MilEME09:
While PRes man power helped, individual augmentation is less effective and does effect unit cohesion by taking a bunch of unknown people and dropping them into an established organization that the people of know how to work together.
What do you think is going to happen when we get into combat and take casualties? The LOB's, if there were any, would have some unit cohesion. Reinforcements coming from e.g. reinforcement battalion/divisional reinforcement company which included returning battle casualties, but mainly battle inexperienced soldiers. Going into France in June 1944 there were few battle experienced soldiers.
After the D-Day drop 1 Can Para Bn received non jump qualified Inf reinforcements, incl a RWpgRif Rfn who was KIA with them.
B Coy, RWpgRif, landed 0750 where the Juno Beach Centre is now. Capt Gower, the Coy Comd, landed with reinforced Coy of 164, 8 Pioneers to clear wire with Bangalore's, FOO party of 3, and 18 Engrs as demolition and mine clearing teams When they got off the beach, Capt Gower was the only Offr with 24 Rfn, plus 4 stretcher bears he left at the beach to look after casualties (don't know if those figures incl the Engrs). That night B coy got 3 Offrs, and 60 OR's and he reorg the Coy into 3 Pls. On the morning of the 7th the Coy received 1 Offr and 40 OR'd which Capt Gower reported were untrained/non Inf. On the afternoon of 8 Jun, A, B, C Coys were over run by a unit of the 12 SS Panzer Div. Fifty-eight of our Rfn were murdered, Capt Gower was captured.
All that to say unit cohesion is going to be missing in a conflict. another example:
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5362&context=etd
An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945
Extract: Combat losses robbed Canadian units of more than just personnel when large numbers of battle
casualties occurred during a short period of time. This type of casualty could total over 200 personnel in
one day, as evidenced by the experience of the previously mentioned The Royal Highland Regiment of
Canada.
Its losses on 25 July 1944 were almost exclusively confined to its four forward infantry line
companies. Due to the experienced, highly-trained and effective infantry platoons of these companies
being the real fighting power of the unit, it's combat effectiveness in the immediate aftermath was reduced
to nothing. The Black Watch would not regain its previous combat effectiveness for some time due to
inexperienced replacements not performing at the same level as their predecessors.
It was very dangerous for an Canadian combat arms unit in NWE to immediately launch a new
operation after receiving a large amount of new replacements. If a gradual integration of new personnel
was not completed with appropriate refresher training, further heavy losses could occur. This is exactly
what befell the Black Watch during its second failed operation on 5 August 1944 in the village of May sur-Orne.
This action involved many new replacement personnel, and it is arguable they had not had to time to acclimatize
themselves and lacked experienced NCO section leadership.
It was most beneficial to slow acclimatize new personnel to front line conditions, regardless of
the combat arm. Upon arrival, a new infantry replacement would not know any of his fellow platoon
members or his section commander. To function as a well-oiled machine in combat, each section member
had to possess a certain confidence in his fellow soldiers and his weapons. This came through training
and shared experiences, the most valuable but most dangerous of the latter being combat itself. Prior to
combat operations it was necessary to have new Canadian soldiers become confident in themselves and
their teammates as soon as possible due to the often immediate need to thrust them back into action.
While it was beneficial for this goal to be achieved on a regular basis within Canadian combat arms units
in NWE, military necessity and a lack of forces often did not allow it to occur.
Failure to accomplish successful integration could result poor combat performance and increased
casualties within the ranks of the new personnel, especially in the infantry. While a shortage of infantry
and constant high-intensity operations from August to November 1944 had hurt the ability of new
Canadian infantry replacements to integrate, a period of inactivity during the winter of 1944-1945
allowed unit training and gradual integration to occur.
