Canadian Armoured Cavalry

[a_majoor]

I was just remembering on another thread that the US army had some very "mixed" units during the first Persian Gulf War in 91. We received a briefing from an American Captain who's Infantry Company consisted of 16 M-2s and 25 HEMMET trucks carrying the fuel and consumables. This conglomeration moved under combat conditions to cut the Basra-Bhagdad highway, and I am not sure if the thought of contacting elements of the Republican Guard or loosing the truck convoy would have been more unnerving.

Perhaps this is the real means of delivering an effective "Cavalry" formation is the development of some form of "embedded CSS" , with a LAV III "Bison" version to carry the supplies in the front line (admin troop/platoon), and some very nimble C3I at the admin/support level of the Cavalry formation to keep things running. Technological edges, like modular vehicle magazines, high capacity fuel transfer systems and advanced mobility to increase the fuel economy of the vehicles is also important, but more a matter of degree than kind.

Re reading a lot of the thread, we all seem to have been absorbed with focusing on the pointy end, but not giving enough attention to the rest of the structure.

 

[Zipper]

Your right. We haven't paid much attention to the support part. I guess with the pointy end in such terrible shape, (and more glamerous) that it gets taken for granted far to often.

You have some interesting ideas. I wonder how much it would take as far as further vehicle purchases as well as development of your modular ideas for it to even be considered? Otherwise it is a good idea.

 

[a_majoor]

Read on: http://army.ca/forums/threads/25555.240.html

 

[Kirkhill]

Just a thought.

Maybe there are lessons to be learned from the South Africans and their excursions.  I believe they did some long range wheeled ops.  That was the battlefield the Rooikat wheeled DFSV and the G6 wheeled 155mm SP howitzer were developed for.  As well as the Mamba, Nyala and the Buffalo??.

How did they support their strikes?  The Aussie Bushmaster, eg, carries a lot of its supplies, including a large water reservoir, on board.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Kirkhill

The pictures of the AMX-10RC on the Direct Fire Support thread had actually got me thinking about the South Africans and there versions of the Eland armoured cars.  I'm glad you brought this up here.  I served with a fellow who had been in the South African army in the Eland-90 armoured cars.  These were basically small 4-wheeled armoured cars with a 90mm gun.  They apparently did well against infantry, T-34/85s and even T-55s and the odd truck.  I'm not sure if the 90mm offers any advantages over the 25mm Bushmaster but I have been wondering if a conventional turreted 90mm for the LAV might be more workable than the 105 mm low profile turret. 

The wheeled SP versions of their G5 gun could be a good fit with the Armoured Cavarly.  Their long range would be an asset to a dispered and fast-moving Cavalry force.

A mobile combined-arms cavarly force has much to offer as long as it is employed for the right role and the South African experience sheds some light on how to go about it.

Cheers,

2B

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

AMajoor,

You are absolutely correct to bring up the the CSS part.  Given that the framework of Deep, Close and Rear is not always relevant we do need to approach CSS from a different perspective.  How about having all the soldiers driving the CSS vehs around being combat arms soldiers?  At a minimum the CSS soldiers must be well drilled in their part of warfighting (and I think that we are moving in this direction).

I like the Armoured Sqn echelons as they have some AFVs mixed in with some very senior Crewmen (the SSM for one) present.  Perhaps this needs to be expanded to the rest.

Cheers,

2B

 

[Kirkhill]

2 Bravo:

Last night I looked up an old copy of Jane's  that I had and found the following

The front end of their army seemed to be based on the Panhard Eland 90 and the Oliphant version of the Centurion.

Behind that they had a wheeled force that seems to have been largely responsible for their "Expeditions" into Namibia and Angola

Their vehicles had long range, lots of seats and carried their water and fuel with them in large part.

Basic fighting vehicle was the Ratel, an armoured 6x6 truck with wheels configured like the Grizzly (2+4).  It carried up to 11 crew, regardless of configuration and had a 1000 km range.

Configurations included:

IFVs with a 20mm turret or a 60mm turreted mortar and 7 dismounts.
FSVs had a 90mm turret and could still carry 7 dismounts
CMD with 12.7mm
ATGW
81mm mor
Recovery.

Depth Fire Support was supplied by the G6 wheeled 155mm - also a 6x6 (2+4) configuration.

The logistics train was based on the Casspir.  That high mounted 4x4 with the V-Shaped hull to protect from mines.  All versions retained the v-hull and the armoured cabin.  The Troop Carriers were fully armoured.

Casspir Versions:

Casspir APC for 1+12
Armoured Cargo Carrier (Blesbok)
Armoured Fuel Tanker (Duiker)
Armoured Recovery (Gemsbok)
Armoured Ambulance
Arty Fire Control
Mine Clearance
Mine Sensors

These have been backed up by the Rooikat 8x8 with a turreted 76mm (I believe this is related to the IMI and Otomelara 60mm HVM and the Otomelara 76mm naval gun used on our frigates)

As well they incorporate the Mamba.

The dominant characteristics appear to be range, armour, mine protection, spare seats, self-sufficiency, long-range engagement over protection.  (The 90mm FSV and the Casspirs would be hard pressed to find a hull down position).

And if I am not mistaken they ended up engaging some older vintage tanks in their excursions (T-34s and T-55s probably - maybe the odd 62 or 64?)

Just more grist for the mill.

 

[a_majoor]

The LAV III chassis is quite roomy, and a combination of clever repackaging of existing systems and some advanced technology (Hybrid drive, for example) would make carrying extra supplies and taking extended range jaunts relatively easy. Integral or embedded CSS would solve the other piece of the puzzel (keeping the momentum going), but I hope some logisticians could weigh in with suggestions, since my hand waving isn't getting any rabbits out of the hat.....

 

[Kirkhill]

Using the LAV platform could you go back to a 4 man in the back of the turreted LAV - more space for water, fuel and grub;  your Bison variant as a Logistics/Troop carrier (maybe even add some windows in the back) and possibly even your pick-up truck flat-bed variant?

Can the LAVs be mineproofed to a greater extent than they are now? Say taken from a 2-3 kg mine threat to a 7 kg level?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I would say that fuel is the big issue, followed by water, spare parts and other sundries.  Bigger fuel resevoirs and extra jerry cans can extend the range of a force but eventually somebody has to bring the fuel forward.  Our FARs (tactical tanker trucks which I think were designed for helos but I could be wrong) are efficient but do make a good target.  I think that the key is to make our echelons able to fight and protect themselves.  It is our centre of gravity right now, IMHO, and the answer is making the CSS elements self-sufficient in terms of defending themselves.

I do like the idea of armoured echelon vehicles.  Our current CSS doctrine was designed in WW II with front lines etc.  To me, the crew of the CSS vehicles are far more important than their cargo and are the real target of our potential enemies.  The old drill of driving through the ambush to "get the supplies through" is not an option to me.  Not saying that you stop in the kill zone, but the convoy has to fight back and not leave ANYBODY behind.  In addition, the CSS soldiers who travel the roads are just as likely to be under attack as the combat arms guys "on patrol." 

Not to get into war stories again, but in Kabul we kept a four-vehicle OP running for over a month without an echelon.  Due to the nature of the ground we left the vehicles in place and rotated crews.  We did not have any integral CSS to the Company.  The NSE were very cooperative but bringing a FAR up to the OP every couple of days was not the best option.  We did have a Bison RRB vehicle; however, and an SSM who could improvise.  Not many seats inside but we could stuff it full of diesel jerry cans, IMPs and cases of bottled water.  It performed stirling service as an ersatz echelon vehicle.  :warstory:  As AMajoor suggests, a LAV version of the M548 might well be in order.


Kirkhill,

I'm not sure about the possibilities of further LAV/Coyote mineproofing (I'm a bit like Oddball in Kelly's Heroes, I just ride the things and don't know how they work!).  I'd rather not make the Coyote/LAV any taller (like the South African mineproofed vehicles) but perhaps the engineers can come up with something workable. 

Cheers,

2B

 

[Zipper]

All of these ideas are great. And I think the Esh. concepts forming here are very workable.

However should we compare our needs so closely with that of S. Africa? Yes, they are probably one of the best wheeled forces out there. But their terrain and deployment tends to favour wheeled vehicles for the most part. They are not widely deployed to other countries with numerous allies, in varying terrain.

Just a note. Otherwise they are probably the best to take examples from.

 

[a_majoor]

Some of our Log friends are also thinking along these lines just next door: http://army.ca/forums/threads/4273.0.html.

The next big change I can forsee is to really tie the CSS into the unit somehow. They can be integral (CCBG concept) or "embedded" (Cavalry as a Bn/Regimental sized unit), but it has to be much more robust than an umbilical cord trailing behind the lead elements.

The South Africans were participating in long range operations where the force to space ratios were quite low, large vehicles were and are appropriate because they are "self contained" to a certain extent, able to carry extended supplies, sufficient armour and still pack a punch. Considerations like being air transportable in a C-130 were moot, since they were just a long road move away from the action. IF we put the air mobility thing out of our heads and accept we may have to drive in from a beachhead/railhead, then things become easier for us as well.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Deployed Canadian Task Forces will tend to have disproportionate CSS arrangements because we do not deploy over a battalion-
sized yet still need all the bits and pieces found in a Brigade level support unit.  We also like to over-insure our CSS, and in this we are not alone.

Within the Cavalry Task Force I see Squadron/Company echelons along our traditional lines.  There would also be a CSS sub-unit that I would like to see resembling our current HQ Sqn or Inf Bn Admin Coy.  The tricky part is that this Task Force will be working for a coalition formation that may not be in a position to provide support on Canadian-unique items.  This means that we will need an NSE of some kind that perhaps dovetails into the Division or Brigade sustainment organization. It won't be pretty but I guess it is the cost of doing business.

Going back to first principles regarding CSS, one way to reduce the burden is to lessen the "demand."  In the book The March Up describing the USMC's part of the intiatial phases of OIF the concept of "Loglight" was discussed.  Apparantly the senior USMC commander had his people take a good hard look at what was really essential and forced the Div to lighten its load.  One notable decision was the lightening of artillery ammunition loads.  If you have air supremacy and effective air to ground communication this becomes an attractive option.  The bottom line is that they did not "overinsure" their CSS to enable them to move quickly without overextending their supply lines.  I'd like the Armoured Cavalry to adopt something along these lines.  Since we should be avoiding pitched battles on mobile ops we should not need tons of 25mm, 105mm and TOW ammunition in our log trains.  Fuel, water, food, spare parts and medical evac should be our priorities (not necessarily in that order).

Cheers,

2B

 

[Zipper]

One notable decision was the lightening of artillery ammunition loads. If you have air supremacy and effective air to ground communication this becomes an attractive option. The bottom line is that they did not "overinsure" their CSS to enable them to move quickly without overextending their supply lines. I'd like the Armoured Cavalry to adopt something along these lines. Since we should be avoiding pitched battles on mobile ops we should not need tons of 25mm, 105mm and TOW ammunition in our log trains. Fuel, water, food, spare parts and medical evac should be our priorities (not necessarily in that order).

Good ideas. But one notable question? Are we sure we are moving in a Armoured Cavalry direction? Or are you referring to USMC formations?

As well the idea of carring less ammunition is a good one. But will we have plans for those supplies to be not far behind? The idea of us avoiding pitched battles is fine. You'll just have to tell that to the other side (whoever they may be) before we go over. I would think that your idea would be very "mission" specific, and with enough flexibility built in to respond to circumstances that may not go our way.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Zipper,

I am proposing that we head for a Canadian Armoured Cavarly and not a USMC or US Army unit.   That being said, I was influenced by both the US Army and USMC due to courses with the US Army (which had Marine officers on them) and an exercise with the USMC on which I went as an exchange officer.   If we want to have global mobility the USMC does offer some insights.   In addition, their LAR battalions (equipped with the LAV-25 family) have lots of experience and can also offer some lessons for us.   I'm not suggesting that we simply copy the US Army or USMC (or any other nation's military), but rather that we look around for ideas that have relevance for us and perhaps adapt some of them.   We would still be Canadian and would have some unique outlooks.

Reducing the amount of artillery and other ammunition is a calculated risk.   The Cavarly Task Force should be able to fight a short pitched battle in a defensive mode.   I do not see the vehicles expending all their ammo, however, as the heavy fighting will be left for the follow-on coalition forces that would be right behind us.   We would still have ammunition in our echelon, but perhaps not as much as we planned to carry for battles against the Warsaw Pact.   Any integral fire support (mortars or guns) for the Cavalry would only fire to enable us to disengage and would not be firing prolonged bombardments in support of a deliberate attack.   Just like Buford's action at Gettysburg was only to cover the deployment of the main Union forces, so would this Cavalry only fight to cover the supported formation and not as the "main event."

Going back even farther in history, part of the Blitzkrieg theory was the use of airpower as a substitute (or supplement) to artillery.   This only works, of course. if we have air superiority or supremacy.   Not to be complacent, but I think that this condition is a farily safe bet for NATO in the near future.

For a Recce Sqn, I'd rather have two HLVWs carrying fuel than one with fuel and one with 25mm on board (just my two cents).   One issue with the MGS will be the rather limited on-board ammo storage.   TOW missiles are also somewhat bulky with limited on-board vehicle storage and could perhaps be in high demand.   This could make the "loglight" concept somewhat hard to implement.   I'll need to chew on this one a little bit.

Cheers,

2B

p.s. I hope I have not given the impression that the USMC does not have supply trains etc or that I am proposing that we simply ignore the CSS issue by hoping we do not fight any battles.  Our echelon will need ammo etc, I just think that we can be a little more ruthless in our planning.  The USMC takes logistics very seriously and this is their big advantage over airborne forces in terms of strategic deployment.  When an airborne force lands by parachute it has very little CSS capability.  When a USMC force lands from ships it has a considerable CSS capability.  I'm risking a merge with the Marine thread so I'll hold up now.

 

[Zipper]

I am proposing that we head for a Canadian Armoured Cavalry and not a USMC or US Army unit.   That being said, I was influenced by both the US Army and USMC due to courses with the US Army (which had Marine officers on them) and an exercise with the USMC on which I went as an exchange officer.   If we want to have global mobility the USMC does offer some insights.   In addition, their LAR battalions (equipped with the LAV-25 family) have lots of experience and can also offer some lessons for us.   I'm not suggesting that we simply copy the US Army or USMC (or any other nation's military), but rather that we look around for ideas that have relevance for us and perhaps adapt some of them.   We would still be Canadian and would have some unique outlooks.

I understood that. I'm was just asking whether you knew something of the direction we're headed or not. I agree with you entirentirely with the loss of our armoured capability, we need to look at other options. Screening Cavalry would be one of them.

Reducing the amount of artillery and other ammunition is a calculated risk.  The CavarCavalry Force should be able to fight a short pitched battle in a defensive mode.  I do not see the vehicles expending all their ammo, however, as the heavy fighting will be left for the follow-on coalition forces that would be right behind us.  We would still have ammunition in our echelon, but perhaps not as much as we planned to carry for battles against the Warsaw Pact.  Any integral fire support (mortars or guns) for the Cavalry would only fire to enable us to disengage and would not be firing prolonged bombardments in support of a deliberate attack.  Just like Buford's action at Gettysburg was only to cover the deployment of the main Union forces, so would this Cavalry only fight to cover the supported formation and not as the "main event."

Going back even farther in history, part of the Blitzkrieg theory was the use of airpower as a substitute (or supplement) to artillery.  This only works, of course. if we have air superiority or supremacy.  Not to be complacent, but I think that this condition is a fairly good bet for NATO in the near future.

For a Recce Sqn, I'd rather have two HLVWs carrying fuel than one with fuel and one with 25mm on board (just my two cents).  One issue with the MGS will be the rather limited on-board ammo storage.  TOW missiles are also somewhat bulky with limited on-board vehicle storage and could perhaps be in high demand.  This could make the "loglight" concept somewhat hard to implement.  I'll need to chew on this one a little bit.

I agree again that we would not need as much ammo. Now in regards to the MGS and TOW. If we are acting in a screening/recce capacity, would we even be using our main MGS and TOW units? Or would they be attached to another formation entirely that may have better CSS? In fact, it will be hard to tell at this point what sized units we'll even be able to field in the near future, especially in the more aggressive missions. It may only be individual Coy/Sqn's that get attached to our bigger brothers.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Zipper,

I'm really not sure what direction we are headed.  The Cavalry thing is just my suggestion (and not a very original one at that).  My worry is that we have taken away tanks and will try to do it the old way relying on perfect ISTAR and the TOW/MGS/ADATs.  I think that some might actually think that we could do it that way.  It is partly this fear that has inspired my desire to adopt a Cavalry role.

The TOW/MGS may or may not be used heavily in a screening or recce role (Cavalry).  If we are in a more conventional warfighing scenario then the Cavalry should have integral TOW and/or MGS.  Their purpose would be two-fold.  First, they would be employed to destory enemy recce assets found by the Coyotes (the hunter/killer concept).  Second, they would be there to protect the recce assets against the enemy's counter-reconnaissance effort (along with the infantry in their LAV IIIs).  In a defensive screen against a mechanized opponent more missiles and shells may be fired but that scenario is somewhat unlikey these days.  In we are "screening" an advance we would probably fire some missiles and shells when we encounter enemy security picquets and such.

I would certainly have integral CSS with the Cavalry and I do not see this as limiting our ability to employ TOW and MGS.  As for the size of our deployed forces, I see a robust Task Force consisting of a "regiment/battalion" sized group including integral combat support and combat service support.  This fits the Cavalry role quite nicely, as we could attach it to a coalition formation (brigade/div).

Cheers,

2B

 

[Zipper]

All sounds good to me. I agree with you totally that we need to find new ways of doing things with what we have. I'm just trying to ask questions to clarify things in my own mind, and maybe luck out on something you haven't thought of yet. So far I have failed in that.   I've been out of the loop (forces) for so long that I'm not up on all these things anymore. Your views and explanations are well taken.

Thank you.

Now here is another question, and one that may not go over to well.

Considering we are getting rid of our armoured capability. And that we are in essence going to be working with other forces in most situations. And that most of those other forces will be other NATO countries with air assets. Why do we need ADATS? In fact, why would we need any air defense with overseas operations? We'll be relying on other countries for air superiority and operating under that blanket. So why not get rid of it like the tanks and put our money into something that would be more operationally useful?

Now I don't fully believe in this myself. But if we are getting rid of one aspect of the forces that we seem to deem unnecessary, then why not others?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Zipper,

You are asking a very good question and your input is most welcome.  I'm trying to come up with a fairly tight argument and to do that I need questioning.  I think that the ADATs is now being seen as more of an anti-tank system than an air defence system.  The 8 km range is good and all, but I'm not sure about getting those lines of sight.  For the Cavalry I'm content to have LAV TOW (if and when we get it online) for scenarios where we may face enemy armour.  I would say that virutally all of our land mechanized systems and how/if they are operated need to be reviewed. 

Now, having a man-portable capability could be useful if we are deployed on independent operations in far away places that may have small airforces available.  More to think about.

Cheers,

2B

 

[Zipper]

The ADATs at an anti-tank weapon? Yes it is feasible, but it was never designed as such. And is it fire and forget?

I guess I question that, and even TOW because of the fact that these weapons have to be guided. To keep yourself exposed after firing for even those few seconds (unless you have a FOO), and in such a thin skinned vehicle calls into question survivability.

As for 8km. Who came up with this number? Ranges of that sort have always been the perview of the Artillery. You can't see squat beyond 2km unless your in a table flat landscape, or a very large valley. And much less if you add trees as you well know. So why is this number being quoted so often?

As Majoor is fond of saying. Why are we not looking at hellfire and other similar weapon systems that are fire and forget? They would allow for a higher survivability on our part. Although if I remember correctly, they have a habit of killing our own people just as well.

I would say that virtually all of our land mechanized systems and how/if they are operated need to be reviewed.

I would agree with this. With the way we are going, I would even call into question why we are mechanized in the first place. Most of our missions are foot patrols inside urban centers with a few vehicle escorts and farther ranged patrols outside the center. So why not just turn our Infantry into light, give em trucks and a few APC's to get from one center to the other, and let the armoured handle the escorts and ranged patrols and be done with it? Forget about the cavalry role and just admit that we're going to be a light infantry country (man, am I going to burn in hell for that).

Oh, and give them shoulder mounted AA as well.