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Georgia and the Russian invasions/annexations/Lebensraum (2008 & 2015)

Saturday, August 16, 2008

Russian forces pull back from Georgian town, other troops stay put

Christopher Torchia, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

IGOETI, Georgia - Russian forces pulled back Saturday from the centre of a town not far from Georgia's capital after Russia's president signed a ceasefire deal, but other troops stayed put despite pressure for Moscow to honour the agreement.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said a broader withdrawal would come only with further security measures, calling into question how quickly the troops will be out.

Lavrov also said Russia would strengthen its peacekeeping contingent in South Ossetia, the breakaway Georgian region at the centre of more than a week of warfare that has sharply soured relations between Moscow and the West. .....

The Russian seizure of territory raised fears that Moscow was aiming for a permanent occupation of the country that once was part of its empire.....

But he (Lavrov) said any "international mechanism" for South Ossetia must back the work of Russian peacekeepers long stationed in the province, indicating that Georgia would not be able to restore its peacekeeping contingent there.

"These questions are not decided by Condoleezza Rice or somebody else. They are decided first of all by the side that has suffered in the conflict," Lavrov said. "What peacekeepers from what countries are needed for the people of South Ossetia to feel comfortable is a primarily up to the people of South Ossetia."

Lavrov also said the cease-fire deal Saakashvili differed from the one signed by Medvedev, lacking the introductory portion. While the difference appeared largely to be a technicality, it was one that either side might potentially cite if it wanted to abandon the deal.

Link

So we have a deal with a backdoor opt out, and a set up where South Ossetians will ask for Russian Peacekeepers to protect them.  Presumably the Georgians will then ask for American/NATO/EU/Ukrainian Peacekeepers.

As I said in a PM to one of the members: Berlin II but with the Russians in the Salient at the end of a Corridor (the Roki Tunnel Corridor).

Revolution +71 and the White Forces are back to where they were in Revolution +5.
 
Salim Mansur on the dangers of this conflict:

http://www.torontosun.com/Comment/2008/08/16/pf-6469236.html

On the rogue again
Russia provides lesson to Iran in the power of nukes and oil
By SALIM MANSUR

In one swift demonstration of military swagger Moscow punctured soft-headed thinking in the West that since the Soviet Union's disintegration post-Communist Russia would be a partner supporting freedom and democracy's progress around the world.

The invasion of Georgia was choreographed by Vladimir Putin's Russia, sending to western capitals the message that Moscow's interests in controlling the former vassal states of the defunct Soviet empire on its borders remain unchanged.

Moscow is the capital of a state that has failed repeatedly to consummate its ambition of being equal to or greater than its western rivals since the times of Peter the Great in the early 18th century. During the last century a savage political ideology backed by military ruthlessness provided Moscow with a facade of great power status that eventually crumbled through irresolvable inner contradictions.

Its lies and weaknesses exposed, Russia momentarily withdrew behind its own frontiers while embracing cosmetic democratic reforms as a charade.

This was greeted in the West, exhausted by the Cold War, as the end of history and other associated platitudes of new age politics.

An August invasion of the small nation of Georgia is a reminder of another Moscow's mid-summer blitzkrieg into Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the crushing of Prague Spring.

RISK AVOIDANCE

Moscow's rulers knew then, as they do now 40 years later, that the West will not risk military confrontation for one simple reason. Russia is a giant rogue state with nuclear weapons.

But Moscow also is assured of the West's soft-power approach -- the game of endlessly talking with adversaries for keeping the pretence of doing something -- as the European Union's dependency on Russian oil and gas grows.

A nuclear weapon state sitting atop vital energy reserves is a combination that seemingly guarantees Moscow the power to bully its neighbours, and to take it for granted that the West will grudgingly respect Russia's sphere of influence as it did during the Cold War era of a divided Europe.

For the West to reflexively appeal to the UN is worse than delusional given Moscow's veto in the Security Council. This would be a craven gesture appeasing a rogue state in the temple of hypocrisy, and conceding there is not much the free world can do in responding to naked aggression.

Putin's power play has its admirers, and likely none more than the power-crazed theocrats in Iran. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his master, Ayatollah Khamenei, have been given a vivid display of how potent is the mix of nuclear weapons and energy reserves in contemplating military force against opponents.

If the West cannot protect the fragile democracy of Georgia, nor guarantee its independence and territorial integrity by doing the minimum of suspending Russia from the G-8 club, it must yet demonstrate some spine to deter rogue states -- such as Iran, Sudan, or Venezuela -- from imitating Putin's swagger.

There was another August, within reach of living memory 94 years ago, when Europe tumbled into a catastrophic war. Russia's invasion of Georgia hopefully will not be the guns of August for our generation.

But when small states are crushed by rogue powers, and the first impulse is to appease the aggressor and blame the victim as western democracies did in September 1938 over Czechoslovakia, then the catastrophe that free people desperately seek to avoid paradoxically looms closer.

 
Another aspect of this conflict and look at these enclaves - if I recall correctly, the same could be said about Muldavia:

August 16, 2008
Op-Ed Contributor
When the War Ends, Start to Worry
By MICHAEL BRONNER
EVEN as Russia and Georgia continue their on-again, off-again struggle over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a frenzied tea-leaf reading about the war’s global political ramifications has broken out across airwaves and think-tank forums. But as the situation on the ground recedes inevitably to some new form of the pernicious “frozen conflict” that has plagued the region since Georgia’s civil wars of the early 1990s, few are paying attention to a less portentous but equally critical international threat: an increase in the longstanding, rampant criminality in the conflict zones that is likely to further destabilize the entire Caucasus region and at worst provide terrorist groups with the nuclear material they have long craved.

While the Russian “peacekeepers” who entrenched themselves in the conflict zones in the 1990s (and who will now likely resume their posts anew) have proved ineffectual and uninterested in maintaining stability, they’ve been highly successful in protecting an array of sophisticated criminal networks stretching from Russia through Georgian territory. South Ossetia, in particular, is a nest of organized crime. It is a marketplace for a variety of contraband, from fuel to cigarettes, wheat flour, hard drugs, weapons, people and, recently, counterfeit United States $100 bills “minted” at a press inside the conflict zone.

“It’s a pretty sophisticated counterfeiting piece,” the American ambassador to Georgia, John Tefft, told me when I was in Georgia last year. He added that the fake bills appear so authentic that, if you weren’t specifically looking for a forgery, you’d easily miss it. More than $20 million worth have been found up and down the East Coast of the United States as well as in Israel, Russia and Georgia.

“We know where the printing press is,” Shota Utiashvili, a chief intelligence analyst at Georgia’s Interior Ministry, told me last year, when I was researching a study on smuggling that was published by Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “We know the channels of distribution. And we know who is running the business. But the problem is neither we nor the Americans can do anything because the place is under the protection of the Russian military.” I found this sentiment echoed in my discussions at the American Embassy.

Far more dangerous contraband than fake bills is bartered in the conflict zones. On a bleak winter day last year, I hitched a ride from Tbilisi, the capital, to the “administrative border” — the semiporous line of control that swoops deep into Georgian territory from the Russian border demarking the contours of South Ossetia. I was investigating one of the most serious nuclear smuggling incidents in years — an offer of up to 3 kilograms of bomb-grade highly enriched uranium.

Because South Ossetia is within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders, Georgia doesn’t recognize the South Ossetian periphery as a legitimate frontier, and has thus refused to post border guards or impose any normal controls at the administrative line. At the grim little checkpoint, I had to navigate through dozens of armed young men, clad in seemingly random combinations of camouflage, none bearing the insignia of a national force (the scariest kind of border to cross, as there’s no way of telling who’s who).

Aside from demanding bribes from journalists, these South Ossetian irregulars, backed by the Russian peacekeepers, have long prevented Georgian forces from getting anywhere near the actual border — a two-lane hole called the Roki Tunnel that plunges into a mountainside on the Russian side of the border, cuts through two miles of bedrock beneath the Caucasus Mountains and pops out in South Ossetia, smack in the war zone.

Three years ago, Georgian intelligence officials began receiving reports from South Ossetian criminal contacts that a Russian smuggler — a North Ossetian calling himself Oleg — was circulating in Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital. He was reportedly looking for a buyer for what he claimed was high-quality enriched uranium pilfered from the Russian military. The price was $1 million for the initial shipment: 100 grams at $10,000 per gram. If the deal went well, a mother lode of up to 3 kilograms would be made available. One hundred grams of highly enriched uranium is not enough to build a nuclear bomb — it’s thought that even a top-tier terrorist group would require at least 15 kilograms — but it would be a step in the right direction.

Huge international efforts sponsored by the United States State, Energy and Defense Departments have sought to counter such nuclear smuggling (since 1994, the Energy Department has spent upwards of $420 million installing nuclear detection equipment at international border crossings, most of that effort concentrated on Russia’s frontiers), but conflict zones like South Ossetia have been an Achilles’ heel.

In this case, we got lucky. A haphazard sting operation run by Georgian paramilitaries and Interior Ministry agents recovered the 100 grams of highly enriched uranium and captured Oleg Khinsagov, the Russian smuggler, and three Georgian associates. Testing of the material proved it to be nearly 90 percent pure — bomb-grade uranium indeed — sending secure telephone lines ringing from Washington to Langley, Va.

The Russian government refused to acknowledge the obvious — that the uranium had originated in Russia — so a quickly assembled team of American experts from the Energy Department and the F.B.I. loaded an unmarked jet and quietly raced to Tbilisi to secure the material.

Good police work is vital, but we simply cannot depend on dramatic interventions like the Georgian raid to combat the broad security threats posed by anarchy on Russia’s borders. There are some great examples of cooperation between Washington and Moscow — the setting up of nuclear detection programs at borders is clearly one of them. Somehow, however, the full spirit of cooperation has yet to reach to the top of Russia’s government — the same men, unfortunately, who seem more inclined to pouring fuel on the fire in Georgia.

Michael Bronner is an investigative journalist and filmmaker.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/16/opinion/16bronner.html?_r=1&th=&emc=th&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin



 
Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from Friday’s Daily Telegraph is an opinion piece that should give us a good view of what America’s so-called (but mislabelled) conservatives ‘wing’ thinks about the Georgia crisis:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2563260/John-Bolton-After-Russias-invasion-of-Georgia-what-now-for-the-West.html
After Russia's invasion of Georgia, what now for the West?
At least for now, the smoke seems to be clearing from the Georgian battlefield. But the extent of the wreckage reaches far beyond that small country.

By John R Bolton

Last Updated: 2:32PM BST 15 Aug 2008

Russia’s invasion across an internationally recognised border, its thrashing of the Georgian military, and its smug satisfaction in humbling one of its former fiefdoms represents only the visible damage.

As bad as the bloodying of Georgia is, the broader consequences are worse. The United States fiddled while Georgia burned, not even reaching the right rhetorical level in its public statements until three days after the Russian invasion began, and not, at least to date, matching its rhetoric with anything even approximating decisive action. This pattern is the very definition of a paper tiger. Sending Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice to Tbilisi is touching, but hardly reassuring; dispatching humanitarian assistance is nothing more than we would have done if Georgia had been hit by a natural rather than a man-made disaster.

The European Union took the lead in diplomacy, with results approaching Neville Chamberlain’s moment in the spotlight at Munich: a ceasefire that failed to mention Georgia’s territorial integrity, and that all but gave Russia permission to continue its military operations as a “peacekeeping” force anywhere in Georgia. More troubling, over the long term, was that the EU saw its task as being mediator – its favourite role in the world – between Georgia and Russia, rather than an advocate for the victim of aggression.

Even this dismal performance was enough to relegate Nato to an entirely backstage role, while Russian tanks and planes slammed into a “faraway country”, as Chamberlain once observed so thoughtfully. In New York, paralysed by the prospect of a Russian veto, the UN Security Council, that Temple of the High-Minded, was as useless as it was during the Cold War. In fairness to Russia, it at least still seems to understand how to exercise power in the Council, which some other Permanent Members often appear to have forgotten.

The West, collectively, failed in this crisis. Georgia wasted its dime making that famous 3am telephone call to the White House, the one Hillary Clinton referred to in a campaign ad questioning Barack Obama’s fitness for the Presidency. Moreover, the blood on the Bear’s claws did not go unobserved in other states that were once part of the Soviet Union. Russia demonstrated unambiguously that it could have marched directly to Tbilisi and installed a puppet government before any Western leader was able to turn away from the Olympic Games. It could, presumably, do the same to them.

Fear was one reaction Russia wanted to provoke, and fear it has achieved, not just in the “Near Abroad” but in the capitals of Western Europe as well. But its main objective was hegemony, a hegemony it demonstrated by pledging to reconstruct Tskhinvali, the capital of its once and no-longer-future possession, South Ossetia. The contrast is stark: a real demonstration of using sticks and carrots, the kind that American and European diplomats only talk about. Moreover, Russia is now within an eyelash of dominating the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the only route out of the Caspian Sea region not now controlled by either Russia or Iran. Losing this would be dramatically unhelpful if we hope for continued reductions in global petroleum prices, and energy independence from unfriendly, or potentially unfriendly, states.

It profits us little to blame Georgia for “provoking” the Russian attack. Nor is it becoming of the United States to have anonymous officials from its State Department telling reporters, as they did earlier this week, that they had warned Georgia not to provoke Russia. This confrontation is not about who violated the Marquess of Queensbury rules in South Ossetia, where ethnic violence has been a fact of life since the break-up of the Soviet Union on December 31, 1991 – and, indeed, long before. Instead, we are facing the much larger issue of how Russia plans to behave in international affairs for decades to come. Whether Mikhail Saakashvili “provoked” the Russians on August 8, or September 8, or whenever, this rape was well-planned and clearly coming, given Georgia’s manifest unwillingness to be “Finlandized” – the Cold War term for effectively losing your foreign-policy independence.

So, as an earlier Vladimir liked to say, “What is to be done?” There are three key focal points for restoring our credibility here in America: drawing a clear line for Russia; getting Europe’s attention; and checking our own intestinal fortitude. Whether history reflects Russia’s Olympic invasion as the first step toward recreating its empire depends – critically – on whether the Bush Administration can resurrect its once-strong will in its waning days, and on what US voters will do in the election in November. Europe also has a vital role – by which I mean the real Europe, its nation states, not the bureaucracies and endless councils in Brussels.

First, Russia has made it clear that it will not accept a vacuum between its borders and the boundary line of Nato membership. Since the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union collapsed, this has been a central question affecting successive Nato membership decisions, with the fear that nations in the “gap” between Nato and Russia would actually be more at risk of Russian aggression than if they joined Nato. The potential for instability and confrontation was evident.

Europe’s rejection this spring of President Bush’s proposal to start Ukraine and Georgia towards Nato membership was the real provocation to Russia, because it exposed Western weakness and timidity. As long as that perception exists in Moscow, the risk to other former Soviet territories – and in precarious regions such as the Middle East – will remain.

Obviously, not all former Soviet states are as critical to Nato as Ukraine, because of its size and strategic location, or Georgia, because of its importance to our access to the Caspian Basin’s oil and natural gas reserves. Moreover, not all of them meet fundamental Nato prerequisites. But we must now review our relationship with all of them. This, in effect, Nato failed to do after the Orange and Rose Revolutions, leaving us in our present untenable position.

By its actions in Georgia, Russia has made clear that its long-range objective is to fill that “gap” if we do not. That, as Western leaders like to say, is “unacceptable”. Accordingly, we should have a foreign-minister-level meeting of Nato to reverse the spring capitulation at Bucharest, and to decide that Georgia and Ukraine will be Nato’s next members. By drawing the line clearly, we are not provoking Russia, but doing just the opposite: letting them know that aggressive behaviour will result in costs that they will not want to bear, thus stabilising a critical seam between Russia and the West. In effect, we have already done this successfully with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Second, the United States needs some straight talk with our friends in Europe, which ideally should have taken place long before the assault on Georgia. To be sure, American inaction gave French President Sarkozy and the EU the chance to seize the diplomatic initiative. However, Russia did not invade Georgia with diplomats or roubles, but with tanks. This is a security threat, and the proper forum for discussing security threats on the border of a Nato member – yes, Europe, this means Turkey – is Nato.

Saying this may cause angst in Europe’s capitals, but now is the time to find out if Nato can withstand a potential renewed confrontation with Moscow, or whether Europe will cause Nato to wilt. Far better to discover this sooner rather than later, when the stakes may be considerably higher. If there were ever a moment since the fall of the Berlin Wall when Europe should be worried, this is it. If Europeans are not willing to engage through Nato, that tells us everything we need to know about the true state of health of what is, after all, supposedly a “North Atlantic” alliance.

Finally, the most important step will take place right here in the United States. With a Presidential election on November 4, Americans have an opportunity to take our own national pulse, given the widely differing reactions to Russia’s blitzkrieg from Senator McCain and (at least initially) Senator Obama. First reactions, before the campaigns’ pollsters and consultants get involved, are always the best indicators of a candidate’s real views. McCain at once grasped the larger, geostrategic significance of Russia’s attack, and the need for a strong response, whereas Obama at first sounded as timorous and tentative as the Bush Administration. Ironically, Obama later moved closer to McCain’s more robust approach, followed only belatedly by Bush.

In any event, let us have a full general election debate over the implications of Russia’s march through Georgia. Even before this incident, McCain had suggested expelling Russia from the G8; others have proposed blocking Russia’s application to join the World Trade Organisation or imposing economic sanctions as long as Russian troops remain in Georgia. Obama has assiduously avoided specifics in foreign policy – other than withdrawing speedily from Iraq – but that luxury should no longer be available to him. We need to know if Obama’s reprise of George McGovern’s 1972 campaign theme, “Come home, America”, is really what our voters want, or if we remain willing to persevere in difficult circumstances, as McCain has consistently advocated. Querulous Europe should hope, for its own sake, that America makes the latter choice.

John R Bolton is the former US Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Currently a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, he is the author of the recently published “Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations” (Simon & Schuster/Threshold Editions, £18.99), which is available from Telegraph Books for £16.99 + £1.25 p&p. To order, call 0870 428 4112 or go to books.telegraph.co.uk

I think Bolton’s analysis is pretty much dead on point throughout.

Let me take him paragraph by paragraph:

Russia’s invasion across an internationally recognised border, its thrashing of the Georgian military, and its smug satisfaction in humbling one of its former fiefdoms represents only the visible damage. Too true. It is also the sort of aggressive warfare for which we, including the Russians, hanger several Germans during my lifetime.

As bad as the bloodying of Georgia is, the broader consequences are worse. The United States fiddled while Georgia burned ... True again. Bolton goes farther, characterising America, under President George W Bush, as a paper tiger – strong stuff but America did look a lot like Casper Milquetoast for too many hours, stretching into too many days.

The European Union took the lead in diplomacy, with results approaching Neville Chamberlain’s moment in the spotlight at Munich ... Yes, indeed, proving, yet again, that a strong, coherent and self serving European foreign policy remains a Franco-German wet dream.

Even this dismal performance was enough to relegate Nato to an entirely backstage role [and] In New York, paralysed by the prospect of a Russian veto, the UN Security Council, that Temple of the High-Minded, was as useless as it was during the Cold War. Once again, too true. The UN is useless.

The West, collectively, failed in this crisis. And it continues to do so as it dithers, Paul Martin like, trying to parse the ’signals’ from the Caucuses.

Fear was one reaction Russia wanted to provoke, and fear it has achieved, not just in the “Near Abroad” but in the capitals of Western Europe as well. But its main objective was hegemony ... Yes, again. Now, I know that some members here object to constant reference to Russia and the Russians as being ”thuggish” but what other word applies to those who aim to provoke fear? Russia is a thug and the Russian people elected leaders who promised to make it so – and that qualifies the Russian people for the title of ”thuggish” too, in my book.

It profits us little to blame Georgia for “provoking” the Russian attack. Quite right. The Georgians were, technically, the ’aggressors’ but they were lured into that role by the Russians – using peasant like craftiness to create a crisis the Georgians could not ignore.

So, as an earlier Vladimir liked to say, “What is to be done?” There are three key focal points for restoring our credibility here in America: drawing a clear line for Russia; getting Europe’s attention; and checking our own intestinal fortitude. It is not just America’s credibility that needs restoring. The entire West is in the Casper Milquetoast mode.

First, Russia has made it clear that it will not accept a vacuum between its borders and the boundary line of Nato membership. A fact which must lead us to certain deductions that will, inevitably, influence whatever course of action we, eventually, decide to take.

Europe’s rejection this spring of President Bush’s proposal to start Ukraine and Georgia towards Nato membership was the real provocation to Russia, because it exposed Western weakness and timidity. True, again. But I think that NATO expansion, perhaps even NATO’s continued existence is problematical.

Obviously, not all former Soviet states are as critical to Nato as Ukraine, because of its size and strategic location, or Georgia, because of its importance to our access to the Caspian Basin’s oil and natural gas reserves. Which is why we need to keep Ukraine and Georgia out of Russia’s sphere of influence.

By its actions in Georgia, Russia has made clear that its long-range objective is to fill that “gap” if we do not. That, as Western leaders like to say, is “unacceptable”.And “unacceptable” is what it must remain.

Second, the United States needs some straight talk with our friends in Europe, which ideally should have taken place long before the assault on Georgia. But, as the man said, Europe is from Venus and America is from Mars.

Saying this may cause angst in Europe’s capitals, but now is the time to find out if Nato can withstand a potential renewed confrontation with Moscow, or whether Europe will cause Nato to wilt. But there is a bigger question: why is NATO still here, at all? Is it the best tool for guaranteeing the peace in Europe in the 21st century?

Finally, the most important step will take place right here in the United States. With a Presidential election on November 4, Americans have an opportunity to take our own national pulse, given the widely differing reactions to Russia’s blitzkrieg from Senator McCain and (at least initially) Senator Obama. Americans need to do some clear, not so politically correct talking, amongst themselves about their vital interests: their goals and the steps they need to take to met them. America’s friends and allies – Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark and so on  - need to have similar and coincident discussions – equally loud and equally politically incorrect.

In any event, let us have a full general election debate over the implications of Russia’s march through Georgia. Yes, indeed, and see above.

Bolton has a few prescriptions and I’m not so sure that they are all as good as his analysis:

1. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline must be kept out of Russian hands if America wishes to achieve “continued reductions in global petroleum prices, and energy independence from unfriendly, or potentially unfriendly, states.” Agreed.

2. There should be “a foreign-minister-level meeting of Nato to reverse the spring capitulation at Bucharest, and to decide that Georgia and Ukraine will be Nato’s next members.” I’m not so sure, but I don’t have any better ideas.

3. “This is a security threat,” Agreed! “and the proper forum for discussing security threats on the border of a Nato member – yes, Europe, this means Turkey – is Nato.” Sort of agreed, but shouldn’t there be a better forum? The problem is Bolton’s Eurocentric view. Russia’s return to its traditionally thuggish ways is a problem for more than just NATO-Europe.

4. America should follow John McCain and agree to expel Russia from the G8, deny it entry into the WTO, cancel all military cooperative measures and so on. Agreed, again.
 
NATO held, mostly, as long as there was an existential threat to the member states - and they were required to do nothing more than divert much of their unproductive society into large armies and self-serving defence industries - a glorious make-work project inherited from the 19th century that continues to cripple euro thinking on economics.

But back to the existential....


NATO started to drift when the threat "disappeared", when they were asked to act, when buffer states rose to take the brunt of any military action.

Spain, France, Italy, and much of Germany, now feel that there will be no war in their backyard.  They can afford to trade someone else's land for peace.  Fine.

Time to find allies with those  that feel the existential threat and that are willing to act. Time to support the new frontline states and let the Western European Union wither within NATO.

The Russians seem to behave themselves better when their limits are clearly proscribed.
 
Russia considering nukes for Syria, and other stable bastions of liberal democracy (not)  :(

Dig deep and keep the canned food handy....

http://www.debka.com/headline_print.php?hid=5513
 
Well, perhaps Europe is developing a backbone: http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/afp/080817/world/georgia_russia_conflict_nato:

Georgia 'will join NATO': Merkel
1 hour, 16 minutes ago



TBILISI (AFP) - German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Sunday assured Georgia would join NATO as she strongly backed the ex-Soviet republic's President Mikheil Saakashvili in his conflict with Russia.


"Georgia will become a member of NATO if it wants to -- and it does want to," she told reporters before talks with Saakashvili in Tbilisi.


It was one of the strongest statements yet of support for Georgia's NATO membership bid, which is fiercely opposed by Russia.


"We are on a clear road towards NATO membership (for Georgia)," she added at a later news conference.


On August 12, German Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung had said the conflict in the Caucusus had changed nothing with regard to Georgia's chances of joining the NATO military alliance.


At the last NATO summit in Bucharest in April, leaders agreed that Georgia and Ukraine should join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization eventually, but neither nation was given candidate status and no timetables were set.


The United States is strongly in favour of Georgia joining NATO, but misgivings from France and Germany prevented Tbilisi being awarded full candidate status in Bucharest.


Merkel was in Tbilisi to support Saakashvili and press for the withdrawal of Russian troops who attacked Georgia on August 8 to repulse an offensive by Georgian troops against a Moscow-backed separatist region, South Ossetia.


Standing side-by-side with Saakashvili at the news conference, Merkel declared that the "withdrawal of Russian troops is the most urgent task."


"I am looking forward to the speedy withdrawal of Russian troops, which has not yet happened as we had expected."


She was the latest world leader to visit Georgia -- which has repeatedly appealed for Western support -- after trips by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in the last week.


She said she had come to Tbilisi "to show that we support the Georgian people and also the government to deal with the work there is to do."


Merkel on Friday held talks with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who later in a frosty news conference stated that Moscow was "the guarantor of security" in the Caucasus region.


Meanwhile, Merkel also attempted to reassure Georgia about Russia's right under a ceasefire agreed earlier this week to take "additional security measures" outside the South Ossetia conflict zone.


This phrasing -- the most contentious issue in the EU-brokered six point ceasefire deal -- has raised fears in Tbilisi that Russia could maintain a long term troop presence deep inside the country.


"The security zone is temporary. This is not disputed by any of the parties," said Merkel.


She urged the rapid deployment of monitors from the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).


"It is more important that foreign observers arrive so it is not only troops of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)," she added, referring to the post-Soviet international body dominated by Russia.

Saakashvili angrily dismissed suggestions from some Russian military officials that their forces could stay on as "peacekeepers" to patrol the security zone.

"There is no such notion any more in Georgia as Russian peacekeepers. There can be no Russian peacekeepers -- these are just Russian forces," he said.

Employing his customary mix of rhetoric and emotion, Saakashvili added: "We will defend our capital whatever it takes."

Russian troops on Sunday remained deployed in the north and west of the country, including units within half an hour's drive of Tbilisi.

Russia says that regular forces will begin withdrawing Monday but that an unspecified number of Russian peacekeepers will remain.

Moscow is furious at Georgia's attempt to join NATO. The Western military alliance is divided over how fast to accept Georgia, but has indicated that membership is a matter of when, not if.

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, in an interview with weekly Welt am Sonntag, warned on Sunday against any "knee-jerk" reaction in relations with Russia, such as suspending EU cooperation talks.



 
daftandbarmy said:
Russia considering nukes for Syria, and other stable bastions of liberal democracy (not)  :(

Dig deep and keep the canned food handy....

http://www.debka.com/headline_print.php?hid=5513

I think you're jumping the gun here. If you read the Debka report you will see that they describe the Iskander as being "nuclear-capable."
That doesn't mean that the Russians would actually sell the Syrians nuclear warheads. Lets face it, not even Putin is that stupid.


 
Perhaps the formulation "New Europe" might better fit an alliance or economic cooperative effort by the former East Bloc nations, separate from and independent of NATO, the EU, WEU or what ever other sorts of formulations that "Old Europe" comes up with.

From a historical point of view, this isn't exactly the best solution (there was a series of "small wars" in that part of Europe between WWI and WWII as various Eastern European nations grabbed "historic" territories and peoples from each other, and this continued into the Second World War, with the nations allied with the Germans or Soviets depending on the tides of war and what territorial concessions they could grab), but all the nations in the region now face a renewed "Existential threat" for at least another generation. Standing together provides mutual support, and their semi democratic and free market societies, if allowed and encouraged to evolve towards true Liberal Democracies will provide the economic muscle to counterbalance both Russia and the EU.

And a roundup on Instapundit Aug 17 2008:

http://pajamasmedia.com/instapundit/

WHAT HATH PUTIN WROUGHT? Germany Offers Support for Georgia's NATO Bid:

German Chancellor Angela Merkel is offering strong support for Georgia, saying the country is on track to become a member of NATO. Merkel flew to the Georgian capital of Tbilisi on Sunday, two days after she met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in the Black Sea resort of Sochi.

Plus this: Ukraine to join in US-led missile shield in Europe:

Ukraine has agreed to take part in a missile defence system designed by the United States to protect Western countries. The government in Kiev defended its decision for military co-operation with the West, saying Russia cancelled a bilateral treaty with Ukraine earlier this year.

A few days ago, Poland and the United States reached agreement on the siting of missiles on Polish territory. These, together with radar installations in the Czech republic, make up the missile shield. Russia is fiercely opposed to the defence system and has threatened retaliatory measures.

It seems that Putin's bullying is having precisely the opposite effect he intended.

UPDATE: Making Putin Pay. "In the past 48 hours, the West has begun to push back. If its leaders stay the course, they may yet turn Mr. Putin's meager military success into a significant political defeat."

ANOTHER UPDATE: Randall Parker offers an innovative suggestion: "17% of the people in Ukraine are Russians. So that's about 7.8 million people who could be offered financial incentives to move over the border into Russia. A lot of people. But NATO could offer money as a much cheaper way than weapons to make Ukraine a more secure place. . . . The Baltic states ought to consider buying out their Russian citizens. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could avoid future trouble by paying Russians hefty sums of money to leave. Russia has massive open spaces. The influx would not create a strain since Russia is shrinking by 400,000 people per year." I don't think this'll do the trick -- and would you take that deal? I wouldn't. Of course, that would make a point of sorts, too.

MORE: Kevin Drum thinks that Putin blew it:

My take, roughly, is that Putin screwed up. The West was never going to actively approve of the Russian invasion, but if Putin had limited himself to a short, sharp clash in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it would have been an almost unalloyed victory. The murky status of the provinces combined with the fact that Saakashvili sent in troops first would have kept Western reaction to a minimum, and Russia's message would still have been sent loud and clear: don't mess with us in our sphere of influence.

But then Putin got greedy — or just made a mistake — and sent Russian troops into Georgia proper. This was almost certainly militarily unnecessary, and it succeeded mainly in uniting virtually everyone in outrage against Russian aggression. Putin can pretend all he wants that he doesn't care about Western opinion, but he obviously does — and what's more, Western unity makes a difference in concrete terms too. Poland's quick turnaround on missile defense is probably just the first example of this. The U.S. has gotten lots of bad reviews for its handling of the situation, but in the end, the countries on Russia's border are more firmly in our camp now than they were even before the war.

Even militarily, Putin's overreach might have been a mistake. Sure, the Russian Army is in better condition than it was ten years ago, but it's clear now that its performance in Georgia was still only so-so, despite the fact that Georgia is a minuscule country and the Russians have had this operation planned and ready to go at a moments notice for weeks (maybe months). In the end, Russia is still basically Mexico with nukes, and their ability to project power even along their own borders is limited.

I certainly hope he's right.

 
In regards to the redeployment - if so - has anyone tracked the troop buildup, if indeed this wasn't done with regular numbers of units on the Russian Military bases in the area. Eg. Did it happen when Turkey mobilized 200,000 personnel against the Kurds, or another time?

Was this information not supplied? Does NATO not track Russian forces by spy satalite or other means - and is there a reason why they would not alert western leaders - who were taken by suprise when the event happend.

Why so now then does the media let on that Russia preplanned the incursion? Where is the evidence of a buildup? Where else would Russia position its military, other than Eastern Europe are there any other non Russian supporting nations on the Russians frontier?
 
For oligarch, the saint Russian army and their allies

http://www.hrw.org/photos/2008/georgia0808/
 
Anyone wanna take a long shot bet that instead of a withdrawl the capital will be taken?


what do you think the odds are 1:100,000 1:1,000,000?



 
army08 said:
Anyone wanna take a long shot bet that instead of a withdrawl the capital will be taken?


what do you think the odds are 1:100,000 1:1,000,000?
Russia will not take the capital.  They will raze Georgian military infrastructure on the way back (as they've been doing), but they won't go take Tiblisi
 
army08 said:
Seems like they've started the pullback.
¸
... smashing everything along the way that could be of use to Georgian authorities
 
The Russians have, IMHO, been quite effective in this little foray of theirs.  They handed Georgia a humiliating defeat.  They've boosted the confidence of volksRussians outside their borders, and the message to Georgia (and others) is "Don't do it again!"  And the Georgians won't be able to.
 
geo said:
¸
... smashing everything along the way that could be of use to Georgian authorities

Which is pretty much what they did in 1990-91.  Whatever they couldn't take they burned or blew up. The Georgians hadn't yet finished repairing that so this will add insult to injury.
 
The Russians have, IMHO, been quite effective in this little foray of theirs.  They handed Georgia a humiliating defeat.  They've boosted the confidence of volksRussians outside their borders, and the message to Georgia (and others) is "Don't do it again!"  And the Georgians won't be able to.

I fully agree.  The Russians fight mean for a reason.  I think they have also shown that the don't care about the hyper-power or what is has to say.  This increases their global street cred.  It has also increased the self-confidence of Russians after a series of defeats on Iraq and Kosovo.  The Russians have, IMHO, seriously hurt U.S energy interests in the Caucus and has largely shown the U.S to being unable to support its allies in a way meaningful to the violence of action.  Despite U.S training, the Georgian military was in a constant state of retreat.  Maybe an actual Air force might help Georgia?  It makes countries not only in Caucus, but all over Eastern Europe ponder their realpolitk.  It will cause them to think that while  the U.S makes for a good commercial ally, as a military ally not so much.  They will be wary of the Russian bear.
 
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