Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves

[foresterab]

Interesting discussion on what is involved with secondary credentials. I've been on wildfires where the out of province resource beside me offers to deal with bear issues...because that's part of their day job but not mine...or oil spills or wiring (journeyman electrician who did a career change). Like the army these are not tracked skills but there are some things I think we do right...especially out of province when credentials are not the same.

Deploy on a wildfire and you go as X role - incident commander, fire fighter, helicopter coordinator?...it's the role the host agency ordered but the agency representative/liaison officer also has copies of all your training and certification records so if you need to move from position X to Y they can authorize the change. Keep in mind that position change might also entail very different workloads, qualifications and payment rates as per the pre-arranged agreements. So it's a positive on that front...

Unfortunately things like languages are rarely tracked well. Africans, Polish, Dene, Cree, French, German, Russian...pick a language skill set and they've come up. Last summer I really could have used a Chinese and Nepalese speaker. In many cases it's not a fully fluent person as per federal government standards but someone that knows enough to break the ice and communicate the language issue which can sometimes mean using a 3rd language to communicate - iZulu speaker using Afrikans to translate so we can understand it in English in one case.

Secondary skills such as trades are often not known at all and skill sets people have come exposed at the most unusual times. Locked the keys in the truck...put a pack of smokes on the truck, announce the problem, and go for a coffee. When you return the truck is unlocked but nobody knows how . Many professionals are there to get the job done and will volunteer their experience if asked as long as a person treats it as a true emergency situation and not a case of "Joe the plumber...you're in charge of toilets instead of driving your tank". The electrician example I found out at 1am when the individual complained of cold showers and no water and then reset the heater units so he could be clean for the next days operations. An electrician was called in the next day to ensure all was correct and my emergency fixer never touched a another tool that deployment.

 

[FJAG]

I would suggest that is very antiquated and biased view of the reserves and just how desperate they actually do want to evolve.

The CAF has no idea what it wants from its reserve force and in particular the army reserves.
I’m not saying that some units are resistant to certain changes but at some point things break when they are ignored or left to rot for too long.

I think that your statement is highly accurate.

Yes. There is clearly a calcified element within the reserves that while it talks reforms is just as happy to keep it the way it is. But, the mass of troops want something more.

I'm of the view that the calcified views of the RegF, that still see the ResF as a social club that competes with them for resources rather than one of the cornerstones of a total army, is a key problem as it controls the purse strings, and the primary access channel to the government.

The main problem though is that the RegF does know exactly what it wants from the ResF - a steady stream of Class Bs to fill chairs in cubicles and the occasional Class C to round out a deployment. In order to generate those, it wants the cheapest Class As that money can buy. The result is an underequipped and undertrained Class A force and that suits the RegF just fine as it means it doesn't have to spend money on additional equipment and training dollars for the ResF.

The primary motivator in the RegF leadership is the question of "what are you doing for me today?" It is not "What can you do for me tomorrow?" As long as the focus is on day-to-day activities with no thought of what is needed for the future, the Class A ResF will always play a very minor role in defence thinking and planning and especially in funding. That's the way its been since the middle of the last century and its not about to change.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I think that your statement is highly accurate.

Yes. There is clearly a calcified element within the reserves that while it talks reforms is just as happy to keep it the way it is. But, the mass of troops want something more.

I'm of the view that the calcified views of the RegF, that still see the ResF as a social club that competes with them for resources rather than one of the cornerstones of a total army, is a key problem as it controls the purse strings, and the primary access channel to the government.

The main problem though is that the RegF does know exactly what it wants from the ResF - a steady stream of Class Bs to fill chairs in cubicles and the occasional Class C to round out a deployment. In order to generate those, it wants the cheapest Class As that money can buy. The result is an underequipped and undertrained Class A force and that suits the RegF just fine as it means it doesn't have to spend money on additional equipment and training dollars for the ResF.

The primary motivator in the RegF leadership is the question of "what are you doing for me today?" It is not "What can you do for me tomorrow?" As long as the focus is on day-to-day activities with no thought of what is needed for the future, the Class A ResF will always play a very minor role in defence thinking and planning and especially in funding. That's the way its been since the middle of the last century and its not about to change.

Based on the attitude of most RSS staff I've encountered, the prevailing attitude of the Reg F to the Reserves resembles a pandering and paternalistic approach, similar to that of an angry parent confronting a naughty child.

You get what you lead, of course

 

[daftandbarmy]

Like that wouldn't happen in a large Federal Department where a whole new level of management would be created in order for the Regional Director General to employ her boy toy.

 

[Brad Sallows]

Give credit to people who join for being able to see the problems and having some energy and motivation to deal with the problems. Assume this exists in each cohort and is not a one- or few-off happenstance.

Then allow them to butt their heads against the institution a few times, achieving little except to learn a long list of excuses why things can't change. Some leave; some remain and learn to settle for what is possible; some of the latter become part of the calcification.

"We're not going to change that" comes from on high. So you end up in a Dilbert cartoon: organization surveys employees every year; every year, a few of the same questions return the same low scores; every year, organization forces employees to convene working groups to explore which problems can be addressed to raise scores; every year, working groups make same recommendations; every year, employer says "that can't (won't) change". There's a hole in the bucket, dear Liza...

 

[RocketRichard]

Simple solution (proposed years ago and ignored): Formal quals - granted / validated by CAF. Self-declared quals - free text field not validated or confirmed. So you're a volunteer firefighter? Check. You speak and write Klingon? Check (obviously the latter is probably reserved for the RCCS.)

Of course, that requires granting individuals enhanced access to their own pers information. And the ability to input info. Including flagging corrections. And, once flagged, corrections need a service standard for action - with accountability for failing to act.

The Klingon remark made me laugh out loud! Thanks for the belly laugh.

 

[McG]

Apparently reading the Star Wars alphabet has replaced speaking Klingon as the thing to do.

 

[markppcli]

I didn’t mean to offend if it came off that way. And it may and does look tocome off like that.

I would suggest that is very antiquated and biased view of the reserves and just how desperate they actually do want to evolve.

In what way? Because we have a lobby group, Reserve 2000, who fights tooth and nail to keep the current system running. You can see or hear in the resistance of members to the idea that “their” regiment be reduced a company / Sqn / bty. The Army Reserve in this country is built on an antiquated structure, and in my experience as a reservist seem generally more interested maintaining former glories and empire building then adapting to new realities and becoming a credible war fighting organization.

The CAF has no idea what it wants from its reserve force and in particular the army reserves.
I’m not saying that some units are resistant to certain changes but at some point things break when they are ignored or left to rot for too long.

Augmentation on operations and lead in disaster response.

 

[daftandbarmy]

In what way? Because we have a lobby group, Reserve 2000, who fights tooth and nail to keep the current system running. You can see or hear in the resistance of members to the idea that “their” regiment be reduced a company / Sqn / bty. The Army Reserve in this country is built on an antiquated structure, and in my experience as a reservist seem generally more interested maintaining former glories and empire building then adapting to new realities and becoming a credible war fighting organization.



Augmentation on operations and lead in disaster response.

Interestingly, I have never, ever heard or seen that communicated by anyone in the reserves to me or my troops on the armoury floor.

You know, like 'Mission - say twice', or in writing....

 

[Remius]

Interestingly, I have never, ever heard or seen that communicated by anyone in the reserves to me or my troops on the armoury floor.

You know, like 'Mission - say twice', or in writing....

Correct. I think it’s just an assumption being made more than anything else.

 

[Remius]

In what way? Because we have a lobby group, Reserve 2000, who fights tooth and nail to keep the current system running. You can see or hear in the resistance of members to the idea that “their” regiment be reduced a company / Sqn / bty. The Army Reserve in this country is built on an antiquated structure, and in my experience as a reservist seem generally more interested maintaining former glories and empire building then adapting to new realities and becoming a credible war fighting organization.



Augmentation on operations and lead in disaster response.

Are you referring to the campaign they lead in the 90s? When the government was reducing CAF capability across the board? Are they still relevant?

And what makes you think current units are following that line of thinking? Or are members of that lobby group? I actually haven’t heard much from them until I went to check their website after you mentioned it. Looks like they are calling for pretty much what the whole of the CAF is wanting.

Have the powers that be dictated a new way of doing things that is being resisted? And where exactly? We don’t even have a an actual defense white paper or anything else for that matter that tells the CAF what we are doing or should be doing. No real defense policy.

Is it antiquated? Yep, so what is being done? I’m tracking a few initiatives that are in the right direction. The new reserve readiness initiative is a good step. Not seing resistance to that at all. But the CAF as a whole is antiquated, not sure that is a reserve only issue.


But I’m curious to see what is being resisted. Mission tasks? Most embraced them but we’re set up to fail as they aren’t really being properly resourced. Tactical groupings? Ongoing but happening with units that require that sort of thing.

Not sure what you mean by former glories wanting to be maintained. Like what? Right now I can tell you that I am more concerned about meeting our tasks assigned, manning for deployments and training issues all while trying to encourage culture change as directed.

To be honest though, I feel like we have less resources now than we did back in the « glory days ».

 

[daftandbarmy]

Are you referring to the campaign they lead in the 90s? When the government was reducing CAF capability across the board? Are they still relevant?

And what makes you think current units are following that line of thinking? Or are members of that lobby group? I actually haven’t heard much from them until I went to check their website after you mentioned it. Looks like they are calling for pretty much what the whole of the CAF is wanting.

Have the powers that be dictated a new way of doing things that is being resisted? And where exactly? We don’t even have a an actual defense white paper or anything else for that matter that tells the CAF what we are doing or should be doing. No real defense policy.

Is it antiquated? Yep, so what is being done? I’m tracking a few initiatives that are in the right direction. The new reserve readiness initiative is a good step. Not seing resistance to that at all. But the CAF as a whole is antiquated, not sure that is a reserve only issue.


But I’m curious to see what is being resisted. Mission tasks? Most embraced them but we’re set up to fail as they aren’t really being properly resourced. Tactical groupings? Ongoing but happening with units that require that sort of thing.

Not sure what you mean by former glories wanting to be maintained. Like what? Right now I can tell you that I am more concerned about meeting our tasks assigned, manning for deployments and training issues all while trying to encourage culture change as directed.

To be honest though, I feel like we have less resources now than we did back in the « glory days ».

And stop reorganizing, FFS...

www.canadiansoldiers.com

www.canadiansoldiers.com

www.canadiansoldiers.com

 

[markppcli]

Are you referring to the campaign they lead in the 90s? When the government was reducing CAF capability across the board? Are they still relevant?

I’m assuming so as very little has changed organizationally.

And what makes you think current units are following that line of thinking? Or are members of that lobby group? I actually haven’t heard much from them until I went to check their website after you mentioned it. Looks like they are calling for pretty much what the whole of the CAF is wanting.

The infighting and resistance to forming tactical groups; which from my understanding at least in Winnipeg devolved into fighting between both regiments over how they’d rotate COs as opposed to, I dunno, a merit system.

Have the powers that be dictated a new way of doing things that is being resisted? And where exactly? We don’t even have a an actual defense white paper or anything else for that matter that tells the CAF what we are doing or should be doing. No real defense policy.

Valid points there, but in a similar vain are they suggesting new ways going forward themselves? Does it involve the reduction of numbers of COs? I’d be interested to know.

Is it antiquated? Yep, so what is being done? I’m tracking a few initiatives that are in the right direction. The new reserve readiness initiative is a good step. Not seing resistance to that at all. But the CAF as a whole is antiquated, not sure that is a reserve only issue.

What other structure would you see as being antiquated ? I call out the reserve system because it is in my opinion a structure that works against any kind of force generation, and serves no one but the COs and RSMs of units and Bdes.

But I’m curious to see what is being resisted. Mission tasks? Most embraced them but we’re set up to fail as they aren’t really being properly resourced. Tactical groupings? Ongoing but happening with units that require that sort of thing.

All the units in the reserves require tactical grouping. Possible exceptions might be something like the Royal Newfoundland Regiment where it’s isolated and spread out and occupies the whole province. That’s something of an anomaly though. Agreed that the reserves have done their best on the mission tasks, deploying a mortar platoon in 2022 should have been proof of concept; unfortunately a foolish line in training safety kills that. What other resources are required for say Assault Pioneer?

Not sure what you mean by former glories wanting to be maintained. Like what? Right now I can tell you that I am more concerned about meeting our tasks assigned, manning for deployments and training issues all while trying to encourage culture change as directed.

That was a dig, again, at the Army for holding onto 54 “Regiments.” I mean Christ we have so many we had to reuse the Cameron Highlanders.

To be honest though, I feel like we have less resources now than we did back in the « glory days ».

I mean the glory days of most reserve regiments was like 1945 so probably pretty accurate.

Now how was this a response to me not thinking it really matters in the overal scheme of things that 1 platoon A Coy the Pembroke Highlanders can supply us a 2nd year carpenter apprentice? Since you even said it wouldn’t effect organization.

Interestingly, I have never, ever heard or seen that communicated by anyone in the reserves to me or my troops on the armoury floor.

You know, like 'Mission - say twice', or in writing....

I think the post below you said that I was making an assumption. If you been tasked to do something, like augmentation to operations, since the Cold War, I’d call that informing.

You know like “Sir, I understand your intent to be..”

Agreed it should be spelled out clearly in a mission statement. I whole heartedly disagree about reorganization, all we’ve functionally done is changed districts to brigades, reorganization would’ve meant some actual meaningful change ideally linked to an output.

 

[KevinB]

FWIW I really want to know what idiot thought giving Cbt Spt roles to the PRes was a good idea?
Rifle Section is significantly easier and would be more needed.

 

[dapaterson]

Reserve leadership that, for years have been unable to provide inspiring leadership to units and keep soldiers active and motivated, claimed that the only solution was to give them more tasks to half-ass.

 

[Remius]

What other structure would you see as being antiquated ?

Recruiting.
Retention.
Housing.
Infrastructure.
How people are posted.
Base Locations.
Things like TI cards (not sure why we haven’t started using the revolutionary and innovative technology called bar codes)
Procurement

Plenty of stuff need modernizing, some are symptoms others are causes of the various woes we currently are facing as a force.

For the record, I agree with a lot of what you are posting. I disagree though as to what you think are the real causes. It’s not some cabal of association types that is keeping things like pay sheets a thing or the reason we have CBGs vs Militia Districts etc etc. It’s systemic issues that the CAF as a whole has.

 

[FJAG]

In what way? Because we have a lobby group, Reserve 2000, who fights tooth and nail to keep the current system running. You can see or hear in the resistance of members to the idea that “their” regiment be reduced a company / Sqn / bty. The Army Reserve in this country is built on an antiquated structure, and in my experience as a reservist seem generally more interested maintaining former glories and empire building then adapting to new realities and becoming a credible war fighting organization.

I'm not a defender of Reserves 2000.

Their origin comes from a RegF movement in Ontario under MGen Vernon to downsize and amalgamate units and it was done in a way that involved minimal ResF involvement. Tie that to the debacle of the disappearing Bisons and a multitude of other actions which made it clear that reservists were not partners in the process but merely pawns to be shoved around.

Reserves 2000 opposed this and makes it clear that the required solution is to leave the units as the Army's contact with the nation, to raise the numbers to 30,000 and to properly equip the reserves. Vernon's arrogance and divide and conquer approach was the catalyst that mobilized the movement.

There's nothing in their manifesto that they want to keep the messes open and and run it like the old Militia fiefdoms. (interestingly when they were fiefdoms private money was rolled into units to clothe and equip them far beyond what the government spent on them resulting in many battalions which were at full strength. What Reserves 2000 wants is an effective ResF which they believe based on much evidence, the RegF couldn't care less about. Their manifesto is Fund, Train, Equip and Expand. Nothing more.

I tend to disagree with Reserves 2000 because I do not think that the ResF will ever be effective until it is combined in such a way with the RegF so that RegF commanders become both responsible and accountable for the ResF's effectiveness. That's where ideas like a 30/70 force come into play which are a concept that Reserves 2000 would probably object to because it does result in ResF unit amalgamations. Basically I'm an advocate for fully formed units and not rump units. Basically I believe that a "ready reserve" cannot afford to have minimally trained officers and senior NCMs anymore.

All of that to say, however, at least Reserves 2000 has a vision for the ResF, something which has been absent within the RegF Army's leadership for over a half a century. The RegF is not prepared to put any more resources or the thought into the ResF than they are being pressured to do and, as such, are wasting one of the least expensive assets that the Army has.

The infighting and resistance to forming tactical groups;

These are not a solution. They are a band aid being plastered on a dysfunctional system perpetuated by a RegF too clueless to initiate and work on real reform. I guess in fairness, and looking at how Force 2025 is floundering and everything else going, they are also too clueless to reform themselves.

What other structure would you see as being antiquated ? I call out the reserve system because it is in my opinion a structure that works against any kind of force generation, and serves no one but the COs and RSMs of units and Bdes.

As dysfunctional as it is it was able to generate up to 15-20% of the rotations we sent to Afghanistan. Just think of what could have been done if, like the American National Guard, we could have deployed fully formed brigades.

Let me just say this. The Army ResF has hundreds of middle managers and has had thousands of them but has been universally underperforming for decades. The law of averages alone would dictate that some of those middle managers ought to have been vibrant and successful at their tasks. The fact that they haven't been ought to demonstrate clearly that there are systemic problems and that senior leadership is taking zero interest in solving these.

I've said it above. The RegF looks to the ResF to generate sufficient Class Bs and the occasional Class C and doesn't care one whit about the capability of the Class A force beyond that. The RegF has no plan to make an effective Class A ResF and couldn't care less that it doesn't have one.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Reserve leadership that, for years have been unable to provide inspiring leadership to units and keep soldiers active and motivated, claimed that the only solution was to give them more tasks to half-ass.

That was pretty much it, I believe, and another bastard step child of the 'train to excite' idiocy.

Given the right support, of course, it could be very successful but it always devolves into too little, too late, with no real mission or connection with the rest of the Army.

Infantry reserve units, given the chance, can produce good sections, platoons and companies. Dismounted. That's the bread and butter stuff we should be good at but tend not to be because 'Good Idea Fairy Management'.

 

[markppcli]

FWIW I really want to know what idiot thought giving Cbt Spt roles to the PRes was a good idea?
Rifle Section is significantly easier and would be more needed.

Probably the same geniuses that wrote in requirements for Mortar ranges to have an artillery mosid RSO.

Given the right support, of course, it could be very successful but it always devolves into too little, too late, with no real mission or connection with the rest of the Army.

Very irritating that we never see “our” support platoons in the field.

Infantry reserve units, given the chance, can produce good sections, platoons and companies. Dismounted. That's the bread and butter stuff we should be good at but tend not to be because 'Good Idea Fairy Management'.

Sections yes, platoons maybe, companies would be a stretch right now. Shift some organization and training policies and maybe we’ll see MWOs and Maj’s who are used to leading full companies. I actually think the OJT Dp1 training, while and awful idea for the regular force, will be a net positive for the reserves.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

To be fair, simplistic tasks will not recruit and keep Reserve soldiers. Other armies are quite capable of having well armed and equipped Reserves conducting most tasks. The problem is how the army is structured and supported.