Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC

[KevinB]

The Brits (among other allies) are regularly invited to give us advice. And it's fascinating to hear them have experience on literally every single obstacle we discuss. And while they don't have our geography, economically and institutionally they are probably the best model for us to learn from. I personally detest the tendency of the CAF to look at the Americans. Sure we are all jealous of the cool kit. But we'll never be that big and have the context to operate like that. We can and should be able to operate, as a military and government, more like the Brits.

You need a blend of both American and British outlooks -- the Brit models don't work due to their pop densities, and even the American won't not just due to budget and personnel, but also Canadian population density is less than 10% of the US.

I hate to say it, but you need a Canadianized model of a whole of government approach to Defense (my keyboard autocorrects the C to S).

However Strategic Resilience as you have noted in other posts isn't cheap, while I like the approach of IRD in some areas, economically it is not feasible in a lot of areas, and domestic licensed manufacturing, or a UK/US/EU Canadian subsidiary building entire system is a lot more practical for many items than starting from scratch.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Who said anything about managing their aircraft?

They have the mandate to go to Air Canada, WestJet, Air North, etc and put in place contracts for emergency airlift. And then to activate those as needed for the Government of Canada. That's just one example. But several OGDs have mandates where the CAF just ends up doing it because they don't.

If SHTF, and the Govt needed to mobilize support from private sector partners in the transportation sector, I think the General Public, CAF, Emergency Services, etc would be shocked with how quickly we could move and what assets we could bring to bear to solve a problem.

There is a lot of skilled expertise in the private sector that could be reoriented if needed.

 

[ytz]

You need a blend of both American and British outlooks -- the Brit models don't work due to their pop densities, and even the American won't not just due to budget and personnel, but also Canadian population density is less than 10% of the US.

I hate to say it, but you need a Canadianized model of a whole of government approach to Defense (my keyboard autocorrects the C to S).

The Canadian population is heavily concentrated along the QW corridor, CalEd corridor, Lower Mainland BC and basically Halifax. The actual settled areas of the QW Corridor have a population density approaching that of Spain. That makes defending population and industrial centres easier than one would think. And closer to a European context. Really, it's our approaches/flanks that are sparse that require expeditionary capability.

A Canadianized model is largely a British model (similar legislative and budgeting process context) with expeditionary capabilities to outlying areas. The reality is that we don't have governance context the US does. Even the Brits who visit point out how similar our processes are. In the US, Congress is authorizing specific procurements. In Canada (and every other Commonwealth country), the government is authorizing a budget and the Defence ministry/department is left to sort out the details. There's also nothing like the National Guards in any Commonwealth country. We aren't planning on giving Doug Ford or Danielle Smith mini-armies they can control any time soon.

However Strategic Resilience as you have noted in other posts isn't cheap, while I like the approach of IRD in some areas, economically it is not feasible in a lot of areas, and domestic licensed manufacturing, or a UK/US/EU Canadian subsidiary building entire system is a lot more practical for many items than starting from scratch.

There's an applicable phrase we all need to master here. "To the maximum extent practicable".

Sure. We can't replicate GPS. But we sure can field enough space based assets to not have to rely on the US for much inside our AOR (which is actually quite large). We can't replicate the massive USN carrier groups. But we can definitely field enough naval and air assets to ensure we can hold our own on our SLOCs. We can do enough to ensure that no American sub ever needs to enter the Arctic archipelago. This will, of course, help the US. If they know everything from the edge of Aleutians till the BC coast is secure, it then frees up resources for other applications there. Likewise if they can trust that we can secure our Arctic and the North Atlantic till GIUK, they can be free up resources there for other uses. It also avoids the temptation for any adversary to attack and use Canada simply to create a dilemma that fixes US forces in its near-abroad.

 

[ytz]

If SHTF, and the Govt needed to mobilize support from private sector partners in the transportation sector, I think the General Public, CAF, Emergency Services, etc would be shocked with how quickly we could move and what assets we could bring to bear to solve a problem.

There is a lot of skilled expertise in the private sector that could be reoriented if needed.

I trust the private sector. I just think the portions of government that have the responsibility to orchestrate such movements haven't practiced enough.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I trust the private sector. I just think the portions of government that have the responsibility to orchestrate such movements haven't practiced enough.

They have less practice than we do, that much is certain.

 

[YZT580]

Who said anything about managing their aircraft?

They have the mandate to go to Air Canada, WestJet, Air North, etc and put in place contracts for emergency airlift. And then to activate those as needed for the Government of Canada. That's just one example. But several OGDs have mandates where the CAF just ends up doing it because they don't.

and, although they will no longer have a fleet of a/c you still maintain that they will maintain the responsibility? I was hired by Transport Canada when one of the clauses in my contract suggested that, in the event of war, I would assume an air force rank. don't know when that stopped but I do know that it is no longer the case. Unless you have specifically been given the authority to take over civilian flights, forget it. I suspect that TC has either shelved it entirely or it is with the emergency drugs books i.e. expired or forgotten.

 

[ytz]

, although they will no longer have a fleet of a/c you still maintain that they will maintain the responsibility? I

Rolling over their surveillance fleet to a different department doesn't change their mandate.

 

[Brad Sallows]

It doesn't take a large army of people to guide the hand. One Eisenhower will do.

This is not a new field of study.

 

[YZT580]

Rolling over their surveillance fleet to a different department doesn't change their mandate.

true but do the crews come with them or will the CAF operate them? In either case, the mandate would go with the a/c that were purchased for that task and not department.TC pilots did not sign on to fly for the military. Transport safety inspectors used to be responsible for FFBs in ATC. TC no longer has valid controllers on staff so they have become purely a punitive board and not a pro-safety one. The responsibilities we are talking I fear will follow the same course.

 

[FJAG]

This is just that old bias of "Soldiers were better when I was in uniform."

Having sat through discussions covering what you're talking about, I will call BS. We aren't lacking for competent staff officers. What we're lacking for, is a competent government that listens. And this drives negative reinforcing behaviour in the CAF.

As an old soldier, I'm the first to admit that soldiers today are generally better than "when I was 'originally' in uniform." They are better trained and equipped as individuals than my generation. The same is not true for the CAF as a corporate entity. Ignoring the fact that there were a lot more of us then, the actual ratio of personnel dedicated to defence outputs and those dedicated to corporate management have shifted dramatically for the worse. There are far too many individuals and interests at play within DND/CAF decision loops to be efficient. The system needs massive trimming.

I won't comment too much on staff training. In my day - the 70s - the training that I had in staff functions within the army was quite good. I'm certainly not prepared to say that the military education these days is less effective. However, there is much more of it once you start piling on things like mandatory university education, language training and the numerous online courses that spring up. There is much less time available to exercise the core military skills we all need to round out the practical experience that accompanies and solidifies the "book" learning.

There have been discussions with OGDs about them doing the things that they are supposed to do so that the CAF can be freed up for warfighting. Because if a large war actually breaks out and the CAF is stuck doing everything at home, we will not be able to deploy. Every soldier guarding a factory at home because PSPC didn't plan for their mandate to protect industry, is one less we can deploy and employ on defence tasks.

I think that there is a continuing underlying insecurity that pervades the higher levels of CAF leadership. The CAF is laser focused on today's issues rather than tomorrow's, and on a neediness to stay relevant in the eyes of government. Relevance in today's environment translates into direct resource allocation by the government. Since war is a tomorrow problem it can be "safely" ignored today. OTOH, today's problems must be addressed. Recuring floods and fires are a today problem which cannot be put off. The more that the CAF can be seen in solving today's problems, the more secure CAF's leadership feels about stable resource allocation. There is no doubt in my mind, that the willingness of the CAF to take on "today issues" that could and should be addressed by OGDs, is done so for the purpose of being perceived as more relevant to the government and thus protecting the PYs and Class A positions allocated to them.

If there is one thing that I'd like to see cured its the "Mañana" attitude that is pervasive within the CAF. Instead of leaving tomorrow's fundamental problems to be solved at some indefinite time in the future while today's perceived issues are given the lion's share of the attention, we should be turning our best and brightest to address and solve tomorrow's problems before they get here.

 

[Czech_pivo]

The Canadian population is heavily concentrated along the QW corridor, CalEd corridor, Lower Mainland BC and basically Halifax. The actual settled areas of the QW Corridor have a population density approaching that of Spain. That makes defending population and industrial centres easier than one would think. And closer to a European context. Really, it's our approaches/flanks that are sparse that require expeditionary capability.

A Canadianized model is largely a British model (similar legislative and budgeting process context) with expeditionary capabilities to outlying areas. The reality is that we don't have governance context the US does. Even the Brits who visit point out how similar our processes are. In the US, Congress is authorizing specific procurements. In Canada (and every other Commonwealth country), the government is authorizing a budget and the Defence ministry/department is left to sort out the details. There's also nothing like the National Guards in any Commonwealth country. We aren't planning on giving Doug Ford or Danielle Smith mini-armies they can control any time soon.



There's an applicable phrase we all need to master here. "To the maximum extent practicable".

Sure. We can't replicate GPS. But we sure can field enough space based assets to not have to rely on the US for much inside our AOR (which is actually quite large). We can't replicate the massive USN carrier groups. But we can definitely field enough naval and air assets to ensure we can hold our own on our SLOCs. We can do enough to ensure that no American sub ever needs to enter the Arctic archipelago. This will, of course, help the US. If they know everything from the edge of Aleutians till the BC coast is secure, it then frees up resources for other applications there. Likewise if they can trust that we can secure our Arctic and the North Atlantic till GIUK, they can be free up resources there for other uses. It also avoids the temptation for any adversary to attack and use Canada simply to create a dilemma that fixes US forces in its near-abroad.

Especially if we manage to pull off 15 Rivers, dozen subs and a dozen CDC's over the next 15-20 years. Throw in some robust RCAF assets in terms of P8's (maybe 20-22 instead of 16) and that's a respectable 'Middle Power' force.

 

[Remius]

As an old soldier, I'm the first to admit that soldiers today are generally better than "when I was 'originally' in uniform." They are better trained and equipped as individuals than my generation. The same is not true for the CAF as a corporate entity. Ignoring the fact that there were a lot more of us then, the actual ratio of personnel dedicated to defence outputs and those dedicated to corporate management have shifted dramatically for the worse. There are far too many individuals and interests at play within DND/CAF decision loops to be efficient. The system needs massive trimming.

I won't comment too much on staff training. In my day - the 70s - the training that I had in staff functions within the army was quite good. I'm certainly not prepared to say that the military education these days is less effective. However, there is much more of it once you start piling on things like mandatory university education, language training and the numerous online courses that spring up. There is much less time available to exercise the core military skills we all need to round out the practical experience that accompanies and solidifies the "book" learning.



I think that there is a continuing underlying insecurity that pervades the higher levels of CAF leadership. The CAF is laser focused on today's issues rather than tomorrow's, and on a neediness to stay relevant in the eyes of government. Relevance in today's environment translates into direct resource allocation by the government. Since war is a tomorrow problem it can be "safely" ignored today. OTOH, today's problems must be addressed. Recuring floods and fires are a today problem which cannot be put off. The more that the CAF can be seen in solving today's problems, the more secure CAF's leadership feels about stable resource allocation. There is no doubt in my mind, that the willingness of the CAF to take on "today issues" that could and should be addressed by OGDs, is done so for the purpose of being perceived as more relevant to the government and thus protecting the PYs and Class A positions allocated to them.

If there is one thing that I'd like to see cured its the "Mañana" attitude that is pervasive within the CAF. Instead of leaving tomorrow's fundamental problems to be solved at some indefinite time in the future while today's perceived issues are given the lion's share of the attention, we should be turning our best and brightest to address and solve tomorrow's problems before they get here.

If I can add, while you may think they are better trained and equipped they all have a major problem with resiliency.