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Bruce,
The technical briefing on the proposal was held yesterday. I have attached the NL position of the terms for your review.
The technical briefing on the proposal was held yesterday. I have attached the NL position of the terms for your review.
Analysis of Federal Government Offer on the Atlantic Accord
Winnipeg, December 22, 2004
On June 5, 2004 the Prime Minister accepted the proposal of the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador to remove the effect of the Equalization clawback on offshore revenues so that the Province will receive 100 per cent of the value from these revenues.
The principle accepted by the Prime Minister was reiterated in the federal proposal of December 22, 2004.
"...the annual offset payment...shall be equal to 100 per cent of any reductions in Equalization payments resulting from offshore revenues."
This statement demonstrates that the federal government understands the principle, but it then attached seven conditions which eroded the 100 per cent commitment.
To understand how these conditions operate, it is first necessary to understand how the offset payment is calculated. The equalization formula, in its simplest form, provides that each dollar of new own-source revenue collected by a province will result in the reduction, or clawback, of equalization payments by one dollar to the benefit of the federal government. To eliminate the regressive effect of the equalization clawback due to offshore revenue, and provide 100% benefit of offshore revenues to the province, the offset payment should return to the province each dollar which has been clawed back. Therefore, if $10 million of equalization is clawed back due to offshore revenue, the offset payment should be $10 million. If $500 million is clawed back, the offset payment should be $500 million. The offset payment would stabilize, and not grow any further, at the point where all equalization payments have been clawed back.
Federal Conditions
Each of the seven conditions in the Federal Proposal deflates the 100 per cent commitment. Ultimately the clawback is completely reinstated.
Annual Termination: The new offset arrangement will terminate in any year in which NL is off equalization. Even though there is a transition mechanism, any immediate reduction in offset payments means that the clawback on offshore revenue has been reintroduced.
Inadequate Transition Mechanism: The federal transition mechanism which is triggered when the new offset terminates is the one embedded in the existing Atlantic Accord. This mechanism ensures a rapid reduction of the offset payment. For example, if NL is off Equalization in two years of the first eight years, NL would be $1 billion short of 100 per cent.
Transition Ends in 7 Years: The transition mechanism will not be available after year 7, which means that the clawback reduction will be fully reinstated if NL is off equalization in year 7 or later.
Uncertain Extension: The federal criteria to extend the arrangement to a second eight year period could deprive NL of the extension altogether. The federal government proposed that if NL is off equalization in years 7 and 8, or if our debt/GDP ratio moves ahead of one other province, or if we fail to balance our budget in year 8, then the extension will not be granted. If not granted, and without the benefit of a transition mechanism, the clawback will be in full effect again.
Annual Termination Potential after 8 Years: Even if an extension does occur, the federal proposal says that the arrangements could end in any year by applying the same criteria for 8 year renewal (i.e., two years off equalization, improved debt/GDP ratio, failure to balance budget).
Project Limitations: The arrangement will include revenue only from Hibernia, Terra Nova and White Rose. Hebron's inclusion will only last 8 years in total (possibly not at all if NL is off equalization.). The revenues from other new fields will not be included.
Time Limitations: The whole arrangement will be 16 years or less, even though the revenues on existing projects extend beyond 16 years. The federal government will not even commit to a formal discussion about a further extension.
Balanced Budget Condition
The requirement to balance the budget in order to receive offset payments between years 8 and 16 is extraordinary. The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador has adopted an aggressive fiscal policy to balance its budget, but the timing and nature of its budget policy should not be dictated by the federal government.
Principal Beneficiary
The reinstatement of the federal clawback, especially if Newfoundland and Labrador continues to require equalization during this period, negates the objective of the Atlantic Accord which is that the Province should be the "principal beneficiary" of its offshore resources.
Equalization Payments and Offset Payments
The Provincial proposal recognizes that Equalization payments will end when the Province's fiscal capacity achieves the five province average, (or whatever nationally-defined standard may exist for the Equalization program). However, offset payments should continue after the province is off Equalization because the clawback of offshore revenues is still operating â “ indeed, at its maximum level - when Equalization payments are reduced to zero. Offset payments might be reduced when the Province is off Equalization for a sustained period of time, but the federal proposal does not adequately recognize this concept.
January 3, 2004