The Case For Purchasing The Close Combat Vehicle For The Canadian Army
By Mike Duckworth
Senior Vice President with Nexter
Defence Watch Guest Writer
Last week, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives – Rideau Institute (CCPA-RI) published a report entitled “Stuck in a Rut” which recommends the cancellation of the Department of National Defence’s Close Combat Vehicle (CCV) program. As one of the competing companies which designs and manufactures vehicles intended to protect soldiers, Nexter Systems through Nexter Canada feels it has an obligation to speak out in the interests of providing Canadians with accurate and reliable information on this important public policy matter.
We also hope that the other companies involved in the CCV competition – General Dynamics Land Systems and BAE-Hagglunds – will join us in supporting this crucial procurement program.
Nexter is limited for security reasons on what we can say about military vehicle specifications. However, we would like to offer some general remarks on the CCV program both to support the Government’s decision to proceed with this important procurement and to dispel what we believe are inaccurate and ill-informed comments from the CCPA-RI study.
The 40 page CCPA-RI report recommends the cancellation of CCV based on two principal arguments:
1. That CCV is based upon outdated Cold War main battle tank (MBT) doctrine; and
2. That the Light Armoured Vehicle III Upgrade (LAV III UP) satisfies the CCV program requirements.
Is CCV based on out dated Cold War Doctrine?
In the CCPA-RI study, much criticism is levelled at the Canadian Government for maintaining its tank fleet and for the decision to deploy Canadian Leopard tanks in Afghanistan. MBTs are cited as being counterproductive to the new Counter Insurgency (COIN) doctrine deployed in the later years of the Afghan conflict. By extrapolation, the report concludes that CCV has no place in this new COIN doctrine.
But what is COIN? Within military thinking, COIN can be considered as one phase of a conflict or indeed one type of response doctrine. Certainly COIN has been brought into sharp focus in recent years in Afghanistan as coalition forces have sought to rebuild that nation through hearts and minds campaigns working with local populations, security sector capacity building and reform and governance support. However, even in COIN operations, the MBT has a role to play. The presence of tanks can serve as a persuasive disincentive for armed groups and insurgents seeking to de-stabilize a town or village where the ability to employ overwhelming force is an important confidence building measure for local populations seeking safety and security. Equally, where a security situation has deteriorated, tanks can be one tool among many used to re-establish stability.
However, COIN is not a “one size fits all” response to all potential conflicts in the future. While symmetric threats from major powers are still possible, they are highly unlikely. However, asymmetric or dissymmetric flash points continue to exist. While Afghanistan is an example of the former, the current situation in Syria is a case in point for the latter. There remain extremely well equipped unstable nations that possess naval, land, and air power in addition to chemical and biological weapons. And while these military forces would be insufficient to defend against a large scale military intervention by NATO, they are capable of inflicting suffering on their own civilian populations and threatening neighbouring countries. Is the CCPA-RI study suggesting that air and naval power are the only tools required? One would hope not because most militaries would see that as both unrealistic and ineffective. Instead, virtually all NATO countries maintain a spectrum of capability that includes tanks and heavy armour, artillery, mortars as well as light armoured and reconnaissance vehicles.
As noted, the CCPA-RI report criticizes the Canadian Government for deploying Leopard tanks in Afghanistan. Far from being alone in this approach, both Denmark (Leopard A5) and the US Marines (Abrams M1AI) deployed theirs. The CCPA-RI report suggests that the UK took a positive decision not to send their Challengers, but also concedes that the British used both Danish and Canadian tanks. Here’s what some of our allies have to say about the use of tanks in COIN operations. Kaptajn Bjarne B. Hundevad, Squadron Chief of 2 ESK (the Danish Army’s Second Tank Squadron wrote in a paper in April 2009 that:
“The Leopard 2A5 DK is a robust and accurate weapons system. It’s not that such vehicles cannot be knocked out. But Leopard 2A5s have yet to suffer any serious damage in Afghanistan. Moreover, these tanks add firepower and have boosted ISAF morale. The Taliban is terrified by the tanks.”
As the US was about to deploy tanks in November 2010, MGen Richard Mills, the US Marine commander in Afghanistan, told the BBC that: “Tanks are hardly a weapon of desperation but simply another tool to wage COIN [counterinsurgency efforts] in an effective way that will save Afghan and Coalition lives.” In another interview with the Army Times in December of that year, he said:
“The tank, with its optics, with its stand-off distance, with its battle armor, gives me a very, very good tool that I can use once again to bring very, very precise fires on the insurgents and ensure that civilian casualties don’t rise, an issue that we are very concerned about here.”
So far from being a relic of the past, recent experience shows how heavy armour and its associated precision fire power still have a place in the initial phase of winning a war as in the First and Second Gulf War and indeed within COIN operations in Afghanistan.
Does LAV III UP satisfy the CCV requirements?
The requirement of medium and heavy armour vehicles in the military commander’s toolkit, capable of contributing to high intensity combat situations is vital. The CCV backgrounder (updated on 6th September) on the Department of National Defence website states:
“The experience of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and that of other nations in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and other operational theatre demonstrates the requirement for a new highly survivable medium-weight (25-45 tonnes) armoured Close Combat Vehicle (CCV). The threats of mines, Improvised Explosive Devices, Explosively Formed Projectiles and anti-armour weapons have proliferated and are likely to be faced in most medium to high-threat missions. A more robust vehicle with both passive and active protection appropriate to the mission will likely be required frequently in the future.
The CCV is intended to overcome the aforementioned deficiencies in capabilities as well as fulfill future operational concept requirements. Changes in recent years to the threats facing the CAF on operations have led to increased attention on protection.
The CCV project will provide the CAF with a medium-weight armoured vehicle that is both highly protected and tactically mobile. The CCV will bridge the gap between the current light (5-25 tonnes) and heavy armoured (45 tonnes +) vehicle fleets therefore providing the Canadian Army with an operational capability that can operate in intimate support of the Main Battle Tank or independently within a high-intensity environment.
This project is part of the family of land combat vehicles, announced in July 2009, and provides the Canadian Army with a flexible, multi-purpose capability enabling the CAF to respond effectively and successfully to the full spectrum of military operations.”
Many other countries have also opted for a heavier infantry fighting vehicle (either tracked or wheeled) very similar to what Canada is acquiring through the CCV program. These include: the United States, Britain, France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Norway, Poland and Austria. These medium weight vehicles ensure that dismounted troops can be delivered safely to a tactical objective in a high tempo high threat combat environment in support of, or supported by MBTs.
The LAV III entered service with the Canadian Army in 1999. The LAV III Upgrade Program was initiated in 2009 with the first production contract awarded in 2011. It is intended to extend the life of these vehicles to 2035. Central to the LAV III UP program is the development of the Double ‘V’ Hull (DVH). When the limitations of the US Stryker (LAV III in US service) against IEDs became evident, the development of an improved blast protection system commenced soon after. In 2009/2010 at the time of inception of the CCV program, initial results of the DVH analysis and testing were already demonstrating that the DVH concept improved the protection of the LAV III. While the details of DVH performance are quite rightly restricted, we can surmise that the decision to press ahead with CCV was taken in the full knowledge of DVH protection capability. As a general comment, we at Nexter can certainly attest to the high priority the Canadian Government gives to protecting its soldiers through the CCV program.
Associated with the DVH solution is an increase of vehicle mass. The LAV III Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW) is 38000 lbs (or 17.3 tonnes). The GVW of LAV UP is quoted as 55,000 lbs (or 25 tonnes) representing an increase of 44%. To compensate for this increase in weight, a new more powerful engine has been provided passing from 350 HP to 450 HP representing a 28% increase or an effective decrease in the power to weight ratio of LAVIII to LAV III UP. In reality, the GVW is more often the safe design limit. Consequently, it can be expected that LAV III UP will be initially fielded at something less than 25 tonnes – somewhat less than the medium weight protection required by the CCV.
Crucial to the CCV is its mobility performance in the most demanding environments and terrain. Its mobility requirements are extremely challenging to the point that both tracked vehicles and the latest generation of wheeled platforms were evaluated alongside each other.
CCVs are larger medium weight vehicles than LAV III UP. A simple physical comparison of the three CCV competitors against the LAV III UP is instructive in this regard. The CCV will also provide both increased individual crew and stowage volume inside the vehicle. This ensures that missions of extended durations can be undertaken in increased comfort. Personal equipment stowage inside the vehicle forms part of the vehicle’s combat efficiency.
Closing Statement
In common with other modern forces around the world, Canada has defined the CCV as its medium weight vehicle. As noted above, many countries have capability in the medium weight vehicle range, characterised by their ability to support tanks or conduct independent missions in high intensity environments.
The LAV III Upgrade Program clearly provides important and much needed incremental improvements to the original LAVIII vehicle fleet which is the work horse of the Canadian Army. However, the upgraded LAV IIIs are still not comparable to the more robust, well protected CCV
