Future Canadian Airborne Capability and Organisation! Or, is it Redundant? (a merged thread)

[Infanteer]

The layout of the Headquarters Shelter System’s internal space must be conducive to fostering collaborative work areas, space for briefings and room for the multitude of command post digital display screens.

...and of course, this is what the guys proposing the HQs are looking for, room for numerous vacuous briefs and multitudes of TV screens.... :facepalm:

 

[Kirkhill]

Under canvas in 20 minutes and a level floor? Challenge.

 

[Old Sweat]

...and of course, this is what the guys proposing the HQs are looking for, room for numerous vacuous briefs and multitudes of TV screens.... :facepalm:

which in turn means lots of people to go to briefings by lots of people who put stuff together produced by lots of other people who are cranking it out too quickly to comprehend the information they are processing, and most of the people at the briefings are being told stuff they already knew because they had reported it in the first place.  :boring:

 

[AmmoTech90]

The dangers of writing specs off the cuff:

The system shall be impervious to rain and provide adequate snow load capability to safely operate in Canada’s arctic.

The average snow fall in Tuktoyaktuk is 95 cm.  The average snow fall in Pembroke is 228 cm.  Perhaps an indication of our wholesale move north?

I realize it is a draft bit of PR fluff, but it makes the project look bad when they don't even know some basic facts about Canada's climate.

 

[Good2Golf]

There are five plans that are essential to any airmobile operation.  Staging, Loading, Air Movement, Landing and Ground Tactical.  The first and third are really aviation-led and involve taking off and flying around.  The loading and landing plans involve some good work by planners to make sure the right stuff is going and is put down in the right spot.  The last one is where the Army makes its money, and aside from running off the ramp of a helicopter, it is no different than any other "Phase II - Actions on the Objective".

Point out to me where you can't gain a certain degree of proficiency at these 5 plans through joint rehearsals/TEWTs?  Also, you allude to the fact that getting off a helo "isn't getting off an ML"; point out to me the specialized science behind walking off a ramp and going to your position?

Having planned and partaken in airmobile operations in both training and operations, I see things differently, so we'll have to agree to disagree.  I don't dispute your notion that more familiarity with the equipment will lead to slicker execution, but I don't think air mobile operations are some black art that can only be accomplished by someone in a specific unit or with a shiny, U.S. Army bauble on their uniform.

This.  Particularly the importance of the GTP.

Inter-org coord is critical, but forging of relationships in the off-hours hasn't occurred in the past to the degree that it should have, and because good planning often depends on solid relationships, the airmobile op more than often turns into a well-intentioned, but less-than-optimal goat rodeo somewhere between Y-Hour, L-hour and H-hour.

RoyalDrew also brings up good points about the C2 of the AMF, and there needs to be balance between having enough C2 cap, and having so much that it chokes the ability of the AMF to get well inside the baddies' decision-action cycle.

Enablers are important too, as is a good sustainment plan and, where it fits into the SoM, a solid Link-Up Plan as well.  It often seems that the sustainment after initial actions is either not well appreciated, or it is, but just not followed-up with.  It can be easy to get focused on the "how to get there" instead of the "what do we do when we get there."

The success to airborne/airmobile capability will be in identifying what the capability should be, then develop what method(s) are best suited to providing and supporting the capability.  It is too easy to get caught up in the specifics of how an airborne/airmobile force should get to where it should/wants to be, vice what should it be in the first place.

My own take on the overall capability space is push airborne primarily to CANSOF (with some exceptions within conventional force structure) and ensure that airmobile ops are understood by more of the field force than just the 3rd Bns...the wider the better.  Don't worry, the lifters will come to where the airmobilers are.  :nod:

:2c:

Regards
G2G

 

[Loachman]

one thing that we did was to build a very strong and close relationship with the aviators. We invited the pilots to our functions, we socialized with them, we talked to them at every opportunity. We - the gunners and the aviators - got to know each other and by osmosis we learned a lot about each other's capabilities and limitations.

That was about the time that I was happily flying Kiowas in 427 Squadron.

We belonged to the Airborne Mess, but Loach Flight Officers tended to spend more time at the Liri Valley Mess with the Recce guys and Gunners, or the Service Bn Mess where there were more women.

Yes, we generally socialized with those with and for who we worked. We had more in common with the Recce Guys and Gunners than we had with the Slug Drivers in our Squadron. The semi-alcoholic Brit Exchange Officer Net helped a lot as well - some pretty good inter-unit training activities were spawned in the days following the collection of their monthly NATO duty-free.

Since then, however, many things have driven a wedge between us, and it keeps getting hammered deeper and deeper.

The first noticeable thing for me was the new dress uniform colours. We hardly ever heard, or used, the term "a** f**ce" before those came out. We were all one highly co-operative blob of green. All of a sudden, however, it changed to "you Army guys" and you "a** f**ce guys".

The loss of the Kiowa and conversion to an all-Griffon fleet followed. We lost the Observers in the process, and therefore part of our semi-organic Army connection. We no longer had a real role because of that machine, and certainly not one anywhere nearly as intimate as the Recce role.

The ties between Tac Hel Squadrons and the Brigades are much thinner. 2 Brigade no longer even has a Squadron. Squadrons no longer operate for the Brigades that have one - co-ordinated by the G3 Aviation and run by a Squadron CO who used to operate much like the Arty CO, except that he relied on the G3 Aviation more, and flew as much as possible. Now, the Squadron is placed into an Air Expeditionary Wing and is tasked through an ACCE, neither of which has much of a clue regarding Tac Hel. Static ops like Afghanistan have permitted this to continue, cancer-like; reversion to a more traditional mobile operation as in a general/Cold War situation would prove the problems with that.

As G3 Aviation in the SSF (now 2 CMBG), I had direct tasking authority for 427 Squadron missions in direct support of operational training for SSF. I received helquests from SSF units, conducted the required liaison, and issued heltasks to 427 Squadron with info copies to 10 Tactical Air Group (the forerunner of 1 Wing). Now, the current G3 Aviation receives helquests, sends them to 1 Wing Ops (in garrison) or to the ACCE on an exercise, where we put them into the RFE system on CSNI. Too many steps, over too long a distance, too independent upon reliable electronic means, and involving too many people of too high ranks who do not necessarily understand.

I ran five Canadian Chinooks, six Canadian Twin Hueys, six US ARNG single Hueys, and a buttload of Kiowas as a single Captain with an eighteen-year-old semi-trained Sigs Pte, a phone, a typewriter, pen, paper, and an Iltis for two hectic weeks in 1990.

That's all that one really needs - motivation, imagination, a little experience, and a logical command and control relationship and system.

 

[Old Sweat]

Indeed, but the point I was trying to make is that if one is trying to figure out how to develop an airmobile capability, one should talk to the aviation community along with a host of other folks.

And for a bonus, direct liaison - talking and working together - can sort out a potential issue well before it even gets its first urgent tag stapled to it in the NDHQ CR. Helmets on. When moving C1s by Voyaguers we were encountering cases of the sling slipping down over the panoramic sight mount and ripping it off when the aircraft lifted the gun, which entailed a gun out of action for several weeks in 2nd line maintenance. My guys were blaming 450 and they were bad mouthing us as a bunch of incompetents who didn't know how to rig guns properly. On a recce to Norway I had got to know the DCO of 427 Sqn who had been a Voyaguer pilot in a previous existence and I gave him a call. The next time we were doing air mobility, he came to the gun position and watched. Lo and behold, a sight mount was indeed ripped out in front of his eyes. This was being caused by the aircraft dipping slightly as it transitioned to forward flight, which is perfectly normal. The gun would touch the ground and as the aircraft continued to dip, the sling would loop around the sight mount. A change in the flight profile along with some rerouting of the slings solved the problem quickly and easily. Helmets off.

 

[Good2Golf]

OS, for what it's worth, I understand that the aviation CoC in airmobile land intends on having LOs and LNCMs designated to each of the Bde units in order to establish and reinforce exactly those kinds of relationships.  That, and the double-hook configuration for the M777 should take care of things... :nod:

Regards
G2G

 

[Old Sweat]

OS, for what it's worth, I understand that the aviation CoC in airmobile land intends on having LOs and LNCMs designated to each of the Bde units in order to establish and reinforce exactly those kinds of relationships.  That, and the double-hook configuration for the M777 should take care of things... :nod:

Regards
G2G

:nod:      :nod:      :nod:        :cheers:          :nod:      :nod:        :nod:

 

[PPCLI Guy]

...and of course, this is what the guys proposing the HQs are looking for, room for numerous vacuous briefs and multitudes of TV screens.... :facepalm:

Nuts.  I wonder if they plan on asking the users what they want?

Time to launch or we will have another CIS

:trainwreck:

 

[GK .Dundas]

while I was wandering thru the net I came across this .I hope it will help explain just how an Airborne operation actually works .
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vacad5TV2K4

 

[Jungle]

while I was wandering thru the net I came across this .I hope it will help explain just how an Airborne operation actually works .
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vacad5TV2K4

There are a few things wrong with that video; first of all, just 2 minutes into it, we see the CO and staff wearing the old fleece shirt as an outer garment... SACRILEGE !!! No wonder we were disbanded... 

Secondly, there are no computers, no 50-inch TVs, no inflated staff...  8)

Seriously, there are times I miss that era; good vid, thanks !!

 

[Jarnhamar]

Is the rapid (fastest in NATO?) descent speed on the Canadian chutes worth the trade off for the increased amount of injuries they cause our jumpers?

If we continue to employ conventional jump companies what about giving them some more forgiving chutes?  I realize the benefit of getting to the ground faster but I'm considering the amount of injuries against the number of times we've jumped into combat.

 

[KevinB]

CT-1 makes sure jumper go where they where 'aimed' -- larger chutes with more control don't.

The other aspect is the forward speed on a CT-2 or square chute are higher.  Generally it takes more skills to jump a steerable chute, and greater chance for injury

 

[Jarnhamar]

I am enlightened, thanks

 

[Jungle]

CT-1 makes sure jumper go where they where 'aimed' -- larger chutes with more control don't.

Actually, we don't need larger parachutes; we need lo-po or no-po canopies that will slow the rate of descent. Some modern S-L parachutes also offer steerability without forward momentum, so a jumper can choose how he will land and reduce injuries related to those rear-left landings !!

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Actually, we don't need larger parachutes; we need lo-po or no-po canopies that will slow the rate of descent. Some modern S-L parachutes also offer steerability without forward momentum, so a jumper can choose how he will land and reduce injuries related to those rear-left landings !!

:ditto:

Their is far better technology on the market then what we are presently using; however, will we acquire it?  I believe the crew that just went down on JOAX jumped the new T11 chutes the Americans use.  Will we acquire these chutes?  Uncertain, atleast until the canopy life of our present chutes is past and even then we may end up making some decisions that maybe we simply won't replace the capability, who knows?

Is the rapid (fastest in NATO?) descent speed on the Canadian chutes worth the trade off for the increased amount of injuries they cause our jumpers?

If we continue to employ conventional jump companies what about giving them some more forgiving chutes?  I realize the benefit of getting to the ground faster but I'm considering the amount of injuries against the number of times we've jumped into combat.

If you want guys on the ground faster just drop them at a lower altitude, of course, this may mean you are unable to deploy your reserve parachute if something goes wrong. 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Of4E-2fSeWs

Video above is of Brit Paras jumping under 500ft

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sWi_rMy2Lcg

Brit Paras again jumping with a Low Level Parachute, this time at 250ft

 

[Jarnhamar]

If you want guys on the ground faster just drop them at a lower altitude, of course, this may mean you are unable to deploy your reserve parachute if something goes wrong. 

Not at all. I was just wondering about ways to reduce the number of injuries our guys have.  I've heard our chutes are notorious but I wouldn't know personally.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

Not at all. I was just wondering about ways to reduce the number of injuries our guys have.  I've heard our chutes are notorious but I wouldn't know personally.

I'm not a jumper either I am just part of a Light Battalion so I have a little bit of background info at my disposal.  Two and a half years ago on the Bde spring Ex, Mike Coy jumped onto the Mattawa and suffered 18 injuries on the jump.  A number of soldiers were injured and the most serious had to be airlifted to Ottawa for treatment.  One guy, a Platoon Commander at the time shattered his leg and has never been able to walk right since then.  A few other suffered some head injuries, some of which I would attribute to the SPECTRA helmet we use.  The French airborne units do not use this helmet when they jump because they have deemed it unsuitable for jumping. Rather, they continue to use their older jump helmet.

A good buddy of mine was down on JOAX and said jumping the T11 and our chutes was night and day.  He landed on concrete with the T11 and not a scratch.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Not at all. I was just wondering about ways to reduce the number of injuries our guys have.  I've heard our chutes are notorious but I wouldn't know personally.

The more you parachute and the fitter you are, the fewer injuries you get. No suprises there. Only four jumps per year is just asking for injuries.

If you have some idiot who won't stop drop if the winds get above 'Lucky 13knts', or if you are dispatched from too low an altitude, you can be in trouble too. (find a happy place find a happy place find a happy place)