Throw on top of that a total of at least 16 helicopter carrying Coast Guard Ice Breakers and the three Oceans just might be covered.
Continental Defence Corvette
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Oldgateboatdriver
Army.ca Fixture
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Damn! Why not get a couple of small aircraft carriers and cover all five? 
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Maybe the RN will sell us one of theirs?Damn! Why not get a couple of small aircraft carriers and cover all five?
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I'll accept that.
But I think the overall premise stands. It is line with what I have read from multiple sources over the years.
Launches and whalers were not the preferred solutions for the navies of the day. Nor for that matter were the escort carriers based on cruiser or cargo hulls.
Sometimes situations get the better of plans.
oldcpu
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I think, nominally navies need to assess why they need ships, and based on that the type of ship procured, if possible.
My understanding from reading on the internet, that the RCN currently has planned, for the 2030s:
Both the Kingston Class and Halifax class, will presumably be decommissioned in phase with commissioning of new warships (such as the River Class)
So where does a corvette fit in with regards to the above.
Historically? My understanding is that in WW-II, the wartime justification for the Royal Canadian Navy building corvettes was that the Battle of the Atlantic demanded a very large number of cheap, quickly-built escort ships to protect merchant convoys from German U-boats, and Canada lacked the time, industrial capacity, and trained manpower to produce enough larger destroyers. Corvettes such as the Flower-class corvette were small, simple, seaworthy enough for North Atlantic escort duty, and could be built rapidly in small civilian shipyards using commercial construction methods.
I don't believe all of that logic (from WW-II) 100% still applies today - although it is in some ways still relevant.
I asked myself , what conflicts have Canadian warships been involved in since WW-II?
Of course, Canada did contribute to 'Cold War' 'fleet-in-being' style presence, and not only in conflicts.
I also asked, what other conflicts have small NATO (or EU) navies been involved in since WW-II? Some that I note (where Canada was not involved):
Looking at the above, for many of them, having warships with either helicopters or surveillance drones (and even attack drones) would IMHO greatly help in such missions. I think that supports what many have been saying.
I myself see considerations of the above could be relevant. I speculate that the historical operations that are further from Canada geographically, are likely less important to drive "continental" requirements, than operations closer to the Canadian coastline , if the title "continental" in "Canadian Continental Corvette", is more a 'functional' description as opposed to only a 'political' description.
Any potentially hostile surface warship, close to our coastline, would IMHO be at risk from the RCAF. However any submarine close to our coast, could be much more difficult to both detect and counter. So from that I speculate an ASW capability will still be important in a continental warship.
As for what the RCN thinks?
A recent Canadian Naval Review purports to quote VAdm Topshee where he stated:
"The problem I face as we look at building the River Class Destroyers to take over the response capability of the main surface combatant from the Halifax class, and we recognize that we’ve got the Harry DeWolf class that can go up in the north, is there’s a gap between those two. We need something that can deal with most threats that isn’t going to provide air defence or protection to anyone else, but can defend itself in a fight, and is not afraid of ice. So not an icebreaker, but can go to the ice edge and can rip about at speed near ice. That should be consistent with a hull form that still allows it to have a sonar and still allows it to move with enough speed to be relevant as a combatant. It’s basically the same capability set that’s currently in the Halifax class, shrunk down to a smaller package with an ice edge capability, roughly a Polar Class 6. So that’s what we’re talking about as a Continental Defence Corvette, and we’re working to develop the high-level mandatory requirements for what exactly that would look like. We deliberately chose the name Corvette because we’re trying to indicate that it’s a tier of combatant — it definitely can fight, but it’s not the thing that’s the heart of the fleet."
= = = =
So from that one derives a smaller warship (than the River Class, and smaller than the Halifax class) and also more combat capable than the Harry De Wolf class (which is polar class 5), with capabilities approximating that of the Halifax class, but with Polar Class 6 capability (where polar class 6 is more of a seasonal arctic ice capability).
So it reads seasonal arctic operation capability is planned to be a key capability of the corvette.
If similar capability to Halifax class? Then likely short range and close in weapon system air defence, including anti-drone defence (possibly more 'beefed up' vs drone defences). I speculate a good SIGINT and ESM capability plus anti-drone ECM capability. Likely both a flight deck and hanger to launch, recover and carry embarked surveillance air drones. Likely a substantial warship range if arctic operations planned. And also good ASW capability via hull sonar, possibly towed array sonar, and also sonobuoy processing functionality for air drone dropped sonobuoys (where signal also relayed back to corvette from the air drone).
Clearly that is my speculation if an arctic capability is considered.
Augment existing fleet?
I do wonder, might any such Continental Corvettes be asked to augment the existing RCN fleet?
If one goes by a rule of thumb that for every 3 warships, only one is nominally operational at any one time, then we could be left with operational ships (at any given day):
So with only 5 (type-26) + 3 Harry de Wolfe, available at any one time, with 3 oceans requiring a Navy, THEN having a number of Corvettes available would greatly augment such a fleet. In which case, if so desired, then maybe more than just ASW and underwater + air drone surveillance, and limited air defence required, but also anti-ship and anti-shore functionality could be useful in such corvettes.
Obviously, I am speculating, but still, going back to basic requirements can be helpful.
I look forward to anything that may come out in the unclassified press as to the RCN requirements for the Canadian continental corvettes
My understanding from reading on the internet, that the RCN currently has planned, for the 2030s:
- 15 Type-26 River Class Destroyers
- 8 Harry DeWolf Class offshore patrol vessel
- 12 Canadian Patrol Submarines
- TBD Supply ships
- 8 Orca class Patrol and training vessels
- 12 to 20 Continental Corvettes
Both the Kingston Class and Halifax class, will presumably be decommissioned in phase with commissioning of new warships (such as the River Class)
So where does a corvette fit in with regards to the above.
Historically? My understanding is that in WW-II, the wartime justification for the Royal Canadian Navy building corvettes was that the Battle of the Atlantic demanded a very large number of cheap, quickly-built escort ships to protect merchant convoys from German U-boats, and Canada lacked the time, industrial capacity, and trained manpower to produce enough larger destroyers. Corvettes such as the Flower-class corvette were small, simple, seaworthy enough for North Atlantic escort duty, and could be built rapidly in small civilian shipyards using commercial construction methods.
I don't believe all of that logic (from WW-II) 100% still applies today - although it is in some ways still relevant.
I asked myself , what conflicts have Canadian warships been involved in since WW-II?
- 1951-to-1953 - Korea - Tribal class "train busters" off the Korean coast line to interdict North Korean supplies
- 1973 - Vietnam - Canadian destroyer escorts HMCS Terra Nova and HMCS Kootenay were deliberately stationed in the western Pacific under WESTPLOY specifically to support possible emergency evacuation of Canadian Peace Keeping military personnel in Vietnam.
- 1990s Yugoslav wars - Canadian frigates and destroyers participated in NATO and UN maritime embargo operations such as Operation Sharp Guard.
- 1991 - Gulf war - protecting larger class allied warships, and in one case escorting damaged allied warship out of a minefield.
- 2011 Libya operation - NATO’s Operation Unified Protector
Of course, Canada did contribute to 'Cold War' 'fleet-in-being' style presence, and not only in conflicts.
I also asked, what other conflicts have small NATO (or EU) navies been involved in since WW-II? Some that I note (where Canada was not involved):
- 2008 to present - Operation Atalanta (off the Horn of Africa) by the EU beginning in 2008. A long-running naval operation against piracy
- 2009 to 2016 - Operation Ocean Shield - NATO’s anti-piracy naval mission in the Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin, and western Indian Ocean
- 2024 to present - Operation Aspides - a European Union naval mission launched in 2024 in response to sustained missile, drone, and small-boat attacks on merchant shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent waters
Looking at the above, for many of them, having warships with either helicopters or surveillance drones (and even attack drones) would IMHO greatly help in such missions. I think that supports what many have been saying.
I myself see considerations of the above could be relevant. I speculate that the historical operations that are further from Canada geographically, are likely less important to drive "continental" requirements, than operations closer to the Canadian coastline , if the title "continental" in "Canadian Continental Corvette", is more a 'functional' description as opposed to only a 'political' description.
Any potentially hostile surface warship, close to our coastline, would IMHO be at risk from the RCAF. However any submarine close to our coast, could be much more difficult to both detect and counter. So from that I speculate an ASW capability will still be important in a continental warship.
As for what the RCN thinks?
A recent Canadian Naval Review purports to quote VAdm Topshee where he stated:
"The problem I face as we look at building the River Class Destroyers to take over the response capability of the main surface combatant from the Halifax class, and we recognize that we’ve got the Harry DeWolf class that can go up in the north, is there’s a gap between those two. We need something that can deal with most threats that isn’t going to provide air defence or protection to anyone else, but can defend itself in a fight, and is not afraid of ice. So not an icebreaker, but can go to the ice edge and can rip about at speed near ice. That should be consistent with a hull form that still allows it to have a sonar and still allows it to move with enough speed to be relevant as a combatant. It’s basically the same capability set that’s currently in the Halifax class, shrunk down to a smaller package with an ice edge capability, roughly a Polar Class 6. So that’s what we’re talking about as a Continental Defence Corvette, and we’re working to develop the high-level mandatory requirements for what exactly that would look like. We deliberately chose the name Corvette because we’re trying to indicate that it’s a tier of combatant — it definitely can fight, but it’s not the thing that’s the heart of the fleet."
= = = =
So from that one derives a smaller warship (than the River Class, and smaller than the Halifax class) and also more combat capable than the Harry De Wolf class (which is polar class 5), with capabilities approximating that of the Halifax class, but with Polar Class 6 capability (where polar class 6 is more of a seasonal arctic ice capability).
So it reads seasonal arctic operation capability is planned to be a key capability of the corvette.
If similar capability to Halifax class? Then likely short range and close in weapon system air defence, including anti-drone defence (possibly more 'beefed up' vs drone defences). I speculate a good SIGINT and ESM capability plus anti-drone ECM capability. Likely both a flight deck and hanger to launch, recover and carry embarked surveillance air drones. Likely a substantial warship range if arctic operations planned. And also good ASW capability via hull sonar, possibly towed array sonar, and also sonobuoy processing functionality for air drone dropped sonobuoys (where signal also relayed back to corvette from the air drone).
Clearly that is my speculation if an arctic capability is considered.
Augment existing fleet?
I do wonder, might any such Continental Corvettes be asked to augment the existing RCN fleet?
If one goes by a rule of thumb that for every 3 warships, only one is nominally operational at any one time, then we could be left with operational ships (at any given day):
- 5 Type-26 River Class Destroyers operational. 10 in various degrees of not being operational
- 3 Harry DeWolf Class offshore patrol vessel operational. 5 in various degrees of not being operational
- 4 Canadian Patrol Submarines - 8 in various degrees of not being operational
- 3 (more ? ) Supply ships - where possibly only 1/2 are operational at any given day
- 3 Orca class Patrol and training vessels. 5 in various degrees of not being operational
So with only 5 (type-26) + 3 Harry de Wolfe, available at any one time, with 3 oceans requiring a Navy, THEN having a number of Corvettes available would greatly augment such a fleet. In which case, if so desired, then maybe more than just ASW and underwater + air drone surveillance, and limited air defence required, but also anti-ship and anti-shore functionality could be useful in such corvettes.
Obviously, I am speculating, but still, going back to basic requirements can be helpful.
I look forward to anything that may come out in the unclassified press as to the RCN requirements for the Canadian continental corvettes
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The problem with many discussions around the future RCN Fleet is that people still think in terms of replacing one ship class with another, as if the fleet of 2040 will operate the same way it did in 1995. It will not. The RCN is clearly moving toward a layered fleet structure, and the Continental Defence Corvette appears designed to fill the very obvious gap between the Harry DeWolf class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships and the future River class destroyers.
The Halifax class became a jack of all trades because Canada had little choice. They conducted NATO task group operations, sovereignty patrols, counter piracy missions, embargo enforcement, counter narcotics deployments, ASW patrols, escort duties and disaster response because they were the only true multi role combatants available in numbers. That model is no longer financially or operationally sustainable. You cannot send a multi billion dollar River class destroyer to spend months conducting fisheries patrols, shadowing suspect vessels in the Arctic approaches, or carrying out low to medium threat continental defence missions when a smaller combatant can perform the task effectively.
That is where the Continental Defence Corvette comes in.
Vice Admiral Angus Topshee himself described the requirement as essentially a smaller combatant capable of handling most threats, operating near the ice edge, carrying sonar, maintaining speed and combat relevance, and possessing a capability set similar to the Halifax class in a smaller package. The deliberate use of the word “corvette” matters. This is not a glorified patrol vessel. It is intended to be a warship that can fight and survive, but without the requirement to provide full area air defence for an entire NATO task group the way the River class destroyers will.
People also need to stop thinking about corvettes through a Second World War lens. Modern corvettes in many navies are heavily armed combatants equipped with advanced sensors, missiles, sonar suites, electronic warfare systems and uncrewed systems integration. Some are more capable than Cold War frigates ever were. Today the term reflects size and intended employment more than weakness.
And frankly, the Arctic requirement changes everything. Canada does not need another pure blue water escort optimized only for the North Atlantic. The RCN needs ships capable of operating near the ice edge, supporting sovereignty operations, conducting ASW patrols, deploying drones and uncrewed systems, contributing to NORAD and continental defence, and still integrating into coalition operations when required. That demands endurance, sensors, electronic warfare capability, credible self defence systems and some degree of ice capability.
Most importantly, anti submarine warfare is likely central to the entire concept. People obsess over visible surface threats, but the real continental defence challenge is underwater. Detecting and tracking submarines operating in the Arctic and North Atlantic approaches is one of the most strategically important naval missions Canada performs. A smaller ASW optimized combatant with towed arrays, sonobuoy processing, embarked drones and modern sensors makes enormous operational sense.
The other factor many ignore is fleet mass. Even with fifteen River class destroyers, operational realities mean only a fraction will be available at any given time due to maintenance, training, modernization and crewing cycles. A navy made entirely of high end destroyers becomes too small and too valuable to use routinely. Smaller combatants provide presence, persistence and flexibility while preserving the high end fleet for when it is truly needed.
That is likely why the Continental Defence Corvette concept has steadily evolved beyond what some originally assumed would simply be a Kingston replacement. Increasingly it appears the RCN envisions a globally deployable secondary combatant capable of operating independently, supporting domestic defence, reinforcing NATO operations and integrating into larger task groups when required.
In other words, not a patrol boat. A compact combatant.
The bigger question now is leadership.
Vice Admiral Topshee clearly had a vision for where the RCN needed to go. The CDC concept, expanded Arctic focus, layered fleet structure, integration of uncrewed systems and stronger continental defence posture all carry his fingerprints to varying degrees. But now, as he moves into the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff position, he may actually have less direct influence over naval force development than he did as Commander of the RCN. The VCDS role is broader, focused across the entire CAF, budgets, institutional management and government coordination.
Whether his successor shares that same vision remains to be seen.
And that matters because Canadian naval procurement is never driven by one individual alone. Governments change. Budgets shift. Priorities evolve. Entire capability concepts can quietly disappear between briefing slides and Treasury Board submissions.
Right now the Continental Defence Corvette has momentum, strong operational logic and increasing strategic relevance, especially as NORAD modernization and Arctic sovereignty continue gaining importance. But concepts are easy. Turning them into funded and politically protected programs that survive leadership turnover is the difficult part.
The next few years will likely determine whether the Continental Defence Corvette becomes the backbone of a modern layered Canadian fleet, or simply another promising naval concept added to the long list of Canadian procurement what ifs.
