A bad end looms over Canada's Afghan mission
JEFFREY SIMPSON
From Saturday's Globe and Mail
Now that we've seen the last of the Christmas feel-good stories about Canada's troops in Afghanistan, serious analysis can focus on the tasks ahead for those troops — tasks made more difficult by the lack of progress in 2006.
That lack of progress was not the troops' fault. Instead, it reflected wider, ominous developments over which the Canadians have little, if any, control. These developments include the growing Taliban presence in Pakistan, the refusal of other NATO countries to assume new responsibilities, the Americans' Iraq distraction, the ongoing failure of NATO's poppy eradication policy, and the inability to make a dent against endemic poverty and corruption.
Canada has about 2,500 personnel in the province of Kandahar. Of these, perhaps 800 to 1,000 actually go on patrol. Their job remains to bring peace and stability (with such Afghan soldiers as can be found) to territory roughly the size of Nova Scotia.
The enemies of peace and stability — the Taliban, al-Qaeda, jihadists — are in the province, and over the border in Pakistan. Throughout this winter, these groups have rested, reorganized and trained for the next onslaught.
Borders must be sealed to improve any counterinsurgency's chance of success. The Pakistani-Afghan border, by contrast, is wide open. One slice of territory inside Pakistan adjacent to the border — the so-called federally administered tribal areas — has become what diplomats and intelligence officials quoted in The New York Times call a “Taliban mini-state.”
Last month, the Times chronicled how foreign fighters have implanted themselves in the area, supplanting tribal leaders, sometimes by violence. The foreign fighters have imported from Iraq the use of suicide bombings, car bombs and roadside explosive devices. These tactics will be increasingly used in Afghanistan.
The enemies of stability are also recruiting in Pakistan's madrassas (religious schools). The Times quoted unnamed officials saying the list of youths lining up for suicide attacks is lengthening in the tribal areas and Quetta, the headquarters of al-Qaeda.
Pakistan signed an agreement with the area's tribal leaders that made everything easier for the Taliban and al-Qaeda — and, therefore, more ominous for the Canadians and other NATO forces. The agreement stipulated that Pakistan would withdraw forces from the area in exchange for a pledge by tribal leaders to prevent people from crossing into Afghanistan.
Pakistan's central government essentially gave up trying to control the tribal areas. The result has been a political vacuum into which the Taliban and other militants have moved. It's widely believed that some elements of Pakistan's security forces support the Taliban, either because they sympathize with the Taliban's ideology or prefer a weak Afghanistan.
The Americans went easy on Pakistan's safe haven for the Taliban in exchange for (fitful) co-operation in pursuing al-Qaeda, the use of some military bases, and the shutting down of A. Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation network. The U.S. and NATO retain much leverage over Pakistan.
While the situation in Pakistan deteriorated, so did NATO's overall commitment to the success of the Afghan mission. With security threats rising, NATO countries failed to correspondingly increase the number of forces and reconstruction funds committed to Afghanistan.
When the countries doing the fighting in the troubled south — Canada, Britain and the Netherlands — asked for help, they got next to nothing from the other allies (Poland excepted). These countries, therefore, will spend 2007 facing a redoubtable, better-equipped foe with essentially the same forces as in 2006.
The United States is completely overwhelmed by the catastrophe it created in Iraq. President George W. Bush will make one last desperate attempt to stabilize at least the Baghdad area by sending thousands of additional U.S. soldiers. That deployment means no more troops for Afghanistan.
Police training in Afghanistan, supposedly the responsibility of Germany, is going badly. Poppy eradication, supposedly the responsibility of Britain, is going backward, with the United Nations reporting a record crop in 2006. The profits from the poppy trade help fuel the insurgency and augment corruption. Judicial training, supposedly the responsibility of Italy, is a joke.
Barnett Rubin, the foremost U.S. academic expert on Afghanistan, visited the country four times last year. His eminence gave him access to leaders everywhere. His article in Foreign Affairs chronicles the problems and failures, although he rightly credits Canadians and others (without mentioning them) for preventing the Taliban from winning a fight for territory west of Kandahar.
Failure to provide enough aid, he writes, is leading to rising crime, lack of electricity, deepening poverty, police corruption, and a booming drug economy. Failure to persuade Pakistan to be helpful means a more difficult military challenge. Failure of NATO countries to step up their military contributions (and to redeploy to the dangerous south and east) and to increase reconstruction aid has placed the long-term success of the entire Afghan mission in doubt.
These are factors over which Canada has minimal control. But they are the ones, ultimately, that will determine the fate of the mission in Kandahar.
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