Future Canadian Airborne Capability and Organisation! Or, is it Redundant? (a merged thread)

[daftandbarmy]

Some interesting articles on this subject FYI:


The Future of Airborne Forces in the Objective Force

This paper will examine United States Army airborne forces as they relate to the Objective
Force. It will address the need for the United States to retain a strategic airborne force for
forcible entry operations and will explain why this force should remain a consolidated airborne
division and not some distributed capability scattered across the Army at the Unit of
Employment level. As part of this discussion, the paper will address facilities, training,
command and control, and modernization issues.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415669

Operational Employment of the Airborne Brigade Combat Team: The 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment as a Case Study by MAJ Matthew J. Konz, U.S. Army, 87 pages.

Given the focus on the Brigade Combat Team as the Army‘s primary combat unit, the limited availability of U.S. Air Force airlift assets, and the U.S. Army history of employing predominantly medium sized airborne units, future airborne operations in support of operational level objectives will likely center around the Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). The combat airborne operations of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment will provide a case study to assess the elements of risk, surprise and the operational context of how the airborne unit contributed to the achievement the operational and strategic outcomes. The combat airborne operations discussed are the jump to re-take the island of Corregidor in the Philippines in February 1945, Operation Junction City in February 1967, and the airborne insertion of the 173d Airborne Brigade onto the Bashur airfield in Northern Iraq in March 2003. The intent of this monograph is to provide insights into the possible employment of the current ABCT and how to best use the resources and organization that we have, not necessarily to advocate a radically new airborne organization, propose new equipment, or recommend a new mission for airborne forces.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/cgsc/SAMS/media/Monographs/KonzM-21May09.pdf


THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIRBORNE (PARACHUTE)
FORCES IN MODERN ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE

The current global security environment poses fundamentally different challenges to Western
armies than the Cold War ever did. Every region now faces complex, diverse, non traditional
and interconnected security challenges as a result of the end of the bi-polar world. Resource
scarcity, globalization, demographic shifts, unparalleled technological advancement, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), drug-trafficking and ethnic, religious and racial hatred
compound the problem.1 Guerrillas and subversives now boast cheap cell phone
communications assets and can employ cyber capabilities and WMD, while terrorists have
succeeded in using airliners as missiles. This broad spectrum of modern threats and capabilities
has generated a new term: “asymmetric.”

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_07/iss_3/CAJ_vol7.3_13_e.pdf



South African Airborne Operations

With the advent of democratisation in South Africa in
1994, former enemies have become comrades in arms. The process of integration between former
liberation movements and other forces and the advent of a volunteer army have changed the whole
character of the airborne units in the new South African National Defence Force.
The concept of vertical envelopment, however, remains alive and relevant. Whether the new
South African National Defence Force in its design and training is going to continue to embrace this
unique and flexible form of warfare remains to be seen. Initial indications are that it will not. Severe
budget cuts, radical changes in command and control systems, the reduction of 44 Parachute Brigade
to a regiment, and the decreased airlift capacity have all contributed towards a loss of the ability to
deploy a balanced and potent independent airborne force.

http://www.google.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=5&sqi=2&ved=0CFAQFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ajol.info%2Findex.php%2Fsmsajms%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F81106%2F71329&ei=FNVRUeuBEOKOiALtuoCgBQ&usg=AFQjCNF8u2Yzr2xHoJoQ9ApE4iPRiCsHvQ&bvm=bv.44342787,d.cGE

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

I'm sure the equipment loads will adhere to the "bottom jumper has the right of way" rule

Within the Battalions they can strive for Recce Platoon, etc or if they want more there is CANSOFCOM.  As well,  only those within the 3rd Battalions can strive for the Jump Coy.  Those in the 1st and 2nd Battalions can hope they get the occasional slot offered for B Para and end up not using that skill; unless they eventually are posted to a 3rd BN, CFLAWC or CANSOF.  Other things they can strive for is PPF(I know pers from Mech Battalions have gotten the course),  US Army Ranger course,  etc.

Lots of options for keen individuals to strive for that don't include the jump coy.

The idea of the PPF is for each Bn to have 1 Sect of PPF within their Recce Pl by 2020.  Seeing as how the course is now focusing solely on LZ/DZ marking and insertion methods it can be of some use to everyone.  Like you said soldiers have CANSOF or Recce/Snipers to aim for.  Realistically Ranger Course is only available to a few every year and seeing that it costs thousands of dollars to send one candidate on the course with no guarantee that they will even pass I think the CF is going to be a little more hesitant to send guys down there.

Thanks for the articles daftandbarmy I am going to have a look at some. 

 

[daftandbarmy]

The idea of the PPF is for each Bn to have 1 Sect of PPF within their Recce Pl by 2020.  Seeing as how the course is now focusing solely on LZ/DZ marking and insertion methods it can be of some use to everyone.  Like you said soldiers have CANSOF or Recce/Snipers to aim for.  Realistically Ranger Course is only available to a few every year and seeing that it costs thousands of dollars to send one candidate on the course with no guarantee that they will even pass I think the CF is going to be a little more hesitant to send guys down there.

Thanks for the articles daftandbarmy I am going to have a look at some.

S'alright,

I have never done it, but I understand the Ranger Course doesn't focus much on Pathfinder stuff or, if it does, it's pretty basic.

Also, the other side to the Pathfinder role is the staff effort required to make sure they don't wind up like Merril's Marauders e.g.,  eating their belts, out of ammo and on the run. I hope we're maintaing the ability to depoly, maintain and recover a Pathfider force too.

 

[Sprinting Thistle]

Could you provide the reference to this Army direction:  "The idea of the PPF is for each Bn to have 1 Sect of PPF within their Recce Pl by 2020"

Thanks.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Could you provide the reference to this Army direction:  "The idea of the PPF is for each Bn to have 1 Sect of PPF within their Recce Pl by 2020"

Thanks.

It was in a powerpoint that I saw during a briefing on the new PPF about a year and a half ago, let me see if I can dig it up for you.

Edit:

Well I could not locate the powerpoint, I think the transition to sharepoint probably wiped it out but I did find the Trg Implementation Directive signed by the former Comd LFDTS, Maj Gen Hainse.

CLS intent:  To develop the PPF capability
within every battalion in order to facilitate the
prosecution of Adaptive Dispersed Operations
(ADO).

 

[Jarnhamar]

You could keep the jump course as motivation for guys who want the tattoo and help support the Trenton Kitshop but change the company to amphibious orientated.
Small boat operators courses.  Maybe a watered down (ha) course like engineer divers get.  HK P11 marksman badge.

That way a light infantry battalion with have 3 companies dedicated to Airassault, mountaineering/arctic ops and amphibious methods of insertion/extraction.

We're more likely to use any and all of those well before we insert conventional Canadian soldiers by static line parachute.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

You could keep the jump course as motivation for guys who want the tattoo and help support the Trenton Kitshop but change the company to amphibious orientated.
Small boat operators courses.  Maybe a watered down (ha) course like engineer divers get.  HK P11 marksman badge.

That way a light infantry battalion with have 3 companies dedicated to Airassault, mountaineering/arctic ops and amphibious methods of insertion/extraction.

We're more likely to use any and all of those well before we insert conventional Canadian soldiers by static line parachute.

We need to stop focusing on skills and start talking about capability and the ability to rapidly deploy or surge forces into an Area of Operations which is really what Light Infantry/Parachuting/Amphibious Ops/Air-Mobile Ops is all about.  We have lots of great soldiers in the LIB's with some great skills such as Freefall/PPF/Adv Recce/Jumpmaster's/AMO the list goes on and on but unfortunately all their skills are useless if we cannot actually kick them out the door and right now with the LIBs we cannot do that. 

For one, we don't have the vehicles, equipment or the dedicated CSS available to backstop us and two we don't have any of the necessary enablers available that really set the conditions for success.  The fact that you have a light infantry battalion based in a mechanized bde group is a fundamental flaw and we are deriving support for our LIBs from units which are not designed to support it. 

I feel we need to have a serious discussion on whether their is a utility in having light infantry forces and if we determine their is then lets set them up for success and organize them in such a way so they can make a positive contribution.  If we determine we don't need them then lets get rid of them and give the PY positions back to the 6 Mech Bn's so we can bring back some other capabilities that have been lost such as Anti-Armour, Pioneers and Mortars.

 

[MikeL]

Sorry for going off topic,  but I have a question regarding the org of the LIBs.

In regards to the Air Assault/Mobile Coy and Mountain/Arctic Coy,  why have companies "dedicated" to that?  Why not spread those skills through out the battalion?  I assume there are already troops  in the Air Assault Coy(N?) with BMO/AMO and troops in the Mountain/Arctic Coy(O?) with HII,  US Army Air Assault, etc quals.

How often does the Mountain/Arctic coy actually train in mountainous terrain and the arctic/cold weather?

I assume by seeing all the Griffons supporting 3RCR that the Air Assault/Mobile skills are practiced when air craft are available,  and a Coy(?) went down to work on those skills(and other skills) in the US with the USMC last year(?). But how often are the other mountain/arctic skills practiced/maintained?

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Sorry for going off topic,  but I have a question regarding the org of the LIBs.

In regards to the Air Assault/Mobile Coy and Mountain/Arctic Coy,  why have companies "dedicated" to that?  Why not spread those skills through out the battalion?  I assume there are already troops  in the Air Assault Coy(N?) with BMO/AMO and troops in the Mountain/Arctic Coy(O?) with HII,  US Army Air Assault, etc quals.

How often does the Mountain/Arctic coy actually train in mountainous terrain and the arctic/cold weather?

I assume by seeing all the Griffons supporting 3RCR that the Air Assault/Mobile skills are practiced when air craft are available,  and I a Coy(?) went down to work on those skills(and other skills) in the US with the USMC.  But how often are the other mountain/arctic skills practiced/maintained?

My understanding of why we have three companies that maintain three different skillsets is so we maintain what they refer to as a "General Purpose Combat Capability".  Essentially, we do all of these things so that if $H&^ hits the fan so to speak we have guys available that know how to do all of skillsets we practice so that when we need to actually standup airborne battalions/air-mobile battalions/etc... we already have the shell organizations in place. 

3 RCR itself doesn't have a dedicated company for arctic/mountain warfare, right now we are organized as follows:

Mike Coy - Para Coy
November Coy - Air-Mobile Coy
Oscar Coy - FRIES & Air-Mobile Coy
Quebec Coy - Cbt Spt Coy (Recce/Snipers/Sigs)
Romeo Coy - CSS Coy (Movement Pl, QM, Riggers, KO, Maint Pl, etc)

Practicing skills all has to do with money and aircraft availability; however, over the past two years our primary focus has been first, improving our ability to sustain ourselves while conducting air-mobile/airborne operations and secondly, working on developing a viable air-mobile command post which we now have working in its initial stages. 

 

[MikeL]

Ack,  thanks for the clarification.  I thought I heard/read from somewhere that O Coy was Mountain, which appears to be wrong.

Any reason why N is Air Mobile and not FRIES while O is Air Mobile and FRIES?

 

[Infanteer]

A Coy, 3 PPCLI is oriented towards mountain operations.

 

[Ostrozac]

My initial thoughts on an airborne capability is that if it's important -- it should be centralized. And if it isn't important, the three para companies that we have in the brigades are a distraction from what is important -- light infantry and mech infantry operations.

Personally, I think that if we build a credible conventional airmobile/light capability, that will accomplish 95% of what we can get from paratroopers.

I can't wait to get back into a Chinook!

 

[KevinB]

My initial thoughts on an airborne capability is that if it's important -- it should be centralized. And if it isn't important, the three para companies that we have in the brigades are a distraction from what is important -- light infantry and mech infantry operations.

Personally, I think that if we build a credible conventional airmobile/light capability, that will accomplish 95% of what we can get from paratroopers.

I can't wait to get back into a Chinook!

How far can those fly?

Last time I looked the CF did not sign up for MH models thus no InFlight refueling ability.

The C-130 can take a chalk to Africa, a C-17 even faster with more bodies to drop.

Plus fixed wing A/C are a shit ton fast than Rotors.

 

[MedCorps]

If you look at the Force 2013 Comprehensive Review (which reaches full establishment and force structure changes at end FY-2015 - Mar 2016) it has the following:

1 CMBG - CoE for Heavy Mech and Mountain Ops
- 3 PPCLI - 3 x Coy (TAPV / Para / Light Inf Coy focus Mtn)
- (the Heavy Mech capability resides in 1 PPCLI and LdSH)

2 CMBG - CoE for Air Mobility Ops
- 3 RCR - 3 x Coy (TAPV / Para / Air Mobile)
- It highlights the Air Mobile Coy as a new institutionalized enabler

5 GBMC - CoE for Jungle and Littoral Ops
- 3 R22R - 3 x Coy (TAPV / Para / Light Inf Coy focus Jungle & Littoral)

There is also new Airborne Operations doctrine which has just been released.  Anyone looked at it?  Might have some information on force employment structure for airborne operations.  The Force 2013 Comprehensive Review does not mention airborne ops  less, the Coys identified above. Establishment numbers in the LIBs are holding pretty much constant without any notable cuts.

MC

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

If you look at the Force 2013 Comprehensive Review (which reaches full establishment and force structure changes at end FY-2015 - Mar 2016) it has the following:

1 CMBG - CoE for Heavy Mech and Mountain Ops
- 3 PPCLI - 3 x Coy (TAPV / Para / Light Inf Coy focus Mtn)
- (the Heavy Mech capability resides in 1 PPCLI and LdSH)

2 CMBG - CoE for Air Mobility Ops
- 3 RCR - 3 x Coy (TAPV / Para / Air Mobile)
- It highlights the Air Mobile Coy as a new institutionalized enabler

5 GBMC - CoE for Jungle and Littoral Ops
- 3 R22R - 3 x Coy (TAPV / Para / Light Inf Coy focus Jungle & Littoral)

There is also new Airborne Operations doctrine which has just been released.  Anyone looked at it?  Might have some information on force employment structure for airborne operations.  The Force 2013 Comprehensive Review does not mention airborne ops  less, the Coys identified above. Establishment numbers in the LIBs are holding pretty much constant without any notable cuts.

MC

The fundamental problem with all of this is that again, when we need to kick dudes out the doors our LIBs cannot be deployed as is.  Having skills is one thing and we have lots of skills within the LIBs; however, a bunch of skills does not necessarily equal a capability which a lot of people conveniently forget, even within the LIBs themselves.  We like to talk a big game when it comes to Airborne and Air-mobile ops but how many people actually have experience conducting these sort of operations either on exercise or on operations.  My experience with air-mobile operations is based on exercise with 3 RCR over the past three years.  As well, I have also participated in the annual Marine Corps Weapons & Tactics Instruction Course in Yuma, AZ and I have completed the US Army Air Assault Course. 

When we first began developing an air-mobile capability at the Bn in 2010 we were not what I would call sharp.  This is no fault of anyone it was simply down to a lack of experience.  This was especially apparent during the first few exercises we conducted where very basic things were screwed up, such as, ensuring personnel were properly manifested and loaded into choppers, to having our embarkation and disembarkation drills sorted for different airframes, to squaring away near and far ITG.  We also were not particularly good at contingency planning for unforeseen events like immediate re-embarkation planning, emergency extraction planning, GO/NOGO criteria, TRAP Ops.

The whole point I am trying to make is having one company focused on air-mobile ops does not translate into an actual capability.  Can we do air-mobile operations?  Yah sure we have soldiers that know how to slingload equipment, we have LZ/DZ controllers, we have soldiers that know how to setup LZs but what we have a lot of trouble doing is taking all of these skills and combining them together to provide an actual capability.

Edit:

I have seen the new doctrine.  It is called air-mobile operations and it combines air-mobile operations and airborne operations into one all-encompassing doctrine.  TBH we have developed our own way of doing business at least at 3 RCR with our Force Employment Concept (FEC).  Also, The LIBs were cut last year and PY positions were reduced from 620 to 560 all ranks. 

How far can those fly?

Last time I looked the CF did not sign up for MH models thus no InFlight refueling ability.

The C-130 can take a chalk to Africa, a C-17 even faster with more bodies to drop.

Plus fixed wing A/C are a crap ton fast than Rotors.

The advantage of an Airborne force is it has strategic reach which air-mobile forces do not have.  As well, like you said speed is important and air-mobile forces are particularly resource intensive, far more so then an airborne force.  The CF also lacks an effective attack/escort helicopter or a recce helicopters which further weakens our ability to force generate proper air-mobile forces.

Again an airborne force is only really effective though if we have the supporting arms to back it up with i.e. airborne engineers, artillery, supply.  I would argue that it would be far easier for the CF to field a proper airborne force then it would be to field and maintain a credible air-mobile capability, we already have the nucleus available in our jump coy's, all that would be required would be bringing these forces together into a new unit with the supporting arms cast available to them. 

 

[McG]

... all that would be required would be bringing these forces together into a new unit with the supporting arms cast available to them. 

I think a new unit is a bridge too far in the current fiscal climate.  Rather, all airborne responsibility would have to be assigned to one of the three CMBGs.  Most of that would reside in the 3rd Bn of the CMBG.

 

[MedCorps]

Also, The LIBs were cut last year and PY positions were reduced from 620 to 560 all ranks. 

This may be transient.  Endstate Mar 2016 for the LIBs will be 593 (3 PPCLI and 3 R22R) or 594 (3 RCR).

Enjoy your insight on this topic.

MC

 

[Infanteer]

When we first began developing an air-mobile capability at the Bn in 2010 we were not what I would call sharp.  This is no fault of anyone it was simply down to a lack of experience.  This was especially apparent during the first few exercises we conducted where very basic things were screwed up, such as, ensuring personnel were properly manifested and loaded into choppers, to having our embarkation and disembarkation drills sorted for different airframes, to squaring away near and far ITG.  We also were not particularly good at contingency planning for unforeseen events like immediate re-embarkation planning, emergency extraction planning, GO/NOGO criteria, TRAP Ops.

The whole point I am trying to make is having one company focused on air-mobile ops does not translate into an actual capability.  Can we do air-mobile operations?  Yah sure we have soldiers that know how to slingload equipment, we have LZ/DZ controllers, we have soldiers that know how to setup LZs but what we have a lot of trouble doing is taking all of these skills and combining them together to provide an actual capability.

Airmobile operations are not rocket science, and should be in the repetoire of any infantry battalion.  I say this having worked extensively with airmobile operations at times while with a mech battalion.

It isn't about a course, or a focus, its about planning and administration at the unit level or above for the 5 plans that make up an airmobile op.  At the coy level and below, airmobile operations are pretty much the last step, the ground tactical plan, which is just bog standard infantry s**t.

When I hear talk about specializing in airmobility, I see it as a cop out for some to simply not hit the books and understand the essential steps to successful airmobile planning.  A good unit can do an airmobile operation simulated with MLs.

 

[KevinB]

A good unit can do theoretical airmobile operation simulated with MLs.

Fixed it for you.

I've seen some colossally fucked up AirMobile operations by the troops themselves.

Getting on a Huey or Hook is not the same as boarding a ML.

Birds, (like jumping) add a reality to events that cannot be talked around, it takes blade hours, and that is expensive.

 

[Infanteer]

Getting on a helicopter is not a difficult skill to teach.  No bird - get the pilots and air crew over to talk the boys through a mock up.

The Germans built armoured divisions by practicing with bicycles and tank cutouts.  As corny as it may seem, anything is possible if leadership is smart enough.