, technicians, maintainers, instructors, and project staff going to Korea long before the first Canadian boat ever shows up in Halifax or Esquimalt. That is where the real transition starts.
I did not want to go into too much detail in my already long post that evoked your reply, but obviously one does not 'wait' until the 1st boat is delivered before training starts.
And yes, likely about a year, after contract award, ideally the 1st training should start. Perhaps here we have agreement.
Hanwha Ocean will have a big urgent task of translation of already existing South Korean training material into English language, from plannings such from the moment of Contract award to the first manuals being made available. They will have to go through their own cadre of instructors and select those whose English language skills are up to the task of teaching in English language.
Sadly, I suspect one will not see many South Koreans able to teach in the French language. English IS taught in South Korean schools at a moderately young age - French language is not taught so much. Creating French language material training material will be an RCN problem ... Again, I did not want to delve into such detail in my previous post.
So if a late 2026 contract award, then possibly in early 2028 first training starts.
I never stated training starts on "delivery day". Again, go back again and read my post. Do I need to repeat what I posted?
Not when the first submarine sails into Canada. It starts years earlier with Canadians embedded in training, construction, trials, documentation, maintenance planning, and acceptance work.
Again, I never stated when 1st submarine sails into Canada. Again, go back and read my post.
I don't know who you are replying to at times? This is getting tiresome when you infer statements or assessments I did not make.
There is also a rumour floating around that Korea may even lend Canada a boat to accelerate crew training. If that turns out to be true, it would only reinforce the point. The manpower solution is not simply “deliver Boat 1 sooner.” The solution is getting Canadian crews onto the selected class as early as possible, building the training cadre, and growing the support system before Canada receives its own fleet.
There is NO one solution to the recruitment and retention. There is not.
An early boat would help thou.
So what is your view, a later boat delivery is better? Frankly, IMHO, an early delivery helps with the very aspects you stated in that last quote.
We very very clearly massively disagree if you think an early boat delivery does not help.
My view: an early 2028 training start and a 2031 early boat delivery
helps a lot. It does not 'solve'. It helps. Which is my point. It definitely would help more than a later delivery.
I ask you again, is your view a boat delivery in 2032 superior to one in 2031? Is your answer yes? Then let me ask this, is a delivery in 2033 better than one in 2031? Is your answer again yes? Then if you think the later delivery is better, then again, yes, again, we do disagree.
I would say we disagree massively if that is your view.
Your suggestion of “robbing Peter to pay Paul” is exactly what the RCN has been trying to avoid for decades. Strip experienced sailors out of the Victoria class and you've just degraded the very fleet responsible for keeping the submarine service alive. You haven't created people. You've simply redistributed a shortage.
I think you 100% fail to understand the very personnel shortage the RCN has. You don't understand the seriousness. ... and I dare say, I do not believe you are alone. Many do not understand it.
Robbing "Peter to pay Paul" is the ONLY way they will have the people to send in 2028, 2029 in order to get the first batch of training started.
I don't like that any better than you, but it would help massively in getting the ball rolling to solve the initial training problem - one that is clearly very real in terms of the RCN shortage of manpower today.
The RCN can't man the boats they have today, how can they send people to be trained, if they don't "rob Peter to pay Paul" ?
And while everyone loves to talk as if recruitment and retention are in freefall, the reality is more nuanced. Recruiting and retention are actually improving with the new benefits, pay changes, and quality of life measures recently introduced. Is the problem solved? Of course not.
There is no proof of a continuation month after month of such recruitment improvement.
The Canadian Armed Forces experienced one month of improvement.
That is a far cry from the year after year of consistent recruitment and retention improvement they absolutely need. A very far cry.
There is no nuance about this. There is a MASSIVE issue here with an incredibly serious personnel shortage.
There is still a mountain of work to do. But pretending nothing is changing ignores the fact that the CAF is finally starting to put resources in place to keep people and attract new ones.
On this, we agree - in part only.
I would say your selection of the word 'still' is an understatement. Again, one month of improvement does not show the necessary year after year of recruitment and retention improvement needed.
The manpower challenge isn't caused by delivery schedules. It is caused by trying to grow from four submarines to twelve while sustaining the boats we already have. Delivering Boat 1 in 2031 instead of 2032 doesn't magically produce hundreds of submariners, engineers, technicians, and maintainers.
Yes - a boat in 2031 does not magically solve the hundreds of submariner numbers. Nor does a boat delivery in 2032 solve the problem, nor in 2033, nor in 2034, nor in 2035.
NONE of that will solve the numbers problem. You totally miss the point.
A boat delivery in 2031 helps massively to improve the training, and experience needed, sooner, rather than later boat delivery. The early trainees will have to come from existing trained submariners (if the navy can retain current personnel). Only the later trainees can be those new to the navy, if, and ONLY if, the navy can recruit them.
That recruitment and retention is another issue - one which I wrote a paper about.