Canada's tanks

[KevinB]

I also note that there are no bridging resources in the US Armored Division. These are all concentrated in the three Armored Divisions (Reinforced)

I believe the Theatre level is where the other assets are held now for that.
V Corps has a number of Army Res and ARNG units that get attached for exercises and presumably operations if needed that have higher level engineering resources.

 

[GR66]

One commentators opinion on where tank design should be going...

Tanks at a crossroads: dead end or evolving labyrinth?

As the Russia-Ukraine war reshapes modern warfare, armored vehicle expert and lead analyst Serhiy Berezutskiy argues that the tank is not obsolete but stands at a crossroads requiring profound transformation to remain relevant in an age dominated by drones and precision weapons. “Throughout more...

defence-blog.com

His primary (and controversial) premise is:

The role of tanks is now reduced to direct support of infantry units. This requires dispersing and camouflaging them within combat formations and conducting “hit-and-run” attacks—where the attacking vehicle rapidly moves to a firing position, strikes pre-detected targets (or switches to higher-priority targets if identified en route), and then retreats swiftly, blending back into the surrounding landscape.

Whether you agree with that premise or not there are a couple of ideas in the article that are interesting

 

[FJAG]

One commentators opinion on where tank design should be going...

Tanks at a crossroads: dead end or evolving labyrinth?

As the Russia-Ukraine war reshapes modern warfare, armored vehicle expert and lead analyst Serhiy Berezutskiy argues that the tank is not obsolete but stands at a crossroads requiring profound transformation to remain relevant in an age dominated by drones and precision weapons. “Throughout more...

defence-blog.com

His primary (and controversial) premise is:

The role of tanks is now reduced to direct support of infantry units. This requires dispersing and camouflaging them within combat formations and conducting “hit-and-run” attacks—where the attacking vehicle rapidly moves to a firing position, strikes pre-detected targets (or switches to higher-priority targets if identified en route), and then retreats swiftly, blending back into the surrounding landscape.

Whether you agree with that premise or not there are a couple of ideas in the article that are interesting

I don't agree with his premise or the solutions he proposes.

Many of the solutions are both possible and desirable, but as additional capabilities and not as the next generation of armour. His basic premise starts with the concept that UAVs make massing armour and massive breakthroughs impossible. That ignores the possibility for the development of new systems for defeating surveillance (including satellite surveillance) and swarming UAV attacks. It also ignores the fact that if you are wrong about that premise, then you have nothing to fall back on.

The type of roles that he proposes - dispersed, multiple run ups etc - were part of our NATO strategy in the 1970s with Active Defence. It was done by full-fledged tanks, in conjunction with the fledgeling anti-armour missiles systems of the day. All of those are better, but so is everything else and there always needs to be a capability for exploitation through rapid, violent counter-attack or else you relegate yourself to the meat grinder war going on now in Ukraine. Developing the technology to enable tanks to keep doing just that is paramount.

Many of his suggested future uses for tanks in their infantry support role, are better done by cheaper specialized vehicles in the field of anti-tank, air defence or engineering. Some may be on tank chassis, others on lighter vehicles. A lot of the ideas should be, and are being incorporated, into new models. There's no question that we need cheaper, lighter tanks but the core concept for armour is still required.