Army Reserve Restructuring

[FJAG]

In the absence of a regular supply of enough recruits, and enough good leadership ensuring the reliable delivery of high quality training and administration, the current model will never meet expectations IMHO.

Oh, and while we're at it, a clear mission too.

And even more.

 

[Kirkhill]

I feel like the Reserves are like The Lost Boys. If only they could find a Peter Pan. Or is that the problem?

 

[daftandbarmy]

I feel like the Reserves are like The Lost Boys. If only they could find a Peter Pan. Or is that the problem?

Lost 'People', please....

Isn't that supposed to be the 2 star who is the Chief of Reserves?

 

[FJAG]

Lost 'People', please....

Isn't that supposed to be the 2 star who is the Chief of Reserves?

Chief of Reserves in an advisor to the CDS, not a commander. I've seen my share of them. Peter Pan is an apt analogy.

A free-spirited and mischievous young boy who can fly and never grows up, Peter Pan spends his never-ending childhood having adventures on the mythical island of Neverland as the leader of the Lost Boys, interacting with fairies, pirates, mermaids, Native Americans, and occasionally ordinary children from the world outside Neverland.

 

[MilEME09]

Amalgamation of units is not a solution, IMHO. It's a band-aid, knee-jerk reaction to a much more serious and underlying problem. I worked as an RSSO for 26 Fd Regt in the mid 1970s. In those days 26 Fd could generally deploy on exercise a six gun batteries with a BC and two FOOs. 10th Fd in Regina generally couldn't put out a three gun battery and 116 Bty in Kenora would be hard stretched to deploy a gun and a recce party.

The three now form the 38th Artillery Tactical Gp under one CO. The last stats I saw for them they had in total "on paper": 17 offrs and cadets, 15 WOs and Sgts and 68 other ranks (which includes twenty recruits). That's barely enough to field one battery (even if everyone showed up for an exercise) much less the 424 pers and five batteries that the ARE calls for. (I'm not 100% certain of the total authorized figures - my documentation for that is a tad old)

There were amalgamations, too in the 1960s. They were coupled with force reductions which left the remaining units just as weak as the more numerous prior ones. Amalgamation alone won't work.

I'm a strong advocate for full-sized regiments and battalions based on hybrid units (the 30/70 construct) and IMHO those will need to be amalgamated ones (eg a bn with one RegF coy, and three or four ResF coys (each from a different ResF unit)) in order that a bn can easily be Stage 2 mobilized as a full "enhanced" battalion but can also be easily broken up into the cores of four or five battalions (each with a name and history - yes, I also believe that morale matters) for Stage 3 mobilization as an expanded force. A viable structure for the army must be able to cater for force that can generate its full-time forces in-being (the RegF); and its standing capability (its combined RegF and ResF) and a force larger than it was at the beginning of the conflict (its RegF, its ResF and its newly recruited cohorts). If it fails to plan for all three of those scenarios it will be left to ad hoc its way through a crisis.

The point here is that there is considerably more needed to create a viable army that incorporates both its RegF and ResF components. Mere amalgamation will never be enough and will only ever be a system that can generate individuals and small teams. IMHO what is going on with 38 Arty Tac Gp and the KOCR/SALH does not benefit the army but merely temporarily prolongs its death spiral a bit.

While I dont disagree with you, I do see a different perspective, if a reserve unit is unable to recruit to even a fraction of its strength, and you have a light colonel commanding 2 platoons, they deserve to be fired or demoted for failure to maintain the unit, the unit then folded under control of another unit, or directly controlled by brigade HQ as to create a comprehensive recruiting and training plan until it reaches at least 50% TES again.

 

[FJAG]

While I dont disagree with you, I do see a different perspective, if a reserve unit is unable to recruit to even a fraction of its strength, and you have a light colonel commanding 2 platoons, they deserve to be fired or demoted for failure to maintain the unit, the unit then folded under control of another unit, or directly controlled by brigade HQ as to create a comprehensive recruiting and training plan until it reaches at least 50% TES again.

We don't disagree in principle at all. Here's how I view a 30/70 hybrid battalion:



The battalion is commanded by a RegF LCol who has a significant RegF staff. It initially has one fully equipped RegF coy. Each of four ResF battalions are reduced in strength to a full 10/90 company commanded by a ResF major with a RegF 2i/c and a staff of about 10 RegF pers in key positions. The CS company is a 30/70 company so that each platoon (Mortar, ATGM, UAV, Pioneer, Recce) has a section of full-time pers. Training and recruiting is directed and supervised by the bn and executed by the companies. Each company retains its distinct identity (Hell, give the bn an honourary col and go so far as giving each of them an honourary LCol)

The operational roles are as follows:

1) on a routine peacetime basis, provide a bn HQ, one full rifle company and a portion of a CS company which can be augmented by other RegF resources or ResF resources as appropriate for the mission;

2) in the event of an emergency requiring an enhancement of the CA, mobilize the entire battalion by placing the ResF elements on active service; and

3) in the event of a major war, be available to divide the battalion into five "cores" (a brigade HQ and four battalion ones), recruit from the population and train a full infantry brigade with three battalions and a depot battalion in reserve.

Similar structures exist for armour signals, engineer, artillery and CSS units.

In the early stages of transformation, the battalion shares the equipment held by the RegF company. The ultimate plan is to provide an enduring structure for the CA so that all units and subunits will be fully equipped.

What is key here is that the RegF CO of the bn is responsible, accountable and enabled to lead and administer the entire battalion (RegF and ResF) from recruiting through training to deployment. I tend to see these battalions located in urban centres with sub-units generally within the same facilities or within an hour's travel of its hq. To better enable this we should seriously consider separate restricted terms of service for a class of the RegF so that such a RegF soldier has the ability decline postings and promotions so as to spend an entire career in one geographic location. (I would essentially eliminate Class B service for this restricted RegF service who would be fully deployable like unrestricted RegF personnel.)

As I said above, creating a viable and sustainable CA requires significantly more complex changes to the way the CF does business. The good news is that the raw material is there. The army just needs to shed some old BAOR ways of thinking.

 

[Kirkhill]

While I dont disagree with you, I do see a different perspective, if a reserve unit is unable to recruit to even a fraction of its strength, and you have a light colonel commanding 2 platoons, they deserve to be fired or demoted for failure to maintain the unit, the unit then folded under control of another unit, or directly controlled by brigade HQ as to create a comprehensive recruiting and training plan until it reaches at least 50% TES again.

Or the Lt Colonel reduced to Honorary status to oversee the local volunteers, cadets and pipe bands. Hand the 2 platoons over to a reg force Captain.