Throw on top of that a total of at least 16 helicopter carrying Coast Guard Ice Breakers and the three Oceans just might be covered.
Continental Defence Corvette
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Oldgateboatdriver
Army.ca Fixture
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Damn! Why not get a couple of small aircraft carriers and cover all five? 
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Maybe the RN will sell us one of theirs?Damn! Why not get a couple of small aircraft carriers and cover all five?
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I'll accept that.
But I think the overall premise stands. It is line with what I have read from multiple sources over the years.
Launches and whalers were not the preferred solutions for the navies of the day. Nor for that matter were the escort carriers based on cruiser or cargo hulls.
Sometimes situations get the better of plans.
oldcpu
Guest
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I think, nominally navies need to assess why they need ships, and based on that the type of ship procured, if possible.
My understanding from reading on the internet, that the RCN currently has planned, for the 2030s:
Both the Kingston Class and Halifax class, will presumably be decommissioned in phase with commissioning of new warships (such as the River Class)
So where does a corvette fit in with regards to the above.
Historically? My understanding is that in WW-II, the wartime justification for the Royal Canadian Navy building corvettes was that the Battle of the Atlantic demanded a very large number of cheap, quickly-built escort ships to protect merchant convoys from German U-boats, and Canada lacked the time, industrial capacity, and trained manpower to produce enough larger destroyers. Corvettes such as the Flower-class corvette were small, simple, seaworthy enough for North Atlantic escort duty, and could be built rapidly in small civilian shipyards using commercial construction methods.
I don't believe all of that logic (from WW-II) 100% still applies today - although it is in some ways still relevant.
I asked myself , what conflicts have Canadian warships been involved in since WW-II?
Of course, Canada did contribute to 'Cold War' 'fleet-in-being' style presence, and not only in conflicts.
I also asked, what other conflicts have small NATO (or EU) navies been involved in since WW-II? Some that I note (where Canada was not involved):
Looking at the above, for many of them, having warships with either helicopters or surveillance drones (and even attack drones) would IMHO greatly help in such missions. I think that supports what many have been saying.
I myself see considerations of the above could be relevant. I speculate that the historical operations that are further from Canada geographically, are likely less important to drive "continental" requirements, than operations closer to the Canadian coastline , if the title "continental" in "Canadian Continental Corvette", is more a 'functional' description as opposed to only a 'political' description.
Any potentially hostile surface warship, close to our coastline, would IMHO be at risk from the RCAF. However any submarine close to our coast, could be much more difficult to both detect and counter. So from that I speculate an ASW capability will still be important in a continental warship.
As for what the RCN thinks?
A recent Canadian Naval Review purports to quote VAdm Topshee where he stated:
"The problem I face as we look at building the River Class Destroyers to take over the response capability of the main surface combatant from the Halifax class, and we recognize that we’ve got the Harry DeWolf class that can go up in the north, is there’s a gap between those two. We need something that can deal with most threats that isn’t going to provide air defence or protection to anyone else, but can defend itself in a fight, and is not afraid of ice. So not an icebreaker, but can go to the ice edge and can rip about at speed near ice. That should be consistent with a hull form that still allows it to have a sonar and still allows it to move with enough speed to be relevant as a combatant. It’s basically the same capability set that’s currently in the Halifax class, shrunk down to a smaller package with an ice edge capability, roughly a Polar Class 6. So that’s what we’re talking about as a Continental Defence Corvette, and we’re working to develop the high-level mandatory requirements for what exactly that would look like. We deliberately chose the name Corvette because we’re trying to indicate that it’s a tier of combatant — it definitely can fight, but it’s not the thing that’s the heart of the fleet."
= = = =
So from that one derives a smaller warship (than the River Class, and smaller than the Halifax class) and also more combat capable than the Harry De Wolf class (which is polar class 5), with capabilities approximating that of the Halifax class, but with Polar Class 6 capability (where polar class 6 is more of a seasonal arctic ice capability).
So it reads seasonal arctic operation capability is planned to be a key capability of the corvette.
If similar capability to Halifax class? Then likely short range and close in weapon system air defence, including anti-drone defence (possibly more 'beefed up' vs drone defences). I speculate a good SIGINT and ESM capability plus anti-drone ECM capability. Likely both a flight deck and hanger to launch, recover and carry embarked surveillance air drones. Likely a substantial warship range if arctic operations planned. And also good ASW capability via hull sonar, possibly towed array sonar, and also sonobuoy processing functionality for air drone dropped sonobuoys (where signal also relayed back to corvette from the air drone).
Clearly that is my speculation if an arctic capability is considered.
Augment existing fleet?
I do wonder, might any such Continental Corvettes be asked to augment the existing RCN fleet?
If one goes by a rule of thumb that for every 3 warships, only one is nominally operational at any one time, then we could be left with operational ships (at any given day):
So with only 5 (type-26) + 3 Harry de Wolfe, available at any one time, with 3 oceans requiring a Navy, THEN having a number of Corvettes available would greatly augment such a fleet. In which case, if so desired, then maybe more than just ASW and underwater + air drone surveillance, and limited air defence required, but also anti-ship and anti-shore functionality could be useful in such corvettes.
Obviously, I am speculating, but still, going back to basic requirements can be helpful.
I look forward to anything that may come out in the unclassified press as to the RCN requirements for the Canadian continental corvettes
My understanding from reading on the internet, that the RCN currently has planned, for the 2030s:
- 15 Type-26 River Class Destroyers
- 8 Harry DeWolf Class offshore patrol vessel
- 12 Canadian Patrol Submarines
- TBD Supply ships
- 8 Orca class Patrol and training vessels
- 12 to 20 Continental Corvettes
Both the Kingston Class and Halifax class, will presumably be decommissioned in phase with commissioning of new warships (such as the River Class)
So where does a corvette fit in with regards to the above.
Historically? My understanding is that in WW-II, the wartime justification for the Royal Canadian Navy building corvettes was that the Battle of the Atlantic demanded a very large number of cheap, quickly-built escort ships to protect merchant convoys from German U-boats, and Canada lacked the time, industrial capacity, and trained manpower to produce enough larger destroyers. Corvettes such as the Flower-class corvette were small, simple, seaworthy enough for North Atlantic escort duty, and could be built rapidly in small civilian shipyards using commercial construction methods.
I don't believe all of that logic (from WW-II) 100% still applies today - although it is in some ways still relevant.
I asked myself , what conflicts have Canadian warships been involved in since WW-II?
- 1951-to-1953 - Korea - Tribal class "train busters" off the Korean coast line to interdict North Korean supplies
- 1973 - Vietnam - Canadian destroyer escorts HMCS Terra Nova and HMCS Kootenay were deliberately stationed in the western Pacific under WESTPLOY specifically to support possible emergency evacuation of Canadian Peace Keeping military personnel in Vietnam.
- 1990s Yugoslav wars - Canadian frigates and destroyers participated in NATO and UN maritime embargo operations such as Operation Sharp Guard.
- 1991 - Gulf war - protecting larger class allied warships, and in one case escorting damaged allied warship out of a minefield.
- 2011 Libya operation - NATO’s Operation Unified Protector
Of course, Canada did contribute to 'Cold War' 'fleet-in-being' style presence, and not only in conflicts.
I also asked, what other conflicts have small NATO (or EU) navies been involved in since WW-II? Some that I note (where Canada was not involved):
- 2008 to present - Operation Atalanta (off the Horn of Africa) by the EU beginning in 2008. A long-running naval operation against piracy
- 2009 to 2016 - Operation Ocean Shield - NATO’s anti-piracy naval mission in the Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin, and western Indian Ocean
- 2024 to present - Operation Aspides - a European Union naval mission launched in 2024 in response to sustained missile, drone, and small-boat attacks on merchant shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent waters
Looking at the above, for many of them, having warships with either helicopters or surveillance drones (and even attack drones) would IMHO greatly help in such missions. I think that supports what many have been saying.
I myself see considerations of the above could be relevant. I speculate that the historical operations that are further from Canada geographically, are likely less important to drive "continental" requirements, than operations closer to the Canadian coastline , if the title "continental" in "Canadian Continental Corvette", is more a 'functional' description as opposed to only a 'political' description.
Any potentially hostile surface warship, close to our coastline, would IMHO be at risk from the RCAF. However any submarine close to our coast, could be much more difficult to both detect and counter. So from that I speculate an ASW capability will still be important in a continental warship.
As for what the RCN thinks?
A recent Canadian Naval Review purports to quote VAdm Topshee where he stated:
"The problem I face as we look at building the River Class Destroyers to take over the response capability of the main surface combatant from the Halifax class, and we recognize that we’ve got the Harry DeWolf class that can go up in the north, is there’s a gap between those two. We need something that can deal with most threats that isn’t going to provide air defence or protection to anyone else, but can defend itself in a fight, and is not afraid of ice. So not an icebreaker, but can go to the ice edge and can rip about at speed near ice. That should be consistent with a hull form that still allows it to have a sonar and still allows it to move with enough speed to be relevant as a combatant. It’s basically the same capability set that’s currently in the Halifax class, shrunk down to a smaller package with an ice edge capability, roughly a Polar Class 6. So that’s what we’re talking about as a Continental Defence Corvette, and we’re working to develop the high-level mandatory requirements for what exactly that would look like. We deliberately chose the name Corvette because we’re trying to indicate that it’s a tier of combatant — it definitely can fight, but it’s not the thing that’s the heart of the fleet."
= = = =
So from that one derives a smaller warship (than the River Class, and smaller than the Halifax class) and also more combat capable than the Harry De Wolf class (which is polar class 5), with capabilities approximating that of the Halifax class, but with Polar Class 6 capability (where polar class 6 is more of a seasonal arctic ice capability).
So it reads seasonal arctic operation capability is planned to be a key capability of the corvette.
If similar capability to Halifax class? Then likely short range and close in weapon system air defence, including anti-drone defence (possibly more 'beefed up' vs drone defences). I speculate a good SIGINT and ESM capability plus anti-drone ECM capability. Likely both a flight deck and hanger to launch, recover and carry embarked surveillance air drones. Likely a substantial warship range if arctic operations planned. And also good ASW capability via hull sonar, possibly towed array sonar, and also sonobuoy processing functionality for air drone dropped sonobuoys (where signal also relayed back to corvette from the air drone).
Clearly that is my speculation if an arctic capability is considered.
Augment existing fleet?
I do wonder, might any such Continental Corvettes be asked to augment the existing RCN fleet?
If one goes by a rule of thumb that for every 3 warships, only one is nominally operational at any one time, then we could be left with operational ships (at any given day):
- 5 Type-26 River Class Destroyers operational. 10 in various degrees of not being operational
- 3 Harry DeWolf Class offshore patrol vessel operational. 5 in various degrees of not being operational
- 4 Canadian Patrol Submarines - 8 in various degrees of not being operational
- 3 (more ? ) Supply ships - where possibly only 1/2 are operational at any given day
- 3 Orca class Patrol and training vessels. 5 in various degrees of not being operational
So with only 5 (type-26) + 3 Harry de Wolfe, available at any one time, with 3 oceans requiring a Navy, THEN having a number of Corvettes available would greatly augment such a fleet. In which case, if so desired, then maybe more than just ASW and underwater + air drone surveillance, and limited air defence required, but also anti-ship and anti-shore functionality could be useful in such corvettes.
Obviously, I am speculating, but still, going back to basic requirements can be helpful.
I look forward to anything that may come out in the unclassified press as to the RCN requirements for the Canadian continental corvettes
- Reaction score
- 1,915
- Points
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The problem with many discussions around the future RCN Fleet is that people still think in terms of replacing one ship class with another, as if the fleet of 2040 will operate the same way it did in 1995. It will not. The RCN is clearly moving toward a layered fleet structure, and the Continental Defence Corvette appears designed to fill the very obvious gap between the Harry DeWolf class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships and the future River class destroyers.
The Halifax class became a jack of all trades because Canada had little choice. They conducted NATO task group operations, sovereignty patrols, counter piracy missions, embargo enforcement, counter narcotics deployments, ASW patrols, escort duties and disaster response because they were the only true multi role combatants available in numbers. That model is no longer financially or operationally sustainable. You cannot send a multi billion dollar River class destroyer to spend months conducting fisheries patrols, shadowing suspect vessels in the Arctic approaches, or carrying out low to medium threat continental defence missions when a smaller combatant can perform the task effectively.
That is where the Continental Defence Corvette comes in.
Vice Admiral Angus Topshee himself described the requirement as essentially a smaller combatant capable of handling most threats, operating near the ice edge, carrying sonar, maintaining speed and combat relevance, and possessing a capability set similar to the Halifax class in a smaller package. The deliberate use of the word “corvette” matters. This is not a glorified patrol vessel. It is intended to be a warship that can fight and survive, but without the requirement to provide full area air defence for an entire NATO task group the way the River class destroyers will.
People also need to stop thinking about corvettes through a Second World War lens. Modern corvettes in many navies are heavily armed combatants equipped with advanced sensors, missiles, sonar suites, electronic warfare systems and uncrewed systems integration. Some are more capable than Cold War frigates ever were. Today the term reflects size and intended employment more than weakness.
And frankly, the Arctic requirement changes everything. Canada does not need another pure blue water escort optimized only for the North Atlantic. The RCN needs ships capable of operating near the ice edge, supporting sovereignty operations, conducting ASW patrols, deploying drones and uncrewed systems, contributing to NORAD and continental defence, and still integrating into coalition operations when required. That demands endurance, sensors, electronic warfare capability, credible self defence systems and some degree of ice capability.
Most importantly, anti submarine warfare is likely central to the entire concept. People obsess over visible surface threats, but the real continental defence challenge is underwater. Detecting and tracking submarines operating in the Arctic and North Atlantic approaches is one of the most strategically important naval missions Canada performs. A smaller ASW optimized combatant with towed arrays, sonobuoy processing, embarked drones and modern sensors makes enormous operational sense.
The other factor many ignore is fleet mass. Even with fifteen River class destroyers, operational realities mean only a fraction will be available at any given time due to maintenance, training, modernization and crewing cycles. A navy made entirely of high end destroyers becomes too small and too valuable to use routinely. Smaller combatants provide presence, persistence and flexibility while preserving the high end fleet for when it is truly needed.
That is likely why the Continental Defence Corvette concept has steadily evolved beyond what some originally assumed would simply be a Kingston replacement. Increasingly it appears the RCN envisions a globally deployable secondary combatant capable of operating independently, supporting domestic defence, reinforcing NATO operations and integrating into larger task groups when required.
In other words, not a patrol boat. A compact combatant.
The bigger question now is leadership.
Vice Admiral Topshee clearly had a vision for where the RCN needed to go. The CDC concept, expanded Arctic focus, layered fleet structure, integration of uncrewed systems and stronger continental defence posture all carry his fingerprints to varying degrees. But now, as he moves into the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff position, he may actually have less direct influence over naval force development than he did as Commander of the RCN. The VCDS role is broader, focused across the entire CAF, budgets, institutional management and government coordination.
Whether his successor shares that same vision remains to be seen.
And that matters because Canadian naval procurement is never driven by one individual alone. Governments change. Budgets shift. Priorities evolve. Entire capability concepts can quietly disappear between briefing slides and Treasury Board submissions.
Right now the Continental Defence Corvette has momentum, strong operational logic and increasing strategic relevance, especially as NORAD modernization and Arctic sovereignty continue gaining importance. But concepts are easy. Turning them into funded and politically protected programs that survive leadership turnover is the difficult part.
The next few years will likely determine whether the Continental Defence Corvette becomes the backbone of a modern layered Canadian fleet, or simply another promising naval concept added to the long list of Canadian procurement what ifs.
- Reaction score
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In the search for mass, and assuming a current threat and a current gap in our ability to respond to many threats, is there not a requirement to define a solution that:
can be produced with existing facilities (ours or offshore)
can be produced in numbers
can be produced rapidly
can be produced for a period of decades
can be produced cheaply?
....
My biggest concern with all our military plans is the rate of supply.
Our Cold War Peace Dividend is our version of Churchill's 1919 "10 year rule" which became 1928's "Rolling rule". It stymied miltary and political thought for two decades.
"We don't foresee a war" became "We can't fight a war".
Our National Shipbuliding Strategy was set against a similar backdrop. It assumed peace and time.
In my opinion we have neither.
....
Between WW1 and WW2 the politicians treated battleships like nuclear missiles, like war ending threats that could be bartered across international conference tables. The Japanese in particular felt that, like those not in the nuclear club today, that they were being relegated to second tier status. So they went looking for the other thing.
And they found the other thing. The other thing was demonstrated at Taranto and Pearl Harbor when Billy Mitchell was proven correct and aircraft sank battleships. Poetic justice that Mitchell bombers launched from ships should have been the first to raid Tokyo after Pearl Harbor.
At that point all assumptions about everything changed.
Battleships and heavy cruisers on the slips stayed there for the remainder of the war. Cruiser hulls were converted to aircraft carriers. Yards were turned to producing destroyers, frigates and corvettes as well as submarines. But also tonnes of cargo ships. So much so that steel became in short supply as did the manpower to assemble it all.
So much so that women were brought into factories in yards. So much so that navies expanded their reliance on Coastal Commands by acquiring as many long range aircraft to operate from shore as possible. So much so that materials to replace steel were sought and employed - wood made a reappearance in coastal boats and in aircraft (notably the Mosquito), ships were made with concrete decks, aircraft were made with aluminum.
Some of those changes were flashes in the pan, for the duration of the emergency only. Some endured.
Battleships and heavy cruisers disappeared. Aircraft carriers and aluminum aircraft endured.
Wooden boats and aircraft disappeared. Submarines and rockets endured.
Sonar and Radar endured.
WW2 was an inflection point.
Wright, among others, sees another inflection point today.
The thing about many of the changes that endured post WW2 is that many of them were not only not planned, they were unforeseen.
They were created in panic, made to work, and shoved prior solutions out of the way. Not because they were necessarily the better solution but because they were the only solution available in a timely fashion.
Corvettes, like battleships did not endure.
Nor did the 100,000 Canadian sailors that manned them.
1,500 Canadian sailors in 1938
110,000 in 1945
10,000 in 1946
....
I support the building of the RCDs, CDCs, AOPVs and CPSs.
I am just bothered by the timeline, the planned delivery schedule and the fact that the funding that has magically appeared due to political circumstances could just as magically disappear for the same reasons.
In the mean time, today, with the tools, manpower and materials immediately to hand, what can be done to enhance the capabilities of the existing and planned structure with the money that is immediately on offer?
can be produced with existing facilities (ours or offshore)
can be produced in numbers
can be produced rapidly
can be produced for a period of decades
can be produced cheaply?
....
My biggest concern with all our military plans is the rate of supply.
Our Cold War Peace Dividend is our version of Churchill's 1919 "10 year rule" which became 1928's "Rolling rule". It stymied miltary and political thought for two decades.
"We don't foresee a war" became "We can't fight a war".
Our National Shipbuliding Strategy was set against a similar backdrop. It assumed peace and time.
In my opinion we have neither.
....
Between WW1 and WW2 the politicians treated battleships like nuclear missiles, like war ending threats that could be bartered across international conference tables. The Japanese in particular felt that, like those not in the nuclear club today, that they were being relegated to second tier status. So they went looking for the other thing.
And they found the other thing. The other thing was demonstrated at Taranto and Pearl Harbor when Billy Mitchell was proven correct and aircraft sank battleships. Poetic justice that Mitchell bombers launched from ships should have been the first to raid Tokyo after Pearl Harbor.
At that point all assumptions about everything changed.
Battleships and heavy cruisers on the slips stayed there for the remainder of the war. Cruiser hulls were converted to aircraft carriers. Yards were turned to producing destroyers, frigates and corvettes as well as submarines. But also tonnes of cargo ships. So much so that steel became in short supply as did the manpower to assemble it all.
So much so that women were brought into factories in yards. So much so that navies expanded their reliance on Coastal Commands by acquiring as many long range aircraft to operate from shore as possible. So much so that materials to replace steel were sought and employed - wood made a reappearance in coastal boats and in aircraft (notably the Mosquito), ships were made with concrete decks, aircraft were made with aluminum.
Some of those changes were flashes in the pan, for the duration of the emergency only. Some endured.
Battleships and heavy cruisers disappeared. Aircraft carriers and aluminum aircraft endured.
Wooden boats and aircraft disappeared. Submarines and rockets endured.
Sonar and Radar endured.
WW2 was an inflection point.
Wright, among others, sees another inflection point today.
The thing about many of the changes that endured post WW2 is that many of them were not only not planned, they were unforeseen.
They were created in panic, made to work, and shoved prior solutions out of the way. Not because they were necessarily the better solution but because they were the only solution available in a timely fashion.
Corvettes, like battleships did not endure.
Nor did the 100,000 Canadian sailors that manned them.
1,500 Canadian sailors in 1938
110,000 in 1945
10,000 in 1946
....
I support the building of the RCDs, CDCs, AOPVs and CPSs.
I am just bothered by the timeline, the planned delivery schedule and the fact that the funding that has magically appeared due to political circumstances could just as magically disappear for the same reasons.
In the mean time, today, with the tools, manpower and materials immediately to hand, what can be done to enhance the capabilities of the existing and planned structure with the money that is immediately on offer?
Well stated. A number of the chiefs of intelligence in Europe are forecasting war within this decade. China is anticipated to go after Taiwan within 5 years. Every planned delivery is for after the war? is underway. What can we start building next year for delivery in less than 5 years that will be good enough and where? Like with those under construction battleships in WW2 our major yards are plugged with ships for the 30s and 40s.
- Reaction score
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It seems that packing the punch of a Halifax into a smaller hull AND having the range and some ice capabilities is a very hard ask. I suspect also the RCN fears that a 4,000ish DWT "Corvette" is going to eat the RCD lunch down the road as future politicians start trimming the fat. I suspect their fear is well grounded. So either they need a "Corvette" that's is a frigate in disguise or find some other way to make it unable to come close to the RCD's in capability.
- Reaction score
- 1,915
- Points
- 1,160
I support the building of the River Class Destroyers, Continental Defence Corvettes, Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships, and Canadian Patrol Submarines. Canada absolutely needs to recapitalize the fleet and rebuild maritime capability for the long term. The problem is not the vision. The problem is the timeline like you said. These programs are measured in decades, and the political and economic support that suddenly appears during moments of international tension can disappear just as quickly when governments change, budgets tighten, or public attention shifts elsewhere. Canada has a long history of starting ambitious defence programs only to scale them back later.
That is why the more important question is what can be done right now with the tools, manpower, infrastructure, and money immediately available.
First, maximize the combat capability and readiness of the Halifax Class frigates. A fully crewed and deployable frigate today is worth far more than a future capability promised sometime in the 2040s. Continue weapons, EW, and sensor improvements, maintain ammunition stockpiles, and focus relentlessly on spare parts, maintenance, and crewing stability to keep the fleet operational through the transition period.
Second, lean into what the Harry DeWolf Class is actually good at instead of trying to force it into roles it was never designed for. The AOPVs are not destroyers, but they are highly valuable sovereignty, ISR, Arctic presence, constabulary, and domain awareness platforms. Expand UAV integration, modular payloads, autonomous systems testing, sonar experimentation, and interoperability with the Coast Guard and other CAF elements. Use them aggressively in the Arctic now instead of waiting for some future perfect solution.
Third, invest heavily in sustainment and shore infrastructure. Fuel systems, ammunition facilities, warehouses, dry docks, simulators, repair facilities, and logistics networks are not glamorous, but they are what actually generate operational readiness. Ships tied alongside waiting for parts, technicians, or maintenance periods contribute nothing to deterrence.
Fourth, rebuild manpower before anything else. The reality is simple. Ships do not sail themselves. Canada can build all the new hulls it wants, but without trained sailors, technicians, maintainers, and support staff they become expensive pier side ornaments. Retention incentives, sea pay reform, housing support, family stability initiatives, realistic sailing schedules, and stronger reserve integration would likely produce more immediate operational effect than another future procurement announcement.
Fifth, pursue smaller capability projects that can move quickly and provide operational return immediately. Containerized mission modules, autonomous systems, expeditionary logistics, loitering munitions experimentation, improved Arctic communications, deployable fuel systems, and reserve support craft are all achievable without waiting twenty years for a new class of ship.
Sixth, retain and modernize the four remaining operational Kingston Class for dedicated mine countermeasures and NATO commitments. Naval mines remain one of the cheapest and most effective maritime threats in the world. Eliminating an existing MCM capability before a replacement fully exists would be shortsighted. Modernized with updated sensors, communications, and autonomous mine warfare systems, the Kingston Class could continue contributing meaningfully for years.
There is also no reason these ships need to spend most of their lives cycling in and out of Canadian ports. Forward station them overseas and rotate crews through them, similar to what allied navies already do with smaller vessels. This would strengthen NATO commitments, improve operational availability, reduce transit wear, and provide sailors with far more meaningful operational experience alongside allied MCM forces.
The long term fleet matters. Absolutely. But deterrence is not built on artist renderings, announcements, or ships still sitting in design offices. It is built on what can sail, fight, sustain itself, and show the flag today. Canada needs to stop thinking only about future platforms and start thinking about operational mass, readiness, logistics, sustainment, and personnel now.
oldcpu
Guest
- Reaction score
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I suspect most of us share that concern.
Indeed. Political winds can change ... and consequences could be dire. My hope (in part) is that the cancellation costs for programs underway, will be such that a cancellation is too distasteful not only in terms of $$ but also in terms of public discontent ... (more on that at the end of this reply).
Clearly (assuming both River Class Destroyer and Canadian Patrol Submarine) are built in batches, and assuming contracts awarded in batches, then they could be unfortunately limited in quantity if different 'political winds' are present. That concern IMHO would also apply to a Canadian Continental Corvette, if, say, there were in the future to be a contract for 12 corvettes (in batches of 4 per batch < pure speculation by me) and then the political support to procure such were to change.
Sadly, ships do take time to build, and that means the navy will feel the strong buffet of future political changes for the next decade and more.
I think in addition to hopes that acquisition of warships can be sped up, ... it would help to solve (what I call a 'crisis of invisibility') the lack of understanding and lack of visibility of the Canadian public in terms of the importance of ships for the RCN (in both finding recruits to man the ships, and also in procuring the ships). I think if the public understood better, then the public's political representatives, would not be as big a strong wind, buffeting future budgets for the RCN and buffeting future programs.
To me that begs the question ... how to get more public support?
- Reaction score
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The idea that a 4,000 tonne CDC could somehow replace a 10,000+ tonne River class destroyer ignores what those ships are actually built to do. A smaller combatant can carry serious weapons today, missiles, drones, modern sensors and even limited air defence, but you cannot shrink command capability, endurance, survivability, power generation, aviation support and fleet level air defence into a much smaller hull without major compromises. The River class is not just a ship with missiles bolted on. It is designed to command and defend an entire task group during sustained blue water operations. That capability still requires size.
The CDC exists because the RCN also needs numbers, presence and flexibility. You do not send a billion dollar Aegis destroyer to every sovereignty patrol, NATO presence mission, sanctions operation or Arctic deployment. Smaller combatants allow the RCDs to focus on high end warfighting while the CDCs handle the huge range of day to day missions Canada actually conducts. That is not duplication or competition. That is a layered fleet structure, which is exactly where most serious navies are heading.
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I get that, but if you get another far left PM, all they will see is grey floating things taking money from their socialist dream programs. For them one is as good as another and less capable is better than something that is more capable.
Swampbuggy
Sr. Member
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This is a brilliant post. I think we all get so excited thinking about the future fleet, that we lose track of the current worthiness and value of the existing system, along with its deficiencies. If war is coming before we have a significant amount of new vessels crewed and in the water, then our current fleet must still be considered the force we can bring to bear. Anything we can do to strengthen the support, infrastructure and manpower needs to sustain a credible naval force should be as high a priority as anything else proposed for the future. Innovation and experimentation across the different classes in the fleet will be critical to ensure their continued relevance.
I think many of us have sort of mentally written off the MCDV’s as not being part of the plan anymore. It’s a good reminder that we still have 4 and they can absolutely contribute in a meaningful way if used and supported properly.
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Man you are certainly a glass half empty persona. We’ll never have a far left federal government in Canada.
And honestly, that argument gets thrown around every time the military wants to buy something bigger or more capable. The reality is every government, Liberal or Conservative, eventually runs into the same problem: geography, sovereignty, NATO commitments, NORAD obligations, and the simple fact that Canada is a maritime nation with three oceans. You cannot patrol that with wishful thinking and underpowered platforms.
The other thing people forget is that once capability is lost, it is brutally expensive and time consuming to rebuild. Politicians may debate numbers, timelines, or priorities, but there is still a baseline reality that the RCN needs credible ships, submarines, logistics, and Arctic capability to function as a serious navy. A patrol ship cannot replace a destroyer. A corvette cannot fully replace a major combatant. And “good enough” tends to become dangerously inadequate the moment the world gets unstable, which is exactly what we are seeing now.
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I am going to add nothing to the rest of you post.
WRT the Kingstons I can only agree. I would also point out that the Kingstons evolved from the Anticosti and Moresby - a pair of converted Offshore Supply Vessels. The very same type of vessels that the USN is busily acquiring for the Medium and Large Uncrewed Surface Vessels.
Those vessels are readily available. They can be outfitted at least to the standard of the Kingstons and the Harry de Wolfs. They can take over their jobs. And they can be produced in numbers.
They can also be outfitted with autonomous sailing systems to reduce the numbers of crew necessary to operate them and the training burden on those sailors.
And, if the situation presents itself and a need and capability develop, then they could be operated in the uncrewed mode.
In the meantime they are hulls, that offer presence, and training opportunities and platforms for capabilities.
They could be your new "Flowers".
Absolutely max out the capabilities of the Halifaxes. Make sure their magazines are always full, their hangars have functional helicopters and UAVs and their boats and davits are all operational. And their software can communicate with all the world around them.
But you need the mass that something like the OSVs offer.
The Navy also needs to exploit what is happening with these Autonomous AI turrets and UGVs. If they can work on a UGV in a muddy Ukrainian field then why not bolt 3 or 4 of them onto an OSV for local defence?
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The problem for the RCN has never really been convincing sailors. Sailors already know why ships matter. The problem is convincing a Canadian public that largely never sees the Navy unless there is a disaster, a war, or a Fleet Week once every few years. Out of sight means out of mind, and out of mind means politically expendable. That is the real danger. Programs like the River Class Destroyers, CPS, CDC, and AOPS are not just shipbuilding projects. They are generational national infrastructure projects tied directly to sovereignty, Arctic presence, NATO credibility, continental defence, and tens of thousands of industrial jobs across the country. The moment Canadians start seeing them that way instead of “military spending,” the political calculus changes dramatically.
The irony is the RCN actually has one of the best stories to tell in the CAF. Canadian ships deploy constantly. They intercept narcotics in the Caribbean, enforce sanctions in Asia, reassure allies in Europe, patrol the Arctic, respond to disasters, evacuate civilians, and represent Canada abroad. HMCS Harry DeWolf sailing the Northwest Passage matters. HMCS Charlottetown visiting Vietnam matters. Canadian submariners embarking in allied submarines matters. But too often the RCN communicates like a bureaucracy instead of telling those stories like a nation building institution. Every new ship launched should be treated like a national event. Every keel laid, float out, deployment, and capability milestone should be shoved directly into public view. Canadians support what they can see and understand.
And frankly, the shipbuilding strategy itself may become its own political shield. Once billions are invested, once thousands of workers are employed, once provinces become economically tied to these programs, cancellation becomes politically toxic. That is exactly why batch builds matter. It is harder to kill a program when steel is already being cut, trades are already employed, supply chains already exist, and communities are economically dependent on the work. The best protection for the future fleet is not just military necessity. It is making the programs so visible, so economically integrated, and so publicly understood that no government wants to wear the consequences of gutting them.
