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Canada's tanks

The Ukrainians have gone through hundreds of tanks and their units are reduced from 30 or 40 runners to 4 or 5. The Russians have gone through thousands.

Meanwhile Roshel had built 1700 Senators as of March 2025 and lost only 58 per Oryx as reported by Wiki.

Hardly apples to apples but it does speak to @IKnowNothing 's point about ratios.

The Senator is not operating where the tanks are operating. But they are securing that ground where the tanks aren't and limiting the areas where the enemy can operate generally.
 
Do you mean at what point does the Heavy Force become a glorified Armoured Engineering Regiment, task tailored to one purpose?
Moreso something along these lines.
Would the core of an army be a division of three DRS brigades and one Tank brigade?
But with a corps consisting of multiple "Cavalry" (read dispersed combination of sensors, effectors, local AD, and motorized infantry) divisions each with an integral CAB at their disposal to support their immediate frontage, creating the bubble for a single Heavy Armour Divsion. And an Army having 2-3 such Corps to every traditional maneuver one.

Though keep in mind the fact my opinions and ideas on the subject matter are not exactly burdened by knowledge
 
It's actually not that hard. Since WW2, artillery has worked on a "foot on the ground" basis. For a battery, for example, a troop has trails down and provides fire support to the battalion while the second troop moves to a new position. You could easily do the same with launcher entities and the control entities. Put two of each in a battery and one supports while the other leapfrogs or caterpillars forward.

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From what I've been able to find online it actually is quite hard to control FPV drones on the move. Leapfrogging faster, longer range UAV's is one thing because the supporting unit can still be far enough back from the front to be safe from small UAV's and the drones themselves are fast enough to keep ahead of the advancing forces.

FPV drones (which numerically account for the majority of the UAV's making up the "drone bubble" over the front) are another story. They are slower and have shorter range than the larger drones and would require the controllers to leapfrog more frequently and much closer to the front (and therefore at greater rist) in order to keep up with an advance. Fibre Optic drones can't be used on the move (you can't have both ends of the fibre in motion without breaking the cable) and I understand there are a number of issues with using radio controlled drones on the move.

One of the issues is the control signal. More advanced drones use directional antennas in order to help avoid EW counter measures. It's very difficult to maintain good contact when both the controller and the drone are both moving. Also, movement by the controller can result in blocked signal as terrain and buildings get between the controller and the drone as the vehicle moves. Even if signal is not totally lost due to the above two factors apparently even a weakened signal can result in picture loss/degradation or greater susceptibility to EW counter measures. I've also read that trying to control a FPV drone from a moving vehicle is extremely challenging as there is considerable disorientation caused by both the controller and drone moving in different directions at the same time.

There are some things that have been done to try and overcome these challenges like mast-mounted antennas to clear intervening terrain and gimble-mounted antennas to maintain directional contact with the drones but these can make the control vehicle easer to spot/target and can increase the emissions from the controlling vehicle. Apparently most FPV drone operators still dismount to conduct their operations due to the issues of controlling the drones while on the move.

As an interesting aside, there was an interesting comment by the US Army's Chief Technology Officer on a War on the Rocks podcast that 50% of Ukrainian drones are downed by the Ukrainians themselves. Apparently because the Sense/Decide loop is so short for C-UAS operations there is limited time to determine if a UAV is friend or foe before you need to react.
 
As was mentioned up thread, this line of thinking makes me think of ratios- specifically that of "Cavalry" + CS (as they become understood in the UAx era) vice traditional combined arms maneuver units. At what point does the stacking of the fires + sensors + C-UAS/C-RAM/SHORAD + Cavalry/dispersed force assets necessary to screen/guard the bubble and win the sensors + fires war become the formation, and the heavy combined arms unit(s) the the supporting attachment?
It is an interesting conundrum.

I've been doodling repeatedly in the past few months with various Divisional setups for 1) Europe 2) Pacific/SWA.

Why the Division? Well it is a maneuver unit, the largest tactical formation, as Corps, Army, and Theatre commands are no considered mobile.
It is also the smallest reasonable formation to have enablers that do not overly encumber the staff and commands.

I've totally given up on the Pacific/SWA theatre as I think realistically that is a Naval and Air issue primarily, and SOF. The USMC is doing what it can to be relevant, Canada doesn't have any sort of equivalent, but frankly any land war in Asia will primarily be an Army fight once a beachhead is made - or a breakout from SK.

So the European theater is my primary focus.

Various High Side Wargames have been fought out over and over again.
The key issue is what does competition and conflict look like?
Right now there is no denying that Russia and the supporting cast (I'll call it Russia Inc rather than list everyone repeatedly) are in a Hybrid war against the West.
From Cyber Attacks to Sabotage, Assassinations are more are conducted by Russian Inc in Western countries (and others as well who stray or attempting to stray from the Russian orbit). These attacks are far greater with less grey area than during the Cold War -- sure back then the USSR supported (weapons, ammo and training) Leftist Terrorist groups and Anarchists against the West - but the attacks where generally limited to Political or Military targets -- now commercial activities and civilians have been targeted, and with direct links to Russia.

SOF and the Intelligence Community are the best tools to conduct our own hybrid war against Russia, destabilizing Putin's allies, and eliminating key areas of support. SOF, the IC and LE are also the best tools for combating hybrid war against us -- conventional forces are not well suited for that purpose.

As NATO re-orients from years of neglect back to LSCO's the trades that got ignored during the GWOT years are being noticed again.
Air Defense: Zero air threat. 110% Air Supremacy for friendly forces
Artillery (and yes Artillery was used in Iraq and Afghanistan, but on a very limited basis compared to deployed Armor and Infantry forces, heck in Iraq there where several Artillery Brigades that had been temporarily "re-roled" to Infantry for the purposes of their deployment). While CB/CM Radar where used for C-RAM there wasn't a huge need and most fixed sites had remote systems linked not to Counter fire - but to warning sirens and CONEX Box CiWS systems used for C-RAM given the limited incoming (limited being relative - but 80-120 rounds per day on a bad day isn't nearly what LSCO would see)
Also NATO has been an airpower focused force for decades - with no enemy air, the Air Forces turned to ground pounding and trying to ensure Artillery didn't displace them for funding etc.
Engineers: While IED's were prevalent, and C-RCIED Teams popped up, there wasn't a massive requirement for Combat Engineers compared to Defensive and Offensive Operations in a LSCO. Bridging was not required (*okay a few bridges in Iraq got rebuilt - but not like a assault crossing) similarly pre-fab concrete T Walls, inverted U's and Hesco bastion where plentiful - but formation defense works relatively non existent.
Armor: Shy of the invasion of Iraq, and then retaking Fallujah most tanks sat as static pillboxes to entrances to secure zones. The TUSK was fitted to Abrams (Tank - Urban Survival Kit) and weights went up and up as mobility wasn't a challenge in either the urban or desert environments.

While everyone is probably tired of me blathering - I wanted to give some context for the next segment.

In other threads I gave some fairly detailed comments about my belief on what is needs for the Sensor War, and the various bands I see are.

I feel that every Division should have a Reconnaissance formation (previously I had called it a Brigade - but I'm unsure if that is too grandiose) - I do not want to call it Cav, as mainly the CAV Scout is a MOS down here from the Armor trade - not a crewman - but a separate field -- I honestly don't like the set-up as 19D's run M3 Bradley CFV's to Strykers, to Up-Armor Hummers and JLTV's depending on the Division they are in.

I got back and forth on the "optimal" formation - I started out with something like Dr Watling's concept - but quickly dropped the Mortar vehicles (he proposes something like the M1287 AMPV with NEMO turret, and while I like that vehicle - I don't like it in the Recce Formation).

The formation isn't really germane to the conversation at this point however, as up to armed conflict it really isn't being used* (more on that later).

Who does get used - Tanks, IFV's, and dismounted Dug in Infantry, Engineers (defensive positions, minefields, obstacles etc). The very visible deterrent of a combat force ready to repel any attackers, or go on the attack if the need arises.
Divisional Enablers are also working - but not at the forefront.
EW units passively collecting information
Artillery with pre-registered targets
Recce soft probing up to the LOE
AD Networks being interlaced from VSHORAD through THAAD.
As well as National Force assets gathering intel and perhaps more on the opposition.


All in all I do not see any lacking for Tanks.
 
That observation makes me wonder if the way forward is the UK's Deep Recce Strike Brigage Combat Team.

Should there be more money invested in those brigades than in tank brigades?

How deep is deep? What does the recce component look like?

Would the core of an army be a division of three DRS brigades and one Tank brigade?

I think the UK MoD is on crack.

The Jackal is an open top truck, entirely impractical for a LSCO vehicle.
The Foxhound is a 4x4 MRAP (that is ridiculously top heavy, it honestly makes the TAVP look sensible...). It is another GWOT ism last war vehicle that has no business in a LSCO.
AJAX, okay finally a tracked IFV - but 2 BN in a Brigade with no tanks?

The DRS-BCT sounds like a great GWOT era formation to run around the Desert in, primarily doing convoy and route security, and do some limited offensive operations with a bunch of artillery support.

The Deep on the ground role is a SOF domain, not a role for a conventional force.
 
It's articles like this one and Watlings writings on Ukraine that make wonder about the tank at times.
Probably missing something: however, wouldn't a tank force be something with which to, handled appropriately and with suitable joint support, maul an invader while things are still somewhat fluid?

Avoid getting to the current Ukrainian situation in the first place.
 
Probably missing something: however, wouldn't a tank force be something with which to, handled appropriately and with suitable joint support, maul an invader while things are still somewhat fluid?

Avoid getting to the current Ukrainian situation in the first place.

How many tanks in how many places do you need to accomplish that?
 
I think the UK MoD is on crack.

The Jackal is an open top truck, entirely impractical for a LSCO vehicle.
The Foxhound is a 4x4 MRAP (that is ridiculously top heavy, it honestly makes the TAVP look sensible...). It is another GWOT ism last war vehicle that has no business in a LSCO.
AJAX, okay finally a tracked IFV - but 2 BN in a Brigade with no tanks?

The DRS-BCT sounds like a great GWOT era formation to run around the Desert in, primarily doing convoy and route security, and do some limited offensive operations with a bunch of artillery support.

The Deep on the ground role is a SOF domain, not a role for a conventional force.

What is Deep when the contact zone is 15 to 25 km deep and 15 km wide, when the mid zone is 75 km wide and 75 km deep?

When the ground is littered with dug in fireteams covering 3 to 7 km each and expected to remain in position for weeks?

That used to be the purview of SF types and like 5 RA, the HAC and the 21st and 23rd SAS. Now it is Tuesday for the PBI in the Donbas.

As to what kit is most appropriate to support the Deep Strike Recce battle - no clue, me.
 
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