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Electoral Reform (Senate, Commons, & Gov Gen)

What do you want to see?


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Kirkhill said:
So you would have two provincial voices with the ear of the executive?    You would have both the provincial governments, speaking on behalf of their legislatures and presumably the citizenry as well as the Senate, independently found from the provinces (appointment or election) and thus also speaking for the provinces but independently of the provinicial governments, offering advice and opinion to the executive, the Governor General?   You would then only have the PM acting with the support of the Commons offering "federal" advice?

Yes.  The provincial governments should deal with Parliament on matters pertaining to provincial-federal relations or joint duties.  However, our central, federal government needs provincial input to allow regional interests to balance out Commons.  With a dysfunctional Senate, most Canadians seem to rely on their provincial governments to "stick it to Ottawa", which just creates tension and confusion over who should be doing what.  Providing a Senate (organized along the lines of the Australian model) would give Canadians a legitimate federal body to do so in.  While not being a fix-it-all solution, I think a proper Senate would take the air out of things like Newfoundland oil, the Parti Quebecois, and Ralph Klein telling Ottawa to shove it and eliminate the quasi-feudal order that has overtaken the federal relationship in Canada.

If the GG were "re-legitimised" by whatever method, and able to act independently with the advice and consent not just of the PMO but also the Privy Council (apolitical expertise selected personally by the GG but with no legislative power), the Senate (provincial ambassadors offering advice and consent on Commons legislation), the Commons (the nation at large and law makers in central jurisdiction) AND the provincial legislatures (directly or indirectly via the Senate) then many of our checks and balances would fall back into place.

Roger.  :)
 
I think a proper Senate would take the air out of things like Newfoundland oil, the Parti Quebecois, and Ralph Klein telling Ottawa to shove it and eliminate the quasi-feudal order that has overtaken the federal relationship in Canada.

Frankly I like the idea of Ralph, or Jean Charest or Danny Williams being able to tell Ottawa to "shove it".   Anything less results not in a "quasi-fueudal order" but a feudal order.    

Now if you mean that a properly functioning Senate could reduce the need for the provinces to point the direction to the highway and invite the federal government to take advantage of the clubs recently approved by the SCOC, then I am with you.

But just as you as an individual cherish your freedom to say no, and just as many argue that they need arms to allow them to say no, so the provinces have and need to retain the right to say no.

Everything has consequences but democracy is about the freedom to act.   The consequences will follow whether or not you are aware of them, willing or unwilling to accept them.   The fear of consequences generally keeps most people in line most of the time.

This innate fear tends to act as a natural check on the impulse to act.
 
Kirkhill said:
Frankly I like the idea of Ralph, or Jean Charest or Danny Williams being able to tell Ottawa to "shove it".   Anything less results not in a "quasi-fueudal order" but a feudal order.

I also like it when Ottawa tells provincial leaders who can't seem to figure out the big picture to shove it.   I can't stand petty premiers fighting over the table scraps.

But just as you as an individual cherish your freedom to say no, and just as many argue that they need arms to allow them to say no, so the provinces have and need to retain the right to say no.

Not in matters of federal jurisdiction - there is a reason that the "rules of the game" lay out a proper federal-provincial relationship.   I'm arguing for a strong Senate so as to fix this and get provinces and Ottawa disentangled.   When I put on the uniform, there is a Canadian flag on my shoulder; not BC or Quebec.   As far as I'm concerned, that is where national leadership comes from and it doesn't need to be undermined by Provincial governments.

I fail to understand this view that Provinces are some sort of protectorate against the Federal government.   Constitutionalism, not federalism, moderates the affairs between a citizen and his government.   The fact is that my interests are no better served in Victoria than they are in Ottawa.   Infact, judging by a unicameral house and an even more disproportionate allocation of seats, I'd say the province is an even poorer representative for me politically....
 
Here's a heretical thought - people, not laws, control the actions of people.  Laws moderate their controlling actions but it is not laws alone that control.  AND.  For people to exert control, to exert force, they need a power base from which to work.  I like the idea of balancing the Feds with the Provinces.  They are both me.
 
Huh?

Anyways, this one is swerving off topic - we are talking about Parliament here.
 
Disagree.

Not swerving off topic.

Parliament is a forum where people exercise and negotiate power.  They agree to laws on how that power can be exercised.  We have access to two parliaments (provincial and federal) both responsible to their electorate (me) and both constraining a common executive (the GG and her deputies the Lieutenants Governor all acting in the name of Her Majesty).

Just as there is one taxpayer regardless of which level of government is authorized to act as agent for the funds, there is also only one powerbroker, the elector.

Frankly I think parliamentary reform is a bit of a red herring.  That implies constitutional reform.  The rules as described in 1867 aren't a bad set of rules - probably as good as any other compromise.  It is in the execution that our governments have failed - and in the usurpation of the GG. 

The entire concept of our governance is based on a non-partisan military commanded by the GG, a non-partisan civil service presided over by the GG, a non-partisan advisory group (the Privy Council) and a non-partisan GG and Lieutenants.  The politicians act as brakes on the GG.  The GG and the Solicitor General, Adjutant General, Comptroller General all act as breaks on the politicians - when legitimated.

 
Infanteer said:
A preferential ballot is not the panacea that many make it out to be.   It can be used effectively in multi-member ridings to give a more proportional balance to the election, but it only seems to complicate a straight-forward election of a single candidate to represent a single constituency (Canada).
On issues such as this, I don't believe in a panacea.  However, I do believe the preferential ballot deserves closer attention.  It should be the standard when electing MPs, and it would be desirable when electing a GG aswell.

When you consider the number of parties in this country (and the potential number of independant candidates), there may not be any clear-cut top two candidates to go to a run-off.  At the very least, a preferential ballot could add clarity to who should go on to the next round.

Kirkhill said:
Frankly I like the idea of Ralph, or Jean Charest or Danny Williams being able to tell Ottawa to "shove it".
There should be no need for primiers to be doing this if senators elected by the province's population are sitting in Ottawa as part of a check on the lower houses power.
 
Quote from: Kirkhill on December 22, 2005, 10:01:14
Frankly I like the idea of Ralph, or Jean Charest or Danny Williams being able to tell Ottawa to "shove it".
There should be no need for primiers to be doing this if senators elected by the province's population are sitting in Ottawa as part of a check on the lower houses power.

Agree entirely McG.  If there is an effective voice then discussions don't reach the level where it becomes a "take it or leave it" proposition.  On the other hand, knowledge that the upper house has the backing of powerful premiers would tend to make the lower house more likely to pay attention I would think.

 
Kirkhill said:
On the other hand, knowledge that the upper house has the backing of powerful premiers would tend to make the lower house more likely to pay attention I would think.
I would think more authority would come from having the upper house backed by the electorate (elected by the provinces' population & not appointed by their Premiers).
 
Also possible.  Then a province's voters could play off their Premier against their Senator(s).  More checks and balances - but this time they might effectively be seen as an "internal" discussion, pitting eg Albertan against Albertan vs Albertan against Canadian.
 
Run-off voting might seem fair, but it reinforces the 'voting against' problem we have in Canada.  Its greatest benefit would be to all the soft NDP voters whose greatest worry during elections is making the correct guess between risking a NDP vote or propping up the local Liberal.  If you want to swing Canada permanently into socialism, support run-off voting - Liberal/NDP coalitions unto the end of the economy.  I believe the lure of conscripting others' money is already strong enough; no more encouragement and advantage are necessary.  If Canadians in general had a strong, well-ingrained self-reliance backbone - a culture which viewed the notion of voting to acquire a share of someone else's labour as a distasteful proposition - then run-off voting might be sensible.

OTOH, given the direction we seem to be heading, maybe it's best to accelerate the pace so we can reach the likely culminating point and acquire some serious motivation to each rethink how we view our neighbours' freedom.
 
Brad Sallows said:
Run-off voting might seem fair, but it reinforces the 'voting against' problem we have in Canada. 
I anticipate that run-off elections or preferential balots would encourage voters to go with thier top preference as a first choice.  The need for the stratigic vote would be eliminated/reduced because as one's third party preferences fall from the balot, eventually one's vote would transfer to thier stratigic alternative. (Though for many the stratigic choice may also be thier number one preference).

Parties currently earn money toward the next campaing for each vote recieved in an election.  I would see this money distributed based on the number of first preference votes cast for any party. 

 
I would like to see the money removed entirely.  People who want to control government with their "faction" can damn well pay for it themselves, without any tax breaks.
 
Earlier this week the National Post ran an informative, if quite wrong-headed, series on the ever popular subject of Senate reform.  The series was too long to reproduce here but Andrew Coyne’s response is not.  Here it is, from today’s Post, reproduced here under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act.

Fear of a democratic Senate

Andrew Coyne

Saturday, March 18, 2006

Before this week's series on Senate reform -- only in your soar-away National Post -- I had been under the impression that reform of the Senate was a desirable thing. At any rate I had thought that it was a desired thing -- that somewhere in this favoured land at least a few Canadians thought the present House of the Timeservers should be replaced with something less disgraceful, namely a house elected by universal suffrage, as I understand is often the practice in democracies. I had understood that there were differences of opinion on this great and weighty issue, and that while many believed a reformed Senate was needed to offer some counterweight to the power of the more populous regions, many others disagreed.

How wrong I was. Not content with the daily diet of front-page stories explaining all the many dozens of ways Senate reform simply Could Not Be Done, the Post also put its readers through a strenuous regimen of op-ed pieces exhorting that it Should Not Be Done. Two were explicitly anti-reform, differing only on the comparatively trivial question of whether it should be kept as is or done away with altogether. The third, by my friend Lorne Gunter, was ostensibly pro-reform, but with one caveat: that by reform, he did not actually mean reform. Under the Gunter plan, senators, instead of being appointed by the prime minister, would be appointed by the premiers. The provinces would then control one-and-a-half levels of government: their own, in the usual fashion, and the feds' by remote control.

So I can only conclude that no one in this country actually favours Senate reform, much as no one thinks there should be any serious check on the prime minister's power to appoint Supreme Court judges, or that Parliament should be required to abide by the rights it enshrined in the Charter, without recourse to the notwithstanding override -- issues on which the same consensus of the great and good has lately pronounced, always on the side of the status quo. The democratic deficit? No such thing. Everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.

Still, there is the little matter of a government having been elected on a platform promising, among other things, to begin the process of Senate reform. Which makes the opposition of the learned Gunter and fellow travellers such as Gordon Gibson, also quoted in the Post series, so intriguing. Both are from the West. Both support the Conservative party, and were supporters of the Reform party before it -- a party that arose in large part to address the democratic failings of the federal government, the Senate before all. And both are now skeptical of Senate reform, at least on the democratic model, on the grounds that -- I confess this had not occurred to me as an objection -- it would make the federal government more democratic.

This is how tightly provincialism has gripped some sections of the conservative movement: They would prefer an undemocratic, and hence illegitimate, federal government, rather than suffer any power to arise that might rival that of the provinces. "Were the central government to achieve the legitimacy of genuine, directly elected regional representation in a reformed Senate," Mr. Gibson warns, "the balance would be upset. Power would follow the new legitimacy."

Mr. Gunter goes further. "The centralization of authority in Washington," he notes with alarm, "can be traced to the 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which mandated the election of senators directly by the people of their states. Prior to that, senators were elected to six-year terms by their state legislatures...

"Not surprisingly, senators were highly attentive to the will of their state representatives. But after the 17th Amendment, senators quickly learned to approve all sorts of new federal spending and regulations and laws to please the voters back home... The same will happen here if senators become federal players rather than provincial representatives."

Gracious. Senators focused on "pleasing the voters" rather than jumping to the commands of their provincial patrons. A Senate filled with "federal players" rather than "provincial representatives." A reminder: He means this as an objection.

But of course this is precisely the argument in favour of reform: not only that it is unseemly, in a democracy, to be governed by any but those the people elect, but that the presence of such a house of ill repute in our national capital has served to discredit the federal government itself. Nor is this resolved by abolition: The pressures for regional representation do not go away just because the Senate does. In the absence of a legitimate upper house, that role has been played by the provincial premiers, who have no constitutional standing whatever to intrude themselves into federal matters.

I can understand why the premiers would be so fearful of Senate reform: Their own role would be diminished accordingly. But it is an oddity to see others make the same case against it -- not that it wouldn't work, but that it would.

© National Post 2006


I want to use this as a springboard to suggest that it is not just Senate Reform which is required, we, Canada, need to introduce some form of representative democracy with a few fairly basic principles such as, just for example, one person : one vote in elected legislatures.

I understand that many Canadians believe we have a liberal, democratic, representative democracy; I also understand that many Canadian believe in Santa and the tooth fairy.  All those myths, Santa slides down the chimney, Canada is a representative democracy, the tooth fairy leaves money are equally well founded.

Consider, just for example, one person : one vote.  A voter in Cardigan PEI had, in the 2006 general election, a vote worth about 3 times that cast by a voter in Calgary-Nose Hill or over 2.5 times that cast by a voter in Chatham Essex-Kent in Ontario.  Remember, we are not talking about very small populations in our vast, remote Arctic lands – Cardigan is a lot like Chatham Essex Kent except that it has way, way less than half the population but the same political ‘value’ in Ottawa.

There is a reason why PEI votes are so valuable: PEI has four Senate seats and, according to our Constitution, no province may have fewer MPs than it has Senators.  To change that particular provision of the Constitution requires the unanimous consent of the national parliament and all ten provincial legislatures.

One of the reasons so many people oppose Senate reform is that they perceive that a Constitutional amendment would be required and they agree, amongst themselves, that meaningful Constitutional reform regarding the nature of the state (including parliamentary representation) is impossible under the 1982 Constitution.

So, should we give up, quit, cut and run?

No!

Meaningful democratic reform: creating a fairly modern representative, secular, liberal democracy, is possible.

First we need to recognize that, except for a very, very few special ridings in the Yukon and High Arctic we needURGENTLY need – real representative democracy which will be based on the idea that for 95+% of Canadians one person’s vote will be worth roughly the same as any other person’s vote – say plus or minus 20%.  There is, in my opinion, a simple and, relatively, cheap and easy way to do this, without amending the Constitution: increase the number of MPs to about 1,000.  This requires serious, apolitical rebalancing of seats within provinces – a Toronto Centre vote is ‘worth’ 1.5 times more an Algoma-Manitoulin-Kapuskasing vote within Ontario.  We should settle for one MP for about every 25,000 to 35,000 residents or every 25,000 registered electors.  That means PEI needs 4 MPs, just as it has today, and just as it is Constitutionally required to have.  Alberta needs 91, that’s 3.25 times its current allotment of 28 and Ontario needs a whopping 335, 3.1 times its current 106 – that’s more MPs for Ontario than there are seats in today’s HoC just to provide Ontario with equal representation.

Now, I can hear the screams already: There are already too many of those overpaid, pampered bums.  We can’t afford more!

Yes we can.  Let’s say that each MP ‘costs’ about $1,000,000 per year – salary, benefits, staff, parliamentary library, etc, etc – that’s probably a bit high, but that’s OK.  So we spend as much as $300 million now – about of 0.2% of the budget.  Could we not:

• Triple the number of MPs;

• Increase the parliamentary staff by, say, only 60%, increasing the staff budgets to, say, only $300 million, therefore;

• Reform how MPs work, how they are supported (fewer staff for each), how committees are managed, and, and, and … because so many MPs will require new ways of working; and

• Cut their salaries and staffs, a bit, so that we spend, let’s say $750,000 per MP and thus spend ½ of 1% of the budget on democracy?

Is ½ of 1% of the national budget really too much for a functioning democracy?

We can reform the Senate, too.  I have explained, here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25692/post-218220.html#msg218220  here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25692/post-200811.html#msg200811 and here: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/25692/post-200450.html#msg200450 how I think our Prime Minister should go about it.  My proposal would institutionalize an existing measure of inequality.  Alberta has 2.9 million voters and only six senators, Nova Scotia has only 750,000 electors but it gets 10 senators – that’s a 5:1 disparity.  Only Québec is fairly represented I the Senate of Canada – it has a bit less than 25% of the senators for a bit less than 25% of the population.  Atlantic Canada is grossly over represented and Canada West of the Ottawa River is grossly underrepresented.

We should have a equal Senate – because it should represent the equal partners in the federation: the provinces.  That, too, requires unanimous agreement and is, consequently, probably a practical impossibility.  It may have to be sufficient, for now, to make the Senate elected, which may take 20 years to accomplish, completely.  An elected Senate will make itself effective: one of the reasons the National Post authors opposed democracy!  Equality might have to wait for political maturity in Canada, maybe that will be a 22nd century phenomenon.

Edit: typos
 
Two more arguments by extension to bolster your cause Edward:

Your 1000 member parliament would work and be affordable if it explicitly followed the "jury" format.  That is to say that a jury is a body of common citizens, peers of the accused and accuser, that sit in judgement with no particular skills beyond their common sense.  They represent the community interest and are there to ensure that the community believes that justice has been fairly done.

MPs in parliament need be no more than those Jury members.  Like those jury members they do not need a personal staff to help them in their decisions.  They do however need informed advice and opinion such as is supplied by a judge and lawyers in court.  In parliament that information, normally dug out by the MP's staff or party staff, should be supplied by Parliament's staff - eg Auditor General, Library, etc.... Take the MP's staff budget away and apply to a central pool such as the GAO or CBO in the States.

Let the MPs finance their political staff that keeps them elected themselves.

I like your 1000 MP parliament because it dilutes the power of the Government.  It would be difficult to justify creating 501 Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries.  At that point the Back Benches hold the power.  Nicely done.

Related - I think I saw something recently on the Dutch Parliament where Ministers sit in the House but can't vote on legislation.  They can propose while the MPs dispose.  They Government has to find its majority from the non-governing MPs.  I thought that a nice touch.  The MPs can still fire the Government if they don't like their performance.

WRT the Senate:

I don't think we have to rely on maturity to achieve reform.  I have little faith in that as a concept.  Adults more often than not seem to be oversized five year olds. 

I do think that from time to time it is necessary to throw the cat among the pigeons and let events take their course.  Especially if the cat-thrower has a view of the end-state they wish to achieve.

It is hard to convince people to move away from a comfortable status quo.  It is much easier to get them to act when the status quo is not comfortable.  Sometimes it is necessary to create discomfiture, even if there is an element of risk associated with an unintended outcome.

When do you intend to throw your hat in the ring?

Cheers.
 
A 1.000 man parliament is somewhat of an amusing concept (until you consider it would be twice the size of a current Infantry battalion!), but from a historical perspective, the idea of a 1000 man citizen "Jury" makes more sense.

In the classical Athenian ekklesia, the assembly acted as a jury for the most part, smaller groups elected or appointed by the assembly such as the strategoi and the boule did most of the actual work, and submitted the results to the assembly for confirmation. A full explanation can be found here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Athenian_democracy

For the most part, the faults in the Canadian system are not based on the way the institution is built, but rather how it is run. Tweaking the number of MPs, or even having an elected Senate will not really alter the outcome so long as Paul Martins, Jack Laytons or Caroline Parishes get elected and remain in office for long periods of time. Perhaps the only certain way to restrain office holders is to follow the examples of the ancient Athenians, or modern Americans: strict term limits. In Athens, a citizen could only serve on the boule twice in a lifetime, and similarly, the President of the United States can only serve two terms. Enforcing term limits for elected officials prevents the formation of an insular "parliamentary elite" who have spent a large fraction of their lives in office and have no real world experience anymore. Ossified ideas get tossed out with ossified parliamentarians, and new ideas are allowed to flourish.
 
I think the Senate in particular could benefit if its members were elected to one single term.  With no follow-on career in politics there would be little advantage to towing the party line.  Hiring people at the end of their "working" career would also impact on the degree of partisan activity.
 
Someone should provide a rough outline of what each option means, I dont believe many people understand what proportional commons means.

Would definitly help the vote turn turnout and give us a better idea of the majority opinion
 
A fairly comprehensive review of why PR and other "alternative" voting systems get pushed (and why we should push back):

http://thelondonfog.blogspot.com/  31 March 2006

Proportional representation
recommended by 4 out of 5 activists!

Note the most vocal proponents of proportional representation: invariably they are activists or advocates for special interests. Why is this? Ask yourself what special interests have to gain from political representation. But begin with the question of what they have not gained from the current political system — nothing less than their political objectives, of course. Frequently frustrated by their failures to achieve their objectives, or the slow implementation of those objectives, activists for political interests mischievously recast their complaints as failures of a democratic model. But, as Paul McKeever, leader of the Freedom Party of Ontario, reminded Ontario's select committee on electoral reform in October of last year:

    Elections and voting are not, per se, democracy. "Democracy" is a term derived from the Greek word "dēmos," meaning "people," and "kratos," meaning "power," not "rule." History is filled with examples of democracies that differed wildly in terms of who was permitted to vote or how they voted, but all of those systems have something in common. Properly understood, democracy, or "people power," is the belief that government gets its authority from the governed.

    […] Because one frequently finds lawmakers to be chosen by way of elections in alleged democracies, and because candidates win elections only by winning more votes than their competitors, elections and voting widely have been confused as being synonymous with democracy. However, in truth, elections themselves are not democracy; rather, they are a very effective tool for the defence of democracy. Specifically, by removing law-making authority from the lawmakers at regular intervals, and by requiring would-be lawmakers to obtain law-making authority from the people, elections continually and effectively remind everyone that the authority to make laws comes from the people. Put another way, elections remind the people that government answers neither to God nor to itself, but to the people it governs. Elections remind us that we believe in democracy.

    The relevance of this to electoral reform should be noted. Different electoral systems may differ in how effectively they "kick the bums out," but it would be utterly false to suggest that one electoral system is itself more or less democratic than any other electoral system. Just as elections are not democracy, electoral systems do not differ in how democratic they are. As this committee drafts its final report, I would urge it to keep one thing in mind: Do not let your endorsement of one electoral system over another be based on the false notion that the electoral reform will lead to "greater democracy" or the elimination of a "democratic deficit." Though it may lead to a better or worse defence of democracy, it will not lead to more or less democracy.

Having dismissed the notion that proportional representation or any variation of it is inherently "more democratic," and noting that proportional representation refers more to an electoral outcome than to a system, McKeever goes on to note that suggested electoral reforms have much more to do with how governments arrive at decisions, and that here "the implications of electoral reform are truly immense."

Indeed, the concerns of special interests in democratic nations such as ours are generally not for democracy itself, but the achievement of their objectives. Their objectives and their methods both being political, their interests are unquestionably better served in arenas where decision-making is entirely political in nature; that is, where decisions are negotiated between competing political interests, where deals are cut between the brokers of political parties and lobby groups, for one thing only: political advantage, It goes without saying that such arenas are further removed from citizens. There exists already, of course, opportunities for such political arenas — what proportional representation will achieve is to make such arenas almost inevitable. They are called minority governments. McKeever continues:

    In a majority government, the party in power has the opportunity to govern by doing what it believes is right, even when it's unpopular for it to do so. In a minority or coalition government, the process is almost entirely different. The issue is not one of right and wrong, but of compromise and negotiation. On its face, that sounds very friendly and up-with-people. But in reality, the difference between majority government and minority or coalition government is dramatic. Specifically, when we replace majority governments with minority or coalition governments, we move from a system that accommodates ethical decision-making to a system based on the rejection of ethics and the substitution of whims and numbers -- ballot-counting, or hand-counting, if you're talking about the Legislature. We move from a government guided by reason to one guided by emotion; to one guided not by what's right, but simply by what you want.

Objections can be made, and sustained, that the current electoral system already provides the opportunity for minority governments, and that majority governments as well are arenas in which decisions are made for political advantage. The point is, however, that majority governments at least allow an opportunity for rational, ethics-based decisions without regard to political horse-trading, an opportunity which almost cannot occur in minority governments. With this understanding, it is easy to judge the appeal of proportional representation to special interest groups. What then is the appeal of proportional representation to the average citizen? Simply, there is none except for duplicitous and misdirecting characterizations of democracy from those who have something to gain by it — how democratic is that then?

McKeever's interest in the subject may itself be of interest — as the leader of a party that has never elected a representative, he might be expected to support an electoral system that promises his party at least a chance of putting a chip on the table. Possibly to their political detriment, but to their credit, the Freedom Party is founded on and governed by principles that entirely exceed their pursuit of political advantage. Specifically, McKeever's presentation was incited by the Ontario government's feelers on electoral reform. It appears now that Ontario is moving closer to treading the path of BC. Lawrence Solomon, writing in the Financial Post, provides examples of what we in Ontario could someday look forward:

    Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty announced a Citizens Assembly on Electoral Reform this week, giving it the task of explaining how a system of proportional representation or other electoral reform might work for Ontarians. Electoral reform bodies in B.C. and P.E.I. last year -- each of which put forward their own vision of voting nirvana -- failed to explain the benefits of the more sophisticated -- some say convoluted -- voting systems preferred by many activists. The provincial populaces voted down both schemes.

    Ontario's Citizens Assembly -- 52 women and 51 men chosen randomly from the province's 103 ridings, including one aboriginal of unspecified sex -- have a tall order. They need to become experts in the world's voting systems in a matter of months. The assembly will meet for the first time in September, then come to its decision and issue its report on May 15.

    To help the Citizens Assembly educate itself, I've produced a primer on proportional representation, the reform favoured by most activists, using this week's election in Israel as illustration. Israel is a model of proportional representation.

    1. Don't think in terms of having a majority government run by a single political party with a coherent governing philosophy; think in terms of minority government comprised of a collection of special interests.

    2. Don't think in terms of voting for the candidate of your choice.

    3. Don't expect to know who will form the government after the ballots are counted.

Read the rest here, http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/financialpost/story.html?id=86f453bf-558d-4522-9a30-e9d6c9bbf373&p=2 and judge for yourself the benefits of proportional representation.
 
If you want a concrete example of the power of PR look at Iraq.

The voters there voted for a slate (a party of parties if you like).  The electors often didn't have a clue who the candidates for the parties were nor the parties in the slate.  Now the people that control those votes have been slagging each other since December/January? ( It's been so long I can't remember anymore) trying to finagle seats for friends and the best perqs available.  3 or 4 months and no end in site with the terrorists chuckling as they let the Iraqis enjoy the benefits of "Democracy".

The same thing has happened in most other countries that have accepted PR.  The Pary Apparatchiks decide who stays and who goes not the electors.  In New Zealand, where it is apparently a split house, (some members elected directly and some appointed from the party lists) electors have been treated to the sight of directly elected members being chucked out on their rump for doing a piss-poor job of representing them only to discover that the party reappoints them.  Their party backed vote could potentially veto the wishes of the electors that chucked them out in the first place because of their opinion.

Maybe First Past the Post - Winner Take All is not the best system, I am willing to hear arguments for systems to guarantee the Member has a majority of electors (run-offs or ranking), but it has to come down to one riding, one member, elected by the constituents, and all members elected on the same basis.  If you want to represent other interests - well the Senate and the Provincial legislatures offer possibilities to find different voices representing different constituencies.

 
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