Cancel MGS - Buy new Cockeril 105mm design (see link)...

[TangoTwoBravo]

Doctrine should be a start point.  An eight car escort may not always be possible or practical (although the package put out by the School last year was excellent).  I've seen a high value convoy escorted by three to five Coyotes on operations because resources are not unlimited and the convoy came with its own close protection.  Our schoolhouse doctrine sometimes assumes schoolhouse settings.  Perhaps a mixed escort?  Pairs of Coyotes front and back and a pair of LAVs with infantry sections with the convoy?  Perhaps the LAVs trail the convoy to react to and destroy the threat after it discloses itself?  For an escort like in Thunder Run, do you need the advance guard or would more guns with the convoy be better?

If the principles are observed (as opposed to the details of execution), then I'm happy.  There are some interesting questions to raise (perhaps on another thread) about these (do you stay and fight, who picks up casualties, etc).

Regarding the 40mm, there are certainly greater chances for fraticide and collateral damage.  With weapons must go training.

 

[DG-41]

I didn't realize there was going to be a quiz.

Keeping in mind that the number of "Thunder Run" convoy escort missions I have conducted is exactly ZERO (and so I am extrapolating based on common sense and what I have read) here is the problems as I see it:

1) The vehicles being escorted have little to no armour protection, and are highly explosive to boot. They cannot take hits. They are fast while on roads. They are large targets, of which the majority of their volume encloses vital areas.

2) The weapons used by the enemy are aimed by naked eye over unmagnified sights, and have no range measurement capability, ballistic computers, or lead compensation, and so they will have trouble making a first-round hit on a moving target. They will have to adjust fire as they go.

3) Speed, therefore, is life. The convoy Must Not Stop, because once stopped, the enemies' weapon systems no longer need to worry about lead compensation; their problem becomes one of range estimation and marksmanship (plus with the convoy stationary, they will get more shots off, and each shot taken is more information to correct the firing solution)

4) If we assume an RPG-16 with an effective 800m range 100 metres back from the road, it will take a vehicle moving 70 km/h 82 seconds to traverse his potential firing arc.

5) That gives the escort 82 seconds to identify him, get a weapon pointed at him, get a firing solution, and get rounds on target. The escorts's task is made a little easier in that he need not kill the target, he need only supress him for the 82 seconds required to get clear. The escort's task is made easier by the fact that he may have access to magnifying optics, gun stabilization, laser rangefinding, and thermal sights. The escort's task is made harder by the fact that he probably cannot decisively identify the enemy as a threat until the enemy gets his first shot off. The escort's task is made easier by the fact that the enemy is probably stationary. The escort's task is made harder by the fact that there may be many enemies in the location, all of whom will need to be supressed.

This all suggests to me that the ideal escort weapons are those that can be brought on target quickly, that get multiple shots in a short time frame, can affect a large(ish) area, and need not hit directly in order to supress the enemy. An added bonus is some sort of tracer effect, so that the act of firing draws the attention of other escort weapons to the area being supressed so they can join in.

25mm fires explosive rounds at a reasonably high rate of fire, as does the 40mm grenade launcher, so they can (I would think) be expected to supress a good sized area. MG's don't get the burst effects, but they have a higher rate of fire. All three weapons can be quickly walked on target by watching the trace, so I would expect them to make good quick-reaction supression weapons. More deliberate weapons systems (like the 105) I would expect to be less effective - even if they have a larger area of effect when on target - because the consequences of a miss are larger. If you miss big with a 105, you're looking at, what, 10 seconds or so before you get another round off? (What's the standard for Leo gunnery?) How fast does the MGS cycle?
 
But I reserve the right to be completely wrong.

Tactics we can discuss in another thread.

DG

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

DG,

I like to talk tactics when I talk weapons and then I get into organizations.  I have a hard time talking about them in isolation.  ;D

For the "drive by shooting" style scenario I agree that the 25mm with coax looks like the way to go.  I've heard mixed reviews of the 25mm HEIT. 

I was very impressed with the Leopard C2s ability to fire and hit on the move, but we were not moving terribly fast.  I'd be fairly confident of hitting the bunkers mentioned in the scenario.  I'm not sure of the MGS' (or the vehicle that started this tread) fire on the move capabilities.  I've read that it can, but I am not sure of the max speed possible.

All,

To take this thread further, imagine a Canadian Task Force consisting of LAV companies and Recce squadrons (say, two of each).  For laughs add in two or three DFS Tps consisting of LAV TOW and MGS (say, two TOW and four MGS in each Tp).  Instead of leading the charge up the next dictator's highway, this force is tasked with escorting the supply columns for the leading coalition elements (who have MBTs et al). 

Using the Thunder Run example, LAV infantry companies could hold key intersections (bit like a "tunnel") while the Coyotes ride shotgun with the convoys.  Would MGS be useful with the holding forces?  Maybe more useful than TOW?  Would we only put MGS in the infantry companies or include them with the odd convoy making the run?

Would mixed escort teams be useful, each with Coyote, LAV and MGS integral to deal with situations on the road? 

 

[a_majoor]

A mixed convoy escort makes more sense than an "all Coyote" or "All DFSV" solution since the threats are so multi faceted. The convoy will also be driving through different types of terrain on its move in most circumstances, so there will be occasions for either the long range hitting power of the big guns (Lead patrol stumbles on the ambush, lead DFSV at the head of the convoy comes into range and ends argument with 105mm HEAT-MP or HESH), or a large round vs an improvised barracade/bunker etc. at close range. In some circumstances, a cannister or flechette round might be what is needed, or a smoke round to cover a quick getaway. Looking farther ahead, the large calibre cannon will have the potential to engage with through tube missiles or some other form of "smart round", giving the convoy a few more clubs in the golf bag.

For 2Bravo's scenario, the LAVs and TOWs would probably work best in relatively static "overwatch" positions, perhaps leapfrogging ahead of the ongoing convoy if this is a long road move. To borrow from the Russian experience in Afghanistan, the "tunnel" was often established by dropping platoons or even companies on dominating features by helicopter, then using the speed of airmobility to pick up after the convoy passed to get ahead to the next position. The light infantry in this scenario would be fortified with weapons and systems to provide the longest range coverage possible (in the modern context, a lightweight thermal sight like a Javelin or Gill/Spike system would have a huge force multiplier effect).

WRT MGS vs CV_CT, the CV_CT is a modified Wegmann turret, which is low profile but still has a crew inside. It has a 16 round bustle for the autoloader, giving twice the ready ammunition of the MGS, and mounts a coax and has provisions for the loader's MG on the turret roof. In terms of ergonomics and layout, it seems to be several light years ahead of the LPT of the MGS.

HMMVW's can perform well in combat, the fighting in Mogadieshu during the "Blackhawk Down" battle was probably as intense as anything the Jihadi's threw against the Americans in Iraq or Afghanistan. The vehicles of Task Force Ranger were hit with small arms, machine gun and RPG fire, and although they were damaged and casualties were taken, they brought the convoys home. Since HMMVWs are not designed as combat vehicles, and do not mount the sort of powerful supressive arnament needed to fight through such a massive overmatch, we can assume that a purpose built AFV would have done somewhat better.

 

[Armymatters]

I would rather prefer to see the the Rooikat 105 AFV... the vehicle was not designed to be pure reconnaissance vehicle, but more of a deep penetration unit. This 8x8 was designed to go toe to toe with enemy tanks; the earlier 76mm gun was a easy tank killer (especially of the earlier to later Soviet designs), while the current 105mm gun offers even more tank killing punch. The 105mm rifle gun can fire the whole lot of the NATO 105mm standard ammunition. The vehicle has protection against 24mm ammunition on the frontal arc, and can survive an AT mine explosion while having the crew be able to walk away. I would say this would be a excellent MGS substitution, as it is a well defended platform that has proven combat experience, and was based on the many lessons learned about the various bush wars South Africa fought.

And of course, a few pictures:

 

[a_majoor]

A good design, and taken in isolation I would support that, but given the small size of the "fleet" we would end up with huge logistical problems. A redesign of the Rooikat to use LAV parts (drive train, suspension, wheels, comms gear etc.) would also be hugely expensive, but maybe worth looking at.

Frm a logistics viewpoint the CV_CT is superior because it can use a standard LAV III hull (no cut down back deck, for example). Early on in the thread, you will also see the CV_CT has the potential to be used in large numbers as an Infantry support weapon and a form of Self Propelled Artillery.

There are tactical advantages with the high angle elevation capability of the gun, it is far more flexible, able to shoot targets at long range with indirect or semi-indirect fire, or elevate and fire directly at enemy positions on the roofs of high buildings. Using through tube missiles or other forms of "smart" ammunition, the CV_CT has the potential of becoming the platform for a true MMEV", able to provide precise long range support . Maybe you should be talking about a Rooikat mounting a CV_CT turret instead  .

 

[George Wallace]

Just resurrecting another old thread that seems to be new again. 

Will we be looking for a replacement for the MGS, vice a replacement for the Leopards?  Is our "Defence Philosophy" of having an "All Wheeled Force" still going to hang over our heads?  What does the next few years have in store for the Armoured Corps?  Will any decisions of substance be made towards a viable replacement for our Leopard 1 C 2's?

 

[cplcaldwell]

I remember when the 25mm Bushmaster came out, many people pooh-poohed it as a glorified machine gun. People soon began to realize that the relative velocity and weight of the round, coupled with the rate of fire made it into a rather nasty tool.

Two things (that may revive some thoughts here)..

Alliant Techsystems has developed a 12.7mm Chain Gun. Given the chain gun's robustness, regarding stoppages, would a 50-cal chain gun make a reasonable choice for a light RWS or for the Co-ax mount on a larger weapon?

Second, and still at Alliant Techsystems, I see they have developed a 35/50mm chain gun from the 25. What would the relative uses of a 50 mm chain gun be? Could it be fitted economically to a Coyote?

Some years ago the Israelis experimented with high pressure small(er) calibre guns on some of there old tanks (Chaffees? Walkers?) although there were some good results the program never went anywhere. This was not chain gun technology, but it brought to light some advantages that smaller calibre weapons with higher rates of fire could have over big tubes.  I think the same technology ended up installed somewhere in South America (Chile? on Walkers?) . Do larger chain guns illustrate the same issue (i.e that smaller calibre with higher rates of fire are useful, esp. in this role??)

Does the 50mm calibre with a relatively high rate of fire offer anything, especially on a wheeled chassis, over a low pressure 105 on same platform?

Is this a way of economically upgunning Coyotes?

Is this a possiblility for the next tranche instead of the 105 LAV-AGS?

 

[George Wallace]

A couple of things to ponder:

25mm doesn't have much effect on heavily armoured vehicles and tanks.  More of an annoyance to them, or a "wake up, someone's shooting at me".  So in a way it is a glorified MG.  (It is much better than a .50, and a good piece of kit though.)

Upping the calibre of the weapon, means less ammo that can be carried in the same space.

The more complicated the weapon, the more serious a problem you have with 'breakdowns'. 

 

[Mortar guy]

A couple of things to ponder:

25mm doesn't have much effect on heavily armoured vehicles and tanks.  More of an annoyance to them, or a "wake up, someone's shooting at me".  So in a way it is a glorified MG.  (It is much better than a .50, and a good piece of kit though.)

Really? There are some people a LFTEU who might disagree with you on that one George. I can't divulge too much but let's just say you would be surprised by the 25mm penetrating power.

MG

 

[cplcaldwell]

RE Ineffectiveness of 25mm.

Well, who's the enemy?

Against an M1A2 HA, or even a T-90S certainly I think it would have about the same affect as ringing the dinner bell.

But against a T-55, BMP or BTR?

However, let me return to the 35/50mm chain gun. As a larger round does the 50mm offer advantages? Weight of the round? Programmable rounds? Sabot? bunker buster rounds? Is there a round that can be put together at this caliber that would approximate air-burst HE?

Again, who's the enemy?

How does the KE of this round and the rate of fire add up. As I mentioned when the 25mm Bushmaster came around, people began to notice that the "bang-bang" affect of two slugs hitting the same spot relatively quickly had a nasty effect on RHA and worked fairly well on ERA (by defeating the reactive, then punching a hole in the RHA). (Of course one needs a fairly exposed target to get that affect - sounds a bit implausible - so I am not sure if this is a real thing or urban myth(sic), anyway I've heard of the affect and await correction.).

Just ruminating here, I can't see the 105 LAV-AGS, neither fish nor fowl.

 

[George Wallace]

However, let me return to the 35/50mm chain gun. As a larger round does the 50mm offer advantages? Weight of the round? Programmable rounds? Sabot? bunker buster rounds? Is there a round that can be put together at this caliber that would approximate air-burst HE?

It is a question that could lead to much technical discussion.  There are some smaller calibre weapons munitions that have better effects than larger calibre.  You may find 30 mm cannon rounds that may be more effective than 90 mm low velocity cannon rounds.  It has a lot to do with the munitions, and the weapon, and the combination of both.

How does the KE of this round and the rate of fire add up. As I mentioned when the 25mm Bushmaster came around, people began to notice that the "bang-bang" affect of two slugs hitting the same spot relatively quickly had a nasty effect on RHA and worked fairly well on ERA (by defeating the reactive, then punching a hole in the RHA). (Of course one needs a fairly exposed target to get that affect - sounds a bit implausible - so I am not sure if this is a real thing or urban myth(sic), anyway I've heard of the affect and await correction.).

I think you are looking at ideal conditions here - a stationary target, fired on from a stationary position.  I f either your platform or the target platform are moving, then I don't think you will find this example to be the case.

 

[a_majoor]

Back in the 1980'd AAI corporation developed the ARES, which fired 75mm "telescoped" ammunition (i.e. the projectile is buried inside the cartridge case, which makes round handling easier) in single shots or three round bursts. Israel developed something similar in 60mm, although with conventional ammunition.

From what I could gather, burst fire against tanks and other hard targets was possible and capable of defeating most targets, but the extreme stresses on the gun mechanism, not to mention the ammunition consumption, were judged to count too much against the idea. In theory, weapons like this could be mounted on LAV's, M-113 and other light vehicles, but while you would have a mobile, hard hitting "Cavalry" vehicle in theory, it was suspected in practice you would have a very poor compromise. The 60 or 75mm shell would not carry a great weight of explosive, which would make fire at troops in open, or breaching walls and fortifications difficult (especially if you want to blast an entry hole for the Infantry), while I think the powers that be suspected the amount of KE was marginal to defeat current hard targets, much less future ones.

A 105mm cannon has a decent sized shell which can make an effective HE, HESH or HEAT-MP round to attack soft targets, as well as a big enough CE round (HEAT or HESH) to make an impression on hard targets. If you can carry a high pressure gun, then KE attack becomes possible as well, using some form of Sabot round. The only proven practical use for intermediate rounds seems to be in the AAA role, where they have the range, velocity and can carry enough explosive to make an impression on aircraft and helicopters.

 

[Kirkhill]

This should keep London going for a little while.  724 LAVs incl LAV-25, LAV-AG, LAV-M, LAV-AT, LAV-CC, LAV-PC, LAV-A, LAV-AC LAV-E and LAV-R.

I wonder which AG they are adding to their LAV-AG.

Some other interesting kit as well as 24 Blackhawks

Saudi Arabia - Continued Assistance in the Modernization of the SANG 
 
 
(Source: US Defense Security Cooperation Agency; issued July 20, 2006)
 
 
 

Saudi Arabia has requested 724 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) and related equipment to modernize its National Guard. Shown here is a Stryker LAV operated by the US Army.
(US Army photo)WASHINGTON --- The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Saudi Arabia to continue modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). 

The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $5.8 billion. 

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale for the continuation of the United States supported effort to modernize the SANG by providing Major Defense Equipment (MDE) and non-MDE items: 

--724 LAV-25, LAV-AG, LAV-M, LAV-AT, LAV-CC, LAV-PC, LAV-A, LAV-AC LAV-E and LAV-R Light Armored Vehicles (LAV); 
--1,160 AN/VRC-90E Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) Vehicular Single Long-Range Radio Systems; 
--627 AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS Vehicular Single Long-Range Radio Systems; 
--518 AN/VRC-119 E SINCGARS Vehicular Single Long-Range Radio Systems; 
--2,198 SINCGARS Spearhead Handheld; 
--1,700 AN/AVS-7D Night Vision Goggles (NVG); 
--432 AN/PVS-14 NVG; 
--630 AN/PAS-13 Thermal Weapon Sight; 
--162 84mm Recoilless Rifle; and 
--Harris Corporation Commercial High Frequency Radios; various commercial vehicles; fixed facilities and ranges; simulations; generators; battery chargers; protective clothing; shop equipment; training devices; spare and repair parts; sets, kits, and outfits; support equipment; publications and technical data; personnel training and training equipment; contractor engineering and technical support services and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $5.8 billion. 

The proposed sale coupled with the training, assistance, and advice provided by the U.S. Government through the Office of the Program Manager SANG will serve to make a key regional ally and partner in the Global War on Terror more capable of defeating those who would threaten regional stability and less reliant on the deployment of U.S. combat forces to maintain or restore stability in the Middle East. 

The SANG needs these defense articles so that it can effectively conduct security and counter-terrorism operations. The continuation of services under the SANG Modernization Program is an evolution of the SANG as an effective defensive force with the advice, assistance, and training of the U.S. Army. The Modernization Program ensures necessary training, logistics, support, doctrine development and force integration for the continuing expansion and use of their weapon systems. These services will remain the cornerstone of an effort to upgrade and enhance the infrastructure of the SANG organization. 

The proposed sale will also provide SANG with additional command, control, and communications equipment needed to operate in a secure communications environment that will facilitate the performance of its mission within Saudi Arabia. It is consistent with the National Command Authority's intent for stability in the Central Command Area of Operation. The radios will modernize equipment and provide the critical VHF and HF links necessary for a large fast moving force and integration with the SINCGARS radios SANG already has fielded in its Light Armored Vehicle and Light Infantry Brigades. 

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region. Saudi Arabia is capable of absorbing and maintaining this additional MDE equipment in its inventory. 

The principal contractors will be: 
--ITT Aerospace/Communications Fort Wayne, Indiana 
--Harris Corporation Rochester, New York 
--General Dynamics Land Systems London, Ontario 
--Raytheon Corporation Tucson, Arizona 

There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. 

At present, there are approximately 250 U.S. Government personnel and 630 contractor representatives in country supporting the SANG modernization program. 

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. 

This notice of a potential sale is required by law; it does not mean that the sale has been concluded. (ends) 

 

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.16882086.1133972074.Q5cKasOa9dUAAFC2ZcA&modele=jdc_34

Reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.

 

[George Wallace]

A little update on how the USMC and US Army look at the MGS:

The Wheeled Cannon That Everyone Hates








Those interested in a longer read, for your info only, we have a LOCKED debate on it at:  LAV III Mobile Gun System (MGS)

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

A little update on how the USMC and US Army look at the MGS:

The Wheeled Cannon That Everyone Hates

To me it seems the problem with the Stryker MGS isn't the vehicle itself, it's that they are trying to use it for something it's not designed to do.  The French Army has a couple of vehicles that remind me of the Stryker MGS concept, notably the ERC-90 Sagaie and the AMX-10RC, both seen below:

ERC-90 of 13 Demi-Brigade Légion Etrangere in Djibouti

AMX-10RC in Ivory Coast

Both these vehicles have served France incredibly well over the years, most recently in Mali and Afghanistan.  I'll direct you to an article written by an American Soldier who served with the French Army in Afghanistan.

Here is what he had to say about these particular vehicles:

One giant advantage the French had over us was with their use of tanks. We maintain an armored force that’s fantastic at defeating T-80s crossing the Fulda Gap, not quite so fantastic at fighting insurgents in mountainous valleys. The French had AMX-10s, light wheeled tanks that were perfect for counterinsurgency combat. They were a tremendous force multiplier.

One night before a major operation, I was laid out in the dirt on an outpost perimeter. I had fallen asleep at midnight. At 3 a.m. a tremendous explosion woke me. I lay still for a few moments, then asked a Marine on guard, “What the hell was that?”

He answered, “I don’t know, but something went right over our heads.”

When the sun rose, I was stunned to see an AMX-10 halfway up a mountain behind the outpost. A brave and/or stupid tank crew had rolled up a narrow trail in the dark, and hit some Taliban.
I didn’t envy the poor driver who had to negotiate that trail. Or the loader who I’m sure had to walk ahead of the tank, knowing that if he made a mistake his crew was rolling down the mountain. As a former tanker, I can tell you that driving a tank up a mountain in the dark isn’t something cowards do.

Taken from:  http://www.breachbangclear.com/the-truth-about-the-french-army-pt-iii-getting-into-fights/

Seems the US is trying to use a vehicle for something it is not designed to do, of course the Stryker MGS can't win against tanks because it isn't a tank! For fighting a counter-insurgency fight against an asymmetrical threat I think it has some definite advantages.

 

[Jungle]

There are big differences between the US and French Armies; the US Army is designed mostly for a conventional near-peer fight, while the French Army is designed to tackle both the conventional fight and small wars in post-colonial Africa.

Even the US SF and USMC, which used to advertise themselves as experts in small wars, have moved away from it in the last couple of decades.
We turned out relatively good in Afghanistan with our OMLTs, as they were doing the exact work US SF teams are designed to do, while US ODAs were doing KLEs (basically holding shuras in villages).

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

There are big differences between the US and French Armies; the US Army is designed mostly for a conventional near-peer fight, while the French Army is designed to tackle both the conventional fight and small wars in post-colonial Africa.

Even the US SF and USMC, which used to advertise themselves as experts in small wars, have moved away from it in the last couple of decades.
We turned out relatively good in Afghanistan with our OMLTs, as they were doing the exact work US SF teams are designed to do, while US ODAs were doing KLEs (basically holding shuras in villages).

I completely understand this difference, what I was trying to highlight was the fact this vehicle isn't useless it's probably just being used incorrectly.  This vehicle is a niche capability designed to be used with Airborne Forces (i.e. a niche force).  I find it amusing every time I hear talk about large scale maneuvers with tanks and armour and how we need to go back to that, lets unlearn everything we just learned and go back to the basics they say. 

Everything has a place but if you don't use it correctly or at least learn how to employ it well that's on you.  :2c: 

 

[Ostrozac]

Why are the US Army even concerned about the tank-killing ability of the Stryker MGS? An SBCT is chock-full of Javelin and TOW missiles. The MGS is supposed to be an Infantry DFS vehicle, busting bunkers and grape huts and being a fire base for a rile company.

Now, the argument that you don't need a 20-ton armoured vehicle to do the same job as a Carl Gustav is a valid point.

And in the Canadian context, I'm a solid 'meh' about DFS vehicles. I remember the Cougar -- we ended up using it as a scout car instead. And I seem to remember some thought about taking Coyotes out of the recce role and using them as DFS vehicles -- that idea went nowhere.

But our lack of anti-tank missile capability does scare the willies out of me.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Why are the US Army even concerned about the tank-killing ability of the Stryker MGS? An SBCT is chock-full of Javelin and TOW missiles. The MGS is supposed to be an Infantry DFS vehicle, busting bunkers and grape huts and being a fire base for a rile company.

A task which it is perfectly suited for, with excellent stand-off distance to boot.

Now, the argument that you don't need a 20-ton armoured vehicle to do the same job as a Carl Gustav is a valid point.

 

Except that an MGS has a longer range, a stabilization platform and can carry more ammunition than your average rifleman.... oh it also has a bigger round.

And in the Canadian context, I'm a solid 'meh' about DFS vehicles. I remember the Cougar -- we ended up using it as a scout car instead. And I seem to remember some thought about taking Coyotes out of the recce role and using them as DFS vehicles -- that idea went nowhere.

Again, did we ever prove this theory or was it a lack of will on the part of the heads of state?  I imagine cap badge politics came into play as well.

I was very interested this past MAPLE RESOLVE in watching Infantry companies from 3 RCR get consecutively mowed down on the final Bde attack by two LAV's mostly because the scenario forced them to cross 2,000m+ valley of open ground with OPFOR Tanks and LAV's dug in on the other side of the valley.  The conclusion that came out of that was that Infantry are useless without vehicles as they have no possible answer to the firepower of a LAV or Tank.  Some of the Armoured folks were chomping at the bit because they could use this as proof of the utility of the Tank while the Light Infantry is a dead art we should get rid of. 

Too bad the scenario had totally set the infantry up for failure  : it was almost as if we had situated the estimate :facepalm:

Can you say Death by Ex Design!

But our lack of anti-tank missile capability does scare the willies out of me.

It also scares the bejesus out of me!