Army Reserve Restructuring

[FJAG]

In the absence of a regular supply of enough recruits, and enough good leadership ensuring the reliable delivery of high quality training and administration, the current model will never meet expectations IMHO.

Oh, and while we're at it, a clear mission too.

And even more.

 

[Kirkhill]

I feel like the Reserves are like The Lost Boys. If only they could find a Peter Pan. Or is that the problem?

 

[daftandbarmy]

I feel like the Reserves are like The Lost Boys. If only they could find a Peter Pan. Or is that the problem?

Lost 'People', please....

Isn't that supposed to be the 2 star who is the Chief of Reserves?

 

[FJAG]

Lost 'People', please....

Isn't that supposed to be the 2 star who is the Chief of Reserves?

Chief of Reserves in an advisor to the CDS, not a commander. I've seen my share of them. Peter Pan is an apt analogy.

A free-spirited and mischievous young boy who can fly and never grows up, Peter Pan spends his never-ending childhood having adventures on the mythical island of Neverland as the leader of the Lost Boys, interacting with fairies, pirates, mermaids, Native Americans, and occasionally ordinary children from the world outside Neverland.

 

[MilEME09]

Amalgamation of units is not a solution, IMHO. It's a band-aid, knee-jerk reaction to a much more serious and underlying problem. I worked as an RSSO for 26 Fd Regt in the mid 1970s. In those days 26 Fd could generally deploy on exercise a six gun batteries with a BC and two FOOs. 10th Fd in Regina generally couldn't put out a three gun battery and 116 Bty in Kenora would be hard stretched to deploy a gun and a recce party.

The three now form the 38th Artillery Tactical Gp under one CO. The last stats I saw for them they had in total "on paper": 17 offrs and cadets, 15 WOs and Sgts and 68 other ranks (which includes twenty recruits). That's barely enough to field one battery (even if everyone showed up for an exercise) much less the 424 pers and five batteries that the ARE calls for. (I'm not 100% certain of the total authorized figures - my documentation for that is a tad old)

There were amalgamations, too in the 1960s. They were coupled with force reductions which left the remaining units just as weak as the more numerous prior ones. Amalgamation alone won't work.

I'm a strong advocate for full-sized regiments and battalions based on hybrid units (the 30/70 construct) and IMHO those will need to be amalgamated ones (eg a bn with one RegF coy, and three or four ResF coys (each from a different ResF unit)) in order that a bn can easily be Stage 2 mobilized as a full "enhanced" battalion but can also be easily broken up into the cores of four or five battalions (each with a name and history - yes, I also believe that morale matters) for Stage 3 mobilization as an expanded force. A viable structure for the army must be able to cater for force that can generate its full-time forces in-being (the RegF); and its standing capability (its combined RegF and ResF) and a force larger than it was at the beginning of the conflict (its RegF, its ResF and its newly recruited cohorts). If it fails to plan for all three of those scenarios it will be left to ad hoc its way through a crisis.

The point here is that there is considerably more needed to create a viable army that incorporates both its RegF and ResF components. Mere amalgamation will never be enough and will only ever be a system that can generate individuals and small teams. IMHO what is going on with 38 Arty Tac Gp and the KOCR/SALH does not benefit the army but merely temporarily prolongs its death spiral a bit.

While I dont disagree with you, I do see a different perspective, if a reserve unit is unable to recruit to even a fraction of its strength, and you have a light colonel commanding 2 platoons, they deserve to be fired or demoted for failure to maintain the unit, the unit then folded under control of another unit, or directly controlled by brigade HQ as to create a comprehensive recruiting and training plan until it reaches at least 50% TES again.

 

[FJAG]

While I dont disagree with you, I do see a different perspective, if a reserve unit is unable to recruit to even a fraction of its strength, and you have a light colonel commanding 2 platoons, they deserve to be fired or demoted for failure to maintain the unit, the unit then folded under control of another unit, or directly controlled by brigade HQ as to create a comprehensive recruiting and training plan until it reaches at least 50% TES again.

We don't disagree in principle at all. Here's how I view a 30/70 hybrid battalion:



The battalion is commanded by a RegF LCol who has a significant RegF staff. It initially has one fully equipped RegF coy. Each of four ResF battalions are reduced in strength to a full 10/90 company commanded by a ResF major with a RegF 2i/c and a staff of about 10 RegF pers in key positions. The CS company is a 30/70 company so that each platoon (Mortar, ATGM, UAV, Pioneer, Recce) has a section of full-time pers. Training and recruiting is directed and supervised by the bn and executed by the companies. Each company retains its distinct identity (Hell, give the bn an honourary col and go so far as giving each of the companies an honourary LCol)

The operational roles are as follows:

1) on a routine peacetime basis, provide a bn HQ, one full rifle company and a portion of a CS company which can be augmented by other RegF resources or ResF resources as appropriate for the mission;

2) in the event of an emergency requiring an enhancement of the CA, mobilize the entire battalion by placing the ResF elements on active service; and

3) in the event of a major war, be available to divide the battalion into five "cores" (a brigade HQ and four battalion ones), recruit from the population and train a full infantry brigade with three battalions and a depot battalion in reserve.

Similar structures exist for armour signals, engineer, artillery and CSS units.

In the early stages of transformation, the battalion shares the equipment held by the RegF company. The ultimate plan is to provide an enduring structure for the CA so that all units and subunits will be fully equipped.

What is key here is that the RegF CO of the bn is responsible, accountable and enabled to lead and administer the entire battalion (RegF and ResF) from recruiting through training to deployment. I tend to see these battalions located in urban centres with sub-units generally within the same facilities or within an hour's travel of its hq. To better enable this we should seriously consider separate restricted terms of service for a class of the RegF so that such a RegF soldier has the ability decline postings and promotions so as to spend an entire career in one geographic location. (I would essentially eliminate Class B service for this restricted RegF service who would be fully deployable just like unrestricted RegF personnel.)

As I said above, creating a viable and sustainable CA requires significantly more complex changes to the way the CF does business. The good news is that the raw material is there. The army just needs to shed some old BAOR ways of thinking.

 

[Kirkhill]

While I dont disagree with you, I do see a different perspective, if a reserve unit is unable to recruit to even a fraction of its strength, and you have a light colonel commanding 2 platoons, they deserve to be fired or demoted for failure to maintain the unit, the unit then folded under control of another unit, or directly controlled by brigade HQ as to create a comprehensive recruiting and training plan until it reaches at least 50% TES again.

Or the Lt Colonel reduced to Honorary status to oversee the local volunteers, cadets and pipe bands. Hand the 2 platoons over to a reg force Captain.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Chief of Reserves in an advisor to the CDS, not a commander. I've seen my share of them. Peter Pan is an apt analogy.

Shall be known as: Smithers

 

[markppcli]

We don't disagree in principle at all. Here's how I view a 30/70 hybrid battalion:

View attachment 90689

The battalion is commanded by a RegF LCol who has a significant RegF staff. It initially has one fully equipped RegF coy. Each of four ResF battalions are reduced in strength to a full 10/90 company commanded by a ResF major with a RegF 2i/c and a staff of about 10 RegF pers in key positions. The CS company is a 30/70 company so that each platoon (Mortar, ATGM, UAV, Pioneer, Recce) has a section of full-time pers. Training and recruiting is directed and supervised by the bn and executed by the companies. Each company retains its distinct identity (Hell, give the bn an honourary col and go so far as giving each of them an honourary LCol)

The operational roles are as follows:

1) on a routine peacetime basis, provide a bn HQ, one full rifle company and a portion of a CS company which can be augmented by other RegF resources or ResF resources as appropriate for the mission;

2) in the event of an emergency requiring an enhancement of the CA, mobilize the entire battalion by placing the ResF elements on active service; and

3) in the event of a major war, be available to divide the battalion into five "cores" (a brigade HQ and four battalion ones), recruit from the population and train a full infantry brigade with three battalions and a depot battalion in reserve.

Similar structures exist for armour signals, engineer, artillery and CSS units.

In the early stages of transformation, the battalion shares the equipment held by the RegF company. The ultimate plan is to provide an enduring structure for the CA so that all units and subunits will be fully equipped.

What is key here is that the RegF CO of the bn is responsible, accountable and enabled to lead and administer the entire battalion (RegF and ResF) from recruiting through training to deployment. I tend to see these battalions located in urban centres with sub-units generally within the same facilities or within an hour's travel of its hq. To better enable this we should seriously consider separate restricted terms of service for a class of the RegF so that such a RegF soldier has the ability decline postings and promotions so as to spend an entire career in one geographic location. (I would essentially eliminate Class B service for this restricted RegF service who would be fully deployable like unrestricted RegF personnel.)

As I said above, creating a viable and sustainable CA requires significantly more complex changes to the way the CF does business. The good news is that the raw material is there. The army just needs to shed some old BAOR ways of thinking.

Agree with this fully Real numbers, real task, real purpose. Thats what re organization needs to focus on.

 

[ueo]

To add to your point mark, with the reserves, losing 50% in some areas is only 25-40 troops, some units are really hurting for personal, only the QoR last i checked was even in the green, if a unit is say under 15% TES, there is not many left to actually care about a units traditions to be merged into a new regiment, so lets go the british way, keep traditions at the coy level and merge them all into a single regiment per ARes brigade.

Pls check your sources. G&SF meet or exceed std.

 

[ArmyRick]

Pls check your sources. G&SF meet or exceed std.

That was the unit I retired out of. Not sure what their numbers are. They disproportionately were getting poached a lot for class B jobs at Meaford and Borden because they were "local candidates"

 

[daftandbarmy]

Pls check your sources. G&SF meet or exceed std.

Geez... stop speaking in code... there are non-Infantry types left hanging here

Grey and Simcoe Foresters - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Halifax Tar]

Pls check your sources. G&SF meet or exceed std.

Are STDs that bad up in Barrie and Owen Sound ?

 

[Brad Sallows]

While I dont disagree with you, I do see a different perspective, if a reserve unit is unable to recruit to even a fraction of its strength, and you have a light colonel commanding 2 platoons, they deserve to be fired or demoted for failure to maintain the unit, the unit then folded under control of another unit, or directly controlled by brigade HQ as to create a comprehensive recruiting and training plan until it reaches at least 50% TES again.

Res F units function under imposed limits. Numbers of recruits. Numbers of positions on entry and subsequent courses. Requirements to free up NCOs to staff locally run courses, which for some units essentially deprives them of key people to meet annual collective training goals. Occasional abrupt funding withdrawals. Occasional floods of demand for individual augmentation, usually followed by floods of CT requests.

If a CO is manifestly departing from meeting assigned tasks and mainly focusing on the social calendar, sure, fire him. But don't penalize anyone for factors under external control.

And get the time commitment for COs back somewhere under 60 class A day equivalents.

 

[dapaterson]

As currently structured (I can't in good conscience use the word "organized") the Army Reserve has significantly more positions than authorized strength. The lack of institutional will to discipline the structure to focus on desired capabilities within the constraints of authorized strength is an ongoing problem./

Properly defined, the structure signals training capacity requirements and equipment requirements which in turn signal personnel and resource support requirements.

But, that would mean culling superfluous command positions for LCols and CWOs who are platoon commanders; would make measuring force outputs possible... all things that the R2K crowd and their fellow travellers would scream about.


That would add some challenges to Command teams though; create broad, geographically dispersed units and commanders are then required to travel - a big part of command is showing up on time in the right uniform. So there are trade-offs to fewer, larger, more dispersed units that need to be understood - and would likely drive parts of the command team to be full-time, not part time. (Probably need Reg F sub components, but that's a whole other issue...)

A simple example: A unit in three locations. How often does the command team need to be present, together, in each? Do the CO and RSM have to be geographically co-located? What is the optimal, maximum distance to exercise C2?

 

[Kirkhill]

A simple example: A unit in three locations. How often does the command team need to be present, together, in each? Do the CO and RSM have to be geographically co-located? What is the optimal, maximum distance to exercise C2?

Would the answers be influenced by the quality of the training adjuncts available? Starting with prepared, standard lesson plans, manuals and training aids?

 

[daftandbarmy]

And get the time commitment for COs back somewhere under 60 class A day equivalents.

So, for example, the CO shouldn't be signing in for 200+ days a year just because they are unemployed/unemployable on civvie street, right?

 

[MilEME09]

Pls check your sources. G&SF meet or exceed std.

My numbers are from last year, only one unit had 90% or higher TES much of the rest of ontario was in the yellow which isnt terrible, but there are units less than 30% TES that exist cross the ARes

 

[daftandbarmy]

My numbers are from last year, only one unit had 90% or higher TES much of the rest of ontario was in the yellow which isnt terrible, but there are units less than 30% TES that exist cross the ARes

I was talking to a guy last week from one of those units.

200 'effectives', 30 attending on a weekend exercise...

 

[FJAG]

As currently structured (I can't in good conscience use the word "organized") the Army Reserve has significantly more positions than authorized strength. The lack of institutional will to discipline the structure to focus on desired capabilities within the constraints of authorized strength is an ongoing problem./

Are there even lists or priorities for "desired capabilities?" When one looks at Class Bs then one would think the focus is on admin type folks while support to ops tend to look to combat, CS and CSS pers. That pretty much covers the field.

Properly defined, the structure signals training capacity requirements and equipment requirements which in turn signal personnel and resource support requirements.

IMHO, there is no structure that signals anything. We've had a relatively unchanged ResF structure for nigh onto 60 years notwithstanding terminology changes from districts and areas to bde gps and divisions. Throughout that period the same problems and the same dissatisfactions and the same cyclical unsuccessful attempts at reforms have led things back to square one over and over again.

I agree fully that a "properly defined" structure should signal 1) firstly the equipment and personnel needs and then 2) secondly, the requisite training and resource support needed to achieve the defined structure.

But, that would mean culling superfluous command positions for LCols and CWOs who are platoon commanders; would make measuring force outputs possible... all things that the R2K crowd and their fellow travellers would scream about.

"Culling superfluous command positions" only become an issue if the "properly defined" structure determines that there are superfluous positions. Currently, in the absence of a properly defined structure we really don't know, although like me, most of us assume that this is the case looking at the evidence of how units look. If there really was a national mobilization plan, than a surplus of LCols and CWOs would actually be of value to train and lead a Stage 4 mobilized force. But the govt and the CAF doesn't really acknowledge that there will ever be a need for Stage 4 mobilization so has no plan. In the absence of such a plan we can only speculate.

Personally, I would prefer a plan that provides for the promotion of experienced majors and MWOs to lead newly mobilized battalions but, again, the properly defined structure would need to have that built into it.

That would add some challenges to Command teams though; create broad, geographically dispersed units and commanders are then required to travel - a big part of command is showing up on time in the right uniform. So there are trade-offs to fewer, larger, more dispersed units that need to be understood - and would likely drive parts of the command team to be full-time, not part time. (Probably need Reg F sub components, but that's a whole other issue...)

I'll be the heretic here. We do not need to be, nor should we any longer be, "broad, geographically dispersed" units. The vast bulk of the reserves should be located where the people are - large and moderate sized urban centres. The dispersion of the youth needed for an army are no longer on the farms with their families like they were in the 1880s. Much as I think that every Canadian should have the opportunity to serve, we are simply too small a force to waste resources - both materiel and human - on supporting a twenty man rifle company in some small urban centre. Canada has 34 "large urban centres" (100,000+) and 58 "medium urban centres" (30,000-99,999). 18 of the large urban centres have populations of 225,000+. If we were to target a ResF of 30,000 (the appx equivalent of 40 to 50 full-sized battalions) we would not have to go very far into the stock "medium urban centres" if at all.

IMHO, command teams for full-sized ResF units need to be RegF (and not merely full-time Class Bs or high-parading Class As, regardless of whether a unit is predominantly ResF or a hybrid like a 30/70. IMHO, the job is simply too complex to be done well by personnel trained at the current ResF standard.

A simple example: A unit in three locations. How often does the command team need to be present, together, in each? Do the CO and RSM have to be geographically co-located? What is the optimal, maximum distance to exercise C2?

I use a one hour rule. I also use a three hour rule for an urban unit to be separated from a moderate training area.

I was talking to a guy last week from one of those units.

200 'effectives', 30 attending on a weekend exercise...

Have I mentioned the inherent systemic problems vis a vis the currently available "Order to Train" and the restructuring of policies of service to include "Mandatory Training Days." If the army was ever to do one thing to increase the effectiveness of the ARes it would be to wrestle the "attend when I feel like it" concept to the ground.