Future Armour

[ironduke57]

apparently it's "forbidden" on my work server, must be tank porn...... ;D

;D
It´s this pic.

Regards,
ironduke57

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Thanks, it's kind of pornish in a Flesh Gordon kind of way.....


I wonder how it's working and who has looked at it.

 

[a_majoor]

Some 80's vintage tank porn:

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The turret in the top picture looks rather familar!

 

[ArmyRick]

I beleive it is the same turret has what is on the current MGS. Only on that vehicle, the profile is much lower probably because the hull is low.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

But that can’t be, the Liberals told me that the MGS was Uber-modern and way more advanced than a tank……they wouldn’t have lied to me now would they…….


Take an old gun, give it a large revolver cylinder and paint it green, sell it as something brand new, snake oil at it's best.

 

[TCBF]

The fire control system and such was very advanced.  Cool tech - wrong package.

Apply the tech developments to a proven hull/turret/gun combo and voila!

A command economy can do that: Hull from Corp. A, FCS from Corp. B, etc.  Hard to do that here among competitors unless the payoffs are very high, or the Guvmint threatens to cut them off - the latter is a no-go when dealing with foreign multinationals.

"Put your FCS in an M8, and we'll take it!"

Riiiiiight...  We'll get right on that...

 

[a_majoor]

A flying tactical vehicle may be on the way. The Boeing Aerial Light Multipurpose Vehicle (LAMV) concept may look like an ISO with wings and two jet engines stuck on top, but:

www.boeing.com

The Light Aerial Multipurpose Vehicle (LAMV) could be flown by non-pilots using the orbiting satellites in the Global Positioning System, GPS, as a navigation tool--thereby reducing the Army's dependency on Air Force for transportation.

Avoiding the issue of gaining permission to use landing strips altogether, the LAMV would use pulsed-ejector thrust-augmentor engines for vertical landings and takeoffs. Small, efficient turbofans mounted atop the fuselage are designed to provide a cruising speed of 480 kph. The range of the LAMV would be 2,000 kilometers and it would have a 1590-Kg payload. The LAMV would have removable wings, so that it could be shipped to a war zone in a conventional 40-foot container. Upon arrival, the LAMV would be used for squad-sized insertion and extraction of troops, medical evacuation and the delivery of supplies.

We have the lifting power of a light utility helicopter but the speed of an aircraft, and given the computer does much of the driving ("interpreting" the control inputs so the hapless driver/pilot dosn't overstress the aircraft or fly into the ground) there is the possibility of creating self contained airmobile Mounted Rifle battalions or "Cavalry" regiments. Armed escort aircraft would still be needed (even with more powerful engines to deal with the extra weight/drag., a LAMV should only carry light weapons for self defense. Leave air combat to attack helicopters, ground attack aircraft or UACV's).

Strictly speaking this isn't "armour" in the traditional sense of protection, but rather in the sense of emphasising mobility and the ability to move troops and equipment at speeds an order of magnitude faster than currently possible, without many of the constraints of terrain. Obviously something like this would be great as a recce vehicle (both as a platform for sensors and to deliver patrols where you would not expect them), and to give the commander the ability to operate in a 3D environment (landing sections on the rooftops in urban terrain, for example). Eventual developments could include gunship versions (combining the engines and flight surfaces of the LAMV with a dedicated fuselage optimised for attack) and a suite of flying M-113 type derivatives (ambulance, CP, radio "van", workshop, etc.)

 

[a_majoor]

A different view of what a future AFV might look like. Some of the suggestions are a bit, extreme, and this seems to be more of a STG assault gun than a tank, but let the author describe it himself:

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/2sparks98.pdf

A Crisis of Confidence in Armor? ARMOR — March-April 1998

by Mike Sparks

The First Crisis: Yom Kippur War, 1973

First-generation, wire-guided Sagger antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) operated by joystick control are fired by Egyptian infantrymen at Israeli tanks operating without infantry support, taking a heavy toll on the armored forces counterattacking the Egyptian surprise attack and invasion of the Sinai across the Suez
Canal. Later in the war, IDF tankers learn to turn and fire towards the firing signature of the Sagger  missiles, disrupting the Egyptian infantrymen’s aim. They learn also to dodge their tanks at the last second to evade the missiles. One tank came home after a mission with over a dozen Sagger wires draped over its hull.

One of the results of that war was creation of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that integrated infantry in M113 armored personnel carriers to clear out ATGM positions ahead of tanks. Another result was the development of a better protected tank, the very low silhouette Merkava I, which proved
invincible against first generation ATGMs and RPGs in the later war in Lebanon in 1982.

The Second Crisis: South Lebanon, 1997

Second-generation, Russian signatureless ATGMs like the 9K111 Fagot (AT4 Spigot in the West) are being used by Hezbollah to knock out the once-invincible Merkava IIs in mountainous and urbanized Southern Lebanon. After 28 missile hits, Hezbollah guerrillas have been reported as having learned which are the weak areas of the Merkava II and fire two missiles in rapid succession at that spot. Three Merkava II tanks have been knocked out, resulting in two dead soldiers. Without a firing signature, the Fagot (semi-automatic command line-ofsight) SACLOS ATGM can be controlled until it hits the specific spot on the tank aimed by the firer, who holds the crosshairs there and is free from the tank’s counterfire. The tanker doesn’t know he’s under attack until the ATGM hits his tank. The IDF is considering pulling the Merkava IIs out of Lebanon and have dispatched the legendary General Tal, creator of the Merkava MBT, to the scene to solve the problem.

We owe a great deal of debt to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) who, on the front lines for freedom, are encountering the latest weapons made in both the former Soviet Union and the West. What they learn the hard way, we need to heed in our future armored vehicle designs and in our own TTP.

When the tank as we know it receives some setbacks in battle, there will always be a chorus of those who proclaim that the tank is dead. This shrill message is delivered with an arrogant attitude that suggests we are somehow “above” having to use extreme physical measures to fight battles today and certainly in the
future. What these people really oppose is the reality that, in war, EXTREME physical measures are needed to win.

The modern battlefield is covered by fire, and to advance forward requires armor protection, or else  casualties will mount, as we saw in both World Wars, Vietnam, and more recently in Somalia. These critics of the tank invariably offer us no solutions or alternatives, other than fighting on foot without tanks or from the cockpit with “wunderweapons” of the air. Their goal seems to be killing the tank as an end unto itself. What these individuals fail to realize is that, in war, there is a constant ebb and flow of weapons and countermeasures. The minute you develop an advantage, a counter weapon is created. To stay on top, you have to keep advancing new ideas. Those that want to give up the tank simply want to call it quits, and give up, which will be disastrous on the next battlefield. In war, the side that decides to stick to bows and arrows gets wiped out by the side with firearms.

If the tank is now endangered by the antitank guided missile, firing beyond visual ranges without  signatures, then the tank must adapt to regain the edge. The critics of the tank are partially right: traditional tankers who do not want to adapt to the modern battlefield are making the tank obsolete, so we must change the tank paradigm or else it will be changed for us by our misinformed detractors. The world is rapidly urbanizing; people cause wars, and people live in cities. Tanks will not only be required to lead stampedes in open rural desert areas, à la Desert Storm, to defeat other tank armies in third-generation maneuver wars, but they must fight in closed terrain and assist in stability operations in defensive posture situations like Bosnia and South Lebanon. Tanks must lead the way into the cities, but avoid a replay of fighting infantry-pure, as in Somalia, or tank-pure, as the Russians did in Chechnya.

Tanks will be vital to withstand enemy fires and lead assaults by shock action. Supporting the tank will be shock infantry in their own armored personnel carriers; some with a large-caliber, fire-support cannon to blast buildings/bunkers, others with a telescoping boom ladder with a capsule to take fire teams to the rooftops or selected windows or floors by mouseholing, instead of the predictable helicopter rooftop assaults. We’ll need other vehicles with fire fighting modules or trailers to put out building fires before the city we are trying to save burns down. If tanks cannot swim, at least the APCs should be capable of this without preparation in order to secure river crossings for combat engineers to bridge. However, once the area is secured, maintaining control of urban areas will require the defensive use of tanks.

Some of the best ideas to defeat precision guided munitions/missiles come from the Russians — I suggest reading the recent article in Military Parade magazine at the internet address: http://www.milparade.ru/19/102-105.htm and especially the schematic at http://www.milparade.ru/19/105-f.gif. The following are descriptions of devices the future tank will need to prevail in the city fight. When the future tank ventures into the open, the fight will often be beyond visual range — missile versus missile.

This tank must be airdroppable, so it can be deployed along with airborne forces from the drop zone. America is a strategic air power, as England was once a sea power. Our security interests require significant forces that can move decisively within hours — not days, weeks, or months. The future tank crew must fight laying down so the entire vehicle can be scaled down to a size no larger than a HMMWV. This is a modern equivalent of the “belly flopper” concept tried in the 1930s with the low-tech automotive technology then available. It didn’t work, but it did give birth to the incredibly successful Jeep and is on display in the National Infantry Museum at Fort Benning, Georgia. The future tank must be less than the height of a standing man because height is the chief visual giveaway on the battlefield.

The future tank should be armed with a large-caliber cannon for direct-fire engagement of other tanks, as well as a means to reduce enemy strongpoints in the attack. The tank commander should still be able to look out from the highest spot and command his tank. Working along with the future tank’s small size is that its power plant and tracks are silenced to evade enemy detection, as German Army M113s have been modified. The engine has its exhaust routed and cooled to preclude detection of its infrared signature. A heat reflective tarp can be rapidly pulled over the top of the tank to hide it from view and detection. A dust skirt could prevent dust from spewing out the rear as the tank travels across dry ground. Camouflage strips are integral to the tank to break up its outline and blend into surrounding vegetation. Auxiliary power
units (APUs) must be organic to the tank so it can operate its FLIR and image intensifiers, etc., without having to turn the main engine on.

Stealth must be valued within the Armor community. The days of brazenly operating in the open, based on the belief that Chobham armor makes the tank invincible, are over. It doesn’t work at NTC Fort Irwin, and it certainly doesn’t work anymore in Southern Lebanon, even with the superbly armored Merkava MBT. The Armor community must embrace stealth in design, tactics, and procedures, or they will by inflexibility doom the tank in the U.S. to obsolescence while other countries adapt their AFVs and make them work on the 21st century battlefield. What would Generals Abrams and Patton be advocating today?

Every tank should have a dozer blade to dig its own defilade fighting positions and clear barricades and obstacles. We should not have to wait for a separate unit to do this for us. Just as the individual soldier has an e-tool to scrape out a depression and then a fighting hole from a temporary stop position, the future tank must be able to entrench itself quickly to withstand enemy attacks. One writer in a 1972 issue of Infantry magazine, reacting to the mines encountered in Vietnam, noted that the future armored personnel carrier should have its tracks outside the vehicle hull, not underneath, so mines explode away from the body. We should do this on the future tank as well as mold the hull in a V shape, as the South African Defense Forces do with their mine resistant vehicles, to create a very hard, sturdy, mine resistant tank. Armored vehicles will be key in keeping supply and communications roads open into cities during conflict by warring sides.

Trying to stop bullets at the chest with flak jackets is too late, and so is trying to stop ATGMs at the tank hull. What is needed is a moving shield that can position itself to meet an incoming missile threat and pre-detonate the warhead a safe distance away from the tank. That front shield should be the dozer blade. A shield on the turret could prevent destruction by top-attack missiles like our own Javelin, TOW IIB, and the Swedish Bofors BILL. A shield on the rear, and on each side, covers the rest of the tank. These shields are controlled by computer to move into position and swat incoming ATGMs and RPGs, just as they impact, so their warheads do not impact the tank itself. These stand-off shields would also protect against road-side bombs similar to those being used by Hezbollah against IDF armored vehicles keeping supply lines open to their bases in southern Lebanon.

The IDF tankers do not know they are under attack until the second-generation Russian ATGMs hit them, thus they are not able to dodge the missiles. What is needed is a very low power electronic umbrella that can warn the tank that missiles are flying towards it. The device can alert the crew to move the tank as it
launches smoke grenades and decoys to foil the aim of the ATGM firer and fool the missile. If the tank is static with the engine off, the shields should be able to move to cover the tank and swat the missiles, sacrificing themselves to save the tank and crew. The shields themselves must be easily replaceable in the field.

Like the superb Merkava, the tank must have space in its rear to carry some escort infantry, supplies, extra ammunition, or a vertical launch missile module, the latter being lowered into place by a small crane organic to the tank like the HMMWV LOSAT system has. The vertical missile tubes would be armed with
fire-and-forget ATGMs like the Javelin or the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missiles (EFOGM) for extended range targets. All fuel for the tank should be outside the hull at the rear of the vehicle, like the M113A3, to prevent a fire if the vehicle is hit.

The IDF pioneered use of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) as a reconnaissance tool. However, it’s been overused and, not unlike our use of helicopters in the Vietnam War, has become an obvious signal to the enemy that we intend to fight soon in the area where the UAV flies. The failed September 5 IDF Flotilla 13 naval commando raid, where 12 men were killed, has been directly attributed to UAVs overflying the target area and alerting the enemy to prepare an ambush. Situational awareness must not be a two-way street — we should see the enemy, and he must be in the dark.

One way we could do this is by employing a fiber-optic periscope from the tank itself, extending up to 30 feet high to spot the enemy with sensors and visual images before they can fire ATGMs. Tanks can kill the enemy first with their own or trailer-mounted anti-personnel EFOGMs. With a mobile observation tower that retracts like a submarine periscope, the tank can stay hidden in the terrain. The next step might be to have a helium balloon that can be inflated and unreeled aloft from the tank periscope to an even greater height than the 30-foot pole, say 100-200 feet — a tethered UAV — that stays over friendly territory so the enemy is not alerted to our reconnaissance efforts, yet can see for miles over the next hill. This would be a hightechnology version of the observation balloon used so effectively in WWI to adjust artillery fire into the trenches.

With such a capability built into the future tank, armored crews can call for supporting arms or use their own beyond- visual-range weapons to silence the signature-less ATGM threat.One thing we might do to help fix the situation in South Lebanon would be toloan some M1A2 Abrams MBTs to the IDF to give them time to redress the Merkava II’s armor problems. This will also give us technical feedback on how our tanks fare against the latest ATGMs. We could also loan the IDF some HMMWV-mounted EFOGM firing units so they can use them in concert with their UAVs to suppress Hezbollah ATGM firing positions.

Ultimately, we should develop a Mobil- Trac trailer with wheels-tracks (the bed trailer being used for the U.S. Army’s Explosive Stand-off Minefield Breacher-ESMB-system) with vertical launch EFOGM missiles and a telescoping periscope or tethered observation balloon with fiber optic links to the tank towing it. This would enable the IDF crews to see Hezbollah terrorists first without having to overfly a UAV.

We must also develop, as soon as possible, an anti-personnel EFOGM that uses fuel-air explosives technology to clear out enemy infantry firing signatureless ATGMs. This warhead must be able to penetrate bunkers, buildings and fighting positions with overhead cover. We are kidding ourselves if we think we can go cheap and fight with only light forces on foot supported by aircraft. If we want to fight our enemies in an even strength, or even from numerical inferiority, we can give up on the armored vehicle and suffer the consequences. We do not have, in a 10-division Army, the option of trading casualty for casualty with a Third World country  in a foreign war. The armored vehicle is a tool that a professional Army can have  and more effectively employ than a ragtag guerrilla force like Hezbollah can.

This advantage must not be squandered due to traditional inflexibility, employing excuses that the tank is not suited for the tasks asked of it whenever it suffers setbacks, and falling back until the tank is only useful for ego-gratifying tank-on tank duels in the open. Nor should the tank be abandoned by avant-garde iconoclasm and nonchalance that we are somehow “above” having to use extreme measures to fight battles today. War is often an all-out, extreme activity — a struggle — not to be taken lightly. This struggle does not just take place during the actual fighting, but before — in the debates over force structure design, training, and equipping our forces. Now is the time to win on the next battlefield by seeing it as clearly as possible and preparing for it, not what we wish it to be, but what it already is and will be.

Sources:

Ed Blanche, “Hezbollah find chink in IDF’s Merkava armour,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 29 Oct 97, p. 17.
Steve Rodan, “Israelis eye more Merkava armor,” Defense News, 3-9 Nov 97, p. 8.

Mike Sparks is the director of the nonprofit military reform think-tank, the 1st  Tactical Studies Group (Airborne), which has two web sites at http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/5265 and Pentagon/7963/. Improvements to U.S. Army tactics, techniques, and procedures and equipment are given through official channels at no charge. Suggestions adopted include the wire-cutting feature on the M9 bayonet, all terrain bikes/carts, and the new tripod-carrying modification to the medium machine gun spare barrel bag. A former Marine officer and enlisted man, he is now in a Special Forces U.S. Army National Guard unit. A graduate of MC Basic/AIT, PLC OCS, Officer Basic, Infantry Officer Course, Army Airborne, Combat Life Saver, and IDF parachute school, he holds a Bachelor of Science degree in history/educationn from Liberty University. His works have been published in ARMOR, Infantry, Special Warfare, Army Logistician, Aviation Digest, MC Gazette, Naval Institute Proceedings, Behind the Lines, and the Fort Bragg Post
and Fort Benning Bayonet.

 

[Jantor]

a majoor....check your PM's please



Cheers

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Warning Sparky alert, Sparky alert

After reading the above article, you will have an uncontrollable urge to call a M113 APC: "Gavin" and mount 106mm RR on it.

 

[GK .Dundas]

a majoor....check your PM's please



Cheers

I suspect that most of the PMs will consist  of either death threats or pleas for mercy. Sparky does that to people! I 'm just surprised that apparently you've never run into him before?
Gordon

 

[George Wallace]

Why in God's Green Earth, did you even have to bring up his name?  :

 

[a_majoor]

You can blame the editors of Armor magazine in Fort Knox; they published that article first!

To be fair, the author isn't really suggesting anything "new", band tracks, mine hardening and stand off armour are all familier today, while some of the other suggestions like having the crew lie down to operate the vehicle seem as impractical today as they were in the 1930's. The rest of the ideas should be examined on their merits. Is it the combination of these disparate ideas or just the way he says them that raises everyone's hackles?

 

[Franko]

Why in God's Green Earth, did you even have to bring up his name?  :

Bad memories 'eh?       

Wait a tick....don't tell me he's here!!!!         

Regards

 

[GK .Dundas]

You can blame the editors of Armor magazine in Fort Knox; they published that article first!

To be fair, the author isn't really suggesting anything "new", band tracks, mine hardening and stand off armour are all familier today, while some of the other suggestions like having the crew lie down to operate the vehicle seem as impractical today as they were in the 1930's. The rest of the ideas should be examined on their merits. Is it the combination of these disparate ideas or just the way he says them that raises everyone's hackles?

Mike Sparks has the distinction of being banned at least once here and twice ( at least) at Tanknet. Google some of his postings at various news groups or at his web sites and you'll begin to understand . However a word of warning  reading his stuff is like dealing with Cthlu ,be prepared to lose sanity points! >

 

[ArmyRick]

I read some of this goof's arguments http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/war-iraq/5288-mike-sparks-vs-m-21-sniper-email-debate.html
he is a bloody idiot.
(1) Has he ever served in uniform?
(2) If so, in what capacity?
(3) He can go on beleiving his make beleif world meanwhile the SBCT infantry guys do very much prefer their strykers over M113 (I refuse to call it a gavin, on my course we called it a track or an M113)  ^-^

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I read some of this goof's arguments http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/war-iraq/5288-mike-sparks-vs-m-21-sniper-email-debate.html
he is a bloody idiot.
(1) Has he ever served in uniform?
(2) If so, in what capacity?
(3) He can go on beleiving his make beleif world meanwhile the SBCT infantry guys do very much prefer their strykers over M113 (I refuse to call it a gavin, on my course we called it a track or an M113)  ^-^

I believe he was a reserve Officer in a Logistic unit now or was. Apparently he was flunked out of the USMC, hence his unbridled hatred of them. His unrelenting campaign to have the M113 renamed the “Gavin” has annoyed most people, plus his constant cry about it being the “Uber” machine and that the Styker is a death trap ( I guess the AQ is disappointed that the casualties from their IED attacks on them is not as high as he predicted)
He babbles so much that he even something gets things right, sort of like a stopped clock is right twice a day. The sad part is that occasional the MSM quotes his stuff.

 

[a_majoor]

He babbles so much that he even something gets things right, sort of like a stopped clock is right twice a day. The sad part is that occasional the MSM quotes his stuff.

As did Armor magazine. Well, you do have to screen a lot of dross to find the occasional bit of value....On to our regularly scheduled thread

 

[Red 6]

Ya'll have hit the nail on the head with this guy. This business about the so-called "Gavin" is totally ridiculous. The 113 is good for a lot of things, but it's a battle taxi and that's about it. It's over 40 years old as a concept and doesn't have that much more protection than it did in Vietnam. The Stryker has saved many lives since it went into service in the US Army and it is a solid basis for the Stryker family of vehicles. I was not a big fan when it first was adopted. I crewed Bradleys for quite a few years and my track saved my life in Desert Storm so I was more than partial to the Bradley and tracked vehicles as opposed to wheels. But talking to friends who are still on active duty and studying the Stryker changed my mind. The deal was sealed when I got the chance to scope the Stryker up close at Fort Lewis a couple of years ago.