Cancel MGS - Buy new Cockeril 105mm design (see link)...

[Jungle]

I completely understand this difference, what I was trying to highlight was the fact this vehicle isn't useless it's probably just being used incorrectly.  This vehicle is a niche capability designed to be used with Airborne Forces (i.e. a niche force).  I find it amusing every time I hear talk about large scale maneuvers with tanks and armour and how we need to go back to that, lets unlearn everything we just learned and go back to the basics they say. 

Everything has a place but if you don't use it correctly or at least learn how to employ it well that's on you.  :2c:

I fully agree, I was not saying you were wrong. The US Military is, in my opinion, using the MGS the wrong way. What I was getting at was that the French would probably make better use of the veh, as they are organised and trained for the small wars that the MGS (and Stryker in general) was designed for.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I fully agree, I was not saying you were wrong. The US Military is, in my opinion, using the MGS the wrong way. What I was getting at was that the French would probably make better use of the veh, as they are organised and trained for the small wars that the MGS (and Stryker in general) was designed for.

Got it and I believe you are very right!  Imagine what we would have done with the MGS  ;D had we actually bought it lol

 

[Kirkhill]

Those proposing the employment of Subunits of 20 to 60 tonne vehicles perhaps should be required to supply budget resources for LCUs (20 to 60 tonne capacity) and suitable transport vessels to get them to the fray.

Otherwise they are preparing to fight a war that is unlikely to break out in the only theater they have access to: Canada.

Meanwhile, I need refreshing.

How many Javelins and APKWS can be bought for the price of a LAV or an MBT?
How many can be transported in a single CC-130 or even a CC-150?  How many LAVs or MBTs?

A line of thought that came out of the Vietnam experience was the US Army would supply the government an army that could never be used in a Vietnam scenario ever again.

Does the CF or HMG seek a "Force" that shows well on parade but can never be deployed?


My personal metric is the passenger door of the CC-150.

Before the CF is allowed to buy another vehicle or weapon the budget should be spent on equipping troops  with systems that can fit through the passenger door of the CC-150.

Once the full spectrum of capabilities possible given that limitation have been completely explored, then larger systems that bridge obvious gaps should be considered.

But that would suggest a force centred on JTF2-CSOR-The Infantry-The Militia and backed by the RCAF.

The tankees need the RCN to get where they want to go.  The RCN has not demonstrated a willingness to purchase said transport.  Which brings me back to my original point.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Those proposing the employment of Subunits of 20 to 60 tonne vehicles perhaps should be required to supply budget resources for LCUs (20 to 60 tonne capacity) and suitable transport vessels to get them to the fray.

Otherwise they are preparing to fight a war that is unlikely to break out in the only theater they have access to: Canada.

Meanwhile, I need refreshing.

How many Javelins and APKWS can be bought for the price of a LAV or an MBT?
How many can be transported in a single CC-130 or even a CC-150?  How many LAVs or MBTs?

A line of thought that came out of the Vietnam experience was the US Army would supply the government an army that could never be used in a Vietnam scenario ever again.

Does the CF or HMG seek a "Force" that shows well on parade but can never be deployed?


My personal metric is the passenger door of the CC-150.

Before the CF is allowed to buy another vehicle or weapon the budget should be spent on equipping troops  with systems that can fit through the passenger door of the CC-150.

Once the full spectrum of capabilities possible given that limitation have been completely explored, then larger systems that bridge obvious gaps should be considered.

But that would suggest a force centred on JTF2-CSOR-The Infantry-The Militia and backed by the RCAF.

The tankees need the RCN to get where they want to go.  The RCN has not demonstrated a willingness to purchase said transport.  Which brings me back to my original point.

I am not sure why Canada needs to buy the ships necessary to get tanks or LAVs to an operational theatre. We are not looking at an assault landing. We've been shipping our heavy stuff around for some time. You'll note that we got lots of heavy stuff to a very inaccessible theatre in recent history. What force are you suggesting is being established to look good on parade but not deploy?

Sending light infantry around the world can have a place, but I think that you are completely overestimating their capabilities.

 

[Infanteer]

I was very interested this past MAPLE RESOLVE in watching Infantry companies from 3 RCR get consecutively mowed down on the final Bde attack by two LAV's mostly because the scenario forced them to cross 2,000m+ valley of open ground with OPFOR Tanks and LAV's dug in on the other side of the valley.  The conclusion that came out of that was that Infantry are useless without vehicles as they have no possible answer to the firepower of a LAV or Tank.  Some of the Armoured folks were chomping at the bit because they could use this as proof of the utility of the Tank while the Light Infantry is a dead art we should get rid of. 

Too bad the scenario had totally set the infantry up for failure  : it was almost as if we had situated the estimate :facepalm:

Can you say Death by Ex Design!

It's part of "Wainwright-itis", and it runs deep in our Infantry.  Our training areas are all big long prairie corridors (Wainwright, Lawfield, Suffield, Shilo).  We find places to train that suite the square combat team.  We build a career structure around the square combat team - all of our career courses are oriented towards a square combat team.  This is hard-wired into the genetics of the corps because we spent 40 years in Germany and it seems to be the only way to do things.

Too bad the world isn't one big prairie....

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

It's part of "Wainwright-itis", and it runs deep in our Infantry.  Our training areas are all big long prairie corridors (Wainwright, Lawfield, Suffield, Shilo).  We find places to train that suite the square combat team.  We build a career structure around the square combat team - all of our career courses are oriented towards a square combat team.  This is hard-wired into the genetics of the corps because we spent 40 years in Germany and it seems to be the only way to do things.

Too bad the world isn't one big prairie....

It's to the detriment of our skills on foot unfortunately.  The infantry weren't faultless in this fight either, their application of tactics, techniques and procedures was astonishingly poor.  Companies marching in single file across open ground, platoons not given any freedom of action, zero security measures taken when crossing obstacles or complex terrain.  The biggest crime of all had to be the fact that they were moving without any cover from Armour or LAV's which is a fail on the part of the Bde.  While 3 RCR was getting slaughtered, 2 CMBG's tanks were sitting along with 1 RCR LAV's in a Leaguer.  It amazed me that nobody clued in that maybe we could use them in Support By Fire role for the infantry crossing open ground.  Shows me that we know how to use tanks for combat team attacks but unfortunately that's the extent of our ingenuity.

Funny enough, it seemed the only task anyone actually cared about was that 2 CER was to build a bridge across the Battle River, even though the Bde had secured an alternative crossing point further South already and the Bde (-) the armour could have poured across and at least secured the west side of the river as the OPFOR had mostly been mopped up.  I guess some folks just really wanted to see the cavalry rule the day!

 

[George Wallace]

How can it be so complicated?  The Section Attack is the building block for all tactics, on foot or mounted, in APCs or in Tanks.  Everything from there is basically the same, except you have more and more people and resources.  Failure to use all the resources available, is the fault of the commander, not the tactics.



( I know.....Over simplified.)

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

How can it be so complicated?  The Section Attack is the building block for all tactics, on foot or mounted, in APCs or in Tanks.  Everything from there is basically the same, except you have more and more people and resources.  Failure to use all the resources available, is the fault of the commander, not the tactics.



( I know.....Over simplified.)

You would think so George but the problem is that combat teams tend to move in one large group.  When you are moving infantry sections & platoons on foot; however, you should space them out and split them up.  From what I have seen, a lot of Company Comd's tend to want to keep control of their platoons so rather then giving platoon commanders different axis of advance and freedom of action, they opt to move their company in one large blob which is obviously bad for a number of reasons.  Where they learned this?  I don't know as it's certainly not written in the Platoon & Section in Battle. 

 

[Journeyman]

It's to the detriment of our skills on foot unfortunately.  The infantry weren't faultless in this fight either, their application of tactics, techniques and procedures was astonishingly poor. 

I find it amusing every time I hear talk about large scale maneuvers with tanks and armour and how we need to go back to that, lets unlearn everything we just learned and go back to the basics they say.

While I'm not advocating throwing out the lessons of either Afghanistan1 or the Fulda Gap,2 it sounds like neither lessons' set would work particularly well if the basics aren't mastered -- and there's no excuse for not having them mastered if we claim them to be our bread & butter.


1.  Ensure you choose those lessons wisely; there's more to COIN than building schools/wells and hunting HVTs.

2.  The effective combined/joint conventional armies lessons, not "wars stop on Friday afternoons so schedule Log functions accordingly, and throwing-up off the tank train is the 'warrior way'."

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

  The biggest crime of all had to be the fact that they were moving without any cover from Armour or LAV's which is a fail on the part of the Bde.  While 3 RCR was getting slaughtered, 2 CMBG's tanks were sitting along with 1 RCR LAV's in a Leaguer.  It amazed me that nobody clued in that maybe we could use them in Support By Fire role for the infantry crossing open ground.  Shows me that we know how to use tanks for combat team attacks but unfortunately that's the extent of our ingenuity.

Funny enough, it seemed the only task anyone actually cared about was that 2 CER was to build a bridge across the Battle River, even though the Bde had secured an alternative crossing point further South already and the Bde (-) the armour could have poured across and at least secured the west side of the river as the OPFOR had mostly been mopped up.  I guess some folks just really wanted to see the cavalry rule the day!

You also seem to be indicating that infantry without vehicles in that kind of fight are somewhat helpless. In a mechanized battle tanks are the arbiters. A light battalion in 1944 would have suffered the same fate attacking across open ground against an enemy with AFVs. I think that you will find we know how to use tanks in a variety of ways, but there will rarely be enough if you have two infantry battalions and a single squadron of tanks. As for combat teams moving as a continuous blob, this may be true for the infantry company at the back of the combat team but it is certainly not the case for the tanks up front advancing to contact.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

You also seem to be indicating that infantry without vehicles in that kind of fight are somewhat helpless. In a mechanized battle tanks are the arbiters. A light battalion in 1944 would have suffered the same fate attacking across open ground against an enemy with AFVs. I think that you will find we know how to use tanks in a variety of ways, but there will rarely be enough if you have two infantry battalions and a single squadron of tanks. As for combat teams moving as a continuous blob, this may be true for the infantry company at the back of the combat team but it is certainly not the case for the tanks up front advancing to contact.

You are 100% correct, the armoured corps does combat team stuff incredibly well as it's your bread and butter.  Any time I have talked or worked with armoured officers I have come away very impressed.  My own corps, OTH, seems to have a problem getting the basics right, especially when it comes to following our own TTP's.  I don't know why that is but something needs to change. 

While I'm not advocating throwing out the lessons of either Afghanistan1 or the Fulda Gap,2 it sounds like neither lessons' set would work particularly well if the basics aren't mastered -- and there's no excuse for not having them mastered if we claim them to be our bread & butter.


1.  Ensure you choose those lessons wisely; there's more to COIN than building schools/wells and hunting HVTs.

2.  The effective combined/joint conventional armies lessons, not "wars stop on Friday afternoons so schedule Log functions accordingly, and throwing-up off the tank train is the 'warrior way'."

Both examples you highlighted are good points to sustain; however, I am afraid we are going to take the wrong lessons. 

 

[a_majoor]

An infantry force attacking across open ground without covering fire or suppressing fire will fare badly regardless. Ask the French at Agincourt, Pickett's infantry at Gettysburg or the British going over the top at the Somme.

If the 3rd Battalion was organized in the style of a 1980 era Infantry battalion with an integral 81mm mortar platoon and an anti armour platoon, they would have fared much better (having each company grouping 60mm mortars for further fire support or to provide a smokescreen would have made things even better). If the AAP was dismounted (or mounted on light vehicles like G-wagons or 'gators) but equipped with modern man portable ATGM's like Spike or Javelin, then the dug in tanks and LAVs would have been quickly suppressed or neutralized. (The same might have occurred if the supporting battery or batteries were well equipped with PGM's like Excalibur rounds and that fire effect was called for).

So while it can be suggested that the exercise was "designed" to prove that infantry needs mechanized support, it could be equally taken as an argument to bring back mortars and ATGM's. For that matter, it could also be taken as an argument for the "indirect approach". Why the hell was a light infantry battalion NOT working its way around the flanks and rear of the enemy?

 

[Rifleman62]

RoyalDrew:

I was very interested this past MAPLE RESOLVE in watching Infantry companies from 3 RCR get consecutively mowed down on the final Bde attack by two LAV's mostly because the scenario forced them to cross 2,000m+ valley of open ground with OPFOR Tanks and LAV's dug in on the other side of the valley.  The conclusion that came out of that was that Infantry are useless without vehicles as they have no possible answer to the firepower of a LAV or Tank.  Some of the Armoured folks were chomping at the bit because they could use this as proof of the utility of the Tank while the Light Infantry is a dead art we should get rid of.

The biggest crime of all had to be the fact that they were moving without any cover from Armour or LAV's which is a fail on the part of the Bde.  While 3 RCR was getting slaughtered, 2 CMBG's tanks were sitting along with 1 RCR LAV's in a Leaguer.  It amazed me that nobody clued in that maybe we could use them in Support By Fire role for the infantry crossing open ground.  Shows me that we know how to use tanks for combat team attacks but unfortunately that's the extent of our ingenuity.

Anyone read the official PXR?

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

RoyalDrew: 

Anyone read the official PXR?

Haven't seen it but I am sure I could get my hands on a copy.  I sincerely doubt it was very critical as that would mean we wouldn't be able to certify our Bde as being "ready".

 

[Rifleman62]

What I was getting at, will it be a whitewash (resemble reality) with medals all around in the top echelons?

 

[Kirkhill]

I am not sure why Canada needs to buy the ships necessary to get tanks or LAVs to an operational theatre. We are not looking at an assault landing. We've been shipping our heavy stuff around for some time. You'll note that we got lots of heavy stuff to a very inaccessible theatre in recent history. What force are you suggesting is being established to look good on parade but not deploy?

Sending light infantry around the world can have a place, but I think that you are completely overestimating their capabilities.

We sent heavy forces by air, in dribs and drabs, over an extended period, into a secure airhead taken and secured by allied light forces.  The came out from the same secure airhead over a similar extended period while allies held the perimeter.

With respect to overestimating light force capabilities you will not convince me or, so I believe, anybody else by depriving light troops of the full range of weaponry available to them and then sending them in to a fight they cannot win.

Crecy.  Agincourt.  Poitiers.

Light force wins over heavy cavalry.

Guarantee a reversal of outcome by denying the light forces rapid fire and anti-armour weapons and then force them to assault the French horse over open ground armed with their hammers and daggers.

194 troops carried by CC-150. 

Armed with personal small arms as per a 140 man US Army Company (2x 60mm mor with 159 rounds + 6x 240B with T&E and 6000 rds 7.62 link + 72x Claymore + 9x CG-84 with 54 HEAT + 3x CLU with 9 Javelin)  -
Reference http://thedonovan.com/archives/modernwarriorload/ModernWarriorsCombatLoadReport.pdf

Additional 54 troops available to man 81mm mors with PUMA PGMS, HMGs, C16s and Spike LR-ER-NLOS and PLGRs.

There is no reason for the infantry to assault the cavalry if the infantry is holding ground that the cavalry needs to cover.

Additional support for the light infantry could/should be CH-146 with 12.7/7.62 and possibly Spikes.  Also CF-188s with SDBs and Brimstones.

Now tell me again about the ineffectiveness of the light infantry.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

We sent heavy forces by air, in dribs and drabs, over an extended period, into a secure airhead taken and secured by allied light forces.  The came out from the same secure airhead over a similar extended period while allies held the perimeter.

With respect to overestimating light force capabilities you will not convince me or, so I believe, anybody else by depriving light troops of the full range of weaponry available to them and then sending them in to a fight they cannot win.

Crecy.  Agincourt.  Poitiers.

Light force wins over heavy cavalry.

Guarantee a reversal of outcome by denying the light forces rapid fire and anti-armour weapons and then force them to assault the French horse over open ground armed with their hammers and daggers.


Additional support for the light infantry could/should be CH-146 with 12.7/7.62 and possibly Spikes.  Also CF-188s with SDBs and Brimstones.

Now tell me again about the ineffectiveness of the light infantry.

Using three battles from the middle ages as your proof is a little shaky. I see that you are saying that the longbow was a wonderweapon, and that taking it away would turn those victories into defeat. Comparing the longbow with modern AT weapons, though, is a huge stretch. It was a general issue weapon, not a platoon support weapon. You may also find that war has moved a long a little as well.

What is your point about our airhead? My point is that we put heavy (some would say medium but I figure heavy) forces around the world and sustained them in a landlocked country. Yes they had an airhead. Are you keen for Canada to put all its marbles into entry forces? Do you think that they somehow replace heavy forces? You will note that I did not say to get rid of light infantry. I was responding to your post about how you base your entire military thinking around what fits through a passenger door.

Having said that, even with good support weapons light infantry will still struggle unless the terrain or theatre completely preclude the use of armoured fighting vehicles.

 

[Kirkhill]

I am using mediaeval examples precisely because I don't believe warfare has moved on.

The range and pace may be greater and the tools different but I don't believe there is an inherent difference in warfare over the ages.

I don't take the longbow as a wonder weapon, any more than I take any modern tools as miracles in the making.  It turned the infantry into a combination of the modern MMG sub-unit and, given that the bodkins could penetrate any available plate of the day, it also generated an anti-armour capability that ultimately took heavy armour right off battle field for 600 years.

I do think that the longbow was the best available weapon and it was used to its best advantage.  Yes it was carried  by individuals but its fire was marshalled, just as musket fire was, so that it had the effect of a support weapon.  Individual archers did not range forward.  They worked in formed units.

With respect to the airhead my point was that an airhead makes the movement of heavy cargo possible but it constrains the rate at which the cargo arrives in country.  Naval transport is what is required for moving mass formations of heavy units.    Air transport is more aligned with a policy of employing heavy units in penny packets......  Or else the buidup period is quite drawn out.  Rand keeps coming to the same conclusion.

I do not believe that Canada should put all its marbles into entry forces.

I do believe that Canada should maximize the capabilities of all its forces at all levels.  That means that light troops should be rendered as fully capable as modern technology allows. This is on the ground that light forces are universally employable and can be entry troops, complex terrain troops or, even, auxiliary troops for mobile forces.    When employed in conjunction with LAVs and MBTs capable light troops will add more capabilities than light troops with limited capabilities.

I also do not believe in getting rid of heavy forces.  Just as you do not believe in getting rid of light forces.

I believe that the passenger door of the CC-150 is the correct metric for light forces.

I also believe that there is a place for penny packeting LAVs and MBTs in support of light forces (2x MBT and 4x LAV for

example).

Finally I also believe that there is a role for heavy forces.  They act independently when circumstances suit and they act in support of, and in the gaps between, light forces.

Where we come apart is that I don't accept the emphasis on the heavy force in Canadian Forces thinking.  I would be putting all of the infantry into light mode and hand all of the vehicles over to the RCAC.  3 of the 9 infantry battalions would be in rotation with the RCAC as panzer grenadiers.

That would reduce the number of vehicles on charge.  It would increase the number of light troops avaialable for General Duties.  It would increase the number of scenarios in which the infantry could contribute.

If the infantry outranges the cavalry (4000 to 8000 m) with lower cost, widely distributed forces I question whether terrain favours the manoeuver force as much as you suggest.

Horse was beaten in cavalry country by infantry at Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt.
Armour was beaten by batteries of 88s and 17 pdrs which controlled the open ground.

My plan for equipping the Canadian Army?

Transfer all vehicles out of the Infantry.  Turreted vehicles go to the RCAC.  TAPV becomes a General Duties Command and Recce vehicle.

Organize the infantry battalions with a strong support company - mortars, MGs and ATGWs - together with a Sapper element.

Buy and issue the infantry nothing that can't be carried through the passenger door of  the CC-150.

Possible exception - utility tractors that can be carried in the cargo compartment of the CC-150.

If there are more vehicles than the RCAC can man (from regular and reserve resources) then infantry troops can be trained to man vehicles drawn from RCAC resources.

Guardsmen could be trained to ride camels when the circumstances demanded it.

For the gunners the key is creating as wide an umbrella as possible.

In my view that means investing in an enhanced GBAD system, based on the same technology as the RCN employs.  That would build on the CRAM-Mantis type of system enhanced by systems such as NASAMs,  NLOS and GMRLS.