Future Canadian Airborne Capability and Organisation! Or, is it Redundant? (a merged thread)

[daftandbarmy]

Piling on - if you can intrude on foreign airspace to drop bombs why can't you intrude on foreign airspace to drop paras?

I think the only real objection would be the willingness of the para's originating government to accept casualties.

It's amazing how fast a country's priorities can shift once you start seeing your own civilian nationals being chopped into pieces on TV. The military should., of course, be ready to respond with a  range of options as required, one of them being immediate armed response to a 'worst case' scenario, regardless of potential casualties.

I think we have a bunch of those options covered, except for the 'worst case' scenario.

 

[ArmyRick]

If it comes to down to dollars (lets pretend their is political will) to keep an airborne capability alive, I would push for reducing third battalions to Nil strength and concentrate the three jump companies plus each having some detachments of specialist. Put this unit in Pet, all the facilities are there.
I would suggest maybe a 3 rifle platoon company with a fourth support platoon consisting of signals, medics, combat engineers, FAC/JTAC. Add in one company headquarters.

Keep the three companies at different states of readiness. Put this unit under the CJOC control (and not the army). Task with the following
-Permanent national QRF
-Defense of Canada's arctic (and other far north ops)
-Extra muscle if CANSOFCOM calls for it
-Yes, oh the Liberals would love this, a manpower pool immediately available for DART deployments (which are usually short duration?)

Thoughts? Rotten fruits to throw at me?

 

[daftandbarmy]

If it comes to down to dollars (lets pretend their is political will) to keep an airborne capability alive, I would push for reducing third battalions to Nil strength and concentrate the three jump companies plus each having some detachments of specialist. Put this unit in Pet, all the facilities are there.
I would suggest maybe a 3 rifle platoon company with a fourth support platoon consisting of signals, medics, combat engineers, FAC/JTAC. Add in one company headquarters.

Keep the three companies at different states of readiness. Put this unit under the CJOC control (and not the army). Task with the following
-Permanent national QRF
-Defense of Canada's arctic (and other far north ops)
-Extra muscle if CANSOFCOM calls for it
-Yes, oh the Liberals would love this, a manpower pool immediately available for DART deployments (which are usually short duration?)

Thoughts? Rotten fruits to throw at me?

Increase your core strength to battalions, add arty, engr and other meaningful combat & CS support, and you may be in the right ball park.

We already have the 'slipper wearing Ninja' units, they need a bigger bully as backup.

 

[Brasidas]

If it comes to down to dollars (lets pretend their is political will) to keep an airborne capability alive, I would push for reducing third battalions to Nil strength and concentrate the three jump companies plus each having some detachments of specialist. Put this unit in Pet, all the facilities are there.
I would suggest maybe a 3 rifle platoon company with a fourth support platoon consisting of signals, medics, combat engineers, FAC/JTAC. Add in one company headquarters.

Keep the three companies at different states of readiness. Put this unit under the CJOC control (and not the army). Task with the following
-Permanent national QRF
-Defense of Canada's arctic (and other far north ops)
-Extra muscle if CANSOFCOM calls for it
-Yes, oh the Liberals would love this, a manpower pool immediately available for DART deployments (which are usually short duration?)

Thoughts? Rotten fruits to throw at me?

Maybe I'm missing some sarcasm here, but isn't there already a unit there of similar composition if not role?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Maybe I'm missing some sarcasm here, but isn't there already a unit there of similar composition if not role?

Not with Artillery and other things that make bad guys die faster, in bigger bunches, from a greater distance, and in smaller pieces.

 

[Brasidas]

Not with Artillery and other things that make bad guys die faster, in bigger bunches, from a greater distance, and in smaller pieces.

I saw the delta in your post; I wasn't seeing it in Rick's.

 

[GR66]

While an airborne battlegroup certainly would be desireable, is it economically and logistically feasible for the CF?  Could you get away with an airborne company group spearhead to secure an airfield backed up by the balance of an airmobile battlegroup?

 

[Old Sweat]

Except in the Canadian North, I doubt that an airborne company group could secure an airfield in sufficient force to allow the fly-in of the rest of a battle group against any sort of opposition. I am basing this on a rough calculation of numbers versus tasks and time and space.

 

[GR66]

Except in the Canadian North, I doubt that an airborne company group could secure an airfield in sufficient force to allow the fly-in of the rest of a battle group against any sort of opposition. I am basing this on a rough calculation of numbers versus tasks and time and space.

Is there a serious threat of Russia or China landing battalion + sized forces in the Canadian North?  To what purpose?  Where could they go from there and what military objective would they achieve?  Would it not be easier to starve them out by shooting down/sinking their resupply rather than sending in our own land forces to face them? 

I can maybe see foreign forces seizing economic assets in disputed arctic waters (drilling rigs, etc.?) but what would be achieved by taking Yellowknife or Inuvik or even the entries to the North West Passage?

 

[Kirkhill]

How much manpower would be required to locate and neutralize a section sized body bent on disrupting infra-structure?  How much for multiples?  How quickly do you want the response in place?

 

[Old Sweat]

The North American Defence Plan which dates back to 1946 included (and probably still does) the requirement to counter a Soviet\Russian lodgement to seize an airfield in the north. This was because their long range bombers did not have the range to reach targets in the US and Canada without refuelling. Whether this is still valid is moot, but the requirement to counter a lodgement by airborne assault seemed to have developed some remarkable longevity, even if there has been a degree of creative thinking over the years. 

Google Exercise Sweetbriar for an example of the type of exercises conducted as early as 1950.

 

[Kirkhill]

The North American Defence Plan which dates back to 1946 included (and probably still does) the requirement to counter a Soviet\Russian lodgement to seize an airfield in the north. This was because their long range bombers did not have the range to reach targets in the US and Canada without refuelling. Whether this is still valid is moot, but the requirement to counter a lodgement by airborne assault seemed to have developed some remarkable longevity, even if there has been a degree of creative thinking over the years.

Does that go back discussions about threats, capabilities and intent?

Does a threat exist if only capability or intent exist?  Does the capability to seize an airfield in the north exist?  I would argue: yes.  Does the intent exist?  I would argue: I don't know.  I can't divine the thoughts of my wife let alone the thoughts of murderers or foreign politicians.

I don't think it is possible to say what perceived strategic interest may prompt some body to seize sovereign territory.  But why make it easy for them by having zero response capability?

If we can't despatch a battalion quickly to any part of Canada do we really have a claim on that territory?

 

[GR66]

...

If we can't despatch a battalion quickly to any part of Canada do we really have a claim on that territory?

I don't think any/many would argue that point.  The question is does sovereignty require the ability to conduct a battalion-sized parachute assault against what MAY (of course NOTHING is impossible) be more a hypothetical than real military threat?  Is a smaller, quick reaction force with the capability to either secure an existing airfield or prepare a rough landing field for follow-on airmobile forces enough? 

And what is the cost to other national military capabilities which may be required to counter much more probable threats if we choose to put a significant portion of our limited defence budget into supporting an airborne battalion?  What do we give up to fund this capability?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Except in the Canadian North, I doubt that an airborne company group could secure an airfield in sufficient force to allow the fly-in of the rest of a battle group against any sort of opposition. I am basing this on a rough calculation of numbers versus tasks and time and space.

Depending on the threat, the 'footprint' of the airfield needs to be secured as well, not just the hard pan. That doesn't require everyone to be 'jumpers' of course, as you can air land follow on troops, but it does probably require a force bigger than a company group.

 

[Kirkhill]

I don't think any/many would argue that point.  The question is does sovereignty require the ability to conduct a battalion-sized parachute assault against what MAY (of course NOTHING is impossible) be more a hypothetical than real military threat?  Is a smaller, quick reaction force with the capability to either secure an existing airfield or prepare a rough landing field for follow-on airmobile forces enough? 

And what is the cost to other national military capabilities which may be required to counter much more probable threats if we choose to put a significant portion of our limited defence budget into supporting an airborne battalion?  What do we give up to fund this capability?

But I don't perceive the two forces as mutually exclusive.

I am pretty sure that we could train every soldier in the army to fall out of a plane if we wanted to.  If we don't want to do that I don't see that it is impractical to load para trained light infantry (with necessary sappers, signallers and gunners) into trucks, helos, boats, LCUs, ships or even LAVs or Narmers.

I do think that the force structure should reflect the ability to make those kinds of shifts in a timely manner.

 

[Old Sweat]

Depending on the threat, the 'footprint' of the airfield needs to be secured as well, not just the hard pan. That doesn't require everyone to be 'jumpers' of course, as you can air land follow on troops, but it does probably require a force bigger than a company group.

Exactly. Approaches have to be controlled and the fuel farm, ATC and other facilities have to be secured. This implies sufficient force in the initial drop to establish a perimeter and secure inside it, then build up forces to extend it and operate the airfield and marshall the follow on forces. As luck would have it, I am working on the chapter on the Defence of Nicosia Airport by 1st Airborne Battery RCA in August 1974, so I have been deep into source material. The defenders had a company formed of two troops of the battery and a troop of the Airborne Field Squadron, two 106 RRs, a troop of Brit Swingfires and one of light armour, a Lynx patrol from the LdSH(RC) and a Brit FAC. This only gave them enough troops to hold the terminal, ATC building and ancillary structures in the area. The runways, tarmac etc including the five destroyed jetliners of Cyprus Air were not within the defended area.

 

[daftandbarmy]

But I don't perceive the two forces as mutually exclusive.

I am pretty sure that we could train every soldier in the army to fall out of a plane if we wanted to.  If we don't want to do that I don't see that it is impractical to load para trained light infantry (with necessary sappers, signallers and gunners) into trucks, helos, boats, LCUs, ships or even LAVs or Narmers.

I do think that the force structure should reflect the ability to make those kinds of shifts in a timely manner.

Group the LIBs into an 'airportable brigade'. Have one bn on 'airborne' status, the other two on 'airlanding' status and shift the airborne role around every year, or something like that. Practise inserting into an operational area with the 'in role airborne BGp' doing the assault, then securing the airfield for the other two to fly in and secure the footprint and conduct exploitation operations elsewhere.

But whatever you do, don't call it the Airborne Regiment

 

[Kirkhill]

Group the LIBs into an 'airportable brigade'. Have one bn on 'airborne' status, the other two on 'airlanding' status and shift the airborne role around every year, or something like that. Practise inserting into an operational area with the 'in role airborne BGp' doing the assault, then securing the airfield for the other two to fly in and secure the footprint and conduct exploitation operations elsewhere.

But whatever you do, don't call it the Airborne Regiment

The Canadian Peace Establishment Committee?

 

[Old Sweat]

Group the LIBs into an 'airportable brigade'. Have one bn on 'airborne' status, the other two on 'airlanding' status and shift the airborne role around every year, or something like that. Practise inserting into an operational area with the 'in role airborne BGp' doing the assault, then securing the airfield for the other two to fly in and secure the footprint and conduct exploitation operations elsewhere.

But whatever you do, don't call it the Airborne Regiment

I'd like someone who served in the Airborne Regiment to comment, but I feel the one year rotation has readiness, continuity and training issues. I am not opposed to an airportable brigade group, but suggest a permanent airborne battalion group is the way to go in just about every way except political acceptability. Oh, wait.

 

[PanaEng]

I'd like someone who served in the Airborne Regiment to comment, but I feel the one year rotation has readiness, continuity and training issues. I am not opposed to an airportable brigade group, but suggest a permanent airborne battalion group is the way to go in just about every way except political acceptability. Oh, wait.

As a Sapper/Cpl with the AB BG in the late 80s I can attest that it was really hard to maintain the required occupational trg and the para/interoperability trg. A rotation will further weaken the overall readiness of the whole as you lose continuity, as you said, and synergy/lessons learned to build on.