TCBF said:
If the Reg F foots the bill for the man-days, R&Q, etc.
No. We’d be going down the wrong path in telling the RCDs that they have to cover all the costs (from pay to rations) in order to run reserve individual training courses that the Army did not find important enough to provide a budget for. It is an outstanding recipe for failure.
George has it right. If the decision makers in Ottawa feel that such an approach is appropriate, then the resources should be given to the reserves in the Army & Areas’ business plans.
George Wallace said:
The thought then developed in my mind that if the Corps really wanted to bring Reserve Armour up to speed on the current equipment and tactics, etc., then perhaps the Corps should budget now, and plan now …
But, it is probably already too late even for the 10/11 FY. If the Armd Corps is going to decide it will take a new direction for the training of its reserve units, it needs to make that decision and sell it to the Army early enough that the planning direction can be included when the call letters start cascading downward in the spring.
George Wallace said:
Makes the CLS sound like a "dinosaur" doesn't it. No money for Training Simulators on the big ticket items, but lots for small ticket items. We have small arms simulators, why not simulators to train on the 'big' guns?
Only if you don't look at this in any sort of context of time lines. The SAT & WES did not have to compete with TAPV, CCV, LRPR, etc for project manpower resources or a time slot at PMB, TB, etc.
George Wallace said:
… spend time in the Summer months to run Crses for Reservists. Run Turret Operator (25 mm and 120 mm) for Reservists. Run Surv OP courses. Run D&M Crses. Get rid of the Training Delta. Provide for a good pool of trained pers to draw from to supplement Operations.
Unfortunately, there are not enough vehicles for the regular force to provide this level or training for itself. The plan for all the vehicle procurements that we have planned will only see this reality continue or get worse. I don’t doubt there is significant value to having reserves qualified on the same platforms for individual augmentation, but not if that compromises the regular force capability.
As discussed above, there may be a middle ground with synthetic environment training systems. However, even here there must be dispassionate assessments as to what reserve units could be effectively sustained through this means and contribute to operations. If some usage of the real equipment is required (and it probably should be) then there may be a ceiling on the number of Armed Res that actually can be effectively sustained even with the synthetic environment trainers.
George Wallace said:
What does it take? Drive and Determination and above all, Strong Leadership at the top in the Corps.
Maybe. I was recently accused of blaming “the multitude” (the poor individuals of the Armd reserve units at the bottom) for what is really “lack of leadership from above” (those bad men in the RCAC hierarchy).
In reality, I feel there are a lot who could be blamed though very few (if any) who could be blamed individualy. However, there has been a deficiency of initiative & leadership at many (to all) levels from the units up to the top of the Army.
At the top, the Army & the RCAC should have identified a problem. If there is a surplus of Armd Res units, then that should have been identified (including a breakdown by brigade and metropolitan areas) and solicitations should have been made to the units in order to find who might have been willing to transform into a new (and more potentially more relevant) role outside the branch.
At the bottom, units “left hanging for years and years minus a Role or Doctrine to implement” (without a viable, attainable and doctrinally relevant role) have continued to hold to a pipedream of training on modern AFV for individual to Lvl 3 training. It is not going to happen. COs should have recognized their predicament and could have pushed for a new role (sans black hat) that is doctrinally supported and achievable in a way that is more relevant to the Army.
All the layers of command & staff in between might have observed and achieved momentum for a solution based on a perspective with some combination of the previous two.
In the end, it is collectives & organizations which have failed to adequately resolve the problem of the PRes Armd “place” in the larger picture.