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??? I can't imagine a militia unit with 400 people, trained or otherwise.dapaterson said:
Divining the right role, capabilities, structure, and Regimental System for Canada's Army Reserves
WLSC
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The problem his not the size of the unit but to find a way to have them there when they are suppose to be. My unit his almost half way there. Even fi we parade at a minimum of 80%, it's not in the same time. That's the challenge. The solution for this his in the same ball park that the numbers of Lcol and CWO, well above are heads.
:2c:
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Journeyman said:
How about a unit of three companies, each 125 people?
Say, one company in Brockville, a second in Cornwall, and the third in Kingston...
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Ah, seen. I thought you were saying that there are currently units out there parading 400 people; I would be inclined to mock. But suggesting such an amalgamation would be heresy; think of the Honouraries!dapaterson said:
This whole discussion is above our pay-grades; it's just a "discussion."FusMR said:
And while the CDS would certainly benefit from asking my opinions....
....to date, he has not. (I can only assume that he's still busy redecorating 101 Col By).
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dapaterson said:
That has been talked about for a while, at the last Armour Confrance it came up again. BTW a couple of Armd units are commanded by Majors and SSM.
Mountie
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I realize this topic hasn't been posted to for a while, but if you really want to reduce headquarters and streamline how about converting all the reserve CBGs into Battle Groups or Territorial Battalion Groups on a permanent basis. That's all they can form anyway. So why waste all the additional administrative overhead for a "brigade" when the you only field a battle group / battalion group? By eliminating all those extra officers and senior NCOs you could actually add more PYs where they're needed. Most unit could still be maintained at the sub-unit level. (ie. 4 full strength rifle companies, rather than 4 infantry battalions each providing an HQ, HQ coy and a single rifle company). The battle group/battalion group headquarters would control all the units just like they already do.
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There are a number of reasons why the additional administrative overhead is needed in reserve formations. These include :
-The Reserves need to do their own recruiting
- manage the recruit until trained
-conduct and control release procedure that is done by the Base/Garrison staff
-manage the release file/releasee until release is finalized
These functions are done outside the operational unit/sub-unit in the Reg F, which is one of the reasons for the somewhat large CMP staff.
As well, there are financial authority requirements that require a formation commander, normally a Col / Capt(N).
My preference is to incr the size of the units, so that a Reserve Bde has a strength closer that of a doctrinal Bde / Bde Gp. That option, however, requires political will to increase funding and Reserve establishments.
BDOG
FJAG
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BC Old Guy said:
The reserve Bde / Bde Gp is only required if you plan to mobilize in the traditional sense. Your last para answers it all -- political will and funding which will never happen. There is no government intent to "mobilize" in the traditional sense and perhaps even more important, there is no intent/will within the regular army leadership for traditional "mobilization".
With that said then the concept of reducing reserve brigades to the battalions that they are is the best solution. It cuts extraneous rank overhead and provides a unified leadership and administrative structure that has an enhanced capability of going beyond pure individual augmentation.
The administrative functions that you identify, as well as many others, could be easily incorporated into a "garrison/depot" company. Other items such as financial authorities etc can be easily accommodated.
The biggest impediment to true and meaningful reform are vested interests which exist in keeping historical units active and protecting bloated rank structures.
To some extent we do need some redundancy in mid level officers and senior NCOs to provide depth to protect against high personnel turnover and physical fitness failures, but we do not need a Colonel, a half dozen or more of each of LCols and CWOs and several dozen majors to run what is essentially a battalion strength organization.
I love unit tradition as much as the next soldier, but if we can no longer say that we have both the intent or the ability to expand/mobilize to a two corps army then we simply do not need the numbers of battalions and regiments that we have.
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What FJAG said.
You're letting the tail wag the dog. Unique administrative requirements ≠ requirement for formation staff. Unique administrative requirements can be handled through augmenting unit organizations/CO authorities.
BC Old Guy said:
You're letting the tail wag the dog. Unique administrative requirements ≠ requirement for formation staff. Unique administrative requirements can be handled through augmenting unit organizations/CO authorities.
OldSolduer
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Just as long as we don't get saddled with the CASW.
quadrapiper
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If you don't like napkin-back crayoning, skip to the next post.
[out of lane]
In the search for a more logical and effective Militia structure, would adopting a more flexible interpretation of what a "regiment" is be advisable - allow the retention of whatever benefits a certain identity and history confer, especially in areas where the local regiment has some standing, but without any sort of compulsion to maintain a full old-school RHQ?
If the actual strength is more-or-less battalion/company/platoon sized, then double-hat the appropriate OIC as Regimental CO - let the formation's HQ bodies fill the "RHQ" roles. If there's any requirement for admin/trg/log/whatever beyond what a particular formation can handle, fill that need with a cell distinct from the Batt/Coy/Plt structure - a cell that might be shared by several nearby units. Fine-tune the larger formation's command structure so whatever lieutenant colonels do exist end up commanding a battalion-sized collection of dispersed units - perhaps, in areas without a larger regiment, allow one of the "company" COs to be over-ranked. Over-man a bit as far as officers and NCOs, especially in smaller units, so a particular body deploying doesn't completely disable the unit - I'm assuming something like this already exists?
As far as headquarters - if the idea's to have a pick-up-and-go command cell for a brigade- or division-sized deployment, then don't lumber the HQ proper with militia housekeeping - peel that off as a distinct function.
Pros? Clearly defined roles. No rank inflation for the regiments, and a clear incentive for any units that, by virtue of local demographics, should be much larger, to determine what they're doing wrong. Perhaps a greater possibility of matching deployable roles for individual reservists with their rank and responsibilities at the home unit.
Cons? Howling from the National Union of LCols and CWOs, and everyone else with a vested interest in the current manning structure. Possible loss of experienced bodies. Likely public stink about "gutting defense," and the like. As it'd be (other than the loss of senior officer and WO billets) more or less a recognition of the status quo, not sure what else sucks about it - sure there's something.
[/out of lane]
Oh - and make sure that any DND-maintained Militia infrastructure is seeing full use, whether by the primary unit, or by other CF organizations, whether recruiting offices, cadet corps, or what-have-you.
Speaking of that, why aren't CFRCs located in armouries, if there's one handy to a given area of interest?
[out of lane]
In the search for a more logical and effective Militia structure, would adopting a more flexible interpretation of what a "regiment" is be advisable - allow the retention of whatever benefits a certain identity and history confer, especially in areas where the local regiment has some standing, but without any sort of compulsion to maintain a full old-school RHQ?
If the actual strength is more-or-less battalion/company/platoon sized, then double-hat the appropriate OIC as Regimental CO - let the formation's HQ bodies fill the "RHQ" roles. If there's any requirement for admin/trg/log/whatever beyond what a particular formation can handle, fill that need with a cell distinct from the Batt/Coy/Plt structure - a cell that might be shared by several nearby units. Fine-tune the larger formation's command structure so whatever lieutenant colonels do exist end up commanding a battalion-sized collection of dispersed units - perhaps, in areas without a larger regiment, allow one of the "company" COs to be over-ranked. Over-man a bit as far as officers and NCOs, especially in smaller units, so a particular body deploying doesn't completely disable the unit - I'm assuming something like this already exists?
As far as headquarters - if the idea's to have a pick-up-and-go command cell for a brigade- or division-sized deployment, then don't lumber the HQ proper with militia housekeeping - peel that off as a distinct function.
Pros? Clearly defined roles. No rank inflation for the regiments, and a clear incentive for any units that, by virtue of local demographics, should be much larger, to determine what they're doing wrong. Perhaps a greater possibility of matching deployable roles for individual reservists with their rank and responsibilities at the home unit.
Cons? Howling from the National Union of LCols and CWOs, and everyone else with a vested interest in the current manning structure. Possible loss of experienced bodies. Likely public stink about "gutting defense," and the like. As it'd be (other than the loss of senior officer and WO billets) more or less a recognition of the status quo, not sure what else sucks about it - sure there's something.
[/out of lane]
Oh - and make sure that any DND-maintained Militia infrastructure is seeing full use, whether by the primary unit, or by other CF organizations, whether recruiting offices, cadet corps, or what-have-you.
Speaking of that, why aren't CFRCs located in armouries, if there's one handy to a given area of interest?
daftandbarmy
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Jim Seggie said:
The way things are going these days, if we could be assured of getting the ammo and support, I'd be happy if they made us all CASW/Machine Gun battalions....
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daftandbarmy said:
You're new here, aren't you...
OldSolduer
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daftandbarmy said:
And therein lies the problem.
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While this debate has now reached almost 60-pages of circular argument, we're still no closer to the basic problem -- what is the role of the Reserve; not the feel-good buzzwords, but what do we really want our Reserve to do? [and I'm speaking only to the Army side]
Much of what has been said remains true:
- in some communities, it seems to be the only military touch-stone present -- particularly as the Legions whither.
- it's an old boys' club, designed to grow LCols/CWOs; maybe that wasn't the intent, but it's there. This feeds into the self-licking ice cream cones of protectorate Regimental Senates.
- there appears to be a tendency to give the Reserve tasks that no one particularly cares about: eg - Air Defence, Influence Activities.
- from recent deployments, Reservists tended to be seen primarily as Cpls in rifle sections or staff-officers in non-critical HQ postions.
- some admin functions are indeed unique to Reserve units, in-house.
But until someone mans up, says "Militia mafia, STFU," and states "this is what we want; here's the funding," we will continue to see cities with 2-5 x Coy-size Infantry Regts, and smaller communities with a Pl-size Regt, each commanded by a LCol and CWO -- with appropriate hierarchy -- burning up their funded training year doing ethics and safety briefings....oh, and believing that they're here to form the nucleus of a Brigade or Division during mobilization.
Until our senior leadership honestly addresses the underlying rationale and what they're willing to pay for it, there will be no substantive changes.....even in another 60 pages.
Much of what has been said remains true:
- in some communities, it seems to be the only military touch-stone present -- particularly as the Legions whither.
- it's an old boys' club, designed to grow LCols/CWOs; maybe that wasn't the intent, but it's there. This feeds into the self-licking ice cream cones of protectorate Regimental Senates.
- there appears to be a tendency to give the Reserve tasks that no one particularly cares about: eg - Air Defence, Influence Activities.
- from recent deployments, Reservists tended to be seen primarily as Cpls in rifle sections or staff-officers in non-critical HQ postions.
- some admin functions are indeed unique to Reserve units, in-house.
But until someone mans up, says "Militia mafia, STFU," and states "this is what we want; here's the funding," we will continue to see cities with 2-5 x Coy-size Infantry Regts, and smaller communities with a Pl-size Regt, each commanded by a LCol and CWO -- with appropriate hierarchy -- burning up their funded training year doing ethics and safety briefings....oh, and believing that they're here to form the nucleus of a Brigade or Division during mobilization.
Until our senior leadership honestly addresses the underlying rationale and what they're willing to pay for it, there will be no substantive changes.....even in another 60 pages.
What do we want from the Militia? Do we know why we have the Militia structure we have, other than that we always had it?
Our Militia structure is basically a mid-19th century creation that evolved through periodic crises between the UK and the Americans. It was designed partly as a vehicle to dispense patronage and partly as a way to satisfy the British that we were doing something. But, mostly it was designd to be cheap - in other words, to provide a bit of bang from not too many bucks. That we got away with it was more a matter of luck that design. Remember that there was no second line support and precious llittle in the way of first line; many of the units were rural and could only really parade after the crops were harzested; soldiers had to provide their own boots and underclothing; and command and control was wretched at best. The truth was that Canada lucky not to have faced a serious enemy from 1855 to the end of the Victorian era. The Fenians and the post-buffalo hunting Metis were few in number, not really all that well organized and lacked staying power. Even so, they managed to whip us in most of the early battles. Other than a couple of skirmishes, our first military victory was at Batoche. We lost at Ridgeway and Fort Erie in 1866, lucked out against skeleton Fenians forces in Quebec in the same year and in 1870, were driven from the field at Cut Knife and drew at best at Fish Creek in 1885. We were lucky we did not come up against the Zulus or the Comanches.
Even the Boer War was never really in doubt. However our army had improved and although Sam Hughes would never have admitted it, our successes were largely because of the strong regular army presence in the contingents. We were lucky indeed to have taken on the Boers before the Germans, and not the other way around. In fact the only three serious wars we fought largely made use of the mobilization base provided by the Militia. However, to field an effective army took time and training, and some fairly extensive housecleaning in the officers and sergeants messes. The half century past Korea saw our structure change to forces in being and manning the frontiers. With the end of the Cold War, things got fairly messy, but the Balkanistas and the Afghans were hardly in the big leagues militarily.
Dynamic inertia is a Canadian military organization principle and our reserve forces is still based on the 19th century model. Our Militia unit organization seems designed to perpetuate rather than generate. A cursory examination of the British, Australian and New Zealand organizations seems to indicate all three armies are less tied to maintaining a large number of regiments for the sake of cap badgery, although the number of reservists to both the regular force and the population base seems roughly the same as ours. Let us note that we probably require a few thousand reservists in each of BC, the Prairies, Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada for things like disaster relief, regional security operations and as a base to augment the regular force. The question to ask are we getting the best result for the buck, or are we, in a throwback to the 19th century, applying patronage, albeit in a non-political way?
Edit to add: Ask yourselves how many companies/squadrons/batteries are we getting from our total pool of combat arms COs and RSMs compared to the three other armies I examined?
Our Militia structure is basically a mid-19th century creation that evolved through periodic crises between the UK and the Americans. It was designed partly as a vehicle to dispense patronage and partly as a way to satisfy the British that we were doing something. But, mostly it was designd to be cheap - in other words, to provide a bit of bang from not too many bucks. That we got away with it was more a matter of luck that design. Remember that there was no second line support and precious llittle in the way of first line; many of the units were rural and could only really parade after the crops were harzested; soldiers had to provide their own boots and underclothing; and command and control was wretched at best. The truth was that Canada lucky not to have faced a serious enemy from 1855 to the end of the Victorian era. The Fenians and the post-buffalo hunting Metis were few in number, not really all that well organized and lacked staying power. Even so, they managed to whip us in most of the early battles. Other than a couple of skirmishes, our first military victory was at Batoche. We lost at Ridgeway and Fort Erie in 1866, lucked out against skeleton Fenians forces in Quebec in the same year and in 1870, were driven from the field at Cut Knife and drew at best at Fish Creek in 1885. We were lucky we did not come up against the Zulus or the Comanches.
Even the Boer War was never really in doubt. However our army had improved and although Sam Hughes would never have admitted it, our successes were largely because of the strong regular army presence in the contingents. We were lucky indeed to have taken on the Boers before the Germans, and not the other way around. In fact the only three serious wars we fought largely made use of the mobilization base provided by the Militia. However, to field an effective army took time and training, and some fairly extensive housecleaning in the officers and sergeants messes. The half century past Korea saw our structure change to forces in being and manning the frontiers. With the end of the Cold War, things got fairly messy, but the Balkanistas and the Afghans were hardly in the big leagues militarily.
Dynamic inertia is a Canadian military organization principle and our reserve forces is still based on the 19th century model. Our Militia unit organization seems designed to perpetuate rather than generate. A cursory examination of the British, Australian and New Zealand organizations seems to indicate all three armies are less tied to maintaining a large number of regiments for the sake of cap badgery, although the number of reservists to both the regular force and the population base seems roughly the same as ours. Let us note that we probably require a few thousand reservists in each of BC, the Prairies, Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada for things like disaster relief, regional security operations and as a base to augment the regular force. The question to ask are we getting the best result for the buck, or are we, in a throwback to the 19th century, applying patronage, albeit in a non-political way?
Edit to add: Ask yourselves how many companies/squadrons/batteries are we getting from our total pool of combat arms COs and RSMs compared to the three other armies I examined?
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