Canadian Armoured Cavalry

[Kirkhill]

Would it be a fair assesment to suggest that not all urban warfare will occur in Megalopolises (Sadr City in Baghdad type situations) but that there is also a likelihood of having to control smaller centres where they are isolated by rural areas and have clearly defined perimeters?

Under those circumstances wouldn't the Cavalry be an effective tool for controlling the perimeters and dominating the "spaces between"?  The Infantry would then concentrate on the Urban fight as well as other complex terrain fights. 

Having said that I am sure it would be a great comfort to those Infanteers, if there was a well defended (read armoured), mobile force, capable of entering a "hot" zone and either extricating them at short notice or else assist them in winning the engagement.

 

[a_majoor]

My primary concern is that the force structure discussed appears to be designed to face a conventional opponent which I would argue will be the exception to the rule in future deployments.  On the contrary, I would argue that for the stabilization/ peacemaking role our citizenry (and Liberal Government) expect you guys to handle, it is far more likely your theatre of operations would be an urban environment against irregular infantry with RPG's/IED's.

In that environment, using an armoured cavalry formation to destroy opposing force intelligence gathering appears questionable as in Iraq and Somalia before it, you had individuals (in many cases children) with cell phones calling regional insurgent commanders who were hidden in someone's basement in the middle of a city.

In essence, if the theatre I envision is going to be our dominant environment, we would need to accept we cannot eliminate the opposing force's intelligence gathering capability and accept that the enemy will know our force structure, composition and location at most times.  

With near-perfect intelligence, you are the target.  The enemy needs only to sit back and devise attack methods to "crack the nut".  
Engagements timing and location will much more often be dictated by that enemy and you will forced to take the first hit, and then react.

Bottom Line:  I find the model you're discussing horribly disconcerting as if deployed in that urban environment by our government, we could end up with a lot of brave men & women who don't make it home.  The only workaround is a force policy that if the enemy does possess RPG's/IED's/etc, that Canadian Forces are limited to deployment outside those urban areas where they have the safety of a defensive perimeter to keep thin-skinned vehicles from taking such attacks.  (City perimeter surveillance and convoy escort?)

Here is where I am coming from WRT the ability of a Cavalry formation to have some combat muscle. It does take a fresh set of eyes to see and state what we have been circling around! Now that I have read back over the thread,  my mistake was not qualifying what sort of combat actions I was expecting a Cavalry formation to be able to handle. In addition to finding and defeating enemy recce or Cavalry type formations in a conventional scenario; the Cav would have to be able to perform "counter ambush" type short assaults against enemy forces lying in wait with RPGs, IEDs and irregular infantry, not stand up battles against the 42nd MRR. Getting back to Gen Buford, this would also resemble the opening day of the battle of Gettysburg, where the Cavalry opened the battle by deploying and forcing the fight on the Confederate infantry division, only instead of "One Corps" coming to the battle, we would be waiting for the Air Cav or UA heavy to arrive. The message is there does have to be enough combat power to win the counter ambush drill or force the fight on the opponent.

Blackshirt also has quantified the sort of opposition we are likely to face, so the Cav formation will probably have to load up with more infantry ands especially more recce/scout elements to find them. Given our equipment set and experience, a dismasted Coyote carrying a four man patrol in the back would be a good start, especially if the surveillance kit is to be transferred into a larger LAV III chassis (freeing up more Coyotes for this role.) The dismounted scout element would probably also resemble the unit portrayed in Kirkhill's article, able to locate and if required, eliminate enemy soldiers, leaders and equipment.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

So what about a mixed force?

Keep a majority of your wheeled assets outside highly urbanized areas and swap your purchase of the MGS for something slightly heavier with tracks (Warrior/M-2/CV-90)

In that way, if you're going to add a new incompatable chassis, at least it can perform a different role?

The other thought I had which I have mentioned in the past is that I think our Coyote's Recce/Surveillance Groups need to be bulked up with a VTUAV like Fire Scout.   Specifically, I think it would be an excellent doctrinal change if we tried to operate our forces with overhead surveillance at all times.

In any case, can you gentlemen comment on your thoughts on such a modified force (assuming cancelletion of the MGS and acquisition of something/anything else) and how you would structure it?

I'm certainly not an expert on unit structures and anything you teach me would be greatly appreciated....


Many thanks,



Matthew.    

 

[a_majoor]

A few observations about your post:

A heavy vehicle could work as part of a mixed force, but as always there are some trade offs. An "All LAV" Cavalry unit can do extended road moves at high speed (80 kph or more) on the existing road networks. In Iraq, this allowed Marine LAV and Army SBCTs to displace rapidly and unexpectedly, presenting the enemy with a complete unit before they were aware the unit was on the move. A heavy unit mounted on tracks would have to employ the services of a transport unit to move the same distance and speed (and save the wear and tear on the vehicles and roads). This is not to say the LAVs in a mixed combat team could not provide escorts for the light tanks or whatever tracked vehicles are being transported, but there would still be a pause while everything is unloaded and sorted out, which would give the bad guys time to become aware the unit has arrived in the AOR. The extra logistics requirments of tank transporters, more fuel bowsers, mechanics and recovery vehicles etc. are the real reason tanks and tracked forces are not as easily deployable as a "medium" force.

Air cover is weather and lift dependent, so fixing your doctrine around constant overhead surveillance and cover would limit you to operating on clear days and nights. As well, if you were too dependent on one system, the enemy would eventually figure it out and adopt countermeasures. Extra care with camoflage and concealment, robust anti-air defenses to shoot down UAVs or even suicide bomber attacks against ground control stations could be used against this sort of capability. In the Balkens, I recall reading the Serbs used helicopters to chase down Predator UAVs and door gunners attempted to shoot the Predators down. Since the Predators were flying "low and slow" attempting to get documentary evidence of war crimes, this wasn't as hard as it sounds. Israel has also encountered some problems, since UAVs often announce the impending arrival of an attack helicopter or a ground force. The Palistinians or Hezbollah members they are searching for can "go to ground", or ambushes prepared to meet the oncoming force.

That aside, UAVs will provide a useful capability and enhance existing ones, if you are interested in similar ideas look up "The Return of the Canadian Mounted Rifles" in the Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin Vol 5 No 4 Winter 2002-03 http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ael/adtb/vol_5/adtb_vol5no4_e.pdf

 

[George Wallace]

a-majoor

I can see some of your points of wheels vs tracks, but in war I doubt if that will be much of a factor.  I don't seem to recall any problems of Heavy Armour in WW II or Korea or any major conflict, where we would have had to use tank transporters in the way you alluded to.  That is a 'bean counter' type of arguement, and I won't fall for it.

GW

 

[a_majoor]

I was commenting on the How and Why, not the value of heavy forces. We need to understand what the government wants us to do, then find the appropriate kit to do so. If our job is to do expeditionary ops for PSOs and supply a "niche" Cavalry component for our bigger and better equipped allies, then these proposals fit the bill.

If we are going to be tasked as a "General Purpose" army which can fight "with the best, against the best", then no, these ideas are completely inadequate. We will have to wait for the (ever) pending Defense Review to find the arcs and axis of advance.....

 

[George Wallace]

I know.

Just a thought: what if we took all that money for the MGS and bought MAN Tank Transporters like we used to have in Germany (Although we only had four, which were not enough for any tactical movement.)

GW

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The Cavalry Task Force would be well suited to convoy escorts and other such tasks normally associated with Rear Area Security.  Since lines of communication are now a target of choice this is an important role.  One conumdrum is how to best organize the Cavalry for this task.  Both Coyotes and LAVs can conduct escorts and a mixture of the two would probably be optimum.  A Patrol of Coyotes as the vanguard, a couple of LAVs with the main convoy and perhaps an additional Patrol trailing with a Section.  In a counter-insurgency style operation perhaps mixed Sqns/Coys would be the best approach.  TOW etc might be less useful in this type of scenario.  Having each Cav Sqn consist of two Coyote Tps and two LAV Pls might be interesting.  MGS might fit in somewhere but for convoy escort situations the 25mm would probably suffice.

Coyotes could be used to establish surveillance throughout the area with a view to catching insurgents in the act of setting up but this is harder than it sounds.  Getting tied to static OPs can hand the initative to the enemy but it does remain as an option.

The Cavarly as laid out here would be well suited to two parts of the Three Block War (the humanitarian and peacekeeping blocks) but it could face some challenges in the third block, namely the highly lethal mid-intensity urban battle.  With its infantry component and AFVs it does have the basic parts but I'd sure like to have tanks with it if we're asked to dig the bad guys out.  :evil:

I am a big admirer of the CV90 family and I got a chance to crawl around in one overseas.  Tracks, a 30mm Bushmaster and a low silouette make for a good AFV.  Still, I've based my assumptions on our having the kit we have now plus some potential extras that are forecast (MGS, LAV TOW and MMEV). 

Cheers,

2B

 

[George Wallace]

Just on the idea of Convoy Escort, a Seven Car Troop is the minimum requirement.  One Patrol out front as Vanguard, one Patrol as Rear Security, and one as Escort with the Troop Leader.  A Section to Platoon size Infantry presence would be an asset; size depending on size of convoy. 

One also has to remember that the Troop Leader is at all times the Convoy Comd, no matter what the highest rank may be in the Convoy or VIP being escorted.  It is the "Escort" who have all the Comms, Fire Power an overall "control" of the convoy.

Gw

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

George,

I would agree that three elements plus the Comd is the way to go.  The five car Tp has many issues!  I do suggest that the force can be a mixture of Coyotes and LAVs and not necessarily a complete Tp or Platoon (perhaps two Patrols, two to three Sections and an HQ Veh).  The commander could either be a Pl Comd or a Tp Ldr (or a Tp WO).  I would like to have a LAV III with the trail patrol to give them some infantry to act as an immediate "QRF" if things go bad up front.  Long distance or high threat convoys could also have recovery and medical assets travelling with the trail.  Of course, bigger is not always better when it comes to convoys.  Again, the mixed nature of Cavalry would lend itself to task tailoring and maximizing the strengths of each arm.

Cheers,

2B

 

[Gobsmacked]

  Looking at the Americans, they have Light Cavalry (HMMVW based).  When I was in the states they were concerned about the protection of the HMMVWs (this is before Iraq but after Mogadishu).  They use the Light Cav for formations that deploy rapidly and this does involve some acceptance of risk.  Some US officers had seen the Coyote and saw it as an interesting alternative to the Light Cav.  The whole Stryker brigade concept has followed this path, although I have read that the Stryker ACR has become a casualty.

SBCT4 (2nd Armd Cav Regt - Light), currently in the process of standing up, used to be the US Army's Experimental rapidly deployable Light HMMVW-based Cavalry formation - although it deployed just too late to participate in OIF.
In early 2004, to save US$500M, it was decided the 2nd ACR would adopt the same infantry-heavy configuration of the other 5 SBCTs, so basically an ACR in name only.  As noted in 26 May 2004 'JDW', "the 2nd ACR will have 27x MGS variants rather than the 48 originally planned, and 127 Infantry Carrier Vehicles instead of 13.  It will mean that the Bde will have 1,000 dismounted soldiers as opposed to 500 in the originally planned cavalry configuration, an army spokesman said."  This means that each SBCT will now comprise: 3x Inf Battalions - w\ 65x Strykers (each w\ 10x 120mm mortars); RSTA (reconnaissance, surveillance & target acquisition) Cav Sqn (Bn) - w\ 53 Strykers (incl. 6x 120mm mortars); Anti-Tank Company (w\ TOW 2B) - w\ 10x Strykers; Artillery Bn w\ 18x 155mm M198 towed-howitzers (Eventually NLOS-C); Engineer Co - w\ 9x Stryker ESV; plus support elements. 
I also understand that each SBCT is eventually planned to include an integral aviation Bn - including AH-64D Longbow helicopters.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Gobsmacked,

Thanks for the intel.  I had heard that the Stryker ACR concept was basically turning into an infantry SBCT and it is good to see the details laid out.  The whole Stryker debate got a little warped on both sides of the border.  When I saw a fledging proposal in Fort Knox in 1998 to go with a LAV ACR instead of a HUMMVW ACR it seemed to be a good idea and not controversial in the least.  It somehow turned into a M1 vs Stryker debate along the way.  As long as the SBCT is not given tasks meant for heavy forces it can be an very useful unit.  The Cavalry proposed here is similar to the SBCT if not the same.  I would argue that all of the SBCTs are actually Cavalry organizations in the first place.  Names are perhaps not as important as roles.

Looking back to Canada, if I had a magic wand I would have all of our mounted forces Cavalry and the rest Infantry.  I would even make the section in the back of the LAV III Cavalrymen.  The Canadian Army would have several Cavalry Regiments and several Infantry Regiments.  Realizing that this is not practical I have tried to suggest a way to achieve some of the same effect without the organizational bloodshed.  >

I think that the Light Cavalry Squadrons in the light divisions (101st, 82nd and 10th Mtn) still have the HMMMVW Ground Tp and two Air Tp composition (they did two years ago).  I think that it makes sense for those units due to the nature of their parent divisions.  Do you know if this is still the case?

Cheers,

2B

 

[Infanteer]

Looking back to Canada, if I had a magic wand I would have all of our mounted forces Cavalry and the rest Infantry.   I would even make the section in the back of the LAV III Cavalrymen.   The Canadian Army would have several Cavalry Regiments and several Infantry Regiments.   Realizing that this is not practical I have tried to suggest a way to achieve some of the same effect without the organizational bloodshed.    >:

2Bravo,

I've explored this proposal at well, on this thread.  Funny, I think I got it the notion of it from an earlier proposal you made on the official Army forum a few years back....

Infanteer

 

[Kirkhill]

OK here he goes again....

In my real world I design processing plants.  They happen to be food processing plants but I think I see some similarities to their operations and the operations of the Stability Operation type forces that the CF is trying to create.

This is not for War-Fighting this is for Stability Ops Garrisons.  And try to get by the â Å“Oh Crikey â “ another flaming management consultantâ ?.  You have ample opportunity to shoot me down later.

In Stability Ops the task of the Unit assigned is to create a secure environment for the duration of the assignment on a 24/7 basis.  This seems to be primarily done by presence patrols. The patrol capability is supplied by personnel augmented by equipment.

The Authority of the Unit comes from its ability to Act and eliminate, or at least offer a credible threat to eliminate, judiciously, threats to that security.

The Unit also must be able to protect itself as well as the security of others.

The Unit must be able to maintain effectiveness by being able to maintain the equipment and also allowing personnel adequate rest and recuperation.

In my world Companies must maximize capital and this is done, as much as possible, by running equipment 24/7 year round.

This is done by buying kit necessary to get the job done, maintaining a marginal surplus of kit to handle U/S situations and planned maintenance, maintaining spare parts and over-manning (in military parlance) the kit.

This plays out this way in practice.  An ideal company will have a requirement to produce 100 items per day.  It will acquire 3 lines each capable of producing 50 items per day.  Each line will normally operate at 33 items per day (3x33 = 99 or ~ 100).  When one line is down then the other two lines pick up the pace and go up to maximum capacity.

Now assume that each line conventionally requires 2 operators therefore the plant needs 6 operators to run and a supervisor to coordinate their activities.  7 bodies.  What happens these days is that the 3 lines are linked with a computer and only two operators are required and the Supervisor is surplus to requirements.  Only 2 bodies.

But now the plant is not being run with only one shift it is being run 24/7 year round.  This requires 4 shifts or 2 operators or 8 bodies in total each working a 2150 hour year instead of 7 bodies x 4 shifts for a total of 28 bodies.

The plant has surplus kit to the tune of 50% of capacity but it is overmanned to the tune of 300% (3 spare operators for every operator on shift).

Now as I look at these Stability Ops it seems to me that the problems of stress are at least in some part due to the fact that a Crisis based war-fighting force, where personnel are being asked to work 24/7 for a 72-96 hour period and then be withdrawn or replaced is being asked to operate a Security Plant using the same manning model but for a 6 month, 9 month, 12 month period.  Burn out happens.  Nobody asks the Mounties to supply a Secure environment at home by having their members on duty 24/7 with an occasional leave.

Nor do the Mounties issue (AFAIK) individual Mounties with personal Cruisers, Boats, Helicopters or Aircraft.

Following on from these thoughts it occurs to me that a Stability Force operation organization might look something like this:

Primary task â “ patrolling

Recce Squadron â “ 3 Recce troops of 8 cars and an Surveillance/Observation troop of mixed composition of kit are deemed to be necessary to supply the secure environment.

The Force is supplied with 4 Recce troops of cars and surplus observation platforms to cover U/S kit.  (Need 2 EW-LAVs? Supply 3 to the theatre)

Now manning.

Recce will be conducted 24/7.  Recce operators can't work 24/7. If they were tasked as Civilians (everybody moan here.......) then each Serviceable Recce Troop (lets say of 24-32 bodies) would have 72-96 bodies either back at base or on leave.

The troops back at base would be available for less demanding tasks and as a protective force when not resting or on leave.  They would add to camp security.

Secondary task â “ eliminating threats

Assault/Combat Force comprising Mech Inf, Direct Fire Support and Arty.

This force by contrast to the hard working Recce types (overt attempt to curry favour) will spend the majority of their time lazing around the camp, polishing brasses, training and waiting for the call.....that hopefully never comes.

In the meantime they are contributing to camp security.

The Assault/Combat Force equipment will not be used hard, nor will the personnel.

In that case we assume that every piece of kit deployed has a job to do IN THE ASSAULT and thus is needed and likewise every man or woman is needed.  We also assume that they, by and large are not going to have the wear and tear on them that the Recce types will.  Therefore the need for spares is less, and in a low risk environment may be non-existent meaning that no spare radios, vehicles or personnel are required.

In a high risk environment maybe we want 1 spare vehicle for every 2-10 deployed and one spare soldier for every 2-10 deployed.  Think LOB troops here.

Now if there is a lot of commonality between Assault Force training and kit and Recce Force training and kit then perhaps some of those Recce types that are not on patrol can form a backup Assault Force or contrarily some of those idle Assault Force types can form one of the Recce Force manning tiers.

But I don't really think that is likely nor do I think it is desireable as such a strategy would lead bean-counters to start thinking in terms of double hatting and idle hands and reducing personnel down time.

Support functions would be manned someplace in between because a lot of their functions can be programmed to be performed for specific times and be of specific durations.

So what would the overall Force Composition look like?

Recce Force

1 Recce Squadron of Vehicles with an extra Troop to cover U/S vehicles.
4 Squadrons worth of Personnel

Similar manning and kitting for Command, Sigs and Surveillance.

Assault Force

1 Mech Company of Vehicles
1 Mech Company of Infanteers

1 DFS Squadron/Troop of Vehicles
1 DFS Squadron/Troop of Cavalry types

1 Arty Battery of Guns/Mortars/Missiles
1 Arty Battery of Gunners

Small number of extras to cover U/S kit and LOB bodies.

Support and Sustainment

Similar to Assault force but a higher percentage of extra kit and bodies due to higher usage rates.

This would include Engineers and Medical types

While 3 pieces of kit are necessary to fill demand a 4th is  brought in to cover U/S needs similar to the Recce and Cmd functions.

Manning requirements here may be different than in either Assault or Recce type forces.  They don't need to work 24/7 but at the same time they are going to work at their primary task everyday, unlike the Assault Force types and they still have to be ready to support the Assault Force when it acts.  Lets say the need is for 1 troop to meet daily needs and another to be able to fill the gaps and cover emergencies.

Summary

Command and Patrol elements

Ratio of Deployed Kit to Tasked Kit, 4:3
Ratio of Deployed Tps to Tasked Tps, 4:1

Sustainment elements

Ratio of Deployed Kit to Tasked Kit, 4:3
Ratio of Deployed Tps to Tasked Tps, 2:1

Assault elements

Ratio of Deployed Kit to Tasked Kit, 1:1
Ratio of Deployed Tps to Tasked Tps, 1:1
*Depending on threat level perhaps it would be appropriate to leave a modest in-theatre U/S-LOB reserve.

What this means for force structure generally is that  Sigs Platoons and Recce Troops need to become Squadrons with respect to manning while roughly maintaining current kitting practices.

Engineers, Loggies, Medics etc need to add 2x the bodies for the necessary kit.

Infantry, Arty and DFS Squadrons could stand pat with 1 crew, 1 system generally speaking.

Where do the extra bodies come from?

Rebalancing roles, tasks undertaken by the government and determination of available kit.

Lunacy ends.  Have at it.

Cheers.

 

[a_majoor]

I have had an epiphany with this idea. We need to come up with a means of achieving the goal without to many changes to current organizations and structures, and with minimum wishful thinking about kit or purchasing templates.

The minimum viable size for a Cavalry formation is a Canadian Cavalry Brigade Group, which uses the same units and numbers currently found in a CMBG. The primary difference between the two formations are the formation of Cavalry teams as permanent groupings of Infantry, Armour, Artillery and Engineers. (Current numbers don't give an exact match, but this is the starting point). Service and support elements will be evolved to support widely separated and fast moving Cavalry teams in operations.

Since sub and sub sub units would always train together, they will develop a higher level of cohesion and teamwork than is currently possible. There is nothing to prevent members of the Cavalry teams from forming social networks in garrison as well, such as sports teams, to maintain and strengthen the bonds.

Units in this scenario would resemble UEs in the American Objective Force model, being responsible for training and developing the soldiers under their command. Regimental officers and NCOs would have the hard job of creating challenging training to ensure their troops are able to make their contributions to the Cavalry team. The position of Cavalry team commander would be highly coveted, and open to all (although Infantry and Armoured officers would probably be best suited for the job).

CCBG HQ would have some units and subunits directly under their control, such as the Recce and Surveillance squadrons, UAVs, Helicopter Squadron and ISTAR CC. For administrative purposes, many of these would be held by a parent Regiment or Battalion, for training and personell management issues.

Since there are two LAV battalions in the current brigade structure, one would absorb most of the resources to create the Cavalry teams, leaving the other to be trained for rear area security, enhanced patrolling, or even limited exploitation in a conventional scenario. Every few years, the roles might be switched, accepting the loss of proficiency and learning curve periods involved. I would argue the LIB would be an important part of the CCBG, giving the commander unique abilities to operate in complex terrain, although it can also be argued the LIBs should be grouped together to create a "Light Brigade".

"Neutering" the roles of Regimental and Battalion headquarters would free some resources for the CCBG HQ, such as recce platoons, while other positions might be judiciously eliminated to provide PYs for manning and training members of the Cavalry teams.

The longer term result of this proposal would be to allow Cavalry operations to be practiced in training and operations, resulting in the refinement of Cavalry doctrine, modification of ORBATS, and the selection of new generations of equipment better suited to the needs of the Cavalry Brigade.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Kirkhill,

You are right that going 24/7 for six months is impossible, but having four crews for each Coyote might not be the best way to deal with the problem.  Our Coyotes generally spent three days out of four deployed outside the camp.  Many of these tasks were OPs, so the vehicles were always manned.  I can remember several weeks were every crew was deployed with their vehicles.  We certainly could have used an extra Patrol of personnel to account for HLTA (the three week leave block), so I do support having some surplus personnel (or at least an HLTA period surge of additional soldiers).

The UK Coy deployed on three month tours with no leave periods.  I saw some definate merits in this, although I do not know if our Army could sustain it.

AMajoor,

I do envision the Cavalry as a way to employ our current equipment and structures in a meaningful way without having to change everything and buy all new kit.  I don't know if we need to have a Brigade as the minimum "formation."  A Cav Task Force of "Battalion/Regiment" size could support a Div or even a Bde of coalition troops.  Given our current army I think that a Bde deployment is a bit ambitious.  That being said we could certainly extend the Cavalry concept to Bde level (a bit like an ACR).  In addition, if we want to have lots of UAVs and other kit then maybe we do need a Bde HQ with a Cav unit and an ISTAR unit under it.  Food for thought.

I do not see the need to "neuter" the Battalion and Regt HQs.  Indeed, the unit-sized Cav Task Force would be based on either a LAV III or Armoured Bn/Regt HQ.  I certainly see the Cavalry line command positions as going to either Armoured or Infantry officers (or some unholy blend of both MOCs  >).

My biggest question is whether I go for mixed sub-units (LAVs and Coyotes) or "pure." 

Cheers,

2B

 

[a_majoor]

You are right about deploying an entire CCBG being at the far end of possibilities, but I think there are several reasons to argue for a formation of this size.

Kirkhill's notion of building in a surge capacity to a formation is almost automatic when you have an entire brigade. A battlegroup built around several Cavalry teams can be deployed, and one or two Cavalry teams worth of personell and equipment is still availible to cover HLTA, emergency surge deployments or local DOMOPS situations for the Brigade. (The shortfalls would be in the specialist subunits, which are Brigade assets by nature).

A CCBG will also have a large "gene pool" of officers, NCOs and soldiers, which gives a larger base for manning, training, skill development and "corporate memory" than a small "Cav" unit tucked away in the hanger line. Also this provides a better resolution of the "see" and "act" functions, since dedicated recce and surveillance assets are associated with the CCBG HQ, while the Cavalry teams do the up close work and provide limited combat power if required.

A bigger unit will also have more boots available for manpower intensive taskings, so the CCBG is more versatile when dealing with the wide range of potential taskings we can face, especially DOMOPS, shovelling snow in TO, or PSO and "Three Block War" scenarios.

It is true that current battlegroups are commanded by the "core" Regiment or Battalion of the battlegroup, but the permanent nature of the Cavalry team as opposed to the more ad hoc groupings of a combat team makes that sort of superfluous, the CCBG HQ would provide the elements to stitch together the Cavalry battlegroup. The ISTAR CC is probably the core of the CCBHQ and will be used to coordinate the actions of the CCBG or the associated Cavalry battlegroups or Cavalry teams anyway, so it makes sense for the ISTAR CC to be the "deployable" headquarters element.

 

[Kirkhill]

Looking but not finding....story of my life these days

The French have a Light Armd Airborne Recce Regiment, I think it is the 5th Para Hussards and IIRC they are armed with either Panhard 90's or ERC 90s and VBLs.  They are organized in 3 Recce Squadrons with the 90mm Armd Vehicles and an Anti-Tank Squadron with Milans and HMGs on VBLs.  They also have an Active force dismounted Squadron and a Reserve force dismounted Squadron to keep the Regiment viable.  I will try to confirm this.

I agree that a 4:1 ratio may not necessarily be the correct ratio, probably overkill, as you say there are other strategies but I think we could all agree that a degree of overmanning would probably be in everyone's interest.  It will be especially critical as weapons systems become more complex.

Going way outside my arc (as if that has ever stopped me) I think the gunners effectively already overman their guns as a matter of course.  The LG1 and the C3 are both manned by a 7-man section/det/what-have-you but can be fired by only 3 men if the circumstances require it.  In Blackburn's books (Where are the Guns series - can't remember which one) he describes an incident where a battery was tasked to supply harassing fire.  The whole battery was asleep with the exception of one man on one gun methodically ejecting, loading, laying, firing, repeating, drawing rounds from a prepared stock.  While I don't mean to suggest that every LAV necessarily should have a 12-man section just to supply 4 Dr/Gnr/CC crews - excluding GIBs ......

On the other hand LAVIIIs with an all Blackhat crew of 9 - 3 crews double hatted Both LAV crew qualified and dismount section?  Naaah, never work.

Thinking out loud here....

 

[George Wallace]

On the other hand LAVIIIs with an all Blackhat crew of 9 - 3 crews double hatted Both LAV crew qualified and dismount section? Naaah, never work.

Thinking out loud here....

That would be called:  "Assault Troop"

GW

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks again George.  I can always rely on you to set things plain.

So it could be done?  I'm guessing you think it should be done.  How about the French concept with the Squadron of Dismounted Crews?