Army Reserve Restructuring

[dapaterson]

How about far off unit with a support base in a separate L1 ? And a CBG that has units whose support bases that aren't in the same province.

Especially when it came to national programs like the MAAP ... I had the Army (5 Div) saying 1 thing and the RCN and RCAF all saying their own.

I did love that job! And I loved that exposure to the ARes.

Yes different L1s, MAAP direction to divest things immediately that were in sea cans encased in snow and ice ... The Army taught me that you can't spell "FUN" unless it starts with a big F U.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Yes different L1s, MAAP direction to divest things immediately that were in sea cans encased in snow and ice ... The Army taught me that you can't spell "FUN" unless it starts with a big F U.

Not to mention Victoria park was taken over by the Army a few years ago, but the DRMIS mapping still hasn't been done to bring those units and the support unit under the CA.

Makes for tons of fun when it comes to reports and returns. I felt bad for the soldiers up there.

 

[CountDC]

How about far off unit with a support base in a separate L1 ? And a CBG that has units whose support bases that aren't in the same province.

Especially when it came to national programs like the MAAP ... I had the Army (5 Div) saying 1 thing and the RCN and RCAF all saying their own.

I did love that job! And I loved that exposure to the ARes.

Not to mention Victoria park was taken over by the Army a few years ago, but the DRMIS mapping still hasn't been done to bring those units and the support unit under the CA.

Makes for tons of fun when it comes to reports and returns. I felt bad for the soldiers up there.

Both of these remind me of the good time that Aldershot used to be. Mainly used by the Army, run by the Air Force (Greenwood) and owned by the Navy. Sometimes took creative thinking to get things done. They wanted to replace a condemned H-hut, Greenwood was agreeable, Navy said sorry no funds for a new building but if you have repairs or renovations we have some. From what I was told CE (yay for some civilians) creatively did renovations - removed everything but the 4 outer most corner posts and "renovated" the building.

 

[FJAG]

For anyone interested, the Canadian Military Journal has put out an issue on the Reserve Force.

I've read the articles and have formed my opinion. I'll be interested in hearing from other folks.

Canadian Military Journal

www.journal.forces.gc.ca

 

[daftandbarmy]

For anyone interested, the Canadian Military Journal has put out an issue on the Reserve Force.

I've read the articles and have formed my opinion. I'll be interested in hearing from other folks.

Reserves and Aid to Civil Power. No, just no. Please. Not unless they are Reservists who have been properly integrated into a Reg F unit.

Mission Tasks. Stand alone Class A MT are a waste of time and resources. Once again, if Reservists are integrated into a Reg F unit, sure it can work.

There needs to be less work on setting up the Reserves as a parallel Army, in competition with the Reg F, and more work done on how the Reserves will support the rapid and efficient expansion of the Regular Army on mobilization, IMHO.

This, of course, goes against the ego driven ambitions of certain senior people in Ottawa and elsewhere but that's all I got...

 

[PrairieFella]

Mission tasks are so stupid. It's just shit that everyone should be doing. Every PRes infantry sub-unit (actual sub-unit, no a Pl+ pretending to be a coy) should have mortars, pioneers, recce, etc. Have a requirement to generate a section and Bob's your uncle. It's silly to silo off skills like they're some secret art, every unit should have a pool to draw from for deployments or a training cadre if shit pops off.

Another area where mission tasks is pretty dumb is how low-effort some of them are. In the RCAC, there is the Armoured Troop and the Echelon Section mission task...which is just our BTS. The only one that is unique is the Assault Section but that is so under resourced it'll be a moot point. Spending years developing what is essentially a restatement of BTS seems a little silly to me.

 

[Halifax Tar]

For anyone interested, the Canadian Military Journal has put out an issue on the Reserve Force.

I've read the articles and have formed my opinion. I'll be interested in hearing from other folks.

A slightly off topic question:

Canadian Military Journal

www.journal.forces.gc.ca

Is it common to list ones decorations like GCS as post nominals ? Or is that something done in halls of academia ? And I am not sure what MA is.

Colonel _____________, CD1, MA, GCS-SWA, CPSM, UNMIS

 

[dapaterson]

MA = Masters of Arts.

Listing a post nominal as CD1 is just wrong and tacky.

 

[Ludoc]

MA = Masters of Arts.

Listing a post nominal as CD1 is just wrong and tacky.

Not just tacky, counter productive. It is an easy thing to do properly and has little grey area as to how it is supposed to be done. If you can't even do something so simple properly, how am I supposed to trust you have done your research in more complex matters?

How info is presented in he military is almost as important as what is presented. As a Colonel she should know that. Get your staff work right because getting it wrong undermines your whole argument. Case in point: we are currently talking about post nominals, not the thesis of her article.

 

[KevinB]

For anyone interested, the Canadian Military Journal has put out an issue on the Reserve Force.

I've read the articles and have formed my opinion. I'll be interested in hearing from other folks.

Well anyone reading the Aid to Civil Power article should be wondering how the author remains employed:
Dr. Chris Madsen is a professor in the Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College and Royal Military College of Canada in Toronto where he teaches on the National Security Programme and the Joint and Combined Staff Programme.
Plus I would also suggest that whichever University or College granted him his Doctorate should take a look at their accreditation program.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Well anyone reading the Aid to Civil Power article should be wondering how the author remains employed:
Dr. Chris Madsen is a professor in the Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College and Royal Military College of Canada in Toronto where he teaches on the National Security Programme and the Joint and Combined Staff Programme.
Plus I would also suggest that whichever University or College granted him his Doctorate should take a look at their accreditation program.

No one in their right mind focuses on MACP in the CAF. It's too political and a career killer, which is likely why we aren't any good at it.

I guess this goes for the academics who hold forth on the subject as well...

 

[KevinB]

No one in their right mind focuses on MACP in the CAF. It's too political and a career killer, which is likely why we aren't any good at it.

I guess this goes for the academics who hold forth on the subject as well...

I had been involved in a few during my time in the CAF, and I fully agree.
Yes it is possible, and the author correctly notes it is a force of last resort -- but it is a swing and a miss on so many other issues that I don't think the article was even worth typing.
I debated spending some time dissecting the article point by point, but when he suggested that the PRes was better positioned to conduct MACP, I knew my time was better spent doing something more productive - like staring out the window blankly for a few hours.

 

[FJAG]

MA = Masters of Arts.

Listing a post nominal as CD1 is just wrong and tacky.

So is listing five of them.

I'll throw in my $0.02 now. Except for the article by Kennedy on the New France militia and regular force's integration - which I found interesting and informative - the rest of these articles, and the Chief Res 2023 Symposium - strike me as an academics' surface skimming debate of absolutely zero value. There is nothing here we haven't known for decades and nothing offered to resolve the problems.

The new regime at the CMJ seems hell bent on not discussing anything that truly advances debate on military issues (although, I admit, I only lightly skimmed the last RCAF focused issue.)

 

[foresterab]

For anyone interested, the Canadian Military Journal has put out an issue on the Reserve Force.

I've read the articles and have formed my opinion. I'll be interested in hearing from other folks.

I read through the article and my initial thought was it was a recipe for disaster...and I'm pro CAF reservists getting formal training on Mutual Aid.
The key arguments of using reserve units to man an area as:
a) first on scene - if you don't have red and blue lights good luck beating police and fire. Even a civilian helicopter doesn't always help. And definitely not if you need to mobilize a force prior to deployment.
b) local knowledge - which can be key but ignores the fact that your response force is just as likely to be part of the casualties. A key learning of the Fort Mac Murray wildfire was for municipalities to have multiple staff cross trained in roles so that the absence of a couple of folks due to...mandatory evacuations...doesn't shut things down.
c) highlights the number of reservists who also have police/fire/critical skill sets. But these are forces that might already be deployed on scene.

To mobilize to a scene you need to have either high capacity skill sets - which means the ability to adapt to an unknown while implementing a structure - which means very experienced personnel or sufficient bulk to be able to swamp a situation with bodies to be able to calm things down.

For the public when they see the CAF deploy they have high trust as they believe there is large number of additional personnel available to replace/rotate/maintain a scene in a highly visible manner. But as I understand the CAF reserves they are small units, badly resourced in terms of kit and equipment, and struggle to produce significant numbers for extended deployments (think months at a time vs. weeks). And worse yet the tasking of "aid to civilian power" is a different skill set than what they already struggle to train as their primary skill set - support the CAF.

The CAF can not be the "easy button" for civilian authorities. For a mission like the FLQ Crisis yes there was a demonstrated need for both numbers, skill sets (at least on CAF member was killed trying to defuse a bomb prior to October 1970), and visible force....and a huge portion of the entire CAF deployed as a result. High River in 2013 where they assisted with area security and both provided visible perimeter and internal security...good mission. 200 members of the CAF working on a wildfire nearby my home in 2023...and to be fair the CAF was basically the only resource available left in country those weeks prior to significant international support arriving...I struggle with. That's still a huge bite out of a Reg. Force Battalion let alone however many different Reserve units had to amalgamate to assist. But international resources did arrive, some local residents did volunteer assistance, and many other areas of the country sent significant numbers to assist....which you can't do at the same speed for military missions unless those units are fully manned, fully equipped, and fully trained.

Upon reflection I think the article misses out on some key parts or fails to pay attention to the background issue:
1) formed units will be more effective than individual units. And if it's a national situation then the Federal Government should be called the Reserves out as formed units rather than the current volunteer method. Even a 50% callout (2x platoons at 4/company?) is more effective than 30 odd ranks who were able to volunteer.
2) Need full equipment. Not just for kit/uniform but also equipment. At the cheap end a fleet of 3/4 long box 4x4 painted OD green is still an effective transportation unit...but only within Canada. Would rather a Roshel Senator (civilian mechanics to maintain) to at least give an Option C for war theaters or as used in the Ukraine for rear echelon support. It also portrays a greater force presence which can be important in security situations.
3) Need full support equipment. Drone pilots (good Reserve training mission), Communications staff (again always a need), Transport (love good bed truck drivers), Ambulances (medical posts/first aid posts/transportation). Engineering units could gain valuable skills dealing with temporary bridge installs/road clearing/equipment use. Some can be centralized in bigger centers which the maps show but combined the unit needs to be self transporting CAF members + additional skills that align with CAF tasking.
4) Needs to be a clearly identified part of the bigger picture in a functional way. When I deploy on wildfires I know by the role I get assigned/volunteer for exactly how the reporting works up and down. I might be in a small function (Plans) or a large function (Operations) or between (Logistics) but regardless I clearly know the person beside me wearing the opposite title clearly fits into their role and how to jointly succeed. This might mean FJAG's 70/30 battalion structure where the 30% provide the structure for the remainder to build upon or something different again such as "for Aid to Civilian Power call outs the Loyal Edmonton Regiment (2 platoons) and Calgary Highlanders (2 platoons) shall form a company of trained personnel and deploy as a single unit".

 

[quadrapiper]

I read through the article and my initial thought was it was a recipe for disaster...and I'm pro CAF reservists getting formal training on Mutual Aid.
The key arguments of using reserve units to man an area as:
a) first on scene - if you don't have red and blue lights good luck beating police and fire. Even a civilian helicopter doesn't always help. And definitely not if you need to mobilize a force prior to deployment.
b) local knowledge - which can be key but ignores the fact that your response force is just as likely to be part of the casualties. A key learning of the Fort Mac Murray wildfire was for municipalities to have multiple staff cross trained in roles so that the absence of a couple of folks due to...mandatory evacuations...doesn't shut things down.
c) highlights the number of reservists who also have police/fire/critical skill sets. But these are forces that might already be deployed on scene.

To mobilize to a scene you need to have either high capacity skill sets - which means the ability to adapt to an unknown while implementing a structure - which means very experienced personnel or sufficient bulk to be able to swamp a situation with bodies to be able to calm things down.

For the public when they see the CAF deploy they have high trust as they believe there is large number of additional personnel available to replace/rotate/maintain a scene in a highly visible manner. But as I understand the CAF reserves they are small units, badly resourced in terms of kit and equipment, and struggle to produce significant numbers for extended deployments (think months at a time vs. weeks). And worse yet the tasking of "aid to civilian power" is a different skill set than what they already struggle to train as their primary skill set - support the CAF.

The CAF can not be the "easy button" for civilian authorities. For a mission like the FLQ Crisis yes there was a demonstrated need for both numbers, skill sets (at least on CAF member was killed trying to defuse a bomb prior to October 1970), and visible force....and a huge portion of the entire CAF deployed as a result. High River in 2013 where they assisted with area security and both provided visible perimeter and internal security...good mission. 200 members of the CAF working on a wildfire nearby my home in 2023...and to be fair the CAF was basically the only resource available left in country those weeks prior to significant international support arriving...I struggle with. That's still a huge bite out of a Reg. Force Battalion let alone however many different Reserve units had to amalgamate to assist. But international resources did arrive, some local residents did volunteer assistance, and many other areas of the country sent significant numbers to assist....which you can't do at the same speed for military missions unless those units are fully manned, fully equipped, and fully trained.

Upon reflection I think the article misses out on some key parts or fails to pay attention to the background issue:
1) formed units will be more effective than individual units. And if it's a national situation then the Federal Government should be called the Reserves out as formed units rather than the current volunteer method. Even a 50% callout (2x platoons at 4/company?) is more effective than 30 odd ranks who were able to volunteer.
2) Need full equipment. Not just for kit/uniform but also equipment. At the cheap end a fleet of 3/4 long box 4x4 painted OD green is still an effective transportation unit...but only within Canada. Would rather a Roshel Senator (civilian mechanics to maintain) to at least give an Option C for war theaters or as used in the Ukraine for rear echelon support. It also portrays a greater force presence which can be important in security situations.
3) Need full support equipment. Drone pilots (good Reserve training mission), Communications staff (again always a need), Transport (love good bed truck drivers), Ambulances (medical posts/first aid posts/transportation). Engineering units could gain valuable skills dealing with temporary bridge installs/road clearing/equipment use. Some can be centralized in bigger centers which the maps show but combined the unit needs to be self transporting CAF members + additional skills that align with CAF tasking.
4) Needs to be a clearly identified part of the bigger picture in a functional way. When I deploy on wildfires I know by the role I get assigned/volunteer for exactly how the reporting works up and down. I might be in a small function (Plans) or a large function (Operations) or between (Logistics) but regardless I clearly know the person beside me wearing the opposite title clearly fits into their role and how to jointly succeed. This might mean FJAG's 70/30 battalion structure where the 30% provide the structure for the remainder to build upon or something different again such as "for Aid to Civilian Power call outs the Loyal Edmonton Regiment (2 platoons) and Calgary Highlanders (2 platoons) shall form a company of trained personnel and deploy as a single unit".

Your Senator is also shelter. Not five-star shelter, but somewhere out of the weather with more room than a pickup, and big enough for briefings, O groups, and whatnot with a potentially useful number of people.

 

[foresterab]

Your Senator is also shelter. Not five-star shelter, but somewhere out of the weather with more room than a pickup, and big enough for briefings, O groups, and whatnot with a potentially useful number of people.

Still recall one of the first wildfire deployments and the Plans chief was doing the incident plan via a laptop of his pick up one page printing at a time while another member was tracing maps via a sketch from Ops on the situation taped to one side of a window and blank paper on the other side.

24 hours later a full command post was installed with all the luxury items like coffee and reliable power.

People can do amazing work if they know where to assemble and some basic tools are provide...and sometimes a vehicle is the starting point of future success as things build up/scale down.