• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Back To Fires

tomahawk6

Army.ca Legend
Inactive
Reaction score
66
Points
530
Army artillery is deadly accurate whether the shell comes from the tube of the 155mm gun or a missile from ATACAMs.Artillery is the King of battle. Getting better range is now priority I suspect.

https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/08/27/return-of-fires-how-the-army-is-getting-back-to-its-big-guns-as-it-prepares-for-the-near-peer-fight/         


 
tomahawk6 said:
Army artillery is deadly accurate whether the shell comes from the tube of the 155mm gun or a missile from ATACAMs.Artillery is the King of battle. Getting better range is now priority I suspect.

https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/08/27/return-of-fires-how-the-army-is-getting-back-to-its-big-guns-as-it-prepares-for-the-near-peer-fight/       

'I do not have to tell you who won the war. You know, the artillery did.' Gen George S. Patton
 
I suspect they have enough that we could get 2 batteries worth, tasked with supporting our tanks.
 
A smart officer wrote a report on his observations of a Commonwealth Brigade in training.  His comments was "armies at peace talk about manoeuvre while armies at war talk about firepower."
 
Colin P said:
I suspect they have enough that we could get 2 batteries worth, tasked with supporting our tanks.

We had 76 M109A4B+ the equivalent of 12 batteries, until around 2005 when some genius in Ottawa decided that they'd make better memorials in parks or be cut up for scrap.  :facepalm:

We simply can't seem to think beyond day to day needs. Don't get me wrong. I think that the M777 is a fine piece of kit but we have too few of them and could have kept the M109s in reserve.

:cheers:
 
Air defence is making a strong comeback too with the US
Some of the CA's "act" function seems to be atrophying, badly, by comparison

Canadian M777 Gun Dets ride in 35 yr old MLVW's, while the M777 itself gets towed by any variety of vehicle, few of which are deployable
Other than a few more Excalibur rds, and some PGK, I haven't heard of anything either to improve range, especially in non lethal effects

Air defence is at least budgeted, although the act function in that capability has withered away too.


 
 
"...the allure of “enablers” should not come at the expense of the base combat capabilities that they enable."
 
Is the M777 not towed by the new trucks, now that the MLVW is out/on it's way out??

And in a Canadian context, given our limited operations & budget, should we be developing non-lethal affects? 

Or should we simply focus on creating a more robust M777 force (I think we have 36 guns now, if I'm not mistaken?) - fill out the M777 force, introduce a decent tactical AD system, and fill out the infantry with some new mortars.  **Focus on the basics?

Decent artillery capability with the M777, consistent with our allies in terms of tech & ammo.  Good AD system to protect our deployed forces against helicopters, airplanes, drones.  And a solid 81mm mortar replacement, and just acknowledge that the C16 has a place with the LAV/TAPV fleet, and dismounted in certain circumstances, but is not a replacement for a 81mm mortar.


None of the above would be that money intensive, and yet would fill out the capability gaps quite nicely.
 
Infanteer said:
"...the allure of “enablers” should not come at the expense of the base combat capabilities that they enable."

I'd agree, it definitely should not be a zero sum game

In response to the M777 question, what I'm referring to is a fighting vehicle for the gun det. The truck that tows the gun is just a tractor, it pulls the gun and carries the bulk of Det's ammunition and stores, not many of the gun Det can ride with it. They need a second vehicle that has some firepower, preferably shoot on the move IMO, and some level of CBRN and mine survivability. In the past, operationally deployed units used the Grizzly in the 90's, during the Kandahar deployments they first used Bisons then TLAV's (in Kabul used MLVW's). The Combat Engineers had been using a RWS LAV, which was taken offline and divested, but IMO would have been ideal for transporting the Gun Dets, and providing at least some level of force protection. I'm not sure what they're using operationally now, although it looks like they have some TAPV available within the Gun groups (mostly for Recce purposes, among other tasks), but not for gun Dets. FWIW, if we could get a vehicle that our allies use for this purpose, or even something used already by the CA with those capabilities, I think it'd be a step in the right direction

In regards to non-lethal, I'm talking about Smoke, Multi-spectral smoke, Illum, and IR Illum. Possibly jamming types as well. Right now the M777 can deliver lethal effects IVO 30+(depending on the weather), but non-lethal only to ~18km

Air defence is more complicated than it appears to coordinate and be effective
 
Question for those that have knowledge of such things.  Is there a certain number of guns of a given type required to realistically maintain a proficiency in a given weapon system?  From what I understand we have 37 x M777 155mm guns.  Is that enough to maintain a force with sufficient skills and career progression, etc. to make that force effective in the long term?

Are the skills of those using the C3 and LG1 transferable to the M777?

Is there a point where having more of a less capable weapon actually gives greater overall benefit to the CF than having a smaller number of better weapons (e.g. 37 x M777 and 124 x C3/LG1 vs say 250 x 105mm replacements or 400 x 120mm mortars?).

 
GR66 said:
Question for those that have knowledge of such things.  Is there a certain number of guns of a given type required to realistically maintain a proficiency in a given weapon system?  From what I understand we have 37 x M777 155mm guns.  Is that enough to maintain a force with sufficient skills and career progression, etc. to make that force effective in the long term?

Are the skills of those using the C3 and LG1 transferable to the M777?

Is there a point where having more of a less capable weapon actually gives greater overall benefit to the CF than having a smaller number of better weapons (e.g. 37 x M777 and 124 x C3/LG1 vs say 250 x 105mm replacements or 400 x 120mm mortars?).
 


I guess that depends on training and getting live fire time.
 
2d Canadian Horse Artillery.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Icqpf4kAz4
 
tomahawk6 said:
 


I guess that depends on training and getting live fire time.

The reason I ask is that the original article posted to this thread says that the US (with much higher numbers of each weapon type than Canada) is having personnel issues. 

It’s really not clear from the article if they’re blaming that on misallocation of personnel or the force reductions, or both. So just wondering what that means for a small force like Canada and suggestions you read about adding new platforms like MLRS or ATCAMS which presumably would be procured in limited numbers.
 
GR66 said:
Question for those that have knowledge of such things.  Is there a certain number of guns of a given type required to realistically maintain a proficiency in a given weapon system?  From what I understand we have 37 x M777 155mm guns.  Is that enough to maintain a force with sufficient skills and career progression, etc. to make that force effective in the long term?

Are the skills of those using the C3 and LG1 transferable to the M777?

Is there a point where having more of a less capable weapon actually gives greater overall benefit to the CF than having a smaller number of better weapons (e.g. 37 x M777 and 124 x C3/LG1 vs say 250 x 105mm replacements or 400 x 120mm mortars?).

I'm no expert, but it seems that if they're not 'mechanized/armoured' guns, and we rely only on artillery that still has to be towed, we don't have a weapon system that can be deployed in a peer-peer fight with, say, the Russians.

In this we are less better off than WW2, where we deployed a mix of both towed and mechanized artillery.
 
GR66 said:
Question for those that have knowledge of such things.  Is there a certain number of guns of a given type required to realistically maintain a proficiency in a given weapon system?  From what I understand we have 37 x M777 155mm guns.  Is that enough to maintain a force with sufficient skills and career progression, etc. to make that force effective in the long term?

Are the skills of those using the C3 and LG1 transferable to the M777?

Is there a point where having more of a less capable weapon actually gives greater overall benefit to the CF than having a smaller number of better weapons (e.g. 37 x M777 and 124 x C3/LG1 vs say 250 x 105mm replacements or 400 x 120mm mortars?).

That's actually a very far reaching question.

I joined the artillery in 1965 as a reservist and went regular in 1969 . The period was one of massive downsizing. Around 1965 we lost dozens of reserve regiments by amalgamation and, in particular lost locating, medium and self propelled capabilities in the reserves. In 1969/70 we downsized the regular force artillery from 4,000 personnel to just over 1,000. We had four, four-battery regiments and two missile batteries. The missiles went, our air defence units went, our last locating unit went and appx half of the gun batteries went, not to mention that the establishment in each of the remaining batteries was reduced from what it was before.

It was what I called the "first dark ages". The problem isn't so much the guns themselves. Gun drill is relatively basic and can be taught  to individuals relatively quickly. What gets really lost are some of the more esoteric skills. In the 1980s, when we decided to revive some locating and air defence capabilities, we had a very rough row to hoe because the people that had previously performed those functions had mostly (but luckily not completely) retired. It took years to put it back together in a modest way.

There are numerous skills that you cannot perfect when you have too few guns available. At it's lowest level is the skill to conduct reconnaissance and deployment of weapon systems that are in contact with and under the threat of near peer enemies (self propelled guns using distributed gun positions); at the far end is the massing of fires (which includes the skill and capability to deliver and supply vast amounts of ammunition) by way of artillery headquarters above the battery/regimental level. Air defence is currently weak and fundamental at best. We have no multiple rocket launcher capability which is also a necessity for massed fires.

The problem, however, is not limited to the artillery. While we have sufficient regular force brigades and a modest headquarters to form a division, we do not have many of the enablers needed by such a formation for it to deploy successfully in a near peer environment. Forget about the reserve brigades. Their structure makes them incapable of doing anything but providing a limited number of fill-in personnel at the lowest of combat and support skill levels. Neither do they have any of the most basic equipment needed to go to war.

The simple fact is that the weakness of our artillery at this time is simply a symptom of a total military force that is incapable of doing anything beyond the supply of one or two battalion sized battle groups for participation in moderate level of combat. We have no standing plans, nor the equipment, nor the skills that would allow us to ramp-up our forces into a viable combat formation even though, on paper, we have the number of people that should let us deploy six brigades in one or even two divisions.

We're in what I now call the "second dark ages".

:2c:

[cheers]
 
FJAG said:
That's actually a very far reaching question.

I joined the artillery in 1965 as a reservist and went regular in 1969 . The period was one of massive downsizing. Around 1965 we lost dozens of reserve regiments by amalgamation and, in particular lost locating, medium and self propelled capabilities in the reserves. In 1969/70 we downsized the regular force artillery from 4,000 personnel to just over 1,000. We had four, four-battery regiments and two missile batteries. The missiles went, our air defence units went, our last locating unit went and appx half of the gun batteries went, not to mention that the establishment in each of the remaining batteries was reduced from what it was before.

It was what I called the "first dark ages". The problem isn't so much the guns themselves. Gun drill is relatively basic and can be taught  to individuals relatively quickly. What gets really lost are some of the more esoteric skills. In the 1980s, when we decided to revive some locating and air defence capabilities, we had a very rough row to hoe because the people that had previously performed those functions had mostly (but luckily not completely) retired. It took years to put it back together in a modest way.

There are numerous skills that you cannot perfect when you have too few guns available. At it's lowest level is the skill to conduct reconnaissance and deployment of weapon systems that are in contact with and under the threat of near peer enemies (self propelled guns using distributed gun positions); at the far end is the massing of fires (which includes the skill and capability to deliver and supply vast amounts of ammunition) by way of artillery headquarters above the battery/regimental level. Air defence is currently weak and fundamental at best. We have no multiple rocket launcher capability which is also a necessity for massed fires.

The problem, however, is not limited to the artillery. While we have sufficient regular force brigades and a modest headquarters to form a division, we do not have many of the enablers needed by such a formation for it to deploy successfully in a near peer environment. Forget about the reserve brigades. Their structure makes them incapable of doing anything but providing a limited number of fill-in personnel at the lowest of combat and support skill levels. Neither do they have any of the most basic equipment needed to go to war.

The simple fact is that the weakness of our artillery at this time is simply a symptom of a total military force that is incapable of doing anything beyond the supply of one or two battalion sized battle groups for participation in moderate level of combat. We have no standing plans, nor the equipment, nor the skills that would allow us to ramp-up our forces into a viable combat formation even though, on paper, we have the number of people that should let us deploy six brigades in one or even two divisions.

We're in what I now call the "second dark ages".

:2c:

[cheers]

You've sold me. Let's buck the Army and get a bigger Navy. :salute:

;D
 
FJAG said:
That's actually a very far reaching question.

I joined the artillery in 1965 as a reservist and went regular in 1969 . The period was one of massive downsizing. Around 1965 we lost dozens of reserve regiments by amalgamation and, in particular lost locating, medium and self propelled capabilities in the reserves. In 1969/70 we downsized the regular force artillery from 4,000 personnel to just over 1,000. We had four, four-battery regiments and two missile batteries. The missiles went, our air defence units went, our last locating unit went and appx half of the gun batteries went, not to mention that the establishment in each of the remaining batteries was reduced from what it was before.

It was what I called the "first dark ages". The problem isn't so much the guns themselves. Gun drill is relatively basic and can be taught  to individuals relatively quickly. What gets really lost are some of the more esoteric skills. In the 1980s, when we decided to revive some locating and air defence capabilities, we had a very rough row to hoe because the people that had previously performed those functions had mostly (but luckily not completely) retired. It took years to put it back together in a modest way.

There are numerous skills that you cannot perfect when you have too few guns available. At it's lowest level is the skill to conduct reconnaissance and deployment of weapon systems that are in contact with and under the threat of near peer enemies (self propelled guns using distributed gun positions); at the far end is the massing of fires (which includes the skill and capability to deliver and supply vast amounts of ammunition) by way of artillery headquarters above the battery/regimental level. Air defence is currently weak and fundamental at best. We have no multiple rocket launcher capability which is also a necessity for massed fires.

The problem, however, is not limited to the artillery. While we have sufficient regular force brigades and a modest headquarters to form a division, we do not have many of the enablers needed by such a formation for it to deploy successfully in a near peer environment. Forget about the reserve brigades. Their structure makes them incapable of doing anything but providing a limited number of fill-in personnel at the lowest of combat and support skill levels. Neither do they have any of the most basic equipment needed to go to war.

The simple fact is that the weakness of our artillery at this time is simply a symptom of a total military force that is incapable of doing anything beyond the supply of one or two battalion sized battle groups for participation in moderate level of combat. We have no standing plans, nor the equipment, nor the skills that would allow us to ramp-up our forces into a viable combat formation even though, on paper, we have the number of people that should let us deploy six brigades in one or even two divisions.

We're in what I now call the "second dark ages".

:2c:

[cheers]

I think the reason for this is that Canada wants to always look like a "peacekeeping" country in the world. This means that we shouldn't have/have a lot of equipment meant for a full out war. If we started to get MRL's, bombers and self propelled guns, our image of a peacekeeping nation wouldn't be as strong. Unfortunately, we will probably only start getting the equipment that is needed when we realise the hard way that what we have isn't enough. On the other hand, I think everyone would agree that we don't require that strong a military force as some other countries require to protect themselves.
 
Ashkan08 said:
I think the reason for this is that Canada wants to always look like a "peacekeeping" country in the world. This means that we shouldn't have/have a lot of equipment meant for a full out war. If we started to get MRL's, bombers and self propelled guns, our image of a peacekeeping nation wouldn't be as strong. Unfortunately, we will probably only start getting the equipment that is needed when we realise the hard way that what we have isn't enough. On the other hand, I think everyone would agree that we don't require that strong a military force as some other countries require to protect themselves.

I personally blame our military leadership. We've lounged in the post-Soviet peace dividend with the attitude that we'll never go up against a near peer enemy again and that we'll never need to mobilize our reserves again. They've complacently accepted a long standing status quo as far as reserves are concerned which accepts well known and lamented shortcomings. As far as the regular force is concerned they have made numerous compromises cutting back capabilities and combat effectiveness and readiness. For me, the lesson coming out of Afghanistan was that we were hard pressed to maintain a single battle group fighting a  third world insurgency over a period of years. For the number of people we keep on the payroll and the amount of national treasure that we expend on defence, we should expect and get a lot more. That's not a political failing. I expect politicians to be uninformed about the nuts and bolts of the military. And where there is no clearly articulated defence policy (which is our perpetual state) it is up to the military leadership to fill in the blanks and define ensure that the Forces provide the best options in light of the current international situation.  :2c:

[cheers]
 
FJAG said:
I personally blame our military leadership. We've lounged in the post-Soviet peace dividend with the attitude that we'll never go up against a near peer enemy again and that we'll never need to mobilize our reserves again. They've complacently accepted a long standing status quo as far as reserves are concerned which accepts well known and lamented shortcomings. As far as the regular force is concerned they have made numerous compromises cutting back capabilities and combat effectiveness and readiness. For me, the lesson coming out of Afghanistan was that we were hard pressed to maintain a single battle group fighting a  third world insurgency over a period of years. For the number of people we keep on the payroll and the amount of national treasure that we expend on defence, we should expect and get a lot more. That's not a political failing. I expect politicians to be uninformed about the nuts and bolts of the military. And where there is no clearly articulated defence policy (which is our perpetual state) it is up to the military leadership to fill in the blanks and define ensure that the Forces provide the best options in light of the current international situation.  :2c:

[cheers]
I agree. Just compare Turkey and Canada. Canada spends 6 billion more on defence and yet has less than half the amount of every type of military equipment that Turkey has (except frigates and some other naval forces which we still have less of, but not half). Not to mention that with that budget, Turkey also equips all of military personnel ( which are more than 8x the number we have).
 
Back
Top