Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS

[Navy_Pete]

It boggles my mind how you can have this happen in this day and age, where anything with lead in it is tightly controlled in the workplace.

By using valves clearly labeled as 'non-potable' in a potable water system?

Don't worry, it's not against code so we're good.

Edited to add: Also, Ken Hansen is an asshat who regularly talks about stuff he knows nothing about; surface ships are no where near as complicated as a spaceship, and non combatants aren't that big a deal. This is also the least complicated non-combatant in the NSS.

Everytime we poke at the AOPs we find things that shouldn't have gotten past class or accepted. They will need some engineering changes to get helo certification, and some other issues with their fire insulation that we're just finding out about. But given some genius put the local activation for the fitted system inside the protected compartment, not really surprised about bad design items, but lost confidence that Lloyd's Register (LR) is anything other than an ISI shill at this point as well.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Peak MARS officer, there: Sure the lower decks who stay onboard longer in their careers than officers may well die of lead poisoning, but that's a risk to them I'm willing to take.

And naturally, spent a decade at CFC as an instructor.

https://ca.linkedin.com/in/ken-hansen-b354661a

He's on the Todd Veinotte show all the time here in Halifax.

He's a disgusting shill.

 

[Stoker]

By using valves clearly labeled as 'non-potable' in a potable water system?

Don't worry, it's not against code so we're good.

Edited to add: Also, Ken Hansen is an asshat who regularly talks about stuff he knows nothing about; surface ships are no where near as complicated as a spaceship, and non combatants aren't that big a deal. This is also the least complicated non-combatant in the NSS.

Everytime we poke at the AOPs we find things that shouldn't have gotten past class or accepted. They will need some engineering changes to get helo certification, and some other issues with their fire insulation that we're just finding out about. But given some genius put the local activation for the fitted system inside the protected compartment, not really surprised about bad design items, but lost confidence that Lloyd's Register (LR) is anything other than an ISI shill at this point as well.

So they used non potable water valves in the FW system, is that confirmed?

 

[KevinB]

So they used non potable water valves in the FW system, is that confirmed?

Based on the article yes.

 

[Navy_Pete]

So they used non potable water valves in the FW system, is that confirmed?

And weirdly there doesn't seem to be anything in SOLAS or LR that prevents that, and we didn't have it clearly in our specs to only use potable water components.

There are federal rules for lead in water on land based system, so is applied for the shore supply, but nothing really for the water on ship systems or on the taps that applies, so it's a bit of a mess.

We went through this 20+ years ago on the 280s where there were a few fittings that had lead that was leaching out into the water, and was fully surveyed and replaced every item (inluding a few that some genius used lead solder for a copper pipe fitting). No idea why we have to specify something like that in a spec, but there you go.

It's made worse by the low mineral content of ROD water, so part of the treatment is to remineralize the water, but they don't clearly say they are replacing the components with lead.

edit to add: lead in water is a general issue in city water supplies as well, and lots of buildings had problems during COVID where the stagnant water let it build up, so there were big flushes etc on the go. There is some ongoing monitoring on the ships in general from previous concerns on the shore supply and stagnant water in the systems generally, but this definitely doesn't help.

Personnally would put in a CF98 for every person onboard the AOPs as a precaution, which is what you are supposed to do for even suspected exposures to things like this (and we'll start doing on the navy side once we get the live fire trainers for the potential carcinogen exposures).

 

[Stoker]

There are federal rules for lead in water on land based system, so is applied for the shore supply, but nothing really for the water on ship systems or on the taps that applies, so it's a bit of a mess.

We went through this 20+ years ago on the 280s where there were a few fittings that had lead that was leaching out into the water, and was fully surveyed and replaced every item (inluding a few that some genius used lead solder for a copper pipe fitting). No idea why we have to specify something like that in a spec, but there you go.

It's made worse by the low mineral content of ROD water, so part of the treatment is to remineralize the water, but they don't clearly say they are replacing the components with lead.

Did it have anything to do with the health Canada changing the guidelines for allowable lead in potable water systems from a concentration from 0.01 mg/L, set in 1992, to 0.005 mg/L in 2019? That caused lots of issues on ships and at land based units.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

You would think that a experienced pipefiitter at the yard would say something.

 

[Stoker]

Personnally would put in a CF98 for every person onboard the AOPs as a precaution, which is what you are supposed to do for even suspected exposures to things like this (and we'll start doing on the navy side once we get the live fire trainers for the potential carcinogen exposures).

Apparently everyone has put in CF 98's and 663's. I had a number of high lead incidents on the ships I was on, usually when the jetty connection is not flushed properly or water being stagnant in our brominater. Flushed then system, tested and carried on. Sounds like the valves used probably would have passed the total allowable lead under the previous pre 2019 limits.

 

[Good2Golf]

You would think that an experienced pipefiitter at the yard would say something.

And deny the OEM of higher-margin re-work?

 

[NavyShooter]

Apparently everyone has put in CF 98's and 663's. I had a number of high lead incidents on the ships I was on, usually when the jetty connection is not flushed properly or water being stagnant in our brominater. Flushed then system, tested and carried on. Sounds like the valves used probably would have passed the total allowable lead under the previous pre 2019 limits.

Dude, I gotta say, you are ever the apologist for ISI's faults.

I will simply add this to the list of times they've screwed up and endangered our sailors.

I have no surprise, as mentioned previously, I use the words "willful deliberate sabotage" along with "thievery" and "incompetence" to describe the work that I have seen from that yard with my own eyes.

Cutting Fiber Optic cables? Stealing brass fittings and cutting off hose ends? Catching their 'workers' sleeping in compartments on the ship during the refit period?

Yeah...now they failed to track and apply standard lead quality levels thus endangering every member of the crew.

I'm not surprised at all that this happened. I'm less surprised that NDQAR failed to pick it up.

 

[Stoker]

Dude, I gotta say, you are ever the apologist for ISI's faults.

I will simply add this to the list of times they've screwed up and endangered our sailors.

I have no surprise, as mentioned previously, I use the words "willful deliberate sabotage" along with "thievery" and "incompetence" to describe the work that I have seen from that yard with my own eyes.

Cutting Fiber Optic cables? Stealing brass fittings and cutting off hose ends? Catching their 'workers' sleeping in compartments on the ship during the refit period?

Yeah...now they failed to track and apply standard lead quality levels thus endangering every member of the crew.

I'm not surprised at all that this happened. I'm less surprised that NDQAR failed to pick it up.

Buds I couldn't give a flying f*ck about things you seen Irving do and I could quote many things I saw FMF Cape Scott has done of a similar nature over the years. I'm going by first hand information I personally have experienced with lead in FW systems on ships that I have been on and first hand information from ships staff on the ships in question. Considering the person who first "broke" this story I would question all the details including the navy trying to cover it up. That being said if Irving is at fault then they should step up and make it right.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Did it have anything to do with the health Canada changing the guidelines for allowable lead in potable water systems from a concentration from 0.01 mg/L, set in 1992, to 0.005 mg/L in 2019? That caused lots of issues on ships and at land based units.

Nope. This is unrelated to that, and due to non-potable water components used in the FW system on AOPs. They are specifically labeled by the OEM as not being fit for potable water, and would have been chosen before 2019 anyway.

There are still general concerns if lines aren't flushed properly etc but this has nothing to do with that.

Someone decided to use cheaper valves that included lead in the components. Class approved it in the design. We are living with it. If Irving met the contract requirements, we need to pay for it to make it right, but also requires an engineering change for the in service ships.

 

[Stoker]

Nope. This is unrelated to that, and due to non-potable water components used in the FW system on AOPs. They are specifically labeled by the OEM as not being fit for potable water, and would have been chosen before 2019 anyway.

There are still general concerns if lines aren't flushed properly etc but this has nothing to do with that.

Someone decided to use cheaper valves that included lead in the components. Class approved it in the design. We are living with it. If Irving met the contract requirements, we need to pay for it to make it right, but also requires an engineering change for the in service ships.

Well that's good clarification, FW quality is always a worry for me. I did hear that there may be a filter system going in to mitigate things until the valves can be changed and the later ships will be have the corrected specs.

 

[Navy_Pete]

Well that's good clarification, FW quality is always a worry for me. I did hear that there may be a filter system going in to mitigate things until the valves can be changed and the later ships will be have the corrected specs.

This is a weird one; it would have been reasonable to assume part of the LR review would have been to make sure the parts in the potable water system were meant for potable water.

We seem to do a lot of double checking on things that were 'certified' by LR. The PMOs and ISSC were set up with small teams with the assumption that the designs would actually be fit for purpose using normal commercial standards and we wouldn't need to heavily review the designs. So far we've had a fire main that doesn't work as designed, a main fire suppression system that wouldn't work on the machinery spaces, main engines whose cooling system doesn't work and some other basic things that are normal basic ship things as well as this issue.

Welding and fitup things are normal growing pains, but this is just poor design and oversight by class. I'm sure we'll keep finding design flaws as time goes by.

 

[childs56]

You would think that a experienced pipefiitter at the yard would say something.

I know a few people who walked away from the shipyard because of the stupidity there. Bring up a issue and your blacklisted.

 

[NavyShooter]

I was once headhunted by staff in the CSC Project Office - apparently a CSE Chief with a good understanding of Navigation and SONAR gear was desirable to them. I explained to the exec that I met with that I had too much pride in myself to ever see my name on the same business card as the word "IRVING"

I'm pretty sure I'm black listed with them. I don't really care.

There's been some bad outcomes from FMF as well - but in my experience, ISI does things that are borderline (or actually) sabotage or theft. The worst that FMF does is usually delays work until the last minute so that they can have weekend overtime approved, particularly in November/December so that they can get their Christmas shopping paid for.

FMF was very unhappy when we tracked their presence onboard ship on a daily basis, and for which work order...then during the weekly PLOW meetings they got their chains yanked and had to actually show up during the SWP, instead of getting away with OT on the weekend before we sailed.

 

[CBH99]

There's been some bad outcomes from FMF as well - but in my experience, ISI does things that are borderline (or actually) sabotage or theft.

Care to elaborate on the kind of nonsense that ISI does, that's sabotage and/or theft? (That you're able to share, ofcourse)

I think we've all heard stories of ships coming out of ISI, and the navy being 'less than impressed'...

 

[NavyShooter]

Cutting open black-water suction pipes in the ship's Mini-Laundry (FRE and MON during MLR) and plugging the same section of pipe with threaded rod and welding rod respectively. Then welding the pipe back into place, thus blocking all of the black water suction in the forward end of the ship.

Cutting the AHWCS cables and tucking the cut ends back into the wiring bundle in the wire-way. We had to use a TDR (Time Domain Reflexometer) to measure how far down the cable the cut was.

Every ship in the fleet loses brass fittings. At one point, we had 2 ships in a row come back requiring all fire-hoses to be replaced because someone cut off the hose ends in the racks. 39 hose stations, 4 hoses per station, that's nearly 160 fire hoses needing replacement. Not to mention the lazy rod covers that went missing on a couple of ships, the brass bulkhead number markers...and so on. The fire sentries from ISI using our extinguishers, and keeping them.

Failing to put up a heated enclosure around the SONAR transducers when the dome had been removed, resulting in them freezing, the rubber separating from the crystal, and having to replace over 10% of the SET's.

The list goes on...

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Have the blockage treated as sabotage and start arresting/investigating and integrating people as if they are working for a foreign government. Throw the book at anyone proven to do wilful acts as espionage, because it might as well be. Stupidity and outright theft can be treated as either by contract or civil charges.

 

[Spencer100]

Cutting open black-water suction pipes in the ship's Mini-Laundry (FRE and MON during MLR) and plugging the same section of pipe with threaded rod and welding rod respectively. Then welding the pipe back into place, thus blocking all of the black water suction in the forward end of the ship.

Cutting the AHWCS cables and tucking the cut ends back into the wiring bundle in the wire-way. We had to use a TDR (Time Domain Reflexometer) to measure how far down the cable the cut was.

Every ship in the fleet loses brass fittings. At one point, we had 2 ships in a row come back requiring all fire-hoses to be replaced because someone cut off the hose ends in the racks. 39 hose stations, 4 hoses per station, that's nearly 160 fire hoses needing replacement. Not to mention the lazy rod covers that went missing on a couple of ships, the brass bulkhead number markers...and so on. The fire sentries from ISI using our extinguishers, and keeping them.

Failing to put up a heated enclosure around the SONAR transducers when the dome had been removed, resulting in them freezing, the rubber separating from the crystal, and having to replace over 10% of the SET's.

The list goes on...

How much is deliberate? How much is pure theft? How much is the miss management? And its hard for any company to manage any project on the scale of these refits when the job is so fest and famine. Also on the costumer side of the house too. Contract management is a skill too, on both sides.

Here is my take away
My guess with your examples in first one union problems. The second one misreading plans or incorrect instruction. The third is just pure theft, that has happened to me even when I put in what I think are the controls. The fire sentries and the extinguishers....I can see this happening as many workers or employees at this level are not very entuned with who owns what and the cost of said equipment. Could be honest mistakes. I have had projects when assets like that are shared and then just packed up by different people and then go to the wrong home. The freezing sounds like pure lack of knowledge.

The main take away I see here is the lack of program and project management on both sides. On the government/RCN side it is my understanding many program managers have retired or moved on. On the company side Irving etc. may never had the skill set and if they ever did it is hard to retain when government work is the way it is.