Infantry Vehicles

[Fabius]

I guess I am trying to see the "so what?" Doctrine is an agreed-upon set of fundamental principles on how we will fight. Our BG-level doctrine is sound, and we can execute it. Our CMBG-level doctrine is also sound, and it applies in what we are leading overseas (with variations, of course, for the local situation).

I do not see a need to adjust doctrine based on numbers of tanks? Why do you see that? If we had no tanks at all and no scope for allied tanks then we'd need to look at out combat team and battle group doctrine.

We have six LAV battalions that will be cycling through Latvia. This means that each Battalion will deploy once every three years. This includes the Battalion HQ. combat support company and the combat support company. If we surged another LAV Company Canada could field a rather doctrinal Mech Battle Group on its own.

I suspect the difference between you and @GR66 is that he is looking at the Canadian Army as an army at war with all of its units and formations, whereas you are looking at it in terms of a peacetime rotational deployment.

The CA has three tank squadrons and 18 infantry companies. If those infantry companies go to war anytime in the next 5 years as part of Canadian Army formations chances of them being in a square combat team or even a Sqn(-) or half Sqn will be slight.

Our tactical doctrine at the Cbt Tn and BG levels is sound but due to resources it starts collapsing at Bde and has utterly collapsed as a doctrine for how the Canadian Army will fight as an Army at War. Again simply due to resources and structure.

The whole MRP idea of a Bn deploying every three years should also be heavily caveated. The Infantry is right now using personnel from two Bns for almost every Roto to find enough able bodies. The sqns are going to be worse likely, deploying once every 18 months.

 

[Fabius]

If I was suddenly given a bunch of public funds to spend I would likely just buy 100 more LAV 6 and place a BG worth at JMRC Hohenfels for Level 5/6 training and as a surge BG.

The problem with the entire idea of exporting the Canadian Army’s collective training to Europe for L5 and L6 is that we would be further atrophying our ability to mobilize and train the rest of our army inside fortress North America and then deploy them.
As a surge BG that equipment set would be completely disconnected from the rest of the Canadian Army in Latvia.

 

[FJAG]

The whole MRP idea of a Bn deploying every three years should also be heavily caveated. The Infantry is right now using personnel from two Bns for almost every Roto to find enough able bodies. The sqns are going to be worse likely, deploying once every 18 months.

I'm 100% with you on this. It's a habit we picked up in Afghanistan. I'll trump your two battalions scenario with TF 3-07 which was headed by the RHQ of 3 R22eR. The TF's A Coy was formed by A Coy 1 R22eR; B Coy was formed by 2 R22eR's A Coy and C Coy was formed by 3 R22eR's A Coy.

When we look at the current Latvia eFP we have 9 bns with 27 rifle coys (assuming they are reasonably staffed) to draw on to fill a bn HQ, a rifle coy and parts of a CS coy. The artillery only has six 4-gun batteries to draw on to fill a 6-gun battery and the armoured really only has one tank regiment with three sabre sqns to field a 15-tank squadron. Obviously everyone is robbing Peter to pay Paul. This makes for a poor business model but is pretty much what the designers of the system were aiming for at the turn of the century when battle group-sized task forces were designed to be formed from a variety of coy-sized building blocks and JIMP-capable brigades from building block task forces.

Financial pressures and over-tasking were the driving forces behind this transformation. You've probably read the article in the CAJ a few years ago that discusses some of these issues and argues for an asynchronous army and revised MRP. The MRP has already been revised somewhat but asynchronicity, as proposed, still escapes the army. There is a long way to go, however, and there continues to be disagreement as to the right, or even the best, way forward.

The artillery has for quite some time relied heavily on reservists to fill roto positions. It continues to do so now that the deployment has become heavier but support for reserve force integration and training varies widely across the RegF and ARes brigades.