Infantry of Tomorrow

[daftandbarmy]

That was more than an academic question in the early 1960s when Canada bought the SS11 and there was a tug-of-war as between the infantry, armour and artillery as to who was the most appropriate organization to handle them. Eventually 3 R22R was designated and equipped as an anti-tank battalion with one of it's companies attached to 4 CIBG/4 CMGB in Germany.

Personally, I do not know why that decision was made, but quite frankly once something is a "brigade" asset rather than part of an infantry battalion then which corps it belongs to is a political PY game rather than something built on clear doctrinal principles. While 2 and 6 pdrs may have been part of infantry battalions, the 17 pdr wasn't. It was originally issued to RA and RCA anti-tank regiments. It was heavier and needed a gun tractor, BUT it was nonetheless, post war issued to Brit infantry battalions when austerity measures caused the dissolution of artillery anti-tank regiments.

If you are looking for a sound principle as to why support weapons that are too heavy to be man packed go (even in these days of heavy motorization of the infantry) to any particular branch then I think you are not only going to be frustrated in finding a sound doctrinal principle, but you are also off on a fools errand. The answer isn't as simple as how can it be moved but tied into many more complex questions, not the least of which is what capabilities are you prepared to give up in exchange for they PYs needed to properly run the new systems and how will you train and career manage the new operators. The infantry did not loose its mortars, anti-armour, pioneers etc because of some new tactics or doctrine but because of PY losses that made them choose between rifle companies and CS platoons. The pseudo-doctrine that sprang up subsequently was basically a coping mechanism.

Thanks to technological advances weapons like Javelin are clearly an Infantry, or anyone else, thing so make these 'grouping' arguments about as obsolete as the S11 .

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks to technological advances weapons like Javelin are clearly an Infantry, or anyone else, thing so make these 'grouping' arguments about as obsolete as the S11 .

That doesn't, in my opinion, prevent the addition of a group to add a capability important to the survival of the battalion. The principle is well established.

Leather guns, grasshoppers and gallopers.

Infantry support gun - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

There were other opinions.

General Augustin Lespinasse on battalion guns: "If you want to prevent your troops from manouevering, embarrass them with guns ... A line of infantry supported by good, properly established batteries retains its order of battle better"

 

[daftandbarmy]

That doesn't, in my opinion, prevent the addition of a group to add a capability important to the survival of the battalion. The principle is well established.

Leather guns, grasshoppers and gallopers.

Infantry support gun - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

There were other opinions.

If only we still 'lined up' in battle

 

[Kirkhill]

If only we still 'lined up' in battle

I guess it depends how thick your crayon is.

Forward Line Own Troops
Forward Edge of Battle Area

 

[KevinB]

I guess it depends how thick your crayon is.

Forward Line Own Troops
Forward Edge of Battle Area

You tend to gloss over sustainment and employment.

On top of appearing that you have stock in 70mm rockets, those and some of your other suggestions for Infantry weapons need controls baked into their usage beyond what an Inf BN happens to have.

Now I do think some of this needs a deeper looks, mainly as I think the CA employment model may artificially truncate certain things.

Mainly in terms of CUAS and AD. As there is a need for both CUAS and Anti-Air/Air Defense at lower level formations.

More to follow.

 

[FJAG]

Thanks to technological advances weapons like Javelin are clearly an Infantry, or anyone else, thing so make these 'grouping' arguments about as obsolete as the S11 .

I actually wonder about how we deploy some of these systems these days - not just in Canada but generally.

Just as an example, in my M109 battery we had not only the six guns but a mass of machine guns. Every track had either a GPMG (i.e. Browning 7.62) or a .50 and on the gun line we had 18 tracks; so 18 machine guns for roughly 80 people. On top of that we had 4 Carl G's and would also be issued M72s. We live-fired all that stuff every year. I presume other not-quite-at-the-front agencies also had Carl G's.

So the question is: how far back are we deploying the new Carl Gs and any such thing as Javelin or VLLAD/anti-drone tools or are we just concentrating on the infantry battalions (and maybe recce)? It's both a procurement issue and a training issue that needs resolving. My gut feeling is that with dispersed operations - especially now with shoot and scoot arty tactics once again the norm - local defence equipment, at least on the scale of my 1980s battery, are needed. Add to that that their operation and ammo and other logistics/maintenance supplies means people are needed over and above the notional 2 or 3 that move and fire the gun itself.

 

[ArmyRick]

Very concerned about Reg F infantry skills fade (from what I read).

Can someone who is in a battalion now, tell me what a battalion's routine daily-weekly and periodically may typically look like between deployments and pre-training?

As a former WO, both reg and P Res, and 3 tours deployed, I can offer my outdated insights. And ask more questions.

However, maybe @OldSolduer can confirm, it seems like the Canadian army makes similar mistakes over and over again every 10-20 years.

I will do my best, but its a busy last grazing season on the farm before we sell. And also getting my resume ready to be @KevinB golf caddy

 

[Kirkhill]

You were advocating Stinger ManPads by the infantry. Those are 70mm missiles with an 8 km range. That is roughly the range of your battalion 120 mm mortars. 81 mm mortars have a 5 km range or the range of the latest Javelins and TOWs. Drones are moving the range band well beyond the 10 km mark.

Heavy Weapons Platoons with 50s, Mk19s and TOWS have relied on jeeps and HMMWVS for over 80 years.

I propose nothing that isn't within conventional practice.

Infantry has even had radar since the 1980s at least.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I actually wonder about how we deploy some of these systems these days - not just in Canada but generally.

Just as an example, in my M109 battery we had not only the six guns but a mass of machine guns. Every track had either a GPMG (i.e. Browning 7.62) or a .50 and on the gun line we had 18 tracks; so 18 machine guns for roughly 80 people. On top of that we had 4 Carl G's and would also be issued M72s. We live-fired all that stuff every year. I presume other not-quite-at-the-front agencies also had Carl G's.

So the question is: how far back are we deploying the new Carl Gs and any such thing as Javelin or VLLAD/anti-drone tools or are we just concentrating on the infantry battalions (and maybe recce)? It's both a procurement issue and a training issue that needs resolving. My gut feeling is that with dispersed operations - especially now with shoot and scoot arty tactics once again the norm - local defence equipment, at least on the scale of my 1980s battery, are needed. Add to that that their operation and ammo and other logistics/maintenance supplies means people are needed over and above the notional 2 or 3 that move and fire the gun itself.

I don't know what Svc Bns have as entitlements for weapons, but I know I had to qualify on the Carl G, M72, C6 and C9 both times I was with NSE.

Not to mention C7, 9mm and Grenade,

 

[FJAG]

However, maybe @OldSolduer can confirm, it seems like the Canadian army makes similar mistakes over and over again every 10-20 years.

Welcome to my world. One thing about getting old is that you see the same cycles repeated over and over again as the young folks continuously reinvent the wheel.

 

[ArmyRick]

Welcome to my world. One thing about getting old is that you see the same cycles repeated over and over again as the young folks continuously reinvent the wheel.

I wonder how much the GWOT influenced things. I remember in the 00s hearing these things being said as if though they were holy scripture
-We will never fight a conventional nation on nation war again
-This warfare (counter insurgency) is the way of things for the future
-Whats the point of grid square smashing with an artillery regiment? This was an arty LT COL that said it.
-The Cold war is over and we will not fight a war like that in the future

On and on. Yet, I look at whats happening, and yes things have changed (The biggest I see is EW, comms and drones) but all in all, it hasn't really.

 

[FJAG]

I wonder how much the GWOT influenced things. I remember in the 00s hearing these things being said as if though they were holy scripture
-We will never fight a conventional nation on nation war again
-This warfare (counter insurgency) is the way of things for the future
-Whats the point of grid square smashing with an artillery regiment? This was an arty LT COL that said it.
-The Cold war is over and we will not fight a war like that in the future

On and on. Yet, I look at whats happening, and yes things have changed (The biggest I see is EW, comms and drones) but all in all, it hasn't really.

My research puts those issues somewhat earlier in time and basically coming out of the fragmentation of Yugoslavia and the subsequent "failed state" operations in Bosnia, etc. That was also augmented by the air campaigns in Gulf War 1 and over Yugoslavia that convinced people that precision munitions dropped by aircraft was negating any need for mass fire artillery.

All of the concepts that you mention were already in play by the time that 9/11 happened. Canada was well on its way to building a medium weight LAV army and was on its way to divest its heavy tracked equipment. While the US didn't eliminate their heavy armour, they did convert from divisions to brigade combat teams and were introducing the Stryker medium weight vehicles to form Interim Brigade Combat Teams later renamed as Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.

The GWOT convinced many military leaders that they were on the right track with their transformation projects. Crimea in 2014 should have convinced them that they were mostly wrong but the message didn't really take hold with any sense of urgency until 2022's invasion of Ukraine.

 

[RangerRay]

My research puts those issues somewhat earlier in time and basically coming out of the fragmentation of Yugoslavia and the subsequent "failed state" operations in Bosnia, etc. That was also augmented by the air campaigns in Gulf War 1 and over Yugoslavia that convinced people that precision munitions dropped by aircraft was negating any need for mass fire artillery.

All of the concepts that you mention were already in play by the time that 9/11 happened. Canada was well on its way to building a medium weight LAV army and was on its way to divest its heavy tracked equipment. While the US didn't eliminate their heavy armour, they did convert from divisions to brigade combat teams and were introducing the Stryker medium weight vehicles to form Interim Brigade Combat Teams later renamed as Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.

The GWOT convinced many military leaders that they were on the right track with their transformation projects. Crimea in 2014 should have convinced them that they were mostly wrong but the message didn't really take hold with any sense of urgency until 2022's invasion of Ukraine.

I would suggest the Armenia-Azerbaijan War in 2020 should have woken those up who slept through Georgia and Crimea. I remember thinking then “Wow. We need to up our arty, drones and EW game”.

 

[KevinB]

You were advocating Stinger ManPads by the infantry.

As controlled by an ADAM cell at Bde ( that is controlled by the ADA Bde in Division.)

Those are 70mm missiles with an 8 km range. That is roughly the range of your battalion 120 mm mortars. 81 mm mortars have a 5 km range or the range of the latest Javelins and TOWs. Drones are moving the range band well beyond the 10 km mark.

The issue isn’t solely the range/distance, or the payload.

Mortars are called in on a target by the MFC/FOO parties.

While an indirect fire activity it has a definite target location on the ground.

ATGM’s also have a direct target on the ground (even though it may be a moving target).


When you start getting into CAUS and AD offerings, that is when one needs to look deeply at the span of control and the potential area(s) of affect.

Launching a Stinger active IR seeking missile they has a lock on a helicopter or low flying aircraft isn’t the same as launching a bunch of 70mm

CUAS systems need to have some very deliberate controls onto them, as the 70mm rocket is horribly inaccurate, and even with the BAE APKWS it is still just a guidance kit that needs to be aimed at a target.

Ripple firing 70mm rockets at UAS can be effective, but once a target is destroyed - further rockets from that launch are going where they go… and each individual target must be laser designated.

Given they are being fired at generally a moving target in the air, there is now defined impact area like the Direct Fire HMG’s, GMG’s or even the Mortars or ATGMs.

Heavy Weapons Platoons with 50s, Mk19s and TOWS have relied on jeeps and HMMWVS for over 80 years.

You missed the point. — the you are thinking about direct logistics, not infrastructure and control.

I propose nothing that isn't within conventional practice.

Infantry has even had radar since the 1980s at least.

Ground radar that was moderately useful on an OP to monitor some areas as long as it had a direct LOS to the area (and generally Gen2 Image Intensifier Night Vision Systems had similar range).

 

[Kirkhill]

My research puts those issues somewhat earlier in time and basically coming out of the fragmentation of Yugoslavia and the subsequent "failed state" operations in Bosnia, etc. That was also augmented by the air campaigns in Gulf War 1 and over Yugoslavia that convinced people that precision munitions dropped by aircraft was negating any need for mass fire artillery.

All of the concepts that you mention were already in play by the time that 9/11 happened. Canada was well on its way to building a medium weight LAV army and was on its way to divest its heavy tracked equipment. While the US didn't eliminate their heavy armour, they did convert from divisions to brigade combat teams and were introducing the Stryker medium weight vehicles to form Interim Brigade Combat Teams later renamed as Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.

The GWOT convinced many military leaders that they were on the right track with their transformation projects. Crimea in 2014 should have convinced them that they were mostly wrong but the message didn't really take hold with any sense of urgency until 2022's invasion of Ukraine.

A point about the Strykers -

In 2003 Daniel Bolger published "Death Ground: Today's American Infantry in Battle". The central thesis, as I understood it, was that there wasn't enough infantry. The problem was particularly acute in the Bradley battalions. So much manpower was eaten up serving the beasts, and there was so little room in the back that the typical battalion could only dismount a company if pushed. In some instances battalions were so short of manpower when they showed up at the training centers that they were down to 2 or 3 dismounts per Bradley.

The remainder of the infantry was either highly specialized (airborne, air assault, rangers etc) or didn't have the means to keep up with the mechanized forces.

Shinsecki's Strykers were being touted as the means for moving full 9 man sections of conventional infantry under protection so that they could stay a bound behind the mech troops. Effectively the ask was for a BTR work with the BMPs.

It was protected transport for "infantry".

Bradley infantry (and for that matter Marder, Warrior and CV90 infantry) had to adapt themselves to the vehicle.
The Stryker was supposed to be a vehicle that could transport any standard/leg/regular/line infantry battalion without interfering with its organization.

The Stryker was not an IFV.

...

Canada's infantry ended up looking more like a USMC Light Armored Recon Battalion but without the rest of the MAGTF behind it.

 

[Kirkhill]

As controlled by an ADAM cell at Bde ( that is controlled by the ADA Bde in Division.)

I kind of feel that you are hedging your position on that one. If the infantry has weapons to counter the threats it is encountering but isn't allowed to use them why would it waste rations humping the kit forwards? If the troops are being buzzed they will attempt to counter the buzzer by any means available to them. Stinger, M2 or GPMG.

The issue isn’t solely the range/distance, or the payload.

Mortars are called in on a target by the MFC/FOO parties.

While an indirect fire activity it has a definite target location on the ground.

ATGM’s also have a direct target on the ground (even though it may be a moving target).

Stipulate all of the above.
In all cases procedures were devised to manage the fires, up to and including establishing Fire Support Co-Ordination Centers within the infantry mortar platoons to which arty types could attach themselves.

When you start getting into CAUS and AD offerings, that is when one needs to look deeply at the span of control and the potential area(s) of affect.

Agreed

Launching a Stinger active IR seeking missile they has a lock on a helicopter or low flying aircraft isn’t the same as launching a bunch of 70mm

CUAS systems need to have some very deliberate controls onto them, as the 70mm rocket is horribly inaccurate, and even with the BAE APKWS it is still just a guidance kit that needs to be aimed at a target.

Ripple firing 70mm rockets at UAS can be effective, but once a target is destroyed - further rockets from that launch are going where they go… and each individual target must be laser designated.

Given they are being fired at generally a moving target in the air, there is now defined impact area like the Direct Fire HMG’s, GMG’s or even the Mortars or ATGMs.

First off

70 mm

I used the 70 mm reference with respect to the Stinger because it is related to the 70 mm APKWS employed by the VAMPIRE system. They have similar flight characteristics and ranges. As you note the APKWS requires manual guidance to the target. This is true of a lot of the ManPADS found to be effective in Ukraine (Martlet, RBS70, Starstreak). The Stinger, like the Mistral and Piorun are supposed to be fire and forget missiles.

In the CUAS role the APKWS 70 is being upgraded with a proximity fuse.

FUZE for APKWS – Press Release - TSC

In collaboration with L3-Harris Technologies, TSC is pleased to introduced our new proximity sensor to support the Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) mission. (Image Courtesy of BAE Systems)

tsc.com

We're getting into horseshoes and hand-grenades territory here now.

Ripple firing against UAS may be possible but, as you are suggesting, messy.

....

On the other hand, that same launcher could be used to launch 70mm rockets with APKWS against fixed or mobile ground targets after the fashion of any other ATGM, or it could be used to launch the rockets without the APKWS on a ballistic curve against an area target. In the latter case all the skills of the FSCC would indeed be called on.

But the battalion has one of those doesn't it? Complete with Forward Observers and Fire Controllers.

You missed the point. — the you are thinking about direct logistics, not infrastructure and control.

I may have missed the point on logistics, infrastructure and control. My focus is on delivering the effects necessary to protect the troops on the dispersed battlefield. And as @FJAG noted, it is not only the infantry that are going to be covering large areas with little in the way of mutual support.

Ground radar that was moderately useful on an OP to monitor some areas as long as it had a direct LOS to the area (and generally Gen2 Image Intensifier Night Vision Systems had similar range).

The issue about the radar is that it is an emitter. Wandering around with red filters on flash lights and then light up a radar may have been counter-productive.

 

[FJAG]

Shinsecki's Strykers were being touted as the means for moving full 9 man sections of conventional infantry under protection so that they could stay a bound behind the mech troops. Effectively the ask was for a BTR work with the BMPs.

That's bang on.

It's important to remember that the Stryker M1126 infantry carrier vehicle (ICV), when rolled out, did not have a turret. The basic Stryker ICV had a remote weapon station that carried either a .50 or 7.62 machine gun or a 40mm grenade launcher. In consequence the vehicle's crew was only 2 rather than 3. Further, without a turret cluttering up the interior there was more room for the full nine man squad as dismounts. Finally, without a heavy weapon like the 25mm, there was less temptation to use it like an IFV rather than as the ICV it was designed to be.

In 2017 the M1296 Dragoon came out with its 30mm unmanned remote turret. Interestingly it is still designated an ICV, ICVD in fact, with a crew of 2 and 9 dismounts. There are some places where it is erroneously referred to as being in the class of an IFV. That said, it did not enter into general service in SBCTs, but was limited to one cavalry regiment.