Just finished reading an interview with the current CLS, LGen Peter Devlin in Esprit de Corps. Now before somebody jumps on the 'I hate Scott Taylor...EdC is a rag I wouldn't even use to wipe my butt with...' bandwagon, there was an interesting comment made by the CLS in Vol 17, Issue #10, page 26:
"We are examining things like genuinely light infantry as opposed to battalions minus vehicles, properly resourced and with the mindset that they are light infantry. There are helicopters going into CFB Petawawa. I think that we need to have a very rich air mobile capability.
Where our vehicles are, the number of vehicles, the combination of light and mechanized infantry battalions are all things that we are looking at to give us the flexibility and the respect for the resourcing to allow us to train, train to excite, and train to be ready."
Usually when someone at the GO/FO level starts making inferences or nuances like the CLS just did, it means that these are initiatives which they're looking at in terms of transforming the organization they control. The prior CLS was instrumental in harmonizing the infantry battalion structures into a hybrid mechanized role, whereby two rifle companies were mechanized around the LAV-III platform and the third would be light infantry, however operationally, we saw that all 3 companies were mechanized for the current Afghanistan mission.
Based on the comments that LGen Devlin made, what is the likelihood that we will see a return of the 3 light infantry battalions?
Will we see a consolidation of 3 light infantry battalions (1 battalion from each of the Regular Force regiments) into a light infantry brigade based in Petawawa as part of a 'rich air mobile capability' with the Chinooks?
Is this move due to the fact that we've only ever had enough LAV-IIIs for 6 infantry battalions, prior to CMTC and a number of vehicles being destroyed in the current war in Afghanistan, let alone trying to fleet manage the existing number of LAV-IIIs for 9 infantry battalions?
As part of the current government's emphasis on arctic sovereignty, perhaps there may be a case to be made for a light, airmobile (not necessarily parachute capable/airborne) infantry centric army force structure which could be rapidly deployed to the Arctic. A 3 battalion light infantry brigade sized force would allow for an operational readiness cycle which would result in us always have a light infantry battalion ready for immediate deployment for operational areas or missions whereby a mechanized force may not be ideally suited (i.e. Afghanistan 2002), or necessary (Haiti 2010). Having the remainder of the 6 light infantry battalions would allow for a concurrent operational readiness cycle whereby we could have both a light and heavy battalion available for deployment.
Do we have the capability to concurrently force generate 2 battalion/battlegroup sized units (1 light and one mech)?
As an alternative to 3 light infantry battalions in a brigade formation, would we be better off with the former mix of 2 mech - 1 light in the brigades?
What about a single, independent light infantry battlegroup comprised of sub-units representing each of the 3 regular force regiments (i.e. Canadian Airborne Regiment orbat) that is constantly on a high readiness footing? Would this create a redundancy with CSOR in the battalion/company sized light infantry direct action role?
Do we need permanent light infantry battalions, or can we institute a training regimen that modularizes our infantry force structure whereby all infanteers are skilled in mechanized and light infantry operations and we can 'plug & play' as per mission requirements? Despite the CF tendency to promote a 'general purpose capability' over 'specialized niches', are we going to have the money, training resources, and time to be able to cover such a broad spectrum, so that the end result is an infantry force which is as adept at conducting a mechanized hasty attack as it is at conducting an airmobile assault as it is to conducting footborne patrols in mountainous terrain?
