Electoral Reform (Senate, Commons, & Gov Gen)

[McG]

Directly elect our PM who's job it would be to create a coalition from the other elected MP's to form his cabinet.

Interesting option (and I would suggest the deputy PM should probably be chosen the same way as the PM); however, potentially destabilising.  Being the only nationally elected seats in the House, the GG would not have the option to look to another party leader in the event of a non-confidence vote.  The country would automatically be sent to a vote.  Could it also lead to a majority opposition?  Would it work & has it been done anywhere else?

The reason I oppose most PR variations is that they only serve to strengthen the role of parties.

I think a PR system would strengthen the role of small parties at the expense of the current powerful parties.

I still think the best approach is to continue to elect MPs in the same fashion that we always have.  It ensures that every MP is accountable to a defined constituency (if we Canadian's have not been holding our specific MPs accountable that is another storey).  I like the idea of a PR (or even STV) Senate.  This chamber would see more parties, reflecting a broader cross-section of Canadian society, it would reduce the strength of the powerful parties in both houses, yet it would not have the option of a non-confidence vote against the government.  With the Senate as a buffer on the power of the powerful parties, there may be an increased tendency to vote independents as MPs (vice strategic voting for the MP supporting the desired PM) and thus increased accountability of all MPs to constituents.

. . . or maybe I'm blinded by some sort of utopian optimism.

 

[McG]

It seems that PR systems are becoming more popular at the provincial level.

Partial proportional voting urged for N.B.
Province following on moves by Quebec, B.C., PEI and Ontario to consider changes
Wednesday, 19 Jan 2005
Canadian Press

Fredericton â ” The New Brunswick government says it will consider sweeping changes to the province's electoral system, including partial proportional representation.

New Brunswick's Commission on Legislative Democracy released its final report on Wednesday, recommending the Maritime province move to a mixed-member proportional representation system to try to revive flagging public interest in politics.

â Å“Voter turnout is dropping, youth participation in the electoral process is low, trust and confidence in our democratic institutions have declined and many citizens believe they have insufficient voice in the decision-making process especially when major issues are involved,â ? commission co-chairman Lorne McGuigan said.

New Brunswick joins British Columbia, Quebec, Prince Edward Island and Ontario in moving toward major electoral reform.

The New Brunswick commission is recommending a referendum to find out whether New Brunswickers want to continue with the current, first-past-the-post system or to modify it by including an element of proportional representation.

Under the model proposed by the commission, 36 single-member riding seats would continue to be elected using the first-past-the-post system.

Twenty other members of the legislature would be elected from a pool of candidates within four regional districts, based on the party vote.

Kelly Lamrock of the Opposition Liberals in New Brunswick, said the mixed system might be too complicated.

â Å“If voters can't understand how to get someone elected, I don't know how it will work,â ? Mr. Lamrock said.

Premier Bernard Lord said only that it is important to nurture and renew democracy. He said the report and its 89 recommendations will be considered.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20050119.wnewb0119/BNStory/National/

 

[Reccesoldier]

Hi all, this topic is sort of a response to the PR/Elected Senate topic. It is a fairly long essay but I thought it might be worthwhile to post it here as some people have bought the First-Past-The-Post myth hook line and sinker and it offers a different perspective.

Although I think this is unlikely, for reference purposes (and coppyright) the essay is mine so if you want to use any of the information in it formally please PM me for permission.

Enjoy

Straw Man Arguments:
A Comparison of Electoral Systems in Ireland and the United Kingdom

Supporters of the Single Member Plurality (SMP) systems are often prejudiced against the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system, or any other method of proportional representation for that matter, based on the perception that all such systems create a balkanization and proliferation of political parties.  Another point of criticism of STV, is that the systems proportionality causes governmental instability through the lack of clear majorities, which in turn results in continuous coalition governments.

This essay will focus on the electoral systems of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. In it I will prove, through a most similar systems analysis that many of the prejudices against STV such as the balkanization and proliferation of minor parties and inherent instability of governments that use it are not valid arguments against the Irish STV system.

In order to effectively compare the voting systems used by the subject nations they must first be explained.  The SMP system, also called First-Past-The-Post, is the most simple to calculate and understand of all electoral systems.  Under this system votes are cast for a single candidate in single member constituencies.  The candidate who receives the largest number of votes, regardless of the actual percentage of the total votes that number represents, is declared the winner.  The use of this system is equivalent to a nation running as many separate elections as there are constituencies within the country.  Some of its perceived strengths are seen as its ability to create single party governments, the creation of coherent parliamentary opposition and as being seen as benefiting broadly based political parties.

The STV system is a system of Proportional Representation (PR) in which voters cast ballots in large multi-member constituencies by ranking candidates in order of preference.  The number of votes a candidate receives is compared against a set number, based upon the number of votes cast, called the quota.

There are three main formulae for calculation of the quota: the Droop Quota , Hare Quota  and the Impreiali Quota .  Of these the most commonly used formula is the Droop Quota, which is used by the Republic of Ireland. 

In the first round of counting under an STV system, Process A, the voter's first selection is counted.  Should any of the candidates receive a number of votes equal to or greater than the quota they are declared elected, once elected a candidate can not receive any more votes.  If a candidate is elected with a surplus of votes, those surplus votes are redistributed by using the second choice listed on the ballots.  The selection of which ballots are counted again can be done by selecting them at random or by counting each ballot fractionally.  This process is repeated until there are no more candidates that have votes in excess of the quota.  Any candidate who achieves the quota from votes redistributed in this manner is also declared elected.  In the next step, Process B, the candidate with the least amount of votes after the first round is eliminated and his or her votes are reallocated according to the second choice listed on the ballot.  Once a candidate has been eliminated he or she can not get any more votes.  Once the reallocation of votes is complete the procedure begins again with Process A and continues in this matter until all the seats in the riding have been filled .

There are three main comparisons I have chosen to examine between the UK and Irish systems.  They are the questions of proliferation of minor parties, the representation of voter choice and the predisposition of STV toward coalition governments and their perceived instability.

Proliferation of Parties:

The first point of comparison I examine is the depiction of STV as a fractious system, which causes the proliferation and balkanization of political parties when compared to the more restrictive electoral requirements of an SMP system.  Upon examining the two nations, with regard to this perception, the immediate and glaring incongruity is that in the United Kingdom, there are over 10 times as many registered political parties than in the Irish Republic.

In the United Kingdom there are nine major parties, in addition to these there are 114 minor parties registered, ranging from the traditional parties such as Labour and Conservative to nonsense parties such as the Church of the Militant Elvis Party .    As of the general election of 7 June 2001 only 9 of the 123 registered parties are represented in the UK House of Commons.  Ireland on the other hand has eight major political parties, seven of which are represented in the Dáil Éireann (Irish Parliament) since the general election of 17 May 2002.  There are no minor parties formally represented in the Dáil though there are fourteen members that sit as independents.

This disparity in numbers contradicts the notion that STV creates numerous minor parties.  Upon closer inspection, it becomes obvious that the difference in numbers of registered parties in the two nations is due to the application of more or less stringent registration processes and not necessarily a result of the type of electoral system. 

In the United Kingdom the regulations governing the registration of political parties is fairly simple and straight forward.  It requires only minimal rules and regulations be followed, such as the completion of an application form giving details of the party name and at least two party officers.  Where in the UK the party is to be registered and whether the party will have any accounting units.  Also required is a copy of the party's constitution, a financial scheme showing how the party will comply with the financial controls and a modest registration fee of £150.00.

Ireland on the other hand has much more stringent registration requirements which restrict the process to more serious and well formed political movements.  These regulations include provisions that a certain number of registered voters must be members of the party and the party must have a member of it elected to the Dáil.  Irish law also requires that annual meetings be held and the party must have an executive committee.  On the other hand, there is no fee to register a party and unregistered parties are entitled to fight elections, but the name of the party will not appear on the ballot. 

Thus the stricter registration laws in force in the Republic of Ireland, combats the proliferation of political parties, which is one of the main arguments used by those that support SMP over STV.  The SMP system used in the UK on the other hand, achieves it's much touted governmental stability through the election process, specifically the non-proportional allocation of seats in a First-Past-The-Post electoral system.

Voter Choice

Perhaps the most attractive element of the STV system, as an alternative to SMP, is the more complete representation of voter choice.  Under a First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system, only the candidate who wins the most votes in a riding is elected.  This means that should one candidate receive 48% of votes and another receive 47.9% of votes the candidate who received 48% would be elected.  The other candidate, although his percentage of the vote was almost identical, would loose, resulting in "wasted votesâ ?.  On the other hand, in a STV system with its multi member constituencies, both candidates would most likely be elected and more of the people of the constituency would have a voice in parliament.

It must be noted that neither SMP nor STV requires a candidate to win a majority of votes cast in order to be elected.  But under STV a significant majority of the votes cast do count toward electing candidates, thus representing a majority of the votes cast, as well as a proportional representation of the people's vote within the multi-member constituency. 

Ireland is divided into 3, 4 or 5 member constituencies ranging in population from 108,717 to 47,641 registered electors.  Taking one of these ridings as an example, and comparing it to a similar sized riding in the UK will demonstrate the more complete representation of the public vote achieved under STV.

In the Irish riding of Cavan-Monaghan with an electorate of 87,595 and 61,847 valid ballots cast, the quota was set at 10,308 votes.  Multiplying the quota by the number of candidates for the riding (5) shows that of the 61,847 valid votes, 51,540 voters had a hand in electing the representatives for that riding.    This number represents 83.3% of the votes cast, meaning only 16.7% of valid votes were wasted and did not count toward the election of a member of the Dáil.

In contrast to this, in the UK riding of Isle of Wight with 63,482 total votes cast, the winning candidate received 25,223 votes representing only 39.7% of votes.  For the other 60.3% of votes the voter's choice did not count toward the election of the representative and were wasted.

Further comparison of the most recent general elections in Ireland and the United Kingdom reveals that on average, 71.4% of all votes cast in Ireland assisted in electing a representative.  Conversely, in the UK, the average representative was elected to the House of Commons based on an average of 51.3% of votes cast in each riding. 

These figures are based solely on the votes cast, not on the number of registered voters.  When the national voter turnout for these elections is taken into consideration the number of voters casting votes which assisted in electing representatives is significantly reduced.

For the most recent general elections, only 59.38% of eligible voters in the UK voted compared to 62.57% of voters in Ireland.  Combining these figures with the percentage of votes that assisted in electing a representative reduces the percentage of voters actually assisting in electing a representative to 44.67% for Ireland and 30.46% for the UK.  While certainly not a triumph of democracy for either system, obviously the advantage should be granted to the STV system for it's more complete representation of votes and the voting public.

Coalitions and Weakness

Another criticism of the single transferable vote system is that it leads to coalition governments, which results in governmental instability, when compared to first-past-the-post.  However, comparison of the two nations in question shows that these problems are inconsequential.

From a purely historical point of view coalition governments are not the norm in Ireland, since 1923 there have only been 9 coalition governments formed out of the 26 general elections held.  Since 1989 there has been no single party which has enjoyed a majority in the Dáil, and coalitions do seem to be becoming the norm. 

This political reality does not lead directly or inevitably to instability though.  Irish coalitions have displayed considerable longevity, remaining in power for an average of three and a half years which is longer than non-coalition Irish governments, which on average have lasted approximately 2.9 years.

While historically the UK has not tended toward coalitions, it has had 3 coalition or "National Governmentsâ ? since 1918, each of which was in response to a national crisis, World War 1, the 1930's depression and World War 2.    The need to show solidarity in government during crises by forming coalitions of political parties seems to indicate that the reason behind it is to represent the people and political will of the nation better than is possible under normal circumstances.  This exception demonstrates the inclusive nature of coalitions and far from implying weakness or instability emphasizes their strength and utility.

The inference that coalition governments are unstable is also given as a reason not to employ STV as an electoral system.  This perception too has been exaggerated in favor of SMP.  The United Kingdom and Ireland have conducted 16 general elections since 1945.  The shortest lived government among the two nations was the UK's minority Conservative government of Prime Minister Edward Heath in 1974.  After failing to form a coalition with the Liberal Party, PM Heath resigned, allowing the Queen to commission Labour leader Harold Wilson to form the government.  The minority Labour government of PM Wilson lasted 8 months, and was replaced by a slim Labour majority in October of the same year.

This average of the lengths of terms enjoyed by the respective governments reveals that there is only a slight difference when the two nations are compared.  Since 1945, the United Kingdom has averaged a Parliamentary election every 3.5 years whereas the Irish have conducted elections for the Dáil Éireann every 3.37 years.  Calculated in days the UK on average elects a new parliament every 1277 days and Ireland every 1199 days a difference of only 78 days. 

Going back farther to Ireland's independence, the Irish republic has conducted 26 general elections since 1923 and the UK has conducted 22 for an average length of 3.15 and 3.72 years respectively.

The above averages can not be attributed to differing lengths of administrative terms as Irish law requires elections to be held every seven years.  However, statute has limited the length of terms in Ireland to five years, which is equal to the length of term enjoyed by the UK parliament.

In conclusion, the exaggerated claims made against the Single Transferable Vote system in favor of Single Member Plurality appear to be nothing more than a straw man of personal preferences and prejudices.  With regards to the UK and Ireland, it appears that in the case of party proliferation that the problem is a product of national electoral laws and not the electoral system used.  As for inherent weakness and instability of STV due to its tendency to cause coalition governments, this has been proven insignificant.  The drawbacks of STV versus SMP with regard to these difficulties are counteracted by the ability and willingness of the elected members of the government to work with other political parties and thus persevere, in spite of political ideologies, for the sake of stable national government.

© Martin Gasser 20 Jan 2005

 

[a_majoor]

Interesting essay and rather thought provoking. I do have some questions about the conclusions that are drawn here, however.

1. Ireland's SVT system does not produce unstable coalition governments, but virtually every other nation which uses some form of PR does. Italy is the most notorious example, but Israel also comes to mind for fracticious coalitions. Is it possible there are cultural factors at work here i.e. the vast majority of Irish people already have a "cultural" consensus about a broad range of issues?

2. If culture is not the answer, the rigorous requirements for forming a political party and registering it might go a long way to explain what is happening. Once again, there has to be some sort of consensus to work together in a political party, supporters of the "Monster Raving Loony Party" or the "Parti Rhinoceros" would have a difficult time getting off the ground in Ireland.

3. The historical reason for "First past the Post" is the one elected representative is accountable directly to the people of his riding. We certainly have drifted far away from that principle here in Canada, but in theory, initiatives like voter recall or referendums could bring accountability back. What is the accountability mechanism in SVT?

I will be going over this again in greater detail tonight (beware, beware!), since a lot of other questions are bubbling just below the surface.

 

[Reccesoldier]

a_maj,

1.  In Israel the % of popular vote required to get a representative elected is very, very low (somewhere around 1%  IIRC) This again in my view is a fault with the electoral laws not the system. Germany on the other hand with it's mixed proportional system requires a party to achieve 5% of the popular vote. Extrapilate that to our most recent vote and only the Green Party would have been entitled to PR.

I can not say if there are cultural factors at work in Israel but I know that STV was chosen for Ireland specifically so that the minority Protestant population there would not be overwhelmed by a "tyranny of the majority"

2.  Yes, what you have described counters another criticism of STV, which is the perception that it allows "extremeist parties". My personal belief is that the electorate in Canada is smarter and more moderate than they are given credit for and will for the most part be self policing on this issue.

3.  The short answer is the same mechanisim we have now which is to say none. STV does not preclude accountability (any more than FPTP) though. What you are talking about is once again the electoral laws/process not the system itself.

A couple of points of my own now which I didn't address in the essay.

Another country that uses STV is Malta which, get this, is a classic 2 party system! although it has made subtle changes to STV for utility. This again exposes theStraw man arguments for FPTP. Germany also uses a PR system, is stable and has limited political participation through electoral law and not electoral innequality like FPTP.

I find it insulting that in the article about NB's proposed electoral reform one of the talking heads that responded suggested that the electorate wasn't intelligent enough to understand the system. What complete and utter crap!  This is just another piece of BS which is often spouted by the main political opponents to PR which happen to be or belong to...  The same mainstream political parties that are often over-represented in the HoC by FPTP. 

Give me a room full of average voters and 10 minutes and I can explain STV so that even the most sound proof individual will understand how it is employed.

Yes Italy has problems with PR but I believe that is a cultural problem (for lack of a better word). Canadians are by in large much more middle of the road than Italians.  I realize that this is a generalization and no I cant prove it right now but that is my opinion.

Unfortunately I may not be able to respond to many more posts here as I'm heading off to Gagetown for a course but I'll do my best to respond once I return.

Cheers
Reccesoldier.

 

[McG]

The first point of comparison I examine is the depiction of STV as a fractious system, which causes the proliferation and balkanization of political parties when compared to the more restrictive electoral requirements of an SMP system. Upon examining the two nations, with regard to this perception, the immediate and glaring incongruity is that in the United Kingdom, there are over 10 times as many registered political parties than in the Irish Republic.

In the United Kingdom there are nine major parties, in addition to these there are 114 minor parties registered, ranging from the traditional parties such as Labour and Conservative to nonsense parties such as the Church of the Militant Elvis Party . As of the general election of 7 June 2001 only 9 of the 123 registered parties are represented in the UK House of Commons. Ireland on the other hand has eight major political parties, seven of which are represented in the Dáil Éireann (Irish Parliament) since the general election of 17 May 2002. There are no minor parties formally represented in the Dáil though there are fourteen members that sit as independents.

This disparity in numbers contradicts the notion that STV creates numerous minor parties. Upon closer inspection, it becomes obvious that the difference in numbers of registered parties in the two nations is due to the application of more or less stringent registration processes and not necessarily a result of the type of electoral system.

Your conclusion, that restrictive party registration systems are the true check against a proliferation on parties in government, is mostly accurate but is lacking in depth.

Yes, restrictive party registration processes will reduce the number of parties that can eventually compete at the polls.   However, if this becomes a bureaucratic process (and I can't think of any other way to do it) then it actually restricts the voter's options at the polls.   SMP is superior when it comes to restricting the number of parties that actually get into government in a society that if overflowing with parties (I think your 9:123 ratio shows this fairly well).   Unfortunately, as you alluded to, the voters that do not vote for the winner of the plurality will essentially have lost their vote.   An option would be to use preferential ballots in single member constituencies.   This would ensure that the majority of voters preferred the winner to the next most preferred candidate.

Ireland is divided into 3, 4 or 5 member constituencies ranging in population from 108,717 to 47,641 registered electors.

I think these numbers are critical in the analysis.   The fact that these constituencies are small, will in itself limit the chances of success of fringe parties.   It will take a much higher percentage of the vote for a party to win one seat (or more) in a 3 - 5 member constituency.   In Israel, there is one pan-national constituency of over 100 representatives.   Clearly, the percentage of votes required to win a seat in this system is much lower.   In Canada, the Irish model would usually see fringe parties drown out at the constituency level against the Liberals, Conservatives, NDP, and even the BQ.   The Israeli model could see less than 1% of the population elect a fringe party, and the increased chances for fringe parties to make small victories could lead to more votes for these types of parties (and thus the "Balkanizationâ ? and instability of government).   The problem with small multi-member constituencies is that they would continue the tendency of the SMP system to over-represent regional parties in the House of Commons (the BQ and early Reform demonstrate this).

I find it insulting that in the article about NB's proposed electoral reform one of the talking heads that responded suggested that the electorate wasn't intelligent enough to understand the system. What complete and utter crap! This is just another piece of BS which is often spouted by the main political opponents to PR which happen to be or belong to... The same mainstream political parties that are often over-represented in the HoC by FPTP.

I think the comment was about a mixed PR and FPTP system that the comment was about.   Germany is a mixed system.

 

[Reccesoldier]

MCG,

Electoral law is definitely bureaucratic and in my opinion it should be in a Weberian fashion. Although I'm rather Libertarian I see nothing wrong with ensuring that political parties have more substance than two stoners would be able to come up with while eating the best Kraft Dinner they've ever had.

As long as the requirements were not based on some punitive monetary fee or innacessable (for starting parties) portion of electorate support I see nothing wrong with ensuring a quality of choice over a quantity of it.

I think presonally that the Irish constituancy size would work for Canada. One thing that should be remembered about STV is that it only produces proportionality within each individual constituancy. There will still be a slight non-proportionality in the national outcome but certainly not to the extent that there is now.

My last point was that none of the PR systems is beyond the mental capacities of any person who has it explained to them. The people who seek to ensure the FPTP status quo spit this little gem out any time someone suggests PR because it threatens the stranglehold they have due to the democratic failures of SMP.

 

[a_majoor]

Your conclusion, that restrictive party registration systems are the true check against a proliferation on parties in government, is mostly accurate but is lacking in depth.

Yes, restrictive party registration processes will reduce the number of parties that can eventually compete at the polls.  However, if this becomes a bureaucratic process (and I can't think of any other way to do it) then it actually restricts the voter's options at the polls.  SMP is superior when it comes to restricting the number of parties that actually get into government in a society that if overflowing with parties (I think your 9:123 ratio shows this fairly well).  Unfortunately, as you alluded to, the voters that do not vote for the winner of the plurality will essentially have lost their vote.  An option would be to use preferential ballots in single member constituencies.  This would ensure that the majority of voters preferred the winner to the next most preferred candidate.
I think these numbers are critical in the analysis.  The fact that these constituencies are small, will in itself limit the chances of success of fringe parties.  It will take a much higher percentage of the vote for a party to win one seat (or more) in a 3 â “ 5 member constituency.  In Israel, there is one pan-national constituency of over 100 representatives.  Clearly, the percentage of votes required to win a seat in this system is much lower.  In Canada, the Irish model would usually see fringe parties drown out at the constituency level against the Liberals, Conservatives, NDP, and even the BQ.  The Israeli model could see less than 1% of the population elect a fringe party, and the increased chances for fringe parties to make small victories could lead to more votes for these types of parties (and thus the â Å“Balkanizationâ ? and instability of government).  The problem with small multi-member constituencies is that they would continue the tendency of the SMP system to over-represent regional parties in the House of Commons (the BQ and early Reform demonstrate this).

McG beat me to the punch. Looking at the historical evidence, it seems the trade off is at the level of "compromise" for want of a better term. FPTP requires the representative or the party to appeal to the widest number of voters in the rideing or district. SVT or other PR systems would seem (Malta notwithstanding) to promote the growth of more narrowly focused parties.

If I was to run as a Libertarian in Canada, I would have difficulty since the vast majorety of voters preffer middle class entitlements such as government monopoly Health Care. If I was to work withing the Conservative party, I would have to compromise somewhat, but their message is more appealing to the voters, and hence I would have a better chance as a candidate to run on the Conservative platform. The Conservatives have room for my point of view, so long as I am also willing to work with them.

In a PR Canada, I have less reason to compromise my beliefs (maybe a good thing), and I would be much more apealing to the small number of Libertarians out there. Assuming I crossed the vote threashold, I would now be one of a very small number of Libertarian MPs in a Pizza parliament. Do I represent my riding? all the Libertarian voters in Canada? the Party? These are the practical issues that have dogged PR. Myself, I would like to think the person I voted for represents me and my ridings interests to parliament (alas, the MP is a Liberal, so he represents Ottawa to our riding instead), PR would seem to disconnect that relationship, especially if there was a national or pan national electoral list.

Bottom line, every system has its merits and flaws. I can imagine 10 or 20 years after Canada adops a PR systemn there will be agitation for the adoption of FPTP, with detractors saying how difficult that would be for voters to understand....

 

[Reccesoldier]

a_maj,

Do you believe that your MP realy represents your constituancy now?

Another one of the problems with FPTP is that it produces 4 year dictatorships through Majority governments. In a coalition government there is a requirement to take other points of view into account or else the coalition will splinter and the government will fall. Compromise is supposed to be a function of government not an opposite of it.

 

[a_majoor]

Sorry, I thought I was clear that my MP does NOT represent me or anyone else in the riding.

The elected dictatorship can be addressed by finessing other elements of the system besides the electoral method. Swiss style referendums to propose legislation from outside the house, voter recall, even alternating electoral cycles (such as the US Senate, where half the senators are up for reelection every two years) will put the public right in Parliaments face.

How to get there without an armed revolution? I don't know. We could wage a multi-year propaganda campaign through the Internet, or the financial mismanagement of verious governments could cause a financial disaster and voter revolt (London, ON is gearing up for this since council cannot dicipline their spending and have proposed 10% tax hikes three years in a row now). Maybe an asteroid will fall from space and strike Ottawa. As you say, there are enough people who know how to game the current system and beniftit from it to mount a sustained defense of FPTP.

 

[McG]

If you do not like FPTP, then preferential ballots are another option that would allow us to keep with our single member constituencies.

 

[Kirkhill]

Sign me up for the preferential ballot also known as the Single Vote Transferrable with single member constituencies.   I like accountability and it gives a clear decision - most folks in the constituency either like or can tolerate the winner.  

As to regionalism, what's so bad about that?   The whole rpremise of our system is that the house is made up of representatives from 366(?) regions.   It is a geographically based system.   It is designed to reflect the fact that Urban BC issues are not the same as Rural Ontario or the Backcountry of Nunavut.   These characters are all sent there to work out practical compromises that they think will benefit most Canadians most of the time.   Every few years we get to decide if we like the compromises they have made.

Now as to the Senate and the Governor-General and the Lieutenant-Governors, there I am much more open to proportional representation or even some sort of collegial system where they are appointed or elected by the provinces and the federal parliament and government. - As long as their powers are constrained as they currently are.

 

[Edward Campbell]

As soon as the position becomes elected it will be politicized.  One of the essential virtues of constitutional monarchy is that the Queen doesn't owe anyone any favours, is immune to political pressure, and is above the divisiveness of politics.  The minute you start choosing the person for the office, which really means electing him or her at some level, then you've got yourself another politician.  And we have plenty of those already.

...

Is the German president overly political?  How about the Indian president or the Israeli president?  There are several Westminster style parliamentary republics, with selected presidents.  I refuse to accept that Canadians are so venal as to be unable to manage.

If you think my (or McWhinney's, take your pick) proposal for morphing into a regency is scary, here is my proposal for Senate Reform, by stealth.

On being appointed, Prime Minister Harper writes a few letters:

"¢ First, to each provincial premier outlining (not proposing) his plan for Senate Reform;

"¢ Second, to each senator -

o Outlining his proposal, and

o Demanding each senator's resignation, to be effective the day of the next general election in the province (s)he represents.

Next: the proposal; on the same day as he sent the letters, he goes public and tells Canadians that, starting soon, they will elect their senators when they elect their provincial governments.  He will explain that senators will be elected, province by province, using a simple system of proportional representation: each provincial party will submit lists of candidates for the Senate of Canada when they go to the polls in their respective provinces; senators will be appointed, by the Prime Minister of Canada - as required by the Constitution, from those lists, based on the share of the popular vote earned by each party; senators will, before being appointed, provide the Prime Minster with a letter of resignation, effective at the next provincial general election (this will be a new, practical, requirement for being appointed to the Senate).  He will explain that, almost certainly, a few senators will refuse to resign, preferring that they be allowed to continue in their illegitimate, appointed, pork barrel politics, patronage sinecures.  Most will, sooner rather than later, change their minds after they understand that they will be illegitimate - toothless old hacks, flacks and bagmen.  It may take 20 years to complete the whole process but, at least, it has begun.

In response to questions he will say that while he prefers some form of provincial equality he cannot see how to manage it without turning the Senate into a 250 seat body, something he does not intend to do.  He will also say that he plans to use his power to increase the senate, on a regional basis, to appoint six new senators - one from each territory (selected by the territory, in some form to be agreed) and three others, elected every three or four years by the Assembly of First Nations, the Inuit Tapirisat and the Metis National Council.

Prime Minister Harper will explain that he will establish a new constitutional convention requiring that senators appointed to the cabinet must be elected; he will respect the Senate's right, even duty, to amend or delay legislation but he will not accept that a defeat in the Senate on a matter of confidence in the House of Commons would mean a defeat of the government.  As now a bill might be rejected by the Senate but, if it is passed again by the House then the GG will sign it into law.

The point is that there are many things which can be done to reform our institutions without amending the Constitution; reforming the Senate and ditching the monarch, in favour of a Canadian regent, are just two of them.

 

[Neill McKay]

On being appointed, Prime Minister Harper writes a few letters:

[...]

o Demanding each senator's resignation, to be effective the day of the next general election in the province (s)he represents.

[...]

senators will be appointed, by the Prime Minister of Canada â “ as required by the Constitution, from those lists, based on the share of the popular vote earned by each party; senators will, before being appointed,

Senators are appointed by the Crown, on the advice of the Prime Minister.  You can't have the PM demanding the resignation of 100 people appointed by the Crown and making his own unilateral changes to the way they're appointed.  It's to prevent exactly that kind of thing that we have an apolitical head of state above the PM.  Without the Queen, who would stop a PM from running amok and reinventing the government to suit his own purposes?

 

[Edward Campbell]

Senators are appointed by the Crown, on the advice of the Prime Minister.   You can't have the PM demanding the resignation of 100 people appointed by the Crown and making his own unilateral changes to the way they're appointed.   It's to prevent exactly that kind of thing that we have an apolitical head of state above the PM.   Without the Queen, who would stop a PM from running amok and reinventing the government to suit his own purposes?

Of course the Prime Minister can demand the resignation of senators; it is an overt political act: just what partisan, political prime ministers are meant to do.  What he cannot do is fire them.

When they have resigned and when new ones have been elected, the Queen â “ or the Regent â “ can appoint them on the advice of the PM, just as the Constitution says.

 

[Infanteer]

All-in-all, short of changing our Constitution, I like Mr Campbell's proposal except for a few issues:

He will explain that senators will be elected, province by province, using a simple system of proportional representation: each provincial party will submit lists of candidates for the Senate of Canada when they go to the polls in their respective provinces; senators will be appointed, by the Prime Minister of Canada â “ as required by the Constitution, from those lists, based on the share of the popular vote earned by each party

I think the Senate is a better place to discuss putting PR, but I still disagree with the principal of Proportional Representation as it further mires our politics in the "Party".

What if I want to run for the Senate as an Independent?

Can a Senator be booted from the Party Caucus and still hold his seat, considering that he was put there by people ticking a Party name on the nomination?

Who decides who gets to be put on the Senate list?   What choice would one have if you wanted a Liberal Senator but didn't want Art Eggleton and the rest of the political hacks that the Party decided to accord the top spots to represent your interests in the Senate?

To me, it seems that we've voted for "people" as opposed to "parties" for centuries and it's worked.

appoint six new senators â “ one from each territory (selected by the territory, in some form to be agreed) and three others, elected every three or four years by the Assembly of First Nations, the Inuit Tapirisat and the Metis National Council.

I feel that elected Representatives based upon ethnicity is fundamentally wrong for a few reasons:

-   From a moral standpoint, I refuse to believe that our liberal democracy should afford some sort of special standing on a certain ethnic group whether this standing is advantageous or discriminatory.   Viewing people differently is wrong either way you cut it - saying "Natives get their own Senator" is just as wrong as saying "Coloured folk to the back of the bus".   As well, the organizations you empower to select these "ethnic Senators" are privileged organizations which are closed off to many Canadians - not a good thing in my books with regards to participatory democracy.

-   From a historical standpoint, I can't see anything that should entitle Natives to extra political representation within Canada.   God knows the "Indian Industry" is good at pushing the "time immemorial" spiel (the Supreme Court seems to have bought it), but for all intensive purposes we are all immigrants to North America and all societies (Europeans with other Europeans, Europeans with Natives, Natives with other Natives) have feuded, fought, and bartered the territory within Canada in the past.   European's started the major cities in Canada which are now beakons to minority immigrants - should we give those with European heritage access to a "reserved" positions within City Council?   Sounds ludicrous, doesn't it?

-   From a structural point of view, we effectively give Canadians who have Native heritage two voices in the Senate (both in their province/riding and in their ethnic based interest group) while all other Canadians have only one.   It may seem like peanuts, but it is an important one that flies in the face of representation.

 

[McG]

Infanteer,
Would you be more comfortable with some type of multimember constituency that allowed the voter to vote for the individual or for the party? 

While I generally do not agree with PR systems, I could see a multi-member transferable vote system working for municipalities currently of more than one constituency (2 â “ 4 MPs).

Because of the population density of cities, it could become easier for citizens to identify with the Liberal representative of London ON or with the Conservative representative of London ON.  Dispersion in rural areas does not lead me to believe this would work well outside of cities, and it would not be fair to produce mixed urban/rural multi-member constituencies.

As far as the Senate is concerned, it is probably best suited as a multi-member constituency system (with each province forming a constituency).

 

[Edward Campbell]

...

Would you be more comfortable with some type of multimember constituency that allowed the voter to vote for the individual or for the party?    

...

As far as the Senate is concerned, it is probably best suited as a multi-member constituency system (with each province forming a constituency).

That's an interesting idea.   Wish I'd thought of it.

My views on the Senate derive from my beliefs that:

"¢ In a federal state there must be a bicameral legislature.   One House (which I prefer to call the National Assembly (rather than the time honoured, traditional House of Commons - which speaks to an important part of English, maybe even British political history) needs to represent all the people, as unhyphenated Canadians, in rough equality.   (This is something which will take eons to accomplish in Canada because of PEI's four Senate seats which, according to the un-amendable Constitutions, means PEI has four HoC seats, which means that unless we have 1,200+ members in the HoC then a vote in PEI is worth four or five in Toronto: not equal, not democratic, not at all!)   The other chamber, the Senate, must represent the equal (in constitutional terms) partners in the confederation: the provinces.

"¢ Representation in the Senate should reflect the roughly current views of the people in each province; thus to reflect, in the Senate of Canada, the political preferences of Ontarians, in Ontario, Albertans in Alberta, etc.

The same end might be accomplished with multi member constituencies.

With specific reference to a couple of Infanteer's points:

"¢ The lists, in a simple PR list system, would be prepared by the provincial parties.   I believe that list management might become an important tool; some people, at the top of some lists, are almost guaranteed a Senate seat - once they make the top of the list.   Who gets there might have a significant outcome on the provincial general election; if a near the top senatorial candidate is a despised old political hack or bagman then his very presence night drive voters away; conversely if the (likely) third place party puts a real star candidate close to but not at the top then people might be persuaded to vote for that third party's candidates for the provincial legislature just to send the popular star to the Senate in Ottawa.

"¢ I think that caucus solidarity would be badly damaged - which would not be a bad thing.   It is not clear, to me, that, for example, BC Liberals would, automatically, all join the federal Liberal caucus.

"¢ I share Infanteer's distaste for reserved seats - no matter what the group; but, if any group is entitled to seek special status in our government then it must be aboriginals.

In any event, I remain convinced that real reform is possible without amending the Constitution.

 

[Infanteer]

Well, after the political hub-bub with the Federal Government, BC's electoral reform, and various discussions on here, my current ideas on a better arrangement right now are:

- Parliament, consisting of 2 Houses (call them what you want).

- An Upper House (Senate) which is, as McG mentioned above, formed of multi-member constituencies.   The Senate must be "Triple E" - Elected, Equal, and Effective.   This means that the Senate must be:

     = nominated in constituencies by the citizens of Canada.   I think that a Single Transferable Vote (STV) system that was recently rejected in British Columbia would be an ideal set-up for a Senate.   Divide each province into two and give 5 Senate Seats to each area (ie: in BC, have Greater Vancouver with 5 seats and the rest of the Province with 5 seats).   In an STV system, parties are permitted to run multiple candidates and independents can run as well (getting around problems with PR systems).

     = Equally representative of the regions of Canada (akin to the US Senate).   The Senate is broken as long as Ontario and Quebec get half the seats - essentially, the Senate is representing population, which is a job of the House of Commons.   I guess the exact breakdown is up in the air, but I imagine it could be layed out with 10 votes for each province and 2 votes for the territories (thus, a 102 member Senate).

     = An effective part of Government; the Senate can propose legislation, block bills, and acts as a legitimate check on the Prime Minister by approving of Appointments.

-   A Lower House that is responsible to represent constituencies of equal amounts of citizens (yes, this means that PEI loses some seats).   This will probably be very similar to the current layout - the Lower House forms Cabinet and the Prime Minister is the head of government.   I would like to see arrangements to reduce the grip of the Party and increase the role of ordinary MP's from all parties (perhaps eliminating the confidence vote?)

- An elected Governor General to act as the Head of State.   Whether the GG remains as a representative of the Monarchy is a completely separate issue that is irrelevant here; what I am looking for is, as I've stated a few times on these forums, a legitimate Head of State for Canada with a GG.   The "Elder Statesman", the GG will be elected by Canadians for a longish term (6-10 years) and will only be able to sit for one term (to avoid seeking the politics of seeking a re-election).   The specifics are debatable, but I see the elected GG as a legitimate "last resort" to intercede in Parliament - they will not be very active politicians and should not have to run on policy platforms as they are reactive and are elected to perform the Constitutional duties of the Head of State in order to act as another check on the office of the Prime Minister.  

A very important duty is the Governor General as the Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Forces.   All soldiers, in their oath, swear obedience to the Head of State, not the Head of Government.   If the Head of State (the GG, representing the Queen) is elected, then their is absolutely no ambiguity in the fact that their exists legitimate and democratic civilian control over the military.   As well, the Chief of the Defence Staff is the only Government Official who has the legal right to go around government and to his superior, the Governor General, if he feels the Defence of Canada is being neglected due to the muckraking of Parliament.

Well, just a few thoughts after observing the Government in action - thoughts?

Cheers,
Infanteer

 

[Brad Sallows]

If the Americans can make do with 100 senators, I don't see why we need so many.

Perhaps the GG could be elected by the senate from among the senators.

I still lean toward letting each province decide how to elect/appoint its senators.