Couple of points:
With the AVGP's turret weapons (.50 cal and GPMG) came with the required ground mounts, they were not just "turreted weapons". From memory the HMG course required that you be able to fight both from the turret and the ground. This was accomplished by marrying up AVGP drivers courses with HMG courses. The ground mounts were a pain as I take it with the LAV there is equipment space premium. Add into the mix of the Carl G also being carried in the AVGP to be used either in the dismounted role or being fired from the vechicle through the top back hatches. At one point there was some discussion of mortars doing the same but again from memory the gas tank location was one of the main obstacles hence the use of M113s or the 3/4 ton.
In the delima of who gets what or who's job is what, here is what the Russian solution is as of the 1 September 2006:
"In the late 1980s, the Soviets began forming combined arms battalions, which had organic tanks, BMPs, and artillery. The combined arms battalion allowed units to train for mutual support continuously, instead of only during scheduled exercises. However, the combined arms battalion required seasoned commanders who could deal with the training, supply, and maintenance demands of this complex unit. Soviet junior officers were usually younger and less-experienced than their Western counterparts when they commanded at various levels--although they tended to command longer during a career. The combined arms battalion experiment failed due to its complexity, internal turmoil in the army, and leadership challenges." Onto the adventure in Afghanistan where "The terrain worsened the problem of the tactical gap and, in the areas where the tanks could go, tanks and BMPs were often separated and unable to support each other. In the mountains of Afghanistan, the tanks were often left behind and the BMPs and BTRs had to accomplish an independent mission they were not designed for. The Russians decided that the tactical gap between tanks and mechanized infantry is almost inevitable."
However, "To ensure the survivability of tanks, they needed a new system that was built like a tank, but provided mutual close combat support. The new system should provide protection against enemy antitank weapons, infantry, strong points, helicopters, and fixed wing aviation. The new system needed to be an integral part of the armored unit, but it could not be a modern T-35 with five turrets and multiple weapons. The Russian answer was the BMPT tank support vehicle.
It was not an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP) and the Russians were not discounting the value of mechanized infantry in the combined arms team. They were recognizing that the mechanized infantry may not be at the critical point at the critical time. "The BMPT will be part of the Russian armor forces. Initial tactical employment envisions putting one BMPT with two tanks in the field and two BMPTs with one tank in city fighting. "This is probably not the final answer. The BMPT engages secondary targets allowing the tanks to deal with enemy tanks and strong points. The mix will depend on the situation, but a standard platoon deployment of three tanks and one BMPT is most likely"."Russia believes that tracked tanks have a future and that the BMPT will ensure their survivability and future"
Other points:
1)"The Soviets never fielded enough light infantry to match the quality light infantry of the Mujahideen."
2)"The biggest danger to the RPG gunners
was infantry accompanying tanks, so they tried to take out tanks that were out of immediate infantry support range. Further, RPG gunners usually were accompanied by supporting snipers and machine gunners and an assistant RPG gunner carrying an assault rifle. These could protect the RPG gunner from enemy infantry. When practical, the best way to protect ground vehicles from the RPG is to put infantry well forward of the vehicles to find and destroy the RPG gunners. Combat vehicles should stay out of urban areas or areas dominated by overwatching terrain and tall trees
until the infantry has cleared and posted the area."From SA:
"South African and Namibian forces fighting Angolan guerrillas in Namibia during the 1980s learned to give the RPG a wide berth. Their standard drill, when traveling in an armored personnel carrier and encountering Angolan guerrillas with an RPG, was to immediately begin driving around the guerrillas in an ever-widening circle. They would fire into the circle with automatic weapons. The moving vehicle was harder for the guerrilla RPG gunner to hit and the soldiers were able to exploit their mobility and firepower. Dismounting troops to advance on guerrillas while the stationary personnel carrier provides supporting fire is a good way to lose the carrier."
In the tank verses the APC role the "THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE:Cuba's Mythical Victory provides us with "The SADF/Unita force started mopping up the last groups of men left when the tanks suddenly joined in, causing chaos and sending the lightly-armoured Ratels and Casspirs fleeing in all directions. Once the South Africans had found cover in the bush, however, they began to fire anti-tank (HEAT) shells at the tanks, which were at a disadvantage with their long gun barrels in the bush. The Ratels, realising they had the advantages of speed and manoeuvrability, began to circle round the tanks, enticing them into chasing the armoured cars in ever-smaller cricles until the Ratels were able to come in behind the tanks and fire. By the end of the engagement 5 tanks had been destroyed and over 250 Fapla soldiers killed, for the loss of 8 dead and 3 destroyed armoured cars on the SADF side. The South Africans, after their initial shock at encountering the tanks, had adapted their tactics and proved that their armoured cars could cope with tanks by a combination of fast movement and accurate shooting, tactics reminiscent of those used by the Boers against the British over 80 years earlier".
Source:
Grau, Lester W. "The RPG-7 On the Battlefields of Today and Tomorrow" Infantry, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS . May-August 1998
Grau, Lester W. "Preserving shock action: a new approach to armored maneuver warfare".Armor. 9/1/2006
THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE: Cuba's Mythical Victory
http://www.rhodesia.nl/cuito.htm