CH-146 Griffon

[CBH99]

Zero chopper experience on my part - why is the air force looking for a light attack chopper? Haven't attack helicopters been severely limited offensively since the proliferation of drones?

Zero chopper experience here either...

I think attack helicopters still have a place on the modern battlefield - the threat profile facing those platforms is just significantly larger than it was even a decade ago


Drones and loitering munitions are here to stay, there's no doubt about that. And MANPADS are prevalent to the point where flying over even slightly contested areas has become a lot more dangerous.

But having a platform that can travel faster than any ground vehicle & not be hindered by terrain or IED's, provide fire support for ground units, offer ISR, offer possible show of force, etc etc still has a place in modern war.


Can drones do a lot of those same things without risking their human pilots, and for MUCH cheaper replacement & operating costs? Absolutely

Cheaper and faster to train UAV operators vs training a competent rotary wing combat pilot? I imagine so



I think we (the west) need to probably rethink how we employ attack helicopters in a variety of ways, and equip them with some sort of loyal wingman capability of some sort.

Maybe it's place on the modern battlefield is coming to an end. But I don't think it's gone the way of the battleship just yet... (You are right though, it's offensive capabilities face a lot more considerations than say a decade ago flying over Afghanistan)

(We've also been extremely lucky in the sense that none of our main recent adversaries have bothered to pursue a MANPAD capability)
 
 



(Hey Loachman, you still peeking in from time to time? Anybody else from the TACHEL world kicking around? Would love to hear your insight into this)

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Because it will be harder to have AFV in the area near the front, AH will likley to be there as a quick response force, but using guns far less and more of a missile carrier. They will need EW protection to make it harder for drones to target them.

 

[CBH99]

So what’s going to be used from 2031 to 2033?

A Seaking is gonna knock on your door soon...Just wants to remind you of....well...Seakings...

Platforms can have their expiry dates 'adjusted' as a result of poor planning or political fuckery, and we've seen before.

So what will we use betweem 2031 and 2033, once the Griffon has been retired? Probably the Griffon...

 

[GR66]

Canada spins up Griffon replacement plan in move towards ‘balanced fleet concept’

Canada is likely to replace its ageing Bell CH-146 Griffons with multiple new rotorcraft types as it seeks a more "balanced fleet" to address its tactical transport needs.

www.flightglobal.com

Brining this post forward with some new context from South of the border...

U.S. Army considers halting new helicopter purchases

The Department of War is evaluating a reform concept that would sharply reduce or halt the purchase of new piloted helicopters for the U.S. Army beginning in the second half of the decade, according to individuals familiar with internal discussions.

defence-blog.com

The Department of War is evaluating a reform concept that would sharply reduce or halt the purchase of new piloted helicopters for the U.S. Army beginning in the second half of the decade, according to individuals familiar with internal discussions.

The concept under review focuses on maintaining and upgrading the current helicopter fleet while transitioning funding and force structure toward uncrewed strike, reconnaissance, and logistics platforms.

According to the individuals, the proposal centers on ending new helicopter acquisition as early as late 2026. Instead of investing in new production lines of piloted aircraft, the Army would consolidate spending on sustaining existing UH-60, AH-64 and CH-47 fleets while expanding programs that convert or supplement aviation units with uncrewed aerial systems. The concept is being presented as a way to reduce long-term personnel requirements, lower training and sustainment costs, and limit the exposure of aircrews during high-intensity operations.

Is the CAF again behind the curve and "modernizing" to fight the last war?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Brining this post forward with some new context from South of the border...

U.S. Army considers halting new helicopter purchases

The Department of War is evaluating a reform concept that would sharply reduce or halt the purchase of new piloted helicopters for the U.S. Army beginning in the second half of the decade, according to individuals familiar with internal discussions.

defence-blog.com

Is the CAF again behind the curve and "modernizing" to fight the last war?

Well, we're upgrading the Griffons - does that count as modernizing?

"In the meantime, Canada is modernising the CH-146 through the Griffon Limited Life Extension programme, extending the helicopter’s service life until 2031."

 

[GR66]

Well, we're upgrading the Griffons - does that count as modernizing?

"In the meantime, Canada is modernising the CH-146 through the Griffon Limited Life Extension programme, extending the helicopter’s service life until 2031."

Maybe that modernization should include turning them into uncrewed platforms something like the MQ-8C Fire Scout. Keep them relevant and useful in a modern war and in the meantime consolidate our manned rotary wing fleet into the AW101 platform. Standardizes training and logistics, eliminates the problematic orphan Cyclone fleet issue and replaces the Griffons with a more capable helicopter.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

I am wondering how much of a future there is in human crewed helicopters- and I say this as a person who has spent the better part of two decades in Maritime Rotary Wing Aviation.

There are obvious use cases for crewed helicopters- missions where machines don’t yet have the creativity to solve complex and dynamic problems. But other, traditional roles are either just too dangerous for crewed helicopters to attempt (given recent advancements in defensive technology) or can be done cheaper with drones.

Canada tends to lag these developments because we are hostage to sunk cost fallacy and loathe dumping systems without wringing a full 50 years usage out of them.

 

[GR66]

I am wondering how much of a future there is in human crewed helicopters- and I say this as a person who has spent the better part of two decades in Maritime Rotary Wing Aviation.

There are obvious use cases for crewed helicopters- missions where machines don’t yet have the creativity to solve complex and dynamic problems. But other, traditional roles are either just too dangerous for crewed helicopters to attempt (given recent advancements in defensive technology) or can be done cheaper with drones.

Canada tends to lag these developments because we are hostage to sunk cost fallacy and loathe dumping systems without wringing a full 50 years usage out of them.

Fully agree. I do think there is still a place for crewed Maritime Helicopters as part of a crewed-uncrewed system. There are lots of non-wartime roles they play in addition to their ASW role and some things like anti-piracy missions for example require human judgement to avoid serious mistakes. I don't trust AI or even remote operators watching a screen miles away to be able to make some decisions. Same with SAR and even with TacHel transport roles. Are we ready to trust human passengers to AI or remote pilots when something unexpected happens?

 

[Baz]

Maybe that modernization should include turning them into uncrewed platforms something like the MQ-8C Fire Scout. Keep them relevant and useful in a modern war and in the meantime consolidate our manned rotary wing fleet into the AW101 platform. Standardizes training and logistics, eliminates the problematic orphan Cyclone fleet issue and replaces the Griffons with a more capable helicopter.

US Navy’s MQ-8C Fire Scouts fly into retirement just two years after entering operational service

US Navy (USN) budget documents reveal that the service plans to retire the newest variant of an unmanned helicopter it spent more than a decade and nearly $1.5 billion developing.

...

... “Operational employment of the MQ-8C will end in Q4 FY2024 and sundown will be completed by Q4 FY2026"

I'm not sure that until they figure it out we should try to figure it out. I'm also not sure we can wait long enough for them to figure out the optionally manned UH-60 replacement.

The Ukrainian drone lessons are still being learned. Even though the pendulum has swung in favour of drones right now, the technology to counter it is developing quickly. Witness the Kreuger 100. Given how cheap close in radar systems and other supporting tech and sensors, and the fact you can exploit doppler to detect a drone approaching within the clutter, I think there is going to be an affordable active defence system for AFVs very soon (if the major players don't have one the testing behind the scenes). Note: a drone is much easier to counter with something like that than a missile coming in at Mach 2.

Unmanned is here to stay, and there will be a lot of development and counterdevelopment for the foreseeable future. I'm skeptical that we enough yet to declare any other weapon system dead.

There's also lots of unexplored areas. One of the problems with putting missiles farther back is assured access in an RF denied environment. However, the ongoing drone war has demonstrated that one solution is to trail fiber. Why does that have to be a drone, or an armed drone? Can the "looker" and the "shooter" be two separate platforms? Can better connectivity enable an "over the horizon" missile? Much like the Navy, can the missile be package in a gun round?

Canada cannot answer all these questions itself, and certainly shouldn't be making future force decisions on the knowledge it carruntly has. However, is there some piece we can become the world experts at?

 

[KevinB]

Brining this post forward with some new context from South of the border...

U.S. Army considers halting new helicopter purchases

The Department of War is evaluating a reform concept that would sharply reduce or halt the purchase of new piloted helicopters for the U.S. Army beginning in the second half of the decade, according to individuals familiar with internal discussions.

defence-blog.com

Is the CAF again behind the curve and "modernizing" to fight the last war?

TBFH the GoC has boned rotary wing in the CAF for years.
The Griffon is a turd, and was really obsolete at adoption. It was utterly a Political Buy Canadian regardless of capability program. The life extension program should have been into the UH-1Y but that’s Ft Worth Tx not Mirabel so…

The off the bus, back on the Chinook bus…

And then the whole EH-101 Cadillac fiasco from Jean Cretien.

Mind boggling.

But as @SeaKingTacco points out there are some missions that require a crew.
For some it’s solely a reassurance for the GIB’s.

 

[Kirkhill]

US Navy’s MQ-8C Fire Scouts fly into retirement just two years after entering operational service


I'm not sure that until they figure it out we should try to figure it out. I'm also not sure we can wait long enough for them to figure out the optionally manned UH-60 replacement.

The Ukrainian drone lessons are still being learned. Even though the pendulum has swung in favour of drones right now, the technology to counter it is developing quickly. Witness the Kreuger 100. Given how cheap close in radar systems and other supporting tech and sensors, and the fact you can exploit doppler to detect a drone approaching within the clutter, I think there is going to be an affordable active defence system for AFVs very soon (if the major players don't have one the testing behind the scenes). Note: a drone is much easier to counter with something like that than a missile coming in at Mach 2.

Unmanned is here to stay, and there will be a lot of development and counterdevelopment for the foreseeable future. I'm skeptical that we enough yet to declare any other weapon system dead.

There's also lots of unexplored areas. One of the problems with putting missiles farther back is assured access in an RF denied environment. However, the ongoing drone war has demonstrated that one solution is to trail fiber. Why does that have to be a drone, or an armed drone? Can the "looker" and the "shooter" be two separate platforms? Can better connectivity enable an "over the horizon" missile? Much like the Navy, can the missile be package in a gun round?

Canada cannot answer all these questions itself, and certainly shouldn't be making future force decisions on the knowledge it carruntly has. However, is there some piece we can become the world experts at?

We can only become experts if we get in the game. We need to get on the field today and start learning our own lessons in real time.

Take @GR66 's 407/MQ8C suggestion. We now know that you don't need to start with fly-by-wire helicopters to create a LUAV. The 407 and 412 control design philosophies are pretty similar I would guess?

If they can devise remote control systems for mechanically controlled trucks, tanks and boats, and they have already demonstrated the MQ8C, then why not use the GLLE program to fund a Squadron of 12 UAV variants and give them to the Combat Support Squadrons, along with 440, to operate alongside their existing fleet in their existing role?

I agree with you about the evolution of the threat and counters and we can take advantage of the fact that we are not yet fighting. But equally we are not yet learning at a relevant pace, certainly not at a pace that would turn us into experts, let alone world leaders.

Fail-often-fail-fast takes money. In wartime people are willing to spend money in that fashion because they perceive that the effort saves lives. I believe that the effort also saves lives when the money is spent in peacetime. Potentially both future Canadian lives and the lives of current allies.

MTF...

 

[Kirkhill]

Back to this article....

Of fiber-optics and FPVs – 6 questions with a Ukrainian drone trainer

Unmanned FPV motherships are on the rise, as operators face an intense cat-and-mouse game on frequency jamming and exploiting momentary vulnerabilities.

www.defensenews.com

"Currently, there are many cases of fixed-wing reconnaissance drones carrying FPVs and releasing them over target areas of interest. These setups can reach 30 to 50 kilometers before dropping the FPV, which has proven to be an effective tactic. In this role, the fixed-wing drone serves not just as a carrier, but also as a reconnaissance platform and [relay], providing significantly stronger connectivity to the FPV drone and helping to overcome the majority of jamming systems on the frontline.

The Russians have also been working on the quality of the fiber-optic drones they use, around the distances they can reach.

Previously, they could spread 15-20 km; now, sometimes this is 25-30km. An example of this was that they were able to strike Kramatorsk with a fiber-optic drone strike, which was one of the first times they were able to hit a major city from far behind frontlines with these platforms.

For us, the most critical part is how reliable fiber-optic drones are. On both sides, these drones have had a lot of interruptions in their signal. For now, the main change we are focused on is how to create the spool fiber for these drones that will be reliable, should we use more lubricants, or should we look at the diameter of the fiber-optic. The devil is in the details."

....

EW is a major threat to UAVs but range attenuates ECMs. The farther you can stand-off then the less effect the other guy is and the more effective you are.

The Russians are being effective deploying FOGMs from motherships with ranges of up to 50 km. Can EW effectively suppress at 50 km range? What can be done by going ballistic, or with EFPs and proximity fuzes and MMW radar sensors for the terminal phase?

Polyphem is a FOGM with a 60 km range that weighs 130 km. It was developed in the same era as NetFires, Merlin, Brimstone, E-FOGM and Strix and was curtailed for the same reason as all the other programmes. It is due for resurrection. Why not get BAE and Magellan working on it?

....

One area we should rapidly be developing as a world leading expert is the use of drones above 60. Cold. Bad Weather. Night Operations for 6 months of the year. Satellite support to comms. High altitude persistent radio relays..... I know enough to understand it is a complex problem that will require a lot of focus, a lot of money and a lot of expertise. But once solved it will uniquely advantage Canada and Canadians in both peace and war and create an internationally saleable set of capabilities.

A lot of the programmes are in place at some level but they would benefit from more money, more urgency and more players in the game.

Polyphem - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Kirkhill]

Final thought on the Ukrainian article. It has thoughts on efficiency.

....

What are the efficiency rates of using FPV drones versus fiber-optic ones on the battlefield?

This is a complicated question: it really depends on the skills of the pilots. For example, how many spare parts do you have available to make some additional improvements to your drone? When we talk about the most successful (FPV) pilots, I would say the success rate of their missions is approximately 70% to 80% – but it really depends on how skillful the pilot is.

For mid-range skilled pilots, I would put this at a 40-50% success rate, but for new operators, it sometimes looks like a disaster, and that rate can drop to 20%.

When it comes to fiber-optic drones, it is a really different situation – I would say it’s like maybe 40-50% of success rates is the best you can achieve because a lot of additional things should be accounted for. For fiber-optic drones, you have to change your piloting approach. For these drones, success also depends on artillery intensity (which can sever the cable), weather and wind conditions, the density of friendly FPV operations that might accidentally cut the fiber-optic line, and careful route planning to avoid roads, power lines, and other obstacles that could damage the cable.

....

Expert - 70-80% efficient - 5 shots will get you 4 hits
Average - 40 to 50% efficient - 5 shots will get you 3 or 4 hits
Disaster - 20% efficient - 5 shots will get you 1 hit

He and I have different definition of disaster apparently.

I know of many systems where 20% efficiency is considered highly effective.

"sonofabitch" - five round burst from an LMG to put one round on target - 20%
How many rounds does the Gepard and SkyRanger and the Slinger put into the air at one time?
Britain's Starstreak rocket put 3 missiles into the air at once - effectively a 3 round burst
And if you look at canister, flechettes, tungsten balls, shot guns, PFHE, AHEAD rounds - the round is efficient only because they put a massive number of micro-rounds (pellets and fragments) into a space at one time increasing the probability of hits. Most of those mini-rounds miss. Highly inefficient.
And how many rounds of conventional HE from an artillery battery to neutralize a single tank, or even an infantry company in the open.

Largely 20% efficiency is only a problem if you can only afford to send two rounds instead of five and Chicago gets nuked as a result.

 

[Kirkhill]

We need government accountants that are willing to let you spend a lot more money on your own recognizance.

 

[Baz]

Should Canada pick something they can develop and perfect and make both the CAF experts in: absolutely!

Do we think we can solve large problems that organizations like the USN have struggled with: nope.

Canada spent a lot of time and money developing, over 20 years, an acoustic capability for maritime aircraft that was world leading and still competitive. What other niches are there? Certainly, something related to arctic ops makes sense.

Canada does not have the resources to risk putting all of its eggs in some technological basket.

There is an endless stream of “the future of warfare is…” commentary, and there has been for a long time. Some of the ideas will evolve the status quo. One or more may revolutionize it. However, some of them may be no more than a blip. Other may be a dead end, or worse a path to failure. I don’t have a crystal ball, and we don’t have unlimited resources. We need to choose wisely. The challenge is how to be less risk adverse without being foolhardy.

Fail-often-fail-fast also comes with risk. My career defining project managed risk by accepting short term operational risk in an effort to mitigate long term implementation risk, and iterating rapidly, but never taking flight safer risk. I was shocked that when we succeeded that people either

• thought you could do that in the long term; or
• didn’t learn any lessons in operational assessment in a development spiral.

So I’m biased. However, I’m firmly convinced that Canada does not have the resources for some of the things we think we can do.

 

[Baz]

We need government accountants that are willing to let you spend a lot more money on your own recognizance.

Absolutely… but we also need a plan so the money doesn’t get pissed away. A flexible plan that responds as we learn, but a plan nonetheless.

 

[Kirkhill]

Absolutely… but we also need a plan so the money doesn’t get pissed away. A flexible plan that responds as we learn, but a plan nonetheless.

Agreed.

But it is hard to quantify the difference between money lost on a failed good idea and money lost on a failed bad idea.
I think we have to be tolerant of more bad ideas to find the good ones.

 

[Kirkhill]

@Baz -

Your point about managing risk is exactly the point.
We can't bet big.
We certainly can't bet big only once.
We have to bet small, fast and often. We have to get good and bad ideas onto the bench and into the field.

I envy the Aussies with their CSIRO. They seem to be a lot less risk averse, and a lot more successful than our NRC/DRDC. Our mob seems to prefer hard to measure theoretical projects than easy to quantify practical ones. It is hard to declare a theoretical failure.

 

[Baz]

Agreed.

But it is hard to quantify the difference between money lost on a failed good idea and money lost on a failed bad idea.
I think we have to be tolerant of more bad ideas to find the good ones.

My experience is different…

People that have a good idea need to put in the intellectual effort to justify it. Instead of complaining that the system isn’t supporting them, use the system. Figure out the processes and get good enough at it that it doesn’t eat up all your effort. I know there are people on these forums that are doing that right now.

However, once that intellectual effort has been done and leadership has assigned resources and accepted risk, we need the system to be more responsive. I don’t understand how we allow low level bureaucrats to say no to high level supported initiatives.

We also need to do a better job of understanding the world is constantly evolving, and therefore there is never a final answer. As an example, software classically has four reasons for change: corrective, perfective, adaptive, and enhancement. However, in the military context, an evolving threat is never considered adaptive, and so falls into enhancement. The engineering community often views that as “operator’s wish list” and not core. In that environment it can stagnate, which is not good enough.

 

[Kirkhill]

My experience is different…

People that have a good idea need to put in the intellectual effort to justify it. Instead of complaining that the system is supporting them, use the system. Figure out the processes and get good enough at it that it doesn’t eat up all your effort. I know there are people on these forums that are doing that right now.

However, once that intellectual effort has been done and leadership has assigned resources and accepted risk, we need the system to be more responsive. I don’t understand how we allow low level bureaucrats to say no to high level supported initiatives.

We also need to do a better job of understanding the world is constantly evolving, and therefore there is never a final answer. As an example, software classically has four reasons for change: corrective, perfective, adaptive, and enhancement. However, in the military context, an evolving threat is never considered adaptive, and so falls into enhancement. The engineering community often views that as “operator’s wish list” and not core. In that environment it can stagnate, which is not good enough.

As you suggest, we may have experienced things differently

I have had the fortune/misfortune to work in an environment where there always seemed to be more ideas than resources, and concurrently, more time critical problems demanding solutions. I have worked well planned projects. But I have also worked many, many bandaid projects. A lot of those were 80% solutions, ie they only solved 80% of the immediate problem, Depending on your point of view they were 20% failures or 100% failures. But they got the client, and me, out of a hole and pointed the way to resolving the problem on subsequent projects.

My clients, and my bosses, and their share-holders placed bets on their operations and technical staffs every day. We were held accountable at the end of the project or the end of the year and got promoted or begged forgiveness or found another chancer willing to employ us.

Risk.

Government does not grok it.

Anduril building a factory on spec in Australia to build an unproven concept vessel in anticipation of an order that may never come is, I would suggest, incomprehensible to any of the people managing funds in Treasury. (Or for that matter the new Major Projects Office).